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I. Executive summary 
 
The report first examines optimal financial penalties from an economic perspective and the 
emphasis it puts on deterrence. We also examine the limits to the optimal enforcement theory 
employed by economists to design effective sanctions, in particular the principle of 
proportionality and the need for the penalty to be related to the harm caused and the wrong 
committed, as the legal system should also integrate corrective justice concerns. The first part 
of the report also examines the tension between over-enforcement and under-enforcement 
and that between a more effects-based approach that would rely on economic methodologies 
and a case by case analysis to provide an accurate estimate of the harm caused by the 
anticompetitive conduct and the use of proxies of percentages of the volume of commerce or 
the affected sales, which reduce the administrative costs of the authorities in designing 
appropriate sanctions.  
 
An approach that would emphasize corrective justice and the principle of proportionality may 
insist in setting the fine at a level corresponding to the harm caused by the anticompetitive 
conduct, including the need to take into account general and specific deterrence purposes 
relating to the specific conduct undertaken by the parties. Hence, in view of the objective of 
deterrence, one may not expect an exact correlation between the harm and the penalty. Such 
an effects-based approach to fine setting will not rely, in general, on presumptions and 
proxies based on affected sales or volumes of commerce. According to economic theory, 
fines should be at least equal to the expected illegally earned profits divided by the 
probability to be caught, hence they should relate to expected profits originating from the 
violation and not to the profits actually gained that may be higher or lower than those 
expected at decision-making time, should the fines be paid after the period of infringement. 
 
However, expected profits are not observable and cannot be computed in each individual 
case. A full-effects based approach may be unattainable in practice in view of the great 
diversity of market configurations. At most, competition authorities may estimate the actual 
extra profits generated by the cartel if they possess the relevant information or the damages 
caused by it (second best effects-based approach). A more formalistic approach, relying on 
presumptions or proxies, such as a percentage of the affected sales or volumes of commerce, 
could at first sight appear to be incompatible with the principle of proportionality and 
corrective justice which, in an extreme formulation, would require a case-by-case 
quantification of expected gains. That said, one should take into account the costs of 
computing/estimating the expected or actual profits of an anticompetitive practice, or the 
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damage caused by it. These costs may reduce the administrability of more effects-based 
approaches in setting financial penalties, in particular for fines of modest amount. High 
administrability costs may render the burden to the prosecutor, and indirectly to the tax payer, 
disproportional, in comparison to the level of fines requested. Hence, recourse to some 
presumptions or proxies (and inevitably some degree of formalism) that would reduce the 
costs of estimating the fines may be necessary in instances where these administrative costs 
would cover an important part of the amount of the fine imposed. It may make sense to use 
these methods, if expensive or time consuming, only for fines of a significant amount. Where 
competition authorities are to estimate actual profits or harm caused, the authority should be 
granted a wide margin of discretion to take account of the unavoidable uncertainty in 
determining the counterfactual development that would have resulted in the absence of the 
infringement. Given that it is the infringer that alters the course of events, it should be the 
infringer that bears the burden of the uncertainty about the counterfactual development 
created by its actions. 
 
An intermediary approach will use a measure of expected profits as the starting point for the 
analysis. Some authors have put forward a structured effects-based approach, suggesting as 
the starting point for setting the fine a range of the percentage of the value of sales to which 
the infringement relates, on the basis of some prior analysis of the profitability condition 
derivable from the perspective of an infringer of competition law. This would look to factors 
such as the value of the Lerner index, the likely detection rate of the infringement, and other 
economic parameters influencing gravity of the infringement (more on this intermediary 
approach at Section II (I). 
 
The next section of the report examines the thorny issue of the harm caused by one of the 
most egregious anticompetitive practices, cartels, and the methods that have been put forward 
by economists and employed in various legal systems to estimate that harm. 
 
The report then examines the current legal framework in Chile before making 
recommendations for reform. 
 
The suggestions put forward by the report rely on a detailed comparative analysis of the 
approach followed by five major jurisdictions, in terms of the size of their economy and their 
influence in the diffusion of competition law around the world: the European Union, the 
United States, Germany, the United Kingdom and France. We examine the historical 
background and current controversies of each of these different systems, before proceeding to 
a comparative analysis of their position with regard to the main aspects usually covered by 
Guidelines on setting financial penalties for infringements of competition law.  
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In the related complementary report Judicial Scrutiny of Financial Penalties in Competition 
Law: A Comparative Perspective, we examine the role of the different actors in the fine-
setting process, in particular the judiciary, in order to examine how the publication of 
guidelines on setting fines may affect their interaction. We focus on the judicial scrutiny 
exercised over the decisions imposing a fine and its estimate by competition authorities or 
sentencing judges (in the case of prosecutorial systems, such as the US and Chile). We 
conclude that publishing sentencing guidelines will enable FNE to send a strong message to 
potential cartelists and other competition law infringers that anti-competitive conduct will not 
be tolerated and might give rise to substantial financial penalties. Following the findings of 
the report on the impact of fining guidelines on the policy-making and executing discretion of 
competition authorities, we consider that the publication of such guidelines will not affect the 
ability of FNE to request high financial penalties in actions brought against infringers in front 
of the Competition Tribunal (TDLC). It may also have the advantage of streamlining 
appellate scrutiny of the fines so as to accommodate the prosecutorial discretion of FNE and 
the fact that fines are set by an independent and specialised trial judge with the necessary 
expertise as to integrate optimal deterrence. In our view, the structure of the Chilean 
enforcement system offers advantages as to the individualization of sanctions, so that they are 
reasonably related to culpability and thus proportional.  
 
We agree that effective deterrence depends, in part on the uniformity and predictability of 
serious and swift punishment and we recognize that when drafting sentencing guidelines, a 
compromise should be made between two competing goals of a sentencing system: 
uniformity and proportionality. The publication of guidelines will need to accommodate the 
aim of uniformity and general deterrence, without however compromising the need for 
flexibility and individualized assessment based on the facts of particular cases, inherent in the 
principle of proportionality. This aim can be achieved in the context of Guidelines, in view of 
the numerous parameters individualizing the sanction (linking it to the harm/overcharge) and 
the need to account for specific deterrence.  
 
The publication of guidelines will certainly not bind the TDLC, although it will certainly 
inform its decision-making process, as the experience of the Sentencing Guidelines in the US 
shows with trial judges employing the Sentencing Guidelines as an initial benchmark, even if 
these are not mandatory. The publication of guidelines will also help put emphasis on the 
goal of deterrence and the need for optimal sanctions against anticompetitive conduct, in 
particular in view of the judicial scrutiny of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court should, 
in our view, accommodate the need for both general and specific deterrence, in view of the 
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nefarious effects of cartel activity and, more generally anticompetitive conduct, to the whole 
economy and the consumers. 
 
We conclude that the design of the sentencing guidelines should include the following three 
steps: 
 
1. Determination of the basic amount of the fine: 
 
a. The FNE should be offered the choice between three options, among which it 
may choose the one leading to the greatest financial penalty: 
 
I. Estimate1 the excess illegal gains from the offense2 (that is 100% of the 
overcharge), or  
II. Estimate3 the pecuniary losses to persons other than the defendant 
(100% of these losses) to the extent the loss was caused intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly, or  
III. If the above options would unduly complicate or prolong the 
sentencing process, or would not reflect the harm caused by the 
anticompetitive conduct if this harm may not be quantified in the form 
of pecuniary losses, use a proxy based on a percentage of affected sales 
                                                     
1
 An approximate calculation should suffice, allowing to make a reasonable estimate of the probable amount. 
In contrast to damages cases or restitution claims, the deterrent and punitive function of damages may 
accord with a less precise calculation, as long as this is not speculation or guesswork, the defendant having 
being found to infringe competition law. Hence, she should bear the risks of any doubt on the exact 
amount of gains. 
2
 This refers to the total gross gain from the anticompetitive conduct, including the gross gain to the 
defendants and other participants in the anticompetitive conduct. Some authors have put forward a 
structured effects-based approach involving the estimation of expected profits from the anticompetitive 
conduct, on the basis of some percentage range of the values of sales to which the infringement relates 
[see, Heimler, A. and Mehta, K.  (2012) “Violations of Antitrust Provisions: The Optimal Level of Fines for 
Achieving Deterrence”, World Competition 35 (1), 103–119]. This will require competition authorities to 
take into account the value of the Lerner index, or the change in the value of the Lerner index or the 
probability of detection  as a starting point for such calculation, the defendant being able to challenge the 
figure put forward by the authority as not being accurate. 
3
 An approximate calculation should suffice, allowing to make a reasonable estimate of the probable amount. 
In contrast to damages cases or restitution claims, the deterrent and punitive function of damages may 
accord with a less precise calculation, as long as this is not speculation or guesswork, the defendant having 
being found to infringe competition law. Hence, she should bear the risks of any doubt on the exact 
amount of losses. 
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or volume of commerce (on the basis of e.g. 10-15% as an overcharge 
estimate: e.g. in the EU the starting point is 30% of affected sales) 
 
b. Apply a multiplier equal to the inverse of the estimated detection probability (e.g. 
6 if the detection probability is estimated as 1/6).
4
 
c. In order to take duration into account, the base fine should be multiplied by the 
number of years of participation in the infringement. 
d. Where the fine so calculated exceeds the statutory maximum of 30,000 [UTA] 
Annual Tax Units, it should be possible to apply a higher fine disgorging the gains 
where the gains actually made can be calculated. 
 
2. Adjustments to the basic amount5 
 
a. Aggravating circumstances (upward adjustment) 
i. Repeat offenders6 
ii. Refusal to cooperate 
iii. Role of leader in the infringement 
 
b. Mitigating circumstances (downward adjustment) 
i. Sufficient cooperation with authority 
ii. Limited involvement in the infringement 
 
c. Application for leniency (downward adjustment or full immunity) 
 
d. Inability to pay – bankruptcy considerations (downward adjustment) 
 
e. Adjustment according to the legal maximum: it is suggested to replace the 
legal maximum of 30,000 [UTA] Annual Tax Units, which might lead to 
under-deterrence with a percentage of the worldwide turnover of the infringing 
undertakings, for instance, a percentage of 10%, as it is the case in the EU, 
UK, Germany and France. It is suggested for this percentage to operate as a 
                                                     
4
 Cf. section II.B of this report. 
5
Adjustments to the basic amount are proposed on the basis of the structure outlined in the current EU 
Guidelines (2006). 
6
The current EU Commission’s practice is to increase a fine by 50% -100% where the undertaking has been 
found to have been previously involved in one or more similar infringements. 
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maximum fine, not a cap (see our discussion of the debate in Germany). 
However, it is suggested that a better way forward would be remove the 
statutory maximum, or as a second best, render it operational only if the FNE 
makes use of proxies, such as 30% of the affected sales, in order to define the 
base fine, instead of estimating the excess illegal gains. Hence, the FNE 
should be free to request fines that are higher than the statutory maximum of 
30,000 UTA, and for the TDLC to award them, if the FNE opts instead to put 
forward an estimation of the excess illegal gains (as is the case in Germany). 
 
3. Additional issues 
 
a. Public antitrust enforcement should be accompanied by the possibility of 
private actions for damages.  
b. Corporate fines should be combined with individual fines as well as 
imprisonment. 
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II. The Challenge of an Optimal Competition law Enforcement: Designing Appropriate 
Sanctions and Incentives 
 
A. The function of competition law enforcement 
 
Law enforcement pursues various objectives: compensation, restitution, punishment and 
prophylaxis (prevention). Competition law is not an exception. Its principal aim is to restore 
competition in the market. However, this objective may be conceived broadly as including 
first the ‘micro’ goals of putting the specific infringement to an end, compensating the 
victims,
7
 and curing the particular problem as to competition, but also the ‘macro’ goal of 
putting incentives in place ‘so as to minimize the recurrence of just such anticompetitive 
conduct’ (preventive remedies or deterrence). Different remedial tools and sanctions may 
perform these various overlapping functions
8
. 
 
Looking more specifically to these ‘micro-goals’, remedies seek generally to restore the 
plaintiff’s rightful position, that is, the position that the plaintiff would have occupied if the 
defendant had never violated the law or to restore the defendants to the defendant’s rightful 
position, that is, the position that the defendant would have occupied absent the violation. 
Following the imposition of a remedy, the infringer will be asked to commit negative acts (a 
requirement not to act in a certain way) and/or positive acts (a requirement to act in a certain 
way). Curing the competition law ‘wrong’ committed or providing recovery may also take 
the form of restitution (which involves gain-based recovery) and/or compensation (which 
involves loss-based recovery). Restitution and compensation may thus be considered as the 
two facets of the ‘curing’ function of the remedial process, as opposed to the punishing and 
prophylactic one. These remedies may be either administrative, in the context of 
administrative law enforcement, or civil law remedies imposed by the courts. Monetary 
penalties, such as fines, may also be conceived of as a substitutionary remedy compensating 
the ‘general public’ for the distortion of the competitive process. The remedy of disgorging 
illegal profits is not available, as such, in most competition law regimes.
9
 As fines are 
                                                     
7
 Taking illegal gains away from the law violators and ‘restore those monies to the victims’ constitutes a 
principal goal of competition law remedies. Pitofsky, R. (2002), “Antitrust at the Turn of the Twenty-First 
Century: The Matter of Remedies”, Georgetown Law Journal 91, 169- 170.  
8
 For a detailed analysis of the remedial function of competition law, see Lianos, I. (2012), “Competition law 
remedies: in search of a theory“, in Lianos, I. and Sokol, D. (Eds.), The Global Limits of Competition Law 
(Stanford University Press) 177-204; Lianos, I. (2013) “Competition law remedies in Europe: Which Limits 
for Remedial Discretion?“, in Lianos, I., & Geradin, D. (Eds.), Handbook in EU Competition Law (Edward 
Elgar: Cheltenham), 362-455. 
9
 Although it remains available in some. See, for instance, in Germany, where the FCO may skim-off economic 
benefits related to the infringement. This is possible both for proceedings concerning administrative fines 
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generally assessed with reference to the value of sales to which the infringement directly or 
indirectly relates in the relevant geographic market in the EU and the degree of gravity of the 
infringement multiplied by the number of years of the infringement, they may also be 
considered as exercising a partial and implicit disgorgement function. One could finally list 
measures that are accessory to the principal curative remedies because they facilitate their 
enforcement, such as interim measures (which aim to ensure interim relief) and periodic 
penalties (in order to compel the infringers to comply with the prohibition and/or the positive 
requirements-injunctions imposed). 
 
The punishment of the competition law infringer is certainly an objective pursued by 
competition law enforcement. Punishment is certainly the main function of fines/penalties 
imposed in various jurisdictions for the infringement of competition law, in view of the 
‘aggravating’ circumstances taken into account in their calculation for recidivists, instigators 
or leaders of competition law infringements and undertakings obstructing investigations in 
most competition law systems, as well as the specific ‘increase for deterrence’ that some 
jurisdictions, such as the Commission may impose to infringers. The explicit 
acknowledgment in the European Commission’s Guidelines on the methods of setting fines 
that it will increase the fine ‘in order to exceed the amount of gains improperly made as a 
result of the infringement where it is possible to estimate that amount’10, or the possibility to 
impose a fine up to twice the pecuniary gain or twice the pecuniary loss attributable to the 
alleged cartel activities (for the entire cartel), including all its members, rather than in relation 
to the specific defendant, according to the US alternative Sentencing Guidelines illustrate the 
point.
11
 In addition, some competition law systems put in place criminal or individual 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(Section 81(4), (5) GWB post-2005 or Section 81(2) GWB pre-2005 with § 17(4) of the Act on 
Administrative Offences (OWiG)) applying to cartels, and for administrative proceedings for non-cartel 
activity (which are dealt with under section 34 GWB). The economic benefits to be disgorged not only 
encompass the net revenue generated because of the infraction, but also (the monetary value of) any 
other benefits such as the improvement of an undertaking’s market position. In the United States, see 
Elhauge, E. (2009) “Disgorgement as an Antitrust Remedy”, Antitrust Law Journal 76, 79-95. 
10
 European Commission, Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2) of 
Regulation No 1/2003, [2006] OJ C 210/2, paras 30–31. See also § 81(5) GWB with § 17(4) of the German 
Act on Administrative Offences (OWiG). 
11
 Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) applied in appropriate cases involving cartel related activity. 
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sanctions
12
. Civil remedies through private enforcement aiming to punish may include 
punitive or exemplary damages
13
.  
 
Competition law enforcement may also have a prophylactic (preventive) aim. It seeks to 
ensure that there remain no practices likely to result in distortions of competition and 
infringements in the future. The preventive function is fulfilled in a different way than for the 
curative and punitive ones, which may also indirectly affect the incentives of market actors to 
act in a specific way in the future. First, preventive competition law enforcement 
remedies/sanctions aim directly at specific or general deterrence. Specific deterrence can be 
defined as the impact of the remedy or penalty on the incentives of those apprehended (the 
infringers) to adopt similar illegal behaviour in the future. General deterrence focuses on the 
public at large. Second, competition law remedies may have a pure prophylactic function. 
Prophylactic remedies can be distinguished from specific deterrence as they affect the ability 
(and not the incentive) of the infringers to commit equivalent anti-competitive practices in the 
future by focusing on specific facilitators of potential infringements. These are not illegal 
practices in themselves, but in the specific circumstances of the case, they may facilitate 
illegal conduct. By prohibiting these practices, the decision- maker’s objective is not to deter 
the potential infringers from adopting such conduct, as this is not illegal, but to reduce their 
ability to commit illegal practices. 
 
Specific deterrence is certainly a difficult venture that requires from the courts an inherently 
uncertain prognostic exercise linked to a counterfactual and some prospective analysis of the 
situation in the market with and without the specific competition law violations. This is 
particularly true in complex and dynamically evolving markets, where static models cannot 
easily predict the various incentives of the different market actors in the future. Specific 
deterrence may be achieved with administrative remedies, such as declaratory relief, positive 
injunctions (forward-looking structural and behavioural remedies aiming not only to cure the 
competition law wrong but also to design the market interactions in such a way that the 
problem does not occur again in the future), civil mandatory injunctions and restitutionary 
                                                     
12
 See, in the UK the cartel offence providing additional deterrence in the form of individual sanctions, criminal 
and civil courts having the power to impose disqualification orders on directors of undertakings and up to 
five years imprisonment. In the US, the use of imprisonment and individual sanctions is extensive. 
13
 In the US, treble damages are in principle available in antitrust cases. In the UK, exemplary damages are in 
theory available for infringements of the competition rules when it is necessary to punish the infringer but 
their award is discretionary and the courts must exercise their discretion with caution: Devenish Nutrition 
Limited and others v Sanofi-Aventis SA and others [2007] EWHC 2394 (Ch)., Albion Water Limited v Dŵr 
Cymru Cyfyngedig [2011] CAT 18, 2 Travel Group PLC (in liquidation) v Cardiff City Transport Services 
Limited [2012] CAT 19. 
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damages. General deterrence may be achieved with a wider array of measures, such as fines, 
restitutionary and punitive damages and harsh (in the sense of imposing an important burden 
to the infringer) mandatory remedies (in particular structural remedies or heavy-handed 
behavioural remedies). The following table summarizes the classification of competition law 
remedies/sanctions according to their function. 
 
Table 1: Functions of competition law enforcement and its tools 
 
Function of 
competition 
law 
enforcement 
and its tools 
Curing Punishing Preventing 
Administrative 
process 
 Termination of 
the infringement 
 Behavioural 
remedies 
 Structural 
remedies 
 Fines (to a 
certain extent) 
 Accessory 
remedies 
 Declaratory 
relief 
 Prohibitory 
injunctions 
 Mandatory 
injunctions  
 Compensatory 
damages 
 Restitutionary 
damages 
 
 Fines 
 Exemplary 
(punitive 
damages) 
 Criminal and 
individual 
sanctions 
SPECIFIC 
DETERRENCE 
 Fines 
 Criminal and 
individual 
sanctions 
 Termination of 
the infringement 
 Forward looking 
structural and 
behavioural 
remedies 
 Mandatory 
injunctions 
 Restitutionary 
damages 
 Exemplary 
(punitive) 
damages 
GENERAL 
DETERRENCE 
 Fines 
 Criminal and 
individual 
sanctions 
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 Structural 
remedies 
 Heavy-handed 
long duration 
behavioural 
remedies 
 Restitutionary 
damages 
 Exemplary 
(punitive) 
damages 
 Harsh 
mandatory 
injunctions 
PROPHYLACTIC 
REMEDIES 
 
It follows that the main purposes of fines/penalties is (i) to punish the competition law 
infringer and (ii) to ensure deterrence. Punishment exercise a retributive function, broadly 
perceived, as it aims to punish the violation of the moral rights of the communities affected 
by the competition law infringement and constitutes a ritual of justice. Yet, competition law 
authorities around the world prefer fines/penalties principally for deterrence purposes. We 
will examine how optimal deterrence may be achieved and how effective one may judge a 
competition law enforcement system is. 
 
B. An effective competition law enforcement system: optimal enforcement theory and 
the aim of deterrence 
 
The assumption which underlies the economic approach to sanction is the same as the 
assumption which underlies the economic model of competition: firms are rational profit 
maximizers and they will engage in an illegal practice if their expected benefits of such 
practices are sufficiently large compared to their expected costs.  
 
Entering a cartel agreement is tempting for firms in an industry because if the cartel is 
successful the increase in profits for the participants may come from two sources. First, the 
participants will be able to increase their price because of the reduced competition; second 
the participants may also enjoy efficiency benefits due to the reduced competition (for 
example if they are able to buy equipment allowing them to have lower costs and that they 
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would not have bought had they not known that they were going get certain shares of the 
market). Therefore the gains from the illicit practice may be larger than the surcharge 
imposed on consumers. Thirdly, cartels may exercise distortive effect on price signals (with 
possible inefficiencies in a dynamic perspective because of investments in the wrong market; 
rent-seeking or rent-preservation practices). 
 
However, there are two sorts of costs for consumers associated with a cartel. First consumers 
who keep on buying the product will now have to pay more for each unit because of the price 
increase by the cartel members. This is often called the surcharge attributable to the cartel. In 
addition, some consumers are likely to reduce their purchase of the good because of the 
increase in its price and those consumers will lose the benefit that they would have enjoyed 
from consuming these units that they do not consume anymore. This is called the deadweight 
loss.  
 
If we consider the welfare of society (that is of consumers and producers), the loss due to the 
cartel is only the deadweight loss since the surcharge, which is a cost to consumers, is also a 
profit to producers and those two elements cancel each other out. 
 
If the cartel allows the cartel members to improve their efficiency (which is fairly unlikely), 
the net loss to society from a cartel would be the deadweight loss minus the efficiency gain 
for the cartelists. 
 
The goal of law enforcement is to reduce the number of violations of the law. This is 
achieved by catching at least some violators and punishing them, thus increasing the ex post 
cost of the violation for these violators and reducing the expected profitability of such 
violations for would-be violators. The increase in the costs for some violators due to law 
enforcement and therefore the decrease in the ex-ante profitability of the violations for 
would-be violators will, in principle, reduce the number of violations by discouraging at least 
some would-be violators. For example, firms in an industry would contemplate engaging in a 
cartel activity because such a cartel, if successful, would allow them to increase their price 
and their profits. However If the would-be cartelists  face a risk of  getting caught  and 
sanctioned, the expected benefit of their cartel activity may be less than the profit they will 
benefit from due to the increase in their price.  If the sanction they can expect is sufficiently 
large and if the probability of their getting caught is sufficiently high, they may be 
discouraged from cartelizing the industry. 
 
Law enforcement which results in fewer violations thus reduces the cost to society of those 
violations.  But law enforcement is itself costly since society has to pay the competition law 
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authorities and the courts for their law enforcement activity. The more intense the law 
enforcement effort is, the fewer violations there will be but the higher is the cost of law 
enforcement. Conversely, the less intense law enforcement  is, the lower is the cost to society 
of law enforcement but the higher is the social cost of violations, since there will be more 
violations if there is less law enforcement. 
 
Thus society has to decide how much law enforcement it wants to choose. From an economic 
point of view, the optimal amount of law enforcement will depend on the respective cost of 
violations to society and the social cost of enforcement. For example, it would not make 
sense for society to spend an enormous amount on law enforcement in order to reduce the 
amount of certain violations, if the avoided violations only impose a very small cost on 
society.  
 
To figure out what level of enforcement would reflect the best possible use of our resources 
(what economists call the optimal amount of enforcement), the deterrence approach to law 
enforcement suggests that what we want is to minimize the sum of the costs of violations to 
society that take place plus the cost of law enforcement activities (which discourage some 
other violations from taking place). In other words we want to keep increasing our cost of law 
enforcement activities as long as the additional benefit to society due to the decrease in the 
number of violation is larger than the additional cost on law enforcement. 
 
To make it simple, economists assume that what society chooses is the proportion of violators 
caught or the probability of violators being caught (often denoted by (p)) and the severity of 
the sanction if they are caught (often denoted by f). For example, everything else equal, if the 
budget of the competition authority or the courts is increased, this will allow these bodies to 
investigate more cases and this will increase the proportion of violators found guilty.  
Similarly, everything else equal, if a law is passed which increases the ceiling on sanctions 
(for example raising the ceiling from 10% of the turnover of firms to , say, 15%), this will 
allow competition authorities and courts to increase the amount of the fines they impose at 
least in some cases and will discourage some more cartels. 
 
There are two possible approaches to choosing p and f. 
 
If one believes that cartels inflict harm on consumers (in terms of surcharge and in terms of 
deadweight loss) but may in certain cases also lead to a lowering of the cost of production or 
distribution for the cartel members (therefore may also have a productive efficiency benefit), 
the right approach is to set the sanction at a level which is larger than the total consumer loss 
divided by the probability of the cartel being caught and sanctioned. In that case the expected 
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gain from the cartel will be negative except if the efficiency gain is larger than the 
deadweight loss. For example imagine that a cartel impose a surcharge of 10 per unit sold and 
that, at the cartel price, there are 100 units sold. In that case, the total surcharge imposed by 
the cartel members will be 1000. Assume also that the consumer surplus lost for consumers 
who have given up or reduced their consumption (the deadweight loss) is equal to 500 and 
that the violators have a 20% chance of being caught. Our rule says that the sanction in such a 
case should be larger than 1500/.20= 7500. If the cartel members face a sanction which is just 
equal to 7500 if caught, they have an 80% chance of not being caught (and increasing their 
profits by 1000) and a  20% chance of being sanctioned  (in which case they make 1000 of 
extra profit but they have to pay a sanction of 7500). Hence, their expected profit if they 
consider entering into a cartel is: (1000x.8-6500x.20)= -500. They can expect (on average) to 
lose an amount of money which is precisely the amount of the deadweight loss they impose 
on consumers. If they are risk neutral (and if they know the probability of being caught and 
the sanction they will get if they are caught), they will refrain from entering a cartel except if 
the efficiency gains they can have because of the cartel is larger than the net cost they inflict 
on consumers (except if there is a net benefit for society). 
 
A second approach is the deterrence approach. In this approach we assume that cartels always 
impose a cost on consumers (in terms of surcharge and deadweight loss) and are never a 
source of efficiency benefits for the cartelists. In that case we do not have to bother with the 
deadweight loss to consumers (which is exceedingly difficult to compute in any case). We 
want to deter all cartels since they all impose a cost on society (the overcharge plus the 
deadweight loss). Cartels will be deterred if the sanction is larger than the overcharge divided 
by the probability of sanction (in our example if the sanction is larger than 1000/.20=5,000). 
If the firms consider entering into a cartel agreement they will anticipate that they will have 
an 80% chance of making 1000 and they will have a 20% chance of making 1000 but having 
a sanction of 5000. Thus they will anticipate that their expected profit will be: 1000x.8+.2 
(1000-5000)= 0. If the sanction is larger than 5000 the expected profit from cartelisation is 
negative and no (risk neutral) firm will enter into a cartel agreement. This means, in other 
words, that for law enforcement to deter cartels, violators should expect that crime “does not 
pay”. 
 
In line with the previous analysis, in Becker (1968) it is concluded that the optimal fine 
should be a multiple of the offender's benefits from crime and negatively related to the 
probability of detection. Also, an OECD report (2002) stresses that “effective sanctions 
against cartels should take into account not only the amount of gain realized by the cartel but 
also the probability that any cartel will be detected and prosecuted. Because not all cartels are 
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detected, the financial sanction against one that is detected should exceed the gain actually 
realized by the cartel. 
 
As was mentioned previously, the deterrence approach assumes that the antitrust violations 
considered (cartels) always impose a cost for society (ie. they are per se/egregious violations 
of the competition law). If, on the contrary, cartels may be good for society in some cases (ie. 
If one follows a rule of reason approach for cartels) then the deterrence rule may discourage 
some cartels that are efficient (ie. cartels which have efficiency benefits that are several times 
larger than the overcharge they inflict on consumers). As it has been pointed out by some 
commentators, “(f)ines that are higher than the harm caused by a particular type of conduct 
may discourage firms to engage in conduct, which increases total surplus
14
. For instance, 
Posner (1976) mentions the possibility of firms spending large amounts on advertising that 
neither serves to inform consumers better nor improves the product
15
. If firms could be 
convinced to limit their advertising expenditure, costs would fall. By cooperating in 
advertising or research, or by merely sharing important information, a cartel may be able to 
reduce costs. In order to sustain these gains, Sproul (1993) points out that horizontal price-
fixing may serve the purpose of preventing firms from competing away the benefits that 
induce firms to cooperate to generate these cost savings
16
. Finally, Martin (1999) shows that 
joint profit maximisation requires output to be distributed among firms so that marginal costs 
are the same for all firms
17
. To the extent that the high-cost firm reduces its output and 
accepts a lower market share, the units produced at a lower cost represent an efficiency gain. 
 
However, most competition authorities throughout the world consider that cartels are 
violations per se (or by object) of competition laws and that the economic approach to 
deterrence is applicable to cartel sanctioning. Typical of this position is Werden’s (2009) 
approach: “Cartel activity robs consumers and other market participants of the tangible 
blessings of competition. Cartel activity is never efficient or otherwise socially desirable; 
cartel participants can never gain more than the public loses. Cartel activity, therefore, is not 
like tortious conduct, which is redressed with a liability rule focusing on the harm to victims 
and providing the incentive to take due care. Like other property crimes, cartel activity should 
be prohibited rather than merely taxed. As Judge Richard Posner explained of criminal 
                                                     
14
 Wehmhörner, N. (2005) “Optimal Fining Policies”, Remedies and Sanctions in Competition Policy Conference, 
Amsterdam Centre for Law and Economics, February 2005.  
15
 Posner, R.A. Antitrust law: An Economic Perspective, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1976) cited by 
Nonthika Wehmhörner (2005). 
16
 Sproul, M.F. (1993) “Antitrust and Prices”, Journal of Political Economy, 101(4) 741-755 cited by 
Wehmhörner, N.  (2005). 
17
 Martin, S. (1999) Industrial Economics, Prentice Hall, New Jersey. 
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sanctions generally, they “are not really prices designed to ration the activity; the purpose so 
far as possible is to extirpate it.
18” 
 
It should be noted at this point that the sanctions referred to in the economic literature should 
be understood as the total sanctions that could be inflicted as a result of a violation. As we 
explained in the previous section, the sanctions for anticompetitive behaviour could be 
administrative and/or criminal and/or civil and/or individual/personal. What counts in the 
theory of deterrence is the total cost imposed on the violator. Thus economists consider that 
civil remedies, such as damages, for example, may have a deterrent effect (even if their legal 
aim is to compensate victims rather than to punish violators) because they may increase the 
cost faced by violators if they are found out. 
 
The discussion which follows is focused on sanctions imposed on competition law violators 
in proceedings resulting from competition law enforcement efforts initiated by competition 
authorities because these sanctions are often much more important than civil sanctions or 
criminal sanctions (which, with the exception of the US, are rarely imposed in other 
jurisdictions and in any case are not available in Chile). But, if in a jurisdiction there is a very 
active civil enforcement the reasoning should be adjusted to take into consideration the 
combination of civil and other sanctions. As Enrico Leonardo Camilli argues: “the coherence 
of the entire sanctioning system is of paramount importance, since all the elements are 
closely interrelated, and the change of one parameter is likely to have effect on all the setting. 
For that reason matters like the private damages and the standing to claim them, the 
international or domestic feature of the infringement, the type and quantity of investigative 
tool, the availability of criminal sanctions are to be taken into account when the question on 
the optimal fine is addressed”19.  
 
This analysis may be at odds with some legal practice. For instance, the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) has held that it is not necessary, for the purposes of assessing 
whether the administrative sanction is effective, proportionate and dissuasive, to take account 
of the possibility and/or the level of a criminal sanction which may subsequently be 
imposed
20
. However, examples taking a different approach also exist. In Devenish Nutrition 
Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis SA (hereinafter Devenish) the English High Court had the opportunity to 
                                                     
18
 Werden, G. J. (2009) “Sanctioning Cartel Activity: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime”, European Competition 
Journal 5(1); 19-36. 
19
 Camilli, E.L. (2006) “Optimal Fines in Cartel Cases and the Actual EC Fining Policy” World Competition: Law & 
Economics Review, 29, 575-605. 
20
 Case C-45/08, Spector Photo Group NV and Chris Van Raemdonck v Commissie voor het Bank, Financie- en 
Assurantiewezen (CBFA), [2009] ECR I-12073, para. 77. 
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examine the interaction between fines and exemplary damages finding that that there were 
some cumulative factors that made the award of exemplary damages inadequate in this case: 
first, there was no way of limiting the exemplary damages to avoid the danger of double 
counting, second, there was also the serious problem of assessing the damages, in particular 
the fact that the claimants were only part of the class affected by the wrongful conduct, and 
finally, the large scale of the fines imposed by the European Commission, which made the 
need for punitive damages less compelling in this case
21
.  
 
In many countries competition laws only indicate the maximum sanction that could be 
imposed on violators rather than a precise (mandatory) level of sanctions. This means that 
competition authorities and courts have the ability to decide (within limits) the amount of 
sanctions they impose in particular cases. Similarly many competition authorities have some 
discretion when it comes to allocating their resources to the initiation of investigations even 
though the law may impose some constraints on them. Thus the policies followed by both the 
competition authorities and the courts (either as reviewers or as triers of facts) in their law 
enforcement activities contribute to the choice of p and f. 
 
More formalized summary of the economics of sanctions 
 
In general, a penalty system consists of a probability of detection and a fine. In case of 
violations of antitrust law, these two parameters are called the rate of law enforcement by the 
antitrust authority (denoted by p) and the penalty imposed on the firm for price-fixing 
activities and participation in the cartel (denoted by F). Further the penalty imposed can be 
characterized as a product of the penalty base and the penalty rate (denoted further in our 
recommendations at part VII by k). 
 
To illustrate the economic definition of the harm from cartels, we refer to a simple diagram 
shown in Figure 1
22
. 
                                                     
21
 Devenish Nutrition Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis SA [2007] EWHC 2394 (Ch). 
22
The figure is constructed for the linear demand and constant marginal cost case. 
27 
 
 
      Figure 1: Negative effects of price-fixing on Consumer Surplus (CS) and Social 
Welfare (SW) 
 
The increase in prices above the competitive price c, induced by a cartel, leads to an increase 
in profits for the firm (π) above competitive level that is denoted by PS (Producer Surplus) in 
the Figure 1. However, at the same time there are social costs imposed by this change in 
prices. These social costs are represented by the area of the triangle marked as "Net loss in 
SW" (Net loss in Total Social Welfare). There is obvious damage to the consumers, since 
they lose part of the consumer surplus as a consequence of the price-fixing activities of the 
firm. In addition, there is a clear reduction in total welfare, since due to the increase in price 
above competitive level the reduction of the consumer surplus exceeds the increase in 
producer surplus. Hence, the net effect is always negative and it is necessary to block the 
cartel in order to reduce this damage. 
 
Hence, ideally the optimal fine should extract the entire benefit the firm derives from 
collusion (i.e. the entire excess illegal gains π=PS) in order to block the antitrust violation 
and also, if feasible, compensate for the damage caused to the consumers, which is higher 
than illegal gains and is given by the sum of PS and Net loss in SW in Figure 1. In addition, 
in Becker (1968) it is concluded that the optimal fine should be a multiple of the offender's 
benefits from crime and negatively related to the probability of detection (denoted by p). 
Also, an OECD report (2002) stresses that “effective sanctions against cartels should take 
into account not only the amount of gain realized by the cartel but also the probability that 
any cartel will be detected and prosecuted. Because not all cartels are detected, the financial 
sanction against one that is detected should exceed the gain actually realized by the cartel. 
 
It follows from the previous developments that in the economic model of deterrence the 
sanctions imposed on violators which are caught must be larger than their gains from the 
violation as long as the probability of catching them is less than 100%.  
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A number of economists have tried to estimate the level of fines that cartelists should pay if 
fining policy met the criteria of deterrence and most have come up with a large numbers 
given the importance of the cost imposed on society by cartels and the relatively low 
probability of catching violators. It has been estimated in several empirical studies
23
 that as 
few as one in six or seven cartels are detected and prosecuted, implying the probability of 
detection roughly between 0.14 and 0.17. Indeed, Bryant and Eckard consider this to indicate 
the maximum probability, given that their sample consisted entirely of those cartels that were 
actually detected. It is possible that those cartels that remain undetected are systematically 
better at concealing their cartel, so that the overall probability of detection may actually be 
considerably lower than one in six or seven cartels. This implies a multiple of at least six. For 
example, according to Werden and Simon (1987)
24
, firms would need assets six times higher 
than annual sales to pay the deterrent fine. This means that most firms would be unable to pay 
the deterrent fine and would go bankrupt if they had to. Bankrupting firms which have 
participated in a cartel may entail large social costs. As a consequence, the authors conclude 
that most price fixers should go to prison rather than having their firm pay the deterrent fine. 
Craycraft and Gallo (1997)
25
 analyze the effect of the firm's ability to pay the fine levied and 
find that all firms in their sample of 262 price-fixing firms between 1955 and 1993 were able 
to pay the actual fine imposed. However, only 47, or 18% of the sampled firms would have 
been able to pay the deterrent fine. Finally, Combe and Monnier (2007), under rather 
conservative assumptions, calculated the optimal sanction as being 6.6 times higher than the 
loss of consumer surplus, that is, for a five year cartel this represents more than 300% of the 
turnover
26
. 
 
It is worth noting that some of these studies were undertaken before leniency programs were 
established. Because of the existence of the leniency program one can hope that the 
probability of detecting cartels has increased significantly which means that the optimal 
amount of fines for cartel offenders is now lower than it used to be (see part III of this report 
for more recent evaluations).  
 
The fact that crime does not pay does not mean that there will be no violations. Some risk-
seekers may still want to engage into violations on the off-chance that they might escape 
                                                     
23
See, for example, Bryant, P.G., and Eckard, E.W. (1991) "Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught," The 
Review of Economics and Statistics 73, 531-536. 
24
 Werden, G. and Simon, M. (1987) "Why Price Fixers Should Go to Prison," The Antitrust Bulletin 32, 917-937. 
25
 Craycraft, J. L., Craycraft C. and Gallo, J. C. (1997), “Antitrust Sanctions and a Firm‘s Ability to Pay” Review of 
Industrial Organization 12, 171-183. 
26
 Combe, E. and C. Monnier (2007), “Cartel Profiles in the European Union”, Concurrences N° 3-2007,181-189.  
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punishment (just like the fact that the expected gain from buying a lottery ticket is negative 
does not deter some people from buying lottery tickets but discourages risk averse people 
from doing so). But the number of violations will definitely be smaller than it would have 
been if the level of sanctions had been such that “crime pays”. 
 
There are three major implications of this analysis for competition law enforcers and courts. 
The first implication is that, from an economic point of view, a repressive law against cartels 
should be enforced in such a way as to deter would-be violators from engaging in the 
prohibited practice. The second implication is that firms will not be deterred from engaging 
in cartels and other anticompetitive activity if “crime pays”. The third implication is that for 
crime not to pay, sanctions have to be sufficiently high. They have to be a multiple of the 
profits that the violators derive from their illegal practices, if the probability of detecting and 
sanctioning the violators is less than one hundred per cent. And they should be all the higher 
that the probability of detection and sanction is low.   
 
This approach suggest that sanctions should be based on the quantity of the harm done by a 
prohibited practice rather than on the “quality” of the category of the practice. Yet, this more 
effects-based analysis of individual sanctions may not be practically achievable, hence as a 
second best a competition law regime may focus on the definition of the categories of 
practices for which a presumption of harm, for instance taking into account aggravating 
circumstances, or of no harm, with the consideration of mitigating circumstances, is 
established. 
 
C. The limits of the economic approach to sanctions 
 
The economic approach which we have previously discussed, assumes that the goal of 
sanctions is to deter would be violators. However, from a legal standpoint, sanctions could 
pursue a number of other goals such as retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation etc. Usually 
laws, and competition law is no exception, do not clearly specify what the goal of law 
enforcement is supposed to be. These goals are not necessarily in conflict with the goal of 
deterrence pursued by the economic approach. Yet, there might be some tension between the 
expansive approach to sanctions advanced by the proponents of the deterrence model and 
legal concerns about proportionality and correlativity in the relation between the harm caused 
and the penalty imposed. Indeed, most lawyers would adhere to the principle that the sanction 
should fit the crime. 
 
The deterrence model and more generally optimal enforcement theory shares with economic 
efficiency theory the belief that the aim of the legal system is to promote wealth 
30 
 
maximization. This objective should transcend both the liability and the remedial stages.
27
 
This duty to act in conformity to the principle of wealth maximization may potentially confer 
an important discretion to competition authorities, as it would be possible to impose penalties 
that would achieve optimal deterrence from a wealth maximization perspective, without these 
penalties being necessary from a corrective justice perspective. This may be in opposition to 
the principle of proportionality and corrective justice. 
 
In an economic efficiency inspired legal framework for protective rules, it would also be 
theoretically possible not to adopt a penalty, if its effect would be to jeopardise would-be 
efficient activity by creating over-deterrence, even if the activity in question is legally 
prohibited. For instance, leniency literature has recognized early on that cartels have an 
internal stability problem, which could be exploited to achieve deterrence at lower levels of 
sanction, or even without any need to impose penalties
28
. Leniency programmes, when well 
administered, may increase the probability of detection, by undermining trust among 
members of the cartel and rewarding whistle-blowers, in view of the fact that usually the best 
source of information on secret cartel activity are companies and individuals involved in the 
commitment of the antitrust violation themselves
29
. As it has been documented by the 
literature, the presence of leniency programmes alters the deterrence effect of penalties and 
results in the substantial decrease of financial penalties necessary to achieve deterrence
30
. 
 
Deterrence theory also views penalties as mainly a deterrent device directed against potential 
offenders with the view to ensure that the offender (specific deterrence), but also any other 
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potential offender (general deterrence), would be given sufficient disincentive to be 
discouraged to engage in this harmful activity in the future.
31
  
 
1. Designing a system of deterrent sanctions and remedies 
 
In order to achieve deterrence, policy makers may act on the following fronts:  
 
(i) increase the level of fines or sanctions and alter their form so as to increase 
deterrence;  
 
(ii) increase enforcement expenditures and hence the probability of detection;  
 
(iii) impose a liability rule that would maximize social welfare. 
 
It is well accepted that penalties should be sufficient to induce offenders to internalize the full 
social costs of their behaviour (the internalization thesis). This assumes that if there is perfect 
detection and no social cost of imposing punishment, the optimal sanction will be equal to the 
net social (efficiency) loss post violation, compared to the situation prior to the violation.
32
 
The penalty should thus be equal to the net harm to everyone but the offender.
33
 For cartels, 
the optimal penalty is equal to the deadweight welfare loss plus the wealth transfer to the 
cartel from purchasers (i.e. the sum of PS and Net Loss in SW in Figure 1). This penalty only 
deters those instances of the offense in which the deadweight welfare loss exceeds any 
savings in production costs to the cartel. Accordingly, if the enforcement costs are positive 
and the probabilities of detection and punishment are less than perfect, optimal penalties 
should, according to the optimal deterrence model, exceed the social (efficiency) cost of the 
violation so as to correspond to the efficiency loss caused. The minimum punishment for 
deterrence to work will be equal to the expected gain from the violation (including interest) 
multiplied by the inverse of the probability of the punishment being effectively imposed. The 
idea behind is that the penalty must be sufficient to render the expected value of the violation 
equal to zero. By imposing this cost, the offence will be deterred. The internalization 
approach limits theoretically the discretion of the authorities to impose penalties, if it will 
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lead to a less satisfactory, from an efficiency perspective, equilibrium than that existing prior 
to the violation. 
 
At the same time, if the aim is to ensure that the offender will be given sufficient disincentive 
to be discouraged from engaging in the activity in the future, the expected value of the 
violation would be negative (pure deterrence thesis). In this case, it would make sense to 
include all possible losses, including those of the competitors of the offender that were, for 
example, foreclosed from the market, as a result of the exclusionary practices usually 
following the creation of a cartel, for the long term effects persisting after the practice has 
been terminated, or those of upstream suppliers for lost sales, which, as Hovenkamp 
observes, are ‘potentially unlimited’ losses.34 Of course, increased sanctions and excessive 
penalties may also deter efficient conduct and generate overinvestment in compliance, which 
might be inefficient. However, for the tenants of the pure deterrence thesis, that should not be 
a major issue, because of the future consequence of deterring harmful conduct (and therefore 
its future positive wealth maximization effects).
35
  Yet, even if one takes the pure deterrence 
view, there might still be a problem such as over-enforcement. The marginal cost of sanctions 
must not be larger than the marginal revenues of sanctions. If sanctions have a cost to society 
and if the cost is a function of the amount of the sanction (the costs of collecting of the 
sanction or those of keeping people in prison, for criminal sanctions) then there can be such a 
thing as over-enforcement even in the pure deterrence model. 
 
2. Are these deterrence-focused perspectives compatible with the legal approach 
focusing on justice and the principle of proportionality? 
 
One may argue that deterrence constitutes an inherent principle to corrective justice. One 
could distinguish between two forms of deterrence: deterrence as wealth maximization and 
deterrence as a moral requirement for corrective justice to work effectively. As Gardner 
forcefully explains, there is a distinction to be made between the moral content of corrective 
justice and the legal principle of corrective justice: 
 
“[the legal principle of corrective justice] is supposed to be efficient at securing that 
people conform to certain […] moral norm of corrective justice […] As well as 
correcting torts that have already been committed, this legal principle is apt 
systematically to deter the commission of torts that have not yet been committed”.36 
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Deterrence has a role to play even for those valuing only the moral principle of corrective 
justice and rejecting efficiency as a normative value (deterrence-based corrective justice 
approach). Preventive sanctions have long been a feature of the legal system in most civil law 
systems, in view of the importance deterrence has as an objective of corrective justice. 
 
Some legal experts, such as Justice Scalia in the United States, hold the view that the 
proportionality principle is an inherently retributivist concept, which is incompatible with 
consequentialist goals of punishment (such as the goal of deterrence). Others disagree. For 
example Ian P. Farrell considers that Justice Scalia’s analysis is flawed and that 
“philosophical analysis demonstrates that the principle of proportionality is not an inherently 
retributivist concept, but rather a theoretically independent moral conviction to which we are 
tenaciously attached”37. Whatever option is chosen, there may be a possible conflict between 
the economic approach and the legal approach to sanctions for economic violations.  
 
An illustration of this conflict may be found in the 1998 US Supreme Court Judgment United 
States v. Bajakajian, which was not a competition case but is nevertheless quite interesting 
for our purpose
38
.  In this case, a Mr Bajakijian had attempted to leave the United States with 
$357,144  in cash without filling the form which must be filled by all citizens taking more 
than $10,000 in US Currency out of the United States. The United States’ government argued 
that it had “an overriding sovereign interest in controlling what property leaves and enters the 
country.” and that full forfeiture of the unreported currency ($357,144) supported that interest 
by serving to “dete[r] illicit movements of cash” and aided in providing the Government with 
“valuable information to investigate and detect criminal activities associated with that cash.” 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that it was unconstitutional to take 
$357,144 from a person who failed to report his taking of more than $10,000 in US Currency 
out of the United States. It was the first case in which the Supreme Court ruled a fine to 
violate the Excessive Fines Clause. The Supreme Court justified its decision by saying that 
“(c)omparing the gravity of respondent’s crime with the $357,144 forfeiture the Government 
seeks, we  conclude that such a forfeiture would be grossly disproportional to the gravity of 
his offense. It is larger than the $5,000 fine imposed by the district court by many orders of 
magnitude and it bears no articulable correlation to any injury suffered by the Government…. 
For the foregoing reasons, the full forfeiture of respondent‘s currency would violate the 
Excessive Fines Clause”. 
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In the competition law area, there is a risk that review courts (adhering to the legal principle 
of proportionality and the implicit “retribution approach” or “moral acceptability approach” 
to sanctions) may find sanctions imposed (or requested) by competition authorities (adhering 
to the economic principle of deterrence and the implicit “cost minimization approach” to 
sanctions) disproportional and therefore tend to reduce the amount of the sanctions to non-
deterring levels.  For instance, the principle of proportionality constitutes an important limit 
to the European Commission’s discretion in imposing penalties39. The principle is included in 
Article 49(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU providing that ‘the severity of 
penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence’. Proportionality is also a 
general principle of EU law, applying as such to all measures adopted by Community 
institutions. According to settled case law: 
 
“by virtue of that principle, the lawfulness of the prohibition of an economic activity 
is subject to the condition that the prohibitory measures are appropriate and necessary 
in order to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; 
when there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to 
the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the 
aims pursued”.40 
 
This three-part test has, of course, to take into account the margin of discretion of the 
European Commission in adopting appropriate penalties, including its discretion in 
establishing the level of optimal deterrence. Although the principle of proportionality does 
not exist as such in US antitrust law, a constitutional proportionality requirement applies to 
most punitive damages cases as well as to other types of remedies.
41
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There is a second risk, which is that competition laws themselves may impose ceilings on the 
level of sanctions that limit the ability of competition authorities to impose deterrent 
sanctions. Indeed, many competition laws provide for maximum sanctions for competition 
violations expressed either in absolute terms (example: “the maximum sanction for bid 
rigging will be €1,000,000”) or as a proportion of the turnover of the violators (example: “the 
maximum sanction for bid rigging will be 10% of the total turnover of the firm”) or as a 
proportion the affected market (example “the maximum sanction for bid rigging will be 10% 
of the amount of the relevant procurement market”).  
 
Table 2: Statutory limits 
Jurisdiction Statutory limits 
 
United States 
 USD $ 100 million (~ €76 million) under the 
Sherman Act, or  
 under the Alternative Sentencing Statute fines up 
to twice the gain derived from the criminal 
conduct or twice the loss suffered by the victims 
  
European Union  10% cap of the total worldwide turnover 
  
United Kingdom  10% cap of the total worldwide turnover 
  
Germany 
 
 10% of the annual worldwide turnover of the 
undertaking. This has been interpreted by German 
courts not as a cap (as under EU law), but as a 
maximum fine. 
 
France 
 
 10% cap of the highest worldwide pre-tax 
turnover 
 
Brazil 
 
Canada 
 
Chile 
 30% of the gross revenue of the last financial year 
 
 $10 million Canadian dollars 
 
 The TDLC can impose fines for fiscal benefit up 
to 30,000 annual tax units (UTA), (approximately 
US$30,000,000) for practices consisting in 
express or tacit agreements among competitors, 
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or concerted practices between them, that confer 
them market power and consist of fixing sale or 
purchase prices or other marketing conditions, 
limit production, allow them to assign market 
zones or quotas, exclude competitors or affect the 
result of bidding processes. For all other 
competition law infringements, the TDLC can 
impose fines for fiscal benefit up to 20,000 
annual tax units (UTA). 
  
 
In all those cases the maximum amount of the fine being allowed legally risks being 
considerably lower than the amount which would minimize cost to society. When this is the 
case there is no guarantee that the competition authority will be able to impose deterrent 
sanctions on violators. 
 
Yet, there are arguments to support the view that in the case of competition law, the 
deterrence principle should prevail over the retribution principle in the sanctioning policy of 
the competition authority and the courts.  
 
First, one of the principal goals of competition law is economic: the promotion of economic 
efficiency. The underlying reason for the adoption of competition law lies in the teaching of 
economic analysis which suggests that in most cases competition promotes economic 
efficiency. It follows that the enforcement of competition law must itself be efficient if 
competition law is to promote economic efficiency. And the deterrence model meets this 
criterion. It would thus contradict the goal of competition law to base its enforcement on the 
retribution model. Illustrating the view, widely held by competition authorities, that 
deterrence should be the only goal of sanctions with respect to cartels, Werden (2009) 
observes that “(c)artel activity materially differs from other property crimes only with respect 
to the purpose of sanctions. Rehabilitation and incapacitation are important purposes for most 
criminal sanctions, but deterrence is the only significant function of sanctions for cartel 
activity, and the specific deterrence of convicted offenders clearly is secondary to the general 
deterrence of potential offenders”42. 
 
Second, most competition laws impose a ceiling on the level of sanctions, which is very low 
compared to the cost imposed on society by cartel offenders and to  what  the deterrence 
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model would suggest as appropriate sanctions.  As J.A.H. Maks, M.P. Schinkel and I.A.M. 
Bos (2005) argue: “the existence of ceilings on sanctions in absolute value (US) or in 
percentage of turnover (EU) can have perverse effects on deterrence. Such ceilings are, in 
most cases, economically unjustified”43. However, the main reason why such ceilings are so 
low is to ensure that the sanctions against antitrust violators remain proportional to the 
violations (or morally acceptable). Along those lines Wils (2006) notes that "(t)he maximum 
of twice the gross gain as foreseen in the US under the Criminal Fines Improvement Act, may 
reflect the limit of what multiplication is considered acceptable from a proportional justice 
perspective. In the EU, Regulation No 1/2003 provides that fines imposed by the European 
Commission cannot exceed 10 % of the total (consolidated) turnover of the company 
concerned in the preceding business year. This ceiling appears to reflect more generally 
concerns with very high fines, not only from the perspective of proportional justice but also 
as to the risk of inability to pay, and the social and economic costs of high fines"
44
. Lianos 
has also explained that proportionality requirements limit the discretion of competition 
authorities when adopting remedies or sanctions/penalties. According to recital 12 and Article 
7, the Commission may impose on infringers ‘behavioural or structural remedies which are 
proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to bring the infringement 
effectively to an end’. Structural remedies are subject to a stricter proportionality requirement 
as they can only be imposed ‘either where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or 
where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the 
undertaking concerned than the structural remedy’. Fines are dealt in Article 23 and cannot 
exceed 10 percent of the total turnover of the undertaking the preceding business year, thus 
introducing a quantitative measure of proportionality. Below this threshold, the mere fact that 
a fine may be very high will not render the fine disproportionate, because the 10% threshold 
is an abstract safeguard against disproportionality.
45
 There is no reason given for the 
introduction of this differentiation on the qualitative or quantitative expression of the 
proportionality principle, although it may be explained by the different forms of judicial 
scrutiny of fines and remedies, fines being subject, because of their punitive dimension, to a 
stricter judicial control
46
. 
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Thus within the ceiling set by the law, deterrence should be the overriding concern in the 
setting of the sanctions and the sanctions should be a function of the expected profits by the 
violators and the probability of the practice being sanctioned. Yet in a number of cases 
antitrust fines are based on the volume of affected commerce, rather than on the profits of the 
colluding firms. As Bageri, Katsoulacos and Spagnolo show (2013) fines based on volume of 
commerce have a number of distortive effects
47
. First, specialized firms active mostly in their 
core market expect, ceteris paribus, lower fines (when caps bind) than more diversified firms 
active in several other markets than the relevant one. Second, if expected fines are not 
sufficient to deter cartels (and we will discuss this issue later on), fine based in revenue rather 
than on collusive profits may push firms to increase cartel prices above the monopoly level to 
reduce the penalty thus exacerbating the anticompetitive harm caused by the cartel. Bageri, 
Katsoulacos and Spagnolo conclude that “(d)evelopments in economics and econometrics 
make it possible to estimate illegal profits from an antitrust infringement with reasonable 
precision or confidence, as regularly done to assess damages and advocate that “it is time to 
change these distortive rules of thumbs that make revenue so central for calculating fines, if 
the only thing the distortions buy for us is saving on the costs of data collection and illegal 
profit estimation”.  This issue raises the need to integrate more effects-based approaches in 
setting fines, which will be examined later in this report. 
 
D. Can there be over-deterrence? Are penalties for cartels excessive? Should they be?  
 
The first thing to mention about over-deterrence is whether it should be considered to be a 
problem.  
Over-deterrence of a practice, which may in some cases entail significant  pro-efficiency 
benefits (such as a unilateral practice that may be considered, in some respects, an abuse of 
dominance), may be a major problem since such over-deterrence may entail significant costs 
in lost efficiency, over and beyond the direct cost of the over-enforcement. 
 
Six possible sources of costs due to over-deterrence and/or over-enforcement come to mind: 
 
First, there is the possibility that law enforcement may be so intense that beyond some level 
the additional cost of law enforcement will be higher than the cost that the additional 
violations of competition law deterred would have imposed on society. Indeed, “excessively 
high fines may over-deter by discouraging potential investors away from markets and 
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practices that could raise the possibility of infringement actions”, and this may be welfare 
reducing in the long run
48
. 
 
Second there is the possibility, if competition authorities and courts are not infallible, that 
very high sanctions or a very high level of enforcement will lead to costly enforcement errors. 
The possible errors in appraising the behaviour in question may dilute the deterrent effect of 
sanctions and of course harm social welfare by leading to wrong enforcement decisions 
should also be considered.  
Enforcement errors may be of two sorts
49
:  
 
(i) Type I errors: These consist in wrongly concluding that there is an infringement. 
This can lower deterrence because it reduces the cost of violating the law. 
 
(ii) Type II errors: These consist in falsely not punishing a potential infringement. 
This may lead to uncorrected inefficient situations and also reduce deterrence 
because it reduces the difference between the expected fine from violating the law 
and not violating it. 
 
As it is explained by Polinsky and Shavell, a positive probability of a Type I error reduces 
deterrence because it lowers the expected fine if an individual violates the law, while a 
positive probability lowers deterrence because it reduces the difference between the expected 
fine from violating the law and not violating it, thus making the violation less costly to the 
individual
50
. For instance, Type II errors might be dealt by increasing prosecutorial resources 
and thus the probability of detection, in the context of public enforcement, or training judges 
and putting in place specialised tribunals, in the context of private enforcement, while Type I 
errors may be dealt by putting in place filters, such as summary judgments, in the context of 
private enforcement or by raising the standard of proof in both public and private 
enforcement or finally by adopting the principle of proportionality for penalties and 
remedies
51
. As Harold Houba, Evgenia Motchenkova and Quan Wen observe: “(…) 
excessive fines may amplify the possible negative impact of antitrust enforcement, which can 
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stem from unobservable legal errors. Hence, the rationale for adopting the principle of 
proportionality is to minimize any potential undesirable impact of the antitrust policy”52.  
 
Third, there is the possibility that if sanctions are very high and enforcement very intense, 
firms will spend a disproportionate amount of resources to ensure that their employees do not 
violate the law (for example through compliance programs) leading to a reduction in their 
efficiency because they will refrain from entering into efficient horizontal agreements for fear 
of being sanctioned (see the examples given by Posner referred to earlier). 
 
Fourth, in jurisdictions where the victims of antitrust violations may be awarded damages 
over and beyond the prejudice they have suffered, raising a risk of “over-compensation”, 
there can be a risk that claimants have an incentive to bring dubious claims with the hope that 
they will benefit from a favorable court decision or settlement, thus imposing  unjustified 
costs on the defendants. 
 
Fifth, excessive fines may lead to the insolvency of the undertakings to which they have been 
imposed. This might not necessarily be a problem, as the risk of insolvency following the 
imposition of a fine may have potential deterrence effects. Yet, it may also lead to negative 
welfare effects, if it excludes one of the very few competitors in a market characterized by 
barriers to entry
53
. 
 
Sixth, excessive fines may affect shareholders, bondholders and other creditors of the 
infringing undertaking, or employees, in case the payment of the financial penalty leads to a 
job cutting exercise in order to limit costs, even if none of the above may have been aware of 
the illegal activity or contributed to it. Furthermore, consumers may be harmed if the amount 
of the fine is passed on to them in the form of higher prices. For this reason, individual 
sanctions have been usually considered as a more effective tool of deterrence, in view of the 
fact that they are targeted to those real responsible for the anticompetitive conduct. 
 
However, even though cartels can in very rare cases have pro-efficiency benefits, it is quite 
unlikely that they will have such effects in the vast majority of cases. This is why most 
jurisdictions treat them as per se violations of antitrust laws. Thus the cost of type I errors is 
quite limited for cartels and one may consider that over-deterrence is not a problem in this 
case (although over-enforcement might be). 
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Furthermore, the risk of insolvency is relatively limited in most cases. Although Werden and 
Simon (1987) noted the possibility that the optimal fine may lead several firms to bankruptcy, 
Craycraft et al. (1997) found that 95 to 100% of all firms fined for price fixing 1955-1993 
were able to pay their fines and that some of them would have been able to pay “Beckerian” 
fines (that is, multiple fines imposed according to the optimal deterrence model)
54
. 
 
Finally, some authors doubt that even in the cartel area there is a serious risk that firms may 
overreact to strong enforcement or that unjustified legal costs may be imposed on defendants. 
Thus, for example, Harrington (2014) states:   
 
“(…) as has been noted by others, there are at least two sources of social harm from 
excessive enforcement. First, firms may avoid legitimate activities out of fear that 
their behavior would be misconstrued as collusive. Second, at least in the case of the 
U.S. where there is an overly active litigation scene, customers may pursue unjustified 
cases with the hope that the prospect of legal fees, discovery, and the small chance of 
having to pay large customer damages will induce settlement by innocent suppliers. 
I’m skeptical of these concerns, at least for the U.S. The standards for proving guilt 
for a Section 1 violation have always been high. Furthermore, Twombly has raised the 
bar as now discovery can be avoided unless the plaintiff can plead ‘facts that are 
suggestive enough to render a §1 conspiracy plausible’. At present, it is quite difficult 
for a plaintiff to get past the pleading stage without some reasonably convincing 
evidence that there was collusion and it was of the unlawful variety”55. 
 
It follows from the previous analytical discussion about the deterrence model that there can 
be over-deterrence and/or over-enforcement if (i) the sanctions are larger than the cost to 
society (e.g. overcharge, harm to innovation, reduction of quality and consumer choice) due 
to the violation divided by the probability of the violators being found guilty and (ii) the 
marginal cost of sanctioning cartels is larger than the marginal revenue to society from 
eliminating them. 
 
Thus when one discusses whether sanctions against antitrust violations are optimal, two main 
questions must be addressed: is there under-enforcement (if the level of sanctions is lower 
than the gains to violators from, for instance, cartelizing divided by their (perceived) 
probability of being caught)? Is there over-enforcement (if we are in the optimality zone but 
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the enforcement is so thorough that great costs are incurred to catch cartels which impose 
insignificant costs on consumers). The second question has been rarely examined because, as 
we shall see, most of the evidence presented in recent years has suggested that there was 
significant under-enforcement (rather than a risk of over-enforcement) in the major 
jurisdictions (United States and the European Union). However more recent research has 
argued that the level of sanctions in the EU could reach the deterrence level. 
 
E. Are monetary sanctions over-deterrent or under-deterrent? 
 
In Europe, the European Commission has substantially increased the level of sanctions for 
cartels during the first decade of the 2000s as shown in the following table
56
: 
 
Table 3: Fines imposed not adjusted for Court judgments – period 1990-2013 (last 
change 5 December 2013) 
 
Year Amount in €57 
1990-1994 539 691 550 
1995-1999 292 838 000 
2000-2004 3 462 664 100 
2005-2009 9 414 012 500 
2010-2013 7 241 181 674 
Total 20 950 387 824 
 
Table 4: Ten highest cartel fines per case (since 1969) (last change 31 March 2014) 
 
Year Case name Amount in €58 
2012 TV and computer monitor 
tubes 
1 470 515 000 
2008 Car glass 1 189 896 000 
2013 Euro interest rate derivatives 
(EIRD) 
1 042 749 000 
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 see Combe, E. and Monnier, C. (2011) “Fines Against Hard Core Cartels in Europe: The Myth of Over 
Enforcement”, Antitrust Bulletin 56, 235.  
57
 Amounts as imposed by the Commission and not corrected for changes following judgments of the Courts 
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2014 Automotive bearings 953 306 000 
2007 Elevators and escalators 832 422 250 
2010 Airfreight 799 455 000 
2001 Vitamins 790 515 000 
2008 Candle waxes 676 011 400 
2007/2012 Gas insulated switchgear 
(incl. re-adoption) 
675 445 000 
2013 Yen interest rate derivatives 
(YIRD) 
669 719 000 
 
Table 5: Ten highest cartel fines per undertaking (since 1969) (last updated 31 March 
2014) 
 
Year Undertaking Case Amount in €59 
2008 Saint Gobain Car glass 715 000 000 
2012 Philips TV and computer 
monitor tubes 
705 296 000 (of 
which 391 940 000 
jointly and severally 
with LG Electronics) 
2012 LG Electronics TV and computer 
monitor tubes 
687 537 000 (of 
which 391 940 000 
jointly and severally 
with Philips) 
2013 Deutsche Bank AG Euro interest rate 
derivatives (EIRD) 
465 861 000 
2001 F. Hoffman-La 
Roche AG 
Vitamins 462 000 000 
2013 Société Générale Euro interest rate 
derivatives (EIRD) 
445 884 000 
2007 Siemens AG Gas insulated 
switchgear 
396 562 500 
2008 Pilkington Car glass 357 000 000 
2009 E.ON Gas 320 000 000 
2009 GDF Suez Gas 320 000 000 
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A lively debate has ensued over whether the European sanctions for cartels were 
characteristic of over-enforcement or under-enforcement.  
 
Combe and Monnier (2009), for example, studied 64 cartels sanctioned by the EU 
Commission for which they had sufficient data (a large majority were sanctioned after 2000) 
and concluded the following: 
 
"(...) The level of fines compared to the illegal gain made by cartels members remains 
low as at best only half of the fines reach this value. This implies that fines regularly 
fall below the minimum illegal profits of cartels. Thus, fines imposed against cartels 
by the European Commission are suboptimal even considering a 100% probability of 
detection. It means that even if we do not consider the fact that some cartels remain 
undetected, the level of fines is insufficient. Hence, these fines cannot deter price 
fixing if decisions maker are risk neutral, as the probability of detection is clearly 
below 100%. (....) the Commission has never imposed a dissuasive fine given the low 
probability of detection and a low price elasticity of demand. For all these reasons, the 
risk of over enforcement is actually nonexistent and should be considered as a myth". 
 
The issue of over-deterrence was discussed in the context of the adoption of the EU 
harmonized rules on private actions for damages. An external study prepared for the 
legislative preparations of the European Commission (Renda et al, 2007) included some 
discussion over the adoption of multiple (double) damages in order to enhance deterrence. 
The study found that, under low, medium and high assumptions regarding detection for cartel 
cases, double damages would encourage victims to exercise their right to damage 
compensation with no risk of overdeterrence, as the increase would not be sufficient to 
approximate optimal deterrence, given the low detection rate.  
 
Assuming that the loss to society consists of two components (i) the overcharge (OC) on the 
cartelised goods, and (ii) the lost consumers‘ surplus (CS) on the output not produced 
because in order to raise price the cartel restrict output, Renda et al (2007) found that 
assuming the deadweight loss equals either 10% or 50% and EU penalties imposed on cartels 
are between 23% and 79% of the overcharge, the yearly welfare impact of EU-wide cartels 
would be in the range between €13.4 billion and €36.6 billion, i.e. between 0.12% and 0.33% 
of EU GDP in 2006. One should also take into account that the benefits of a cartel can be 
greater than the overcharge whenever the cartel agreement leads to some efficiencies (e.g. 
cost reductions) for cartelists. The study found that even if treble damages (or, similarly, 
double damages with prejudgment interest) were awarded in Europe, enhanced private 
damages actions in addition to fines and settlement awards would still not recover the full 
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societal loss from detected and undetected cartels
60
. The following table prepared by Renda et 
al (2007) takes into account the penalties, damages and settlement awards a global cartelist 
faces from the various competition law enforcement systems around the world. The inclusion 
of these costs has been explained by Connor (2007), in view of the benefit-cost calculation a 
cartelist will face ex ante (before engaging in cartel activity)
61
. This can be represented with 
the following equation: E(C) = E(F) + E(S) + E(R). The expected penalty faced ex ante by a 
cartelist is the sum of expected public penalties (E(F)), expected private damage settlements 
(E(S)) and expected (negative) reputational effects (E(R)). Although the later are not included 
in the following table, these speculative results show that the liability/overcharge ratio would 
still lead to under-deterrence, even under the least conservative estimates. Even if the 
expansion of competition legislation across the globe the last decade may challenge some of 
these findings, competition law enforcement in most of these new competition law 
jurisdictions is still weak and presumably does not add much to the global efforts of deterrent 
competition law enforcement.  
 
Table 6: Deterrence for a global cartelist
62
 
 
Scenario     
Jurisdiction Low Medium High 
Global cartels 
Detection rate 18% 24% 30% 
Conviction rate 75% 75% 75% 
Ex ante probability 
of conviction 
13.5% 18.0% 22.5% 
Public fines US - % 
of overcharge 
10.8% 18.8% 26.8% 
Public fines Canada 
- % of overcharge 
11.2% 24.0% 36.6% 
Combined North 
America 
10.9% 19.2% 27.5% 
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  Renda, A. et al (2007), “Making  antitrust damages actions  more  effective in the EU: welfare impact and 
potential scenarios” Report prepared for the European Commission, 109-110, (noting that even “with treble 
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EU penalty - % on 
overcharge 
9.2% 20.5% 31.8% 
Combined North 
America and Europe 
20.0% 39.6% 59.2% 
Global penalties 1.6% 3.5% 5.4% 
Combined penalties 21.6% 43.1% 64.7% 
Awards/settlements 
North America 
35% 80% 125% 
Awards/settlements 
EU 
29% 85% 145% 
Awards/settlements 
combined 
64% 165% 270% 
Total liability – 
public fines and 
private awards/settl. 
86% 209% 335% 
Deterrence w/out 
EU private enf. 
7.6% 22.2% 42.7% 
Deterrence with 
EU private enf. 
11.6% 37,5% 75.3% 
 
 
However the methodology used by Combe and Monnier (2009) has been questioned. For 
example, Allain, Boyer, Kotchoniz, and Ponssard (2013) criticize their work on two 
grounds
63
. The first concerns the cartel overcharge. The authors evaluate the validity of their 
estimated overcharge by controlling for econometric problems such as model error, 
estimation error and publication bias in the determination of representative overcharge 
estimates. Second, Allain, Boyer, Kotchoniz, and Ponssard consider a dynamic framework 
through which each individual firm must recurrently determine if pursuing its participation in 
the cartel will generate a level of future profits which exceeds those that would arise from 
deviating from the cartel agreement, while taking into consideration the probability of 
detection and the subsequent fine. Combe and Monnier do not include such a dynamic 
framework in their analysis.  
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Based on these improvements to the methodology of Monnier and Combe (2009), Allain, 
Boyer, Kotchoniz, and Ponssard (2013) estimate that the optimal fine should be more than ten 
times lower than the benchmark suggested by previous studies. They conclude:  
 
"The comparison of our benchmarks to the actual level of fines imposed by the 
European Commission in recent cartel cases (from 2005 to 2010) shows that, 
according to the different competitive scenarios, approximately 30% to 80% of the 
fines are deterrent, while 50% to 80% are compensatory. These empirical results 
could indicate that recent fines are closer to their deterrence and compensation 
objectives than they used to be. However, a striking feature of our results is the 
dispersion of the fines: some seem to be much too high, while others are much too 
low”. 
 
Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013) build on the work of Allain, Boyer, Kotchoniz, and Ponssard 
and introduce an additional consideration regarding the timing of penalty decisions
64
. They 
observe that the existing literature, based on the economics of crime, assumes that the 
detection and prosecution of cases takes place immediately after the action has come to its 
natural end. They point out that antitrust violations can last for many years and competition 
authorities sometimes intervene and terminate actions before they have come to a natural end. 
Symmetrically, a competition authority may only reach a decision on a case and impose a 
penalty long after the antitrust action has terminated.   
 
Katsoulacos and Ulph then reason that if an anticompetitive action is stopped before it has 
reached its natural end, then the firm will suffer a loss of profits relative to what otherwise 
might have happened and so the penalty does not need to be so high to generate the same 
level of deterrence. However, on the other hand, the revenue base on which the penalty will 
be imposed is smaller than it would otherwise have been had the action lasted its natural life 
and so the penalty rate has to be higher to achieve the same level of deterrence. 
 
If a decision can be reached and a penalty imposed long after the action has come to a natural 
end then this implies that the probability of effective action ever being taken is higher than if 
the action is taken only when the action has reached its natural life – pointing to a lower 
penalty. However, the fact that the penalty is imposed much later means that, discounted back 
to the present, it represents a lower potential cost to the firm contemplating taking the action, 
and so the penalty rate needs to be raised to have the same deterrent effect. 
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Altogether, using a new European data set to calculate the impact of these additional factors, 
they show that the optimal penalty is approximately 75% of that implied by the conventional 
formula and they support the conclusions of Allain, Boyer, Kotchoniz, and Ponssard that 
existing penalties are within the range supported by calculations of optimal penalties.  
 
Finally, Harold Houbay, Evgenia Motchenkova, Quan Wen (2013) using the marginal 
deterrence literature make a related point
65
. They show that if one takes into consideration the 
legal principles which antitrust sanctions must obey (punishments should fit the crime, 
proportionality, bankruptcy considerations and minimum fines), the antitrust authority should 
not punish maximally overall, but punish in a smarter manner such that mild offences are not 
fined at all. Their results call for a subtle reconsideration of the common wisdom in the 
economics of concerted crime that setting the fine equal to the available legal upper bound 
always increases the effectiveness of deterrence. 
 
F. Interaction between fines and private enforcement 
 
1. The function of public and private enforcement of competition law: complements 
or substitutes? 
 
The interaction between fines and private actions for damages is of particular interest for all 
jurisdictions that have made the choice of a dual enforcement system for their competition 
laws. This constitutes the majority of jurisdictions, which explains why the topic of the 
interaction between public and private enforcement, in particular with regard to cartels, has 
been, very early on, a matter of concern for the International Competition Network
66
. After 
conducting a survey of the legal framework and practice in a number of jurisdictions, the ICN 
Report noted that private antitrust enforcement, when this results from individual actions for 
damages, “mainly fulfils a compensatory function”, as “the plaintiff resorts to private 
antitrust enforcement to assert his rights as an individual”, “on his own initiative and 
according to his own priorities”67. From this perspective, private enforcement may appear 
complementary to public enforcement whose principal aim is not the compensation of the 
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injured parties from the competition law infringement, but deterrence
68
. Both public 
enforcement and private enforcement (in particular through collective actions for damages) 
may have a deterrent function, as in combination with public enforcement, private 
enforcement can help to raise the deterrent effect of antitrust enforcement for companies and 
so prevent anticompetitive practices. The relation between the two different forms of 
enforcement in this case would be either complementary, if additional deterrence is always 
good, or competitive, if there can only be an optimum level of deterrence, in which case more 
deterrence through private enforcement should lead to less deterrence through public 
enforcement, if the authorities want to avoid over-deterrence, assuming that the latter result 
would be suboptimal for total welfare
69
. Furthermore, private enforcement complements 
public enforcement because it fulfils a relief function when competition authorities have to 
concentrate their relatively limited resources on cases which are of general significance for 
competition, and hence, in the absence of public enforcement, private parties are offered the 
possibility of using private enforcement in order to protect their legitimate rights
70
.  
 
2. Public and private remedies and the need for “equalization” 
 
The interaction between the administrative and the civil remedial process, in particular 
damages for infringements of competition law, has been a subject of controversy. Some 
authors have argued that the potential accumulation of remedies that might result from the 
dual enforcement system may be “problematic” and may demand “a formal mechanism for 
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coordination or equalization”71. Discussing the EU example, Kloub advances a retributive 
equivalence theory measuring the optimal enforceability of a right in the following manner: 
 
“A right is enforceable if the total damage inflicted by the violator (D) equals the 
amount of compensation (C) and monetary punishment (P). In short: D = C + P […]; 
therefore, an optimal enforcement system should strive to impose sanctions (in the 
form of compensation and monetary punishment) that equal the total damage inflicted 
by a violation (in the context of antitrust violations this includes both the actual 
damage caused to victims and the damage caused to society as a whole in the form of 
deadweight loss)
72
. 
 
Although the author distinguishes retributive equivalence from deterrence, which is 
“prospective looking and is viewed from the perspective of the violator or other potential 
violators” (thus specific and general deterrence), he claims that “post-violation enforceability 
of antitrust rules must be based principally on retributive equivalence” and that enforcement 
in excess of D is deemed to be over-enforcement
73
. Over-enforcement may lead to “specific 
effects”, such as misallocate resources in the context of the particular violation, or general 
effects, leading to over-deterrence and consequently to negative chilling competition effects. 
If over-enforcement is possible, then the enforcement system should contain “an equalizing 
mechanism to ensure that the amount of monetary punishment and compensation imposed for 
individual violations does not exceed the total damage (damage to the victims, ie. wealth 
transfer; and damage to society, ie. deadweight loss) caused by the violation”74. 
 
Optimal enforceability defined, one should take into account that this goal may be achieved 
“either by monetary punishment (public enforcement) or compensation (private enforcement) 
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alone, or by their combination”75. There are several arguments for a mixed system of 
enforcement, instead of a purely public or private one, a topic that has already been examined 
extensively in the literature
76
. Because of the risk of over-enforcement should public and 
private enforcement be combined to produce remedies that exceed the total damage (private 
enforcement being uncontrollable to a large extent as it is decentralized and results from the 
individual or collective initiative of the claimants), there is a need for an equalizing 
mechanism or, simply put, coordination between the two. From this perspective, although 
public and private enforcement are complements, they also compete as to the share of the 
total damage they effectively retribute, hence the need to examine the competitive 
relationship between the two and the procedures put in place in EU competition law to 
achieve an “optimal” coordination between these two forms of competition law enforcement. 
However, in view of the fact that public and private enforcement are also complements, their 
mutual interaction requires a greater degree of interoperability between them, which calls for 
rules designed to facilitate the exercise of each of these two forms of enforcement, to render 
them more cost-effective and to achieve the largest synergies possible. 
 
3. The “optimal” combination of public and private enforcement 
 
A possible way to increase the levels of enforcement in times of limited public resources is to 
allow for the private enforcement of competition law, thus contracting out part of the task of 
enforcement to private parties
77
. Following up the work of Becker (1968), Becker and Stigler 
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(1974) argued for a pure private model of enforcement, advancing the view that the public 
system has perverse incentives because of the likelihood of corruption, unless the system is 
organized in such a way that private individuals and firms would investigate violations, 
apprehend violators and conduct legal proceedings to redress violations. If successful, the 
private enforcer will be entitled to retain the proceeds paid by the convicted violator, the 
unsuccessful enforcer being required to reimburse the defendant’s legal expenses78. Landes 
and Posner (1975) have criticized this approach arguing that competitive private enforcement 
will unambiguously lead to over-enforcement relative to what is optimal public 
enforcement
79
. Assuming that an optimal enforcement system relies on the joint operation of 
sanctions and the probability of detection, in public enforcement, it is possible to reduce the 
cost of deterrence by imposing a higher fine and lowering the probability of detection. With 
regard to private enforcement, however, raising the fine would incentivize more enforcement, 
and would thus raise the probability of detection, leading to over-enforcement. This result 
may be explained by a misalignment of the private and the social incentives to bring suit
80
. 
Private parties may have a greater motive to impose liability than what is socially desirable. 
According to Landes and Posner’s model, private monopolistic enforcers will also over-
enforce in comparison to the social optimum, as they do not internalize the full cost of 
enforcement (e..g. the administrative cost of providing the judicial forum), although the level 
of enforcement will be lower than in the context of a competitive private enforcement. 
 
Polinsky (1980) took into account the variable of enforcement cost and found that, in a large 
range of circumstances, private enforcement may lead to less enforcement: the reason is that 
firms are willing to invest in enforcement only if their revenue from the proceeds of the 
sanctions/damages is as large as their enforcement costs, while under public enforcement, the 
public enforcer aims to deter as many potential violators as it is possible, which results to a 
fine revenue that is less than the enforcement costs
81
. Furthermore, when the harm is spread 
over a large population and involves small amounts of money, it is possible that the cost of 
distribution will exceed the benefits for each of the victims of the violation. According to 
Rosenberg and Sullivan (2005) this leads the claimants to invest less in litigation, as they 
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possess only a “fractional ownership interest in prosecuting the common causes of action”82. 
In contrast, the defender benefits from efficiencies in the litigation scale. Indeed, irrespective 
of the litigated amount, “the defendant will treat any common issues as a single litigation 
unit, making a substantial investment to maximize the aggregate return from reduced liability 
and then spreading the cost of that investment across many separate actions it confronts or 
expects to confront”83. In comparison, the plaintiffs are atomized and do not benefit from 
similar litigation efficiencies. For the same reason the defendant also benefits from an 
asymmetric bargaining power in subsequent settlement discussions with each of the plaintiffs, 
thus creating an incentive for the defendant to settle the case
84
. Optimizing deterrence thus 
requires the aggregation of the plaintiffs’ case in order to provide both parties an equivalent 
opportunity to exploit available litigation scale efficiencies and to correct this “systemic bias” 
which undermines the deterrence function of private enforcement
85
. 
 
Regardless of the higher cost of public enforcement, the public enforcer has the advantage of 
being able to choose both the level of sanctions and the enforcement resources invested in 
detection. This is not possible in the context of private enforcement, as courts will calculate 
the damages by reference to the harm inflicted rather than by reference to the infringer’s gain 
and will be responsive rather than pro-active in enforcing the law, as they cannot act proprio 
motu. Thus, the choice of public over private enforcement (monopolistic or competitive) will 
depend on the level of the proceeds (damages/sanctions), public enforcement being superior 
for higher proceeds. The advantage of public over private enforcement nevertheless depends 
on the assumption that public enforcers are motivated by the public interest and have the 
adequate resources to enforce the law when optimal. These assumptions may not always 
prove correct, as public enforcers are also prone to under-performance, either because of 
budgetary and resource constraints, or because of political interference or, finally, because of 
a mismatch between bureaucratic incentives and the public interest. 
 
Assuming that the optimal enforcement system will require some mix of public and private 
enforcement, what should then be the factors to take into account in order to fine-tune the 
system?  
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The cost of information over the occurrence of harmful acts may be an important 
consideration. One may distinguish here between available information and the cost of 
acquiring additional information. Private enforcers have usually superior information from 
public enforcers on the commission of harmful acts and in any case on the harm inflicted to 
them. In contrast, public enforcers have an informational advantage when the likely social 
costs and benefits of the action are uncertain and require a case-by-case analysis or some 
form of analysis by experts. In this case, centralised enforcement might provide economies of 
scale in hiring the necessary expertise. With regard to the acquisition of additional 
information, Segal and Whinston (2007) note that the cost might be higher for public 
enforcers in view of the fact that public enforcement is financed by taxation
86
. Hence any 
additional enforcement cost will increase taxation and will affect economic activity, unless 
public enforcement is financed by the proceeds of the penalties imposed. Nevertheless, public 
enforcers dispose of a wider information base than private enforcers, as they can be seized by 
complaints, and they may dispose of more effective tools to collect information, in view of 
their wide-reaching investigative and sanctioning powers (e.g. leniency programmes and self-
reporting of the harmful acts by the infringers, effective control of the level of sanctions).  
 
The objectives of public and private enforcers may also diverge. According to optimal 
enforcement theory, public enforcers aim to deter harmful activities, while private enforcers 
focus more on compensation, rather than deterrence, without this however denying the 
possible deterrent effect of private enforcement. One may distinguish here between 
standalone and follow on damages actions
87
. With regard to standalone actions, deterrence 
may be achieved, more effectively as it was previously explained, through public 
enforcement, although private enforcement might provide a “hedge” to the risk of under-
enforcement, because of under-funding or ideological opposition to a more active public 
enforcement. The pursuit of public interest and the superior expertise of public enforcers 
constitute additional advantages of public enforcement. Follow-on actions may produce some 
deterrent effect, in particular if that leads to add damages to the other monetary sanctions 
imposed by public enforcement. However, they may also lead to over-deterrence, to the 
duplication of enforcement efforts and to a strategic use of private litigation with the purpose 
to harass a rival, thus suppressing productive business activities
88
. Follow-on damages may 
also jeopardize the effectiveness of public enforcement, in particular if public enforcers place 
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greater reliance on leniency and self-reporting in order to uncover harmful activity. The 
attractiveness of leniency programmes may be affected by the likelihood that leniency 
applicants will be confronted to follow-on private damages litigation.  
 
As it has been observed by Segal and Whinston (2007), a public agency may also more easily 
pre-commit to a strategy of deterrence by committing resources, developing a reputation for 
aggressive enforcement and adopting guidelines setting priorities
89
. In contrast, pre-
commitment is extremely difficult in the context of private enforcement, as the cost of 
developing a reputation for suing offenders will exceed the benefits, unless the plaintiff firm 
is frequently harmed, in which case investment on aggressive litigation might pay off. 
 
Private enforcement may also give rise to enforcement externalities when many parties have 
standing to sue for the same action, leading to inefficient duplication of litigation efforts and 
a possible free rider problem, if the litigation efforts of one of the parties produce positive 
externalities on the litigation efforts of another (e.g. assisting with additional evidence). 
 
In view of the findings for the literature, it has been alleged that a pure public enforcement 
system might achieve more effectively deterrence than a mixed public and private 
enforcement system
90
. This may be right with regard to private enforcement pursuing a pure 
deterrence objective. However, private enforcement, in particular actions for damages, may 
also aim to guarantee restitution to the victims of the competition law violation. If the 
principal objective pursued by the enforcement system is corrective justice, then private 
enforcement system may well be a superior (more effective) option than public 
enforcement
91
. First, private parties dispose of superior information on the magnitude of the 
harm suffered. Second, the proceeds go to the victims having suffered harm rather than to the 
public purse, as it is the case for fines and disgorgement in the context of public enforcement. 
Wils (2009) observes the following: 
 
“(i)f […] public antitrust enforcement is the superior instrument to pursue the 
objectives of clarification and development of the law and of deterrence and 
punishment, whereas private actions for damages are superior for the pursuit of 
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corrective justice through compensation, then the optimal antitrust enforcement 
system would appear to be a system in which public antitrust enforcement aims at 
clarification and development of the law and at deterrence and punishment, while 
private actions for damages aim at compensation”92. 
 
Consequently, any effort of coordination of public and private enforcement should integrate 
the “separate tasks approach, under which public antitrust enforcement and private actions for 
damages are each assigned the tasks they are best at”93. 
 
G. Interaction between fines and leniency 
 
Leniency programmes, “a generic term to describe a system of partial or total exoneration 
from the penalties that would otherwise be applicable to a cartel member which reports its 
cartel membership to a competition enforcement agency” (also called immunity and amnesty 
in various jurisdictions), have spread across the globe
94
. In the U.S., “corporate amnesty” and 
“corporate leniency” are used interchangeably to mean complete immunity from criminal 
conviction and from fines for the anticompetitive conduct”, while in Europe, the term 
“leniency” is preferred to refer to any reduction of fines of up to 100% (ICN, 2014). The 
interaction of leniency programmes and fines is relatively straightforward, as in essence these 
programmes provide a lenient treatment to the infringers providing useful information to the 
competition authorities in order to uncover cartels. One may also add the existence of 
settlement programmes, a sort of plea bargaining mechanism similar to leniency in its effects, 
but which does not originate from self-reporting, as leniency does, but intervenes once an 
investigation has been launched by the competition authority, thus following some already 
undergoing prosecutorial effort. The aims of these two tools of plea bargaining are also 
different: leniency aims to uncover information not available to the authorities, while 
settlements seek to reduce enforcement costs. Both tools, if well designed, increase 
deterrence. Leniency takes advantage of the internal stability problem of cartels in order to 
deter cartel formation and cartel detection at a lower enforcement cost
95
. Settlements free 
                                                     
92
 Wils, W.P.J. (2009) “The Relationship between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for 
Damages”, World Competition 32(1), 3-26, 12. 
93
 Wils, W.P. J. (2009) “The Relationship between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for 
Damages”, World Competition 32(1), 3-26, 12. 
94
 For the list of leniency policies around the globe see, ICN, Anti-cartel enforcement manual (2014), available 
at http://www.icnmarrakech2014.ma/pdf/Intl-ICN-Anti-cartel_enforcement_manual.pdf , 24. 
95
 See, for instance, Motta, M. and Polo, M. (2003) "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," International 
Journal of Industrial Organization 21, 347-379. Motchenkova, E., (2004) "Effects of Leniency Programs on 
Cartel Stability" Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, Discussion Paper 2004-98; Spagnolo, G. 
(2004, revised 2008) "Divide et Impera: Optimal leniency programs," CEPR Discussion paper series, working 
57 
 
competition authorities’ resources, thus increasing prosecution rates and detection. Yet, for 
leniency and settlements to increase deterrence, it is important that penalties are already set at 
a very high level. Although the literature concludes that the introduction of a leniency 
program makes it more difficult for firms to support collusion, it is also recognized that to the 
extent that leniency programs reduce expected fines, they may reduce deterrence. A similar 
argument was made for settlements in view of the reduction of the costs to infringers relative 
to the level of penalties that they would otherwise expect
96
. The literature has also put 
forward the possibility that cartels may make strategic use of generous leniency programmes, 
by explicitly including leniency applications in their collusive strategy in order to obtain the 
benefits of reduced fines
97
. According to Wils,   
 
“(s)uccessful cartels tend to be sophisticated organisations, capable of learning. It is 
thus safe to assume that cartel participants will try to adapt their organisation to 
leniency policies, not only so as to minimise the destabilising effect, but also, where 
possible, to exploit leniency policies to facilitate the creation and maintenance of 
cartels. This raises the question whether there could be features of leniency 
programmes that risk being exploited to perverse effects”98. 
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Competition authorities should be cautious not to compromise the deterrent effects of their 
anti-cartel policies with generous leniency programmes, without increasing before adopting a 
leniency programme the level of the financial penalties they impose to infringing 
undertakings. 
 
H. Interaction between fines and other punitive measures 
 
In many jurisdictions it is possible that criminal sanctions may be added to fines. In principle 
such accumulation of punitive sanctions will not be an issue, and may increase deterrence, in 
view of the different targets of the sanction. Fines often target only the undertakings found to 
infringe competition law (e.g. EU), while sanctions aim at individuals, often company 
managers and CEOs. These may take different forms: criminal sanctions, such as 
imprisonment or civil sanctions, such as disqualification orders on directors of undertakings. 
Imprisonment is regarded as a very strong means of deterring anti-competitive conduct. It is 
possible, for individual sanctions to benefit from the leniency programme in some 
jurisdictions (e.g. US, UK). For instance, in the UK, it is possible for individuals to benefit 
from leniency and receive full immunity from criminal prosecution. The first individual 
applying for leniency in a personal capacity may be granted a “no-action letter”. 
 
Disqualification orders for directors involved in cartel activity or abuse of dominance may be 
for a maximum period of 15 years
99
. Such requests usually take the form of an application to 
the High court in England and Wales, who will decide whether the CDO should be granted. 
The director must either have contributed to the breach of competition law, had reasonable 
grounds to suspect that the conduct of the undertaking constituted a breach, or ought to have 
known that such conduct constituted a breach. It is “immaterial whether the person knew that 
the conduct of the undertaking constituted a breach”100.  
 
We have previously discussed the interaction between fines and punitive damages in a single 
injured party action for damages cases. Some English courts have expressed concerns over 
the compatibility of such accumulation to the principle of ne bis in idem
101
, which should 
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preclude, according to them, the award of exemplary or punitive damages in an action for 
damages following a fining decision by the European Commission, even if the fine has been 
reduced or commuted to nil under the EU leniency programme. Yet, in other cases, the courts 
seem to have opened the theoretical possibility of imposing exemplary damages on top of 
fines imposed in the context of public enforcement, although this may be limited to the 
specific facts of the case, in which no fine was effectively imposed following a statutory 
immunity that did not relate to the policy objective of deterrence, as immunity resulting from 
leniency generally does
102
. Even if punitive (exemplary) damages were granted in this case, 
the court however exercised caution as their calculation. These should be awarded only where 
compensation is inadequate to punish the defendant for his outrageous conduct and should 
bear relation to the compensatory damages awarded, the CAT rejecting any reference to the 
rules for setting fines by the OFT, despite the punitive and deterrent purpose of exemplary 
damages
103
.  
 
The situation may be different for collective actions. Recognizing the difficulties that arise 
from collective actions, if exemplary damages are available, the UK Government has 
proposed in its Consultation response document for Private Actions in Competition Law to 
prohibit exemplary damages in collective action cases
104
. Should legislation be adopted on 
this issue that will lessen the tensions between public enforcement and exemplary damages, 
the two specializing in two different forms of deterrence: general deterrence for public 
enforcement and specific deterrence with regard to actions for exemplary damages? Punitive 
damages are also taken out of the picture of collective redress at the European level in the 
recent Communication of the European Commission on collective actions. The Commission 
clearly indicates that: 
 
“Collective damages actions should aim to secure compensation of damage that is 
found to be caused by an infringement. The punishment and deterrence functions 
should be exercised by public enforcement. There is no need for EU initiatives on 
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collective redress to go beyond the goal of compensation: Punitive damages should 
not be part of a European collective redress system”105. 
 
Member States should remain free, however, to adopt punitive/exemplary damages for single 
redress follow on actions. 
 
I. Effects-based approach versus formalism 
 
An approach that would emphasize corrective justice and the principle of proportionality may 
insist in setting the fine at a level corresponding to the harm caused by the anticompetitive 
conduct, including the need to take into account general and specific deterrence purposes 
relating to the specific conduct undertaken by the parties. Hence, in view of the objective of 
deterrence, one may not expect an exact correlation between the harm and the penalty. Such 
effects-based approach to fine setting will not rely, in general, on presumptions and proxies 
based on affected sales or volumes of commerce. According to economic theory, fines should 
be at least equal to the expected illegally earned profits divided by the probability to be 
caught, hence they should relate to “the ex ante extra profits originating from the violation 
and not to the extra profits actually gained that may be higher or lower than those expected at 
decision-making time”, should the fines be paid after the period of infringement106. However, 
in contrast to actual profits, expected profits are not observable and cannot be computed in 
each individual case. A full-effects based approach may be unattainable in practice in view of 
the great diversity of market configurations. At most, competition authorities may estimate 
the actual extra profits generated by the cartel if they dispose of the relevant information or 
the damages caused by it (second best effects-based approach). A more formalistic approach, 
relying on presumptions or proxies, such as a percentage of the affected sales or volumes of 
commerce, may not also be perfectly compatible with the principle of proportionality and 
corrective justice which, in an extreme formulation, would require a case-by-case 
quantification of expected gains. That said, one should take into account the costs of 
computing/estimating the expected or actual profits of an anticompetitive practice, or the 
damage caused by it. These costs may reduce the administrability of more effects-based 
approaches in setting financial penalties, in particular for fines of modest amount. High 
administrability costs may render the burden to the prosecutor, and indirectly to the tax payer, 
disproportional, in comparison to the level of fines requested. Hence, recourse to some 
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presumptions or proxies (and inevitably some degree of formalism) that would reduce the 
costs of estimating the fines may be necessary in instances where these administrative costs 
would cover an important part of the amount of the fine imposed.  
 
However, as fine levels increase, “they may eclipse the costs of more precisely estimating 
damages” and that “(f)rom an economic perspective, the administrative costs of more 
rigorous calculations are increasingly justifiable as the potential fine value rises, because 
these calculations can prevent costly errors when fines are underestimated or 
overestimated”107. It may make sense to use these methods, if expensive or time consuming, 
only for fines of a significant amount. 
 
The earlier finding that there is a large dispersion in the cartel overcharges, which we 
mentioned in reporting the Oxera study and which also explains the findings of  Allain, 
Boyer, Kotchoniz, and Ponssard that some sanctions seem to be much too high while others 
are much too low, suggests two comments. 
 
First, the legal presumptions that cartels lead to an overcharge or that cartels lead to a 
predetermined cartel overcharge (of say 10%) are not economically justified. As we saw, in 
7% of the cases it appears that cartels do not lead to any over-charge.  
 
Such presumptions are, however, occasionally relied on by courts or legislators, for example 
in the case of Hungary, whose competition law introduced a (rebuttable) presumption that a 
cartel overcharge is 10%. Such presumptions could be used as a procedural device to shift the 
burden of proof in civil matters but in no way should they be considered non rebuttable 
presumptions. 
 
Second, given the variability in the overcharge of cartels, a case by case analysis is necessary 
to establish what the appropriate level of sanctions should be and to avoid both over-
deterrence and under-deterrence. One of the crucial questions then is whether Competition 
Authorities and Courts can have the necessary data and methodology to assess the optimal 
level of fines. It is sometimes argued that Courts usually do not have the means to undertake 
a case by case analysis of the overcharge of cartels.  
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Alberto Heimler & Kirtikumar Mehta (2012) suggest that competition and courts cannot be 
expected  to do a detailed calculation of the optimal sanction in each case but should be able 
to arrive at a general  estimate, thus offering a structured effects-based approach
108
. 
 
The authors argue that a measure of ‘ex ante’ extra profits provides the conceptually correct 
starting point and they suggest how this may be calculated by making a few assumptions: 
 
(a) a 15% permanent increase in prices as a result of the cartel (which is at the upper end 
of the overcharge scale observed to date in the various studies referred to above);  
 
(b) a demand price elasticity between 0.5 and 1.2; (the authors note that if prevailing 
market demand is more elastic, then cheating would undermine any cartel that is 
formed, and if the market demand is much less elastic, then the market coverage of 
the cartel is likely to be much reduced; in other words this range is the range that 
would encourage participants to coordinate their conduct and aim at joint profit 
maximization); 
 
(c) a Lerner index values (i.e. margin divided by the price) between 0.3 and 0.8; 
 
The authors also take into consideration the fact that the violators know that the violation can 
be discovered several years after the illegal cartel practice has been implemented. Future 
sanctions are discounted by the violators who also believe that the probability of an 
infringement being discovered decreases with time since proofs decay over time. Heimler and 
Mehta assume a discount factor for the sanction equal to 5% and a decay rate of the proofs of 
5% per annum together with a probability of sanction of 20% (a rate higher than the 13% rate 
of detection suggested in previous studies to take into account the recent and growing 
effectiveness of leniency programs in the detection of cartels). 
 
Given these estimates, the authors show that the range of optimal penalties for different 
values of the price elasticity of demand and the value of the Lerner Index goes from less than 
1% to 15% of the parties’ turnover depending on the value of the price elasticity of demand 
and of the Lerner Index. 
 
Table 7: Deterrent Sanction in the Case of Cartels 
 
 Value of the Lerner Index 
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Elasticities 0,3 0,5 0,8 
0.5 15.04% 13.12% 10.2% 
0.8 13.09% 9.82% 4.9% 
1.2 10.08% 4.83% ˂1% 
 
Furthermore Heimler and Mehta observe that: “(….) the possibility of private action implies 
that deterrence is achieved with a fine reduced by a factor equal to the expected extra profits 
multiplied by the percentage of expected profits probably accepted as settlement of a damage 
claim. The probability of a follow-on action is increasing rapidly and it can be assumed to be 
equal to one. The share of expected extra profits to be granted as a damage claim can be 
assumed to be in the order of magnitude of 25% (an order of magnitude derived from 
Connor’s estimates of global settlements in Staff Paper #03-12 (Department of Agricultural 
Economics, Purdue University, November 2003). 
 
Under those assumptions regarding private enforcement the deterrent sanctions in cases of 
cartels must be adjusted as follows: 
 
Table 8: Deterrent Sanctions in the Case of cartels Adjusted for Private Enforcement 
 
 Value of the Lerner Index 
Elasticities 0.3 0.5 0.8 
0.5 12.26% 10.69% 8.31% 
0.8 10.67% 8.01% 4.00% 
1.2 8.19% 3.97% ˂1% 
 
The tables provided by Heimler and Mehta have the advantage of providing an educated 
guess of what deterrent sanctions could be, depending on two variables which are usually 
relatively easy to assess in the course of the investigation of cartels. 
 
The authors make similar suggestions for exclusionary abuses for infringements relating to 
the abuse of a dominant position. They suggest that estimates over the expected extra profits 
in relation to sales achieved by the dominant firm may be obtained by “examining the 
determinants of profits as a proportion of total revenue of a dominant firm facing a fringe of 
price take competitors”109. In this case, they assume that the expected profits originating from 
the abuse are equal to a part of the extra profits associated with dominance, in view of the 
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exclusion of competitors and would be entrants from the contestable part of the dominant 
firm’s market share110. They also acknowledge that, because of fixed costs, linked to the 
economies of scale that most usually generate dominance, profits as a proportion of sales of a 
dominant firm are less than its margin over price (e.g. Lerner index). They actually estimate 
that the expected profits over revenue are approximately half of the Lerner index itself. 
According to them, super-dominant firms have not much to gain by eliminating the little 
competition they face from the fringe, hence, the change in the Lerner index is higher the 
lower the degree of dominance. This implies that the sanction should be higher the lower the 
degree of dominance of the infringer and inversely lower the higher the degree of dominance 
of the violating firm. In view of the higher probability of detection for exclusionary abuses, 
which they estimate for most cases as high as 70% (at least 50% where the dominant firm is a 
relatively small entity and virtually 100% for super-dominant large firms), they find that the 
range of sanctions in the case of abuse of dominance should be “much lower” than in the case 
of cartels
111
. A further reason for lower fines advanced is that dominant companies have a 
better ability to raise prices and have greater incentives to pass on the fine to consumers. 
They suggest a range of 3.5%-8.3% of the value of sales to which the infringement relates 
multiplied by the number of years the infringement has lasted. This range is adjusted to a 
range of 2.7%-6.3% in the presence of extensive private enforcement (follow on actions for 
damages), on the assumption that 25% of the expected extra profits are granted as a damage 
claim (or settlement of a damage claim). 
 
Such structured effects-based approach presents some advantages, in terms of administrabiity 
concerns, with regard to the full effects-based approach in setting fines, and advantages in 
terms of accuracy in relation to more formalistic approaches relying on presumptions and 
proxies, such as a percentage of affected sales or affected commerce. They may also increase 
the predictability of fines, which has both advantages and disadvantages. 
 
J. Optimal deterrence and predictability of fines 
The adoption of detailed guidelines with clearly defined steps may increase the predictability 
of the fines, in the sense that it may limit to a certain degree the discretion of competition 
authorities or Courts. Individuals will have less incomplete knowledge of the true magnitude 
of penalties, thus enabling them to perform a cost/benefit calculation and identify situations 
where there might be a net benefit from the breach of competition law rules. This raises the 
issue of the relation between predictability of fines and optimal deterrence. Views diverge. 
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Wils (2006) put forward three reasons why predictability of fines might reduce the deterrence 
effect
112
. First, if the executives of the undertaking planning to infringe competition law are 
risk-averse, predictable fines may reduce deterrence, as it will limit the risks associated with 
engaging in anti-competitive activity and being sanctioned. Second, highly predictable fines 
may induce companies which would otherwise have been law-abiding to conclude that it is in 
their interest to infringe. Third, uncertainty as to the amount of potential fines and different 
fines and the possibility that fines may be different for each cartel member depending on their 
role in the cartel increases the variation in costs between the different cartel members, 
thereby making the cartel more unstable and thus incentivizing the cartel members to cheat. 
Uncertainty as to the proceeds of the cartel, in the presence of a differentiated penalties 
policy, will make it more difficult for colluding parties to reach agreement on who should 
bear the risks and for what reward
113
. Others have put forward that in combination with a 
leniency programme, predictable fines may enhance deterrence in view of the incentives 
created through the leniency programme by the immunity granted whistle-blowers. In a 
recent report by London Economics, commissioned by the OFT, it was stated: 
 
“(t)heoretically, there appear to be more arguments against than for predictability of 
fines. In practice, however, the two main jurisdictions (US and EU) have strived to 
make their fining decisions more transparent and more predictable. It enhances 
leniency which […] can have a powerful effect on deterrence. On balance, 
predictability may be an advantage if fine levels are on average very high but a 
disadvantage otherwise”114. 
 
K. General presentation of the fine-setting process 
 
In the following sections we perform a brief comparative analysis of the current European 
and US penalty schemes for violations of competition law, in view of the impact the EU and 
US models had on the penalties setting policies in other jurisdictions. We then sketch the 
different steps in the analysis. 
 
1. Summary of the current EU fining Guidelines 
 
It is determined in the European Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines (2006) that the 
fines must be in proportion to their intended effect in terms of prevention, in proportion to the 
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potential consequences of the prohibited practices in terms of the advantage to the offender 
and damage to competition, and in proportion to fines imposed on other companies involved 
in the same infringement. For these reasons, in determining the level of the fine, the turnover 
involved in the infringement, in principle, is taken into account. In addition, attention is also 
paid to the importance of the offender in the national economy. In this regard, in determining 
the upper bound on the fine, the total annual turnover of the undertaking is taken into 
account. 
 
The general algorithm for setting the fine for competition law violations in Europe is as 
follows. The first step consists to determine the base fine. Usually, the base fine depends on 
the type of offence, its gravity, and duration and is set by European Commission. Next, the 
fine can be changed if there are any aggravating or attenuating circumstances. Finally, the 
legal upper bound on fines in Europe, which states that the fine cannot exceed 10% of the 
overall annual turnover, is taken into account. 
 
The most recent EU 2006 Guidelines revise those adopted in 1998, with a view to increasing 
the deterrent effect of fines. Council Regulation 1/2003 provides that companies may be fined 
up to 10% of their total annual turnover. Within this limit, the revised Guidelines provide that 
fines may be based on up to 30% of the company’s annual sales to which the infringement 
relates. In particular, the basic amount of the fine will be related to a proportion of the value 
of sales, depending on the degree of gravity of the infringement, multiplied by the number of 
years of infringement (i.e. duration, d). 
 
To summarize, the total fine (F) should be put within the limit of 10% of the overall annual 
turnover (T) of the organization under investigation: F
max
=0,1T. Where T is calculated as 
total annual turnover in all the markets where firm operates, not only markets corrupted by 
cartel agreement.  
 
At the same time, turnover involved in the crime (infringement) is given by t. Further, the 
base fine f
b 
will be determined on the basis of t and the type of infringement, such that this 
base fine f 
b
 is in the range [F
min
, 0.3t].
115
 Moreover, a part of the fine – the so called “entry 
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fee”- will be imposed in hardcore cartel cases, and may be imposed in other cases, 
irrespective of the duration of the infringement. 
 
Further, the calculated base fine will be adjusted according attenuating and aggravating 
circumstances, legal maximum and bankruptcy considerations will also be taken into account. 
Firms, which apply for leniency and satisfy the requirements of the leniency program, will 
get complete or partial exemption from fines depending on the timing of application. 
 
2. Summary of the current US Sentencing Guidelines 
 
In the US, cartels are prosecuted as criminal offences, and sentences are imposed by a non-
specialized court. According to the US Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) both pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary penalties may be imposed: fines on firms and individuals, as well as 
imprisonment of individuals involved in the cartel. With regards to fines on firms, the process 
of their assessment begins with the calculation of a base fine. To determine the base fine, a 
percentage of the volume of affected commerce, that is, of total sales from the relevant market 
(t), is taken into account. The USSG suggests that 20% of the volume of affected commerce 
can be used as a good proxy (f 
b
=0.2t). This volume of affected commerce covers the entire 
duration of the infringement.  
 
Once the amount of the base fine has been calculated, aggravating and mitigating elements 
are taken into consideration. However, the final fine for undertakings must not exceed a 
maximum statutory limit which is the greatest of 100 million USD or twice the gross 
pecuniary gains the violators derived from the cartel or twice the gross pecuniary loss caused 
to the victims ( i.e. F
max
 = max {100 million, 2π, 2LossCS}). 
 
As USSG (2013) chapter 2 indicates, “the purpose for specifying a percent of the volume of 
commerce is to avoid the time and expense that would be required for the court to determine 
the actual gain or loss”. Further, they provide the following motivation:  
 
“tying the offense level to the scale or scope of the offense is important in order to 
ensure that the sanction is in fact punitive and that there is an incentive to desist from 
a violation once it has begun. The offense levels are not based directly on the damage 
caused or profit made by the defendant because damages are difficult and time 
consuming to establish. The volume of commerce is an acceptable and more readily 
measurable substitute”. 
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Most other OECD countries follow the lead of the US and EU on one or both dimensions. For 
example, in the UK the starting point for calculating antitrust fines is a fraction of the 
relevant turnover, i.e. affected commerce; the cap on fines is set at 10% of the undertaking’s 
global turnover, exactly as is the case in the EU. 
 
3. The different steps of the fines setting process 
 
The main steps in the fine-setting process across jurisdictions may be described as following:  
 
a. The base fine 
 
The base level of the financial penalty is determined in relation to the value of the infringer’s 
turnover in the affected market as a rough proxy indication of the potential gains deriving 
from the cartel, the type (and gravity) of the infringement and eventually its duration.  
 
Usually the determination of the fine takes as a starting point the level of the infringing 
company’s turnover, which relates directly to the infringement in question. The concept has 
been interpreted differently in each jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions take a narrow approach 
and refer to additional characteristics, such as the product-related turnover of the infringer or 
the total turnover of the infringing company in the specific jurisdiction or the world-wide 
consolidated turnover of the group of companies to which the infringing company belongs. 
Even these concepts are interpreted differently from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For instance, 
the global turnover refers to the overall consolidated turnover realised by the infringer and its 
subsidiaries worldwide in the relevant business year, which might be the last year of the 
Base fine 
Adjustments (including aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances) 
Limits (maxima and minima) 
Leniency and Settlements 
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infringement or the year before the finding of the infringement). In other jurisdictions, the 
global turnover taken into account is the “highest worldwide turnover, net of tax, achieved in 
one of the financial years ended after the financial year preceding that in which the practices 
were implemented” (France). The global turnover may also be relevant for the general 
purpose of deterrence and in order to increase the fine, in addition to the determination of the 
basic fine (e.g. EU Guidelines). 
 
Other competition law regimes refer to broader criteria, such as the value of sales related to 
the infringement (e.g. EU) or to the volume of the affected commerce (e.g. US). The fine is 
determined starting a percentage of this specific measure. Other concepts frequently referred 
to are the relevant turnover, the value of affected sales and/or the value of affected 
commerce. The combination of the value of sales to which the infringement relates and of the 
duration of the infringement is thought to provide “an appropriate proxy to reflect the 
economic importance of the infringement as well as the relative weight of each undertaking 
in the infringement”116. According to the US Guidelines, the volume of commerce indicated 
the volume of sales done by the company in goods or services that were affected by the 
violation. Sales of the cartelised products between cartel members are generally excluded 
from consideration. Captive sales, that is sales which are used by the undertaking in the 
production of a downstream product, may also be considered, as long as, depending on the 
facts of the case, they amount to sales indirectly related to the infringement and there is no 
double counting. 
 
With regard to the duration of the infringement, there are some slight differences as well. In 
some jurisdictions (e.g. under the 2006 Guidelines in the EU, although actual practice varies) 
the base fine is based on one year of turnover (which is the last business year for which 
figures are available) and the duration of the infringement is accounted for but multiplying 
the base fine by the length of the period of the infringement. Other jurisdictions (e.g. 
Germany) consider the duration in the base fine, because the affected commerce, for instance, 
is taken as the turnover of the company over the period of the infringement.  
 
The competition law regimes then factor in the probability of detection and/or deterrence 
considerations. For instance, in the EU, depending on the gravity of the infringement, the 
base fine can be up to 30% of relevant turnover. The base amount for hardcore cartels will be 
set at the upper end of the 30% limit. The basic amount will be multiplied for each 
undertaking by the number of years of its participation in the cartel. In addition, the 2006 EU 
Guidelines provide for an “entry fee”, that is an additional penalty of 15 to 25% of one year 
turnover for the most serious infringements (e.g. price fixing, market allocation and sharing, 
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output limitation). Some jurisdictions choose a different starting point. For instance, the 
previous OFT Guidelines on setting financial penalties retained a percentage of 10% of the 
relevant turnover of the undertaking. The most recent 2012 Guidelines increased the relevant 
turnover band to 30% brining in line the OFT practice with that of the EU Guidelines. In the 
US, the base fine for bid-rigging, price-fixing or market allocation agreements among 
competitors is commonly set at 20% of the volume of the affected commerce, which 
corresponds, as we have previously explained, to the company’s turnover in the affected 
markets over the duration of the infringement
117
. To this figure, the DOJ establishes a 
“culpability score”, taking into account a number of qualitative factors, such as firm size, the 
nature of the offence, past history of violations, obstruction of justice, degree of involvement 
in the conspiracy and the level of cooperation with the DOJ, which indicates the minimum 
and the maximum “multipliers” to apply to the base fine in order to calculate the fine range. 
Consequently, the base fine may vary from 20 to 40% of the volume of the affected 
commerce. 
 
b. Aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
 
The base fine may be adjusted further by the consideration of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances or of any estimates of any benefit made or likely to be made by the infringing 
undertaking
118
, including its size and financial position. For instance, in the EU repeat 
offenders face a 10% increase on the base fine for each previous offence. Recidivism may 
take into account previous infringements of EU competition law discovered by national 
competition authorities
119
. The Commission also increases the adjusted fine to reflect the 
large size of undertakings. Ring leadership may be an aggravating factor, which in the EU 
may result in up to 50% increase of the fine. In the US, aggravating circumstances consist in 
the prior history of the infringing undertaking (e,g. increasing the culpability score by two, if 
the offender committed an infringement for similar misconduct the last five years). Also, in 
the US, further three points are added to the culpability score if the infringer wilfully 
obstructed or impeded, aided abetted or encouraged an obstruction of justice. Non-
compliance to procedural obligations (such as false or incomplete information, lack of 
disclosure, late provision of requested information) may also be subject to further sanctions. 
Intent and premeditation constitute aggravating factors in certain jurisdictions (e.g. 
Germany). 
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Cooperation with the authorities may, on the contrary, operate as a mitigating factor resulting 
in lower fines at the end of the process in both the EU and the US. In the US, an effective 
compliance and ethics programme may constitute a mitigating circumstance for which points 
may be subtracted from the culpability score if the compliance programme is effective (see 
our discussion previously). The immediate termination of the infringement, the limited 
participation or a minor role or a passive role in the infringement can also be considered as 
mitigating factors (e.g. EU, Germany). In some jurisdictions restitution (e.g. Canada) or 
compensation (e.g. Netherlands) to victims have also been considered as mitigating 
circumstances. Some of these factors, in particular the extensive cooperation with the 
authority, are taken into account in the context of leniency policies, rather than as a 
mitigating factor adjusting the base fine.  
 
Inability to pay is indirectly considered with the provisions setting maximum fines at a 
certain percentage of the turnover. It is often considered by most competition authorities. 
This can either be done through the consideration of the proportionality principle, or by 
examining if the imposition of the fine will lead to drive the infringing undertaking from the 
market, thus reducing competition. According to the US Guidelines, the fine may also be 
reduced to the extent that its imposition would otherwise impair the infringing corporation’s 
ability to make restitution to victims. Other jurisdictions provide facilities for the payment of 
the fine, such as a debtor warrant or a deferred payment (e.g. Germany). 
 
c. Limits (Maxima and Minima) 
 
Several jurisdictions have instituted maximum statutory limits, providing for a maximum 
amount of fines against undertakings. The maximum amount of fines may take the form of a 
specific monetary amount (e.g. Chile) or be a percentage of turnover (e.g. European Union, 
Germany, France) or similar measure. Other jurisdictions use the profits gained from the 
infringement or losses caused to the victims (e.g. US where the maximum fine for a 
corporation is the greatest of 100 million USD or twice the pecuniary gains the conspirators 
derived from the crime or twice the gross pecuniary loss caused to the victims of the cartel. 
Combinations between the different measures is also possible. For an illustration of various 
maxima limits, see Table 2 above. Although none of the examined jurisdictions provides for a 
minimum limit, this is theoretically possible. 
 
d. Leniency and settlements 
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The last step in the process involves the consideration of leniency and settlements, which 
might lead to a reduction of the financial penalty imposed. 
 
III. The harm caused by cartels 
 
A. Aggregate harm of cartels and the development of presumptions 
 
There is a rich body of recent empirical literature on the subject of the aggregate harm of 
cartels to society. John Connor has constructed the most exhaustive data base on cartels 
throughout the world and in his joint work with Lande has examined the design of optimal 
presumptions of harm for cartels
120
. In doing so, in conformity with the economic theory of 
deterrence, Connor has estimated both the average overcharge of cartels and the probability 
of such cartels being caught. 
 
In their seminal 2006 paper on the size of cartel overcharge in the US and the EU, Connor 
and Lande argued that in the United States, cartels overcharged an average of 18% to 37% of 
their total sales, depending upon the data set and methodology employed in the analysis and 
whether mean or median figures are used. With respect to European cartels, the overcharge 
was found to be in the 28% to 54% range. Finally, the authors looked at cartels that had 
effects solely within a single European country and found that overcharges averaged between 
16% and 48%. The authors then compared these overcharges with the level of criminal or 
administrative fines imposed on those cartels and found that, on average, the cartel 
overcharges were significantly larger than the criminal fines in either the European Union or 
the United States. They concluded that since in those jurisdictions the cartel fines did not 
even cover the overcharge of the cartels, the United States and - especially - the European 
Union should increase their penalties for hard core collusion substantially. 
 
Connor (2006) also assessed the antitrust fines and private penalties imposed on the 
participants of 260 international cartels discovered during 1990–2005, using four indicators 
of enforcement effectiveness
121
. Among other things, he found that  median government 
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antitrust fines average less than 10% of affected commerce, but rises to about 35% in the case 
of multi-continental conspiracies; that civil settlements in jurisdictions where they are 
permitted are typically 6 to 12% of sales; and  that global cartels prosecuted in Europe and 
North America typically paid less than single damages. 
 
In its most recent paper (2014), J. M. Connor surveys more than 700 published economic 
studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of 
hard-core cartels
122
. His primary findings are the following:  
 
“(1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time 
periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their 
zenith in 1891-1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel 
episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 
38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% 
more effective at raising prices than unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct 
displays 25% lower mark-ups than price-fixing cartels; (8) when cartels operate at 
peak effectiveness, price changes are 60% to 80% higher than the whole episode; and 
(9) laboratory and natural market data find that the Cartel Monopoly Index (CMI) 
varies from 11% to 95%.”   
 
He finally concludes that "historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels 
are likely to be too low".  
 
The work by Connor and Lande has inspired a number of authors to undertake studies 
refining their methodology in order to assess the level of overcharges from cartels. One such 
study was prepared for the European Commission by Oxera and a multi-jurisdictional team of 
lawyers and economists in December 2009
123
. Oxera removed from the Connor data set a 
large number of observations based on a number of criteria, in particular focusing only on 
estimates obtained from peer-reviewed academic articles and chapters in published books. It 
also refined the sample of cartels examined by Connor, by considering only cartels that 
started after 1960 (thus taking into account only more recent cartels), for which an estimate of 
the average overcharge was available (rather than only an estimate of the highest or lowest 
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overcharge), for which the relevant background study explicitly explained the method for 
calculating the average overcharge estimate. 
 
In the distribution of cartel overcharges across this adjusted data set of 114 observations (out 
of more than 1,000 initially), the overcharge range with the greatest number of observations 
is 10–20%. Oxera found that in this data set the median overcharge was 18% of the cartel 
price, which is not far from the 20% found by Connor and Lande. However, since the 
variation in observed overcharges is large, the authors considered the distribution of 
overcharges and not only the median or average.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of cartel overcharges in empirical studies of past cartels: 
indicative results from new sample selected by Oxera, based on Connor and Lande 
(2008)
124
 
 
In 93% of the past cartel cases in the sample, the overcharge as a percentage of the cartel 
price was above zero. This supports the theory that, in most cases, the cartel overcharge can 
be expected to be positive, although it also indicates that there is a small but significant 
proportion of cartels (7%) where there is no overcharge.  
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In another study, Posner (2001) presents the overcharges for 12 cartel cases, with a median 
value of 28% of the cartel price.  Elsewhere, Levenstein and Suslow (2006), based on their 
review of 16 cartel case studies, find that ‘virtually every cartel case study surveyed reports 
that the cartel was able to raise prices immediately following cartel formation’.  
 
A 2002 OECD study (OECD Competition Committee Report on the Nature and Impact of 
Hard Core Cartels and Sanctions against Cartels under National Competition Laws) based on 
a limited survey of 14 cartel cases conducted by its members between 1996 and 2000 finds 
that the median overcharge was between 15 and 20%.  The OECD report adds: “At the very 
least it seems clear that the gain from cartel agreements can vary significantly from case to 
case, and sometimes it can be very high. Moreover, since the actual loss to consumers 
includes more than just the gain transferred to the cartel (….), the total harm from cartels – 
is significant indeed”. Werden (2003) reviews 13 other studies, and arrives at a median 
overcharge of 15% of the cartel price. Conducting a meta-analysis of cartel overcharge 
estimates, Boyer and Kotchoni (2014) found a mean and median overcharge estimate of 
15.76% and 16.43%. 
 
Altogether these studies are highly consistent with one other on several points. In only 7% of 
the cases there is no overcharge. In more than 90% of the cases cartels result in an 
overcharge. The median overcharge by cartels is between 10 and 20% of the cartel price. 
However there is a wide distribution of results across cartels and hence a case by case study 
is in order. 
 
This literature has given rise to presumptions of cartel overcharge used in the context of 
either setting financial penalties in the context of public enforcement or in order to compute 
damages in the context of private enforcement.  
 
In the context of private enforcement, the nature of the presumption is causal, as its aim is to 
facilitate the burden of proof of the claimants in damages cases against cartelists, in order to 
establish that they have been harmed as a result of a specific cartel (hence this relates to the 
individual harm of the specific cartel to the claimant). The claimant is not expected to bring 
forward concrete evidence of harm and overcharge, in order to establish the causal link 
between the cartel and the harm suffered, in case a cartel has been found, but may rely on a 
rebuttable presumption of harm/overcharge. This presumption is built on the high likelihood 
that a cartel leads to overcharges, in more than 9 out of 10 cases, on the basis of the empirical 
analysis available. 
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For instance, the recent Draft Directive voted by the European Parliament on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of competition law sets 
up a causal presumption for cartels in order to “remedy the information asymmetry and some 
of the difficulties associated with quantifying antitrust harm, and to ensure the effectiveness 
of claims for damages”125. As it is explained in the relevant Recital of the Directive, 
 
“it is appropriate to presume that in the case of a cartel infringement, such infringement 
resulted in harm, in particular via a price effect. Depending on the facts of the case this 
means that the cartel has resulted in a rise in price, or prevented a lowering of prices 
which would otherwise have occurred but for the infringement. This presumption should 
not cover the concrete amount of harm”126. 
 
Accordingly, the Draft Directive requires Member States to establish a presumption that 
cartel infringements cause harm, also recognizing to the infringer the right to rebut this 
presumption
127
. We should note however, that as we mentioned earlier, this presumption is 
not economically justified since 7% ¨of cartels seem not to lead to an overcharge. If it is used 
as a device to simplify the work of antitrust authorities or courts, it should remain a rebuttable 
presumption.  
 
In the context of public enforcement, competition authorities most often make use of 
presumptions of harm, again on the basis of the empirical evidence on the average overcharge 
of cartels. For instance, the United States Sentencing Guidelines recommends a basic fine of 
10% of the affected volume of commerce to a firm convicted of cartel collusion, plus another 
10% for the harms “inflicted upon consumers who are unable or for other reasons do not buy 
the product at the higher price”. This generates a fine of 20% of the affected volume of 
commerce, subject to further adjustments for aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The 
Sentencing Commission, which adopted the Sentencing Guidelines in 1987 explained the 
choice of this 20% by the fact that it doubled the figure representing the average overcharge 
of cartels (10%) in order to account for losses, including customers who are priced out of the 
market (counterfactual customers). In the EU, the basic fine is set in a range up to 30% of the 
relevant turnover over the duration of the infringement, presumably also taking into account 
empirical evidence that the median overcharge of cartels is between 15-20%, with more than 
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40% of the population of cartels in these studies having an overcharge of more than 30%, on 
top of the need to factor in deterrence. 
 
By being a step in the fine-setting process, such presumption entails the risk that it will be 
sued mechanically without taking into account the real harm that the specific cartel may have 
caused. As cartels are considered anticompetitive by their object in the EU or per se 
prohibited in the US, there is no effort made by the Competition authorities to determine the 
harm of the cartel when establishing the existence of the competition law infringement, with 
the result that this information is unavailable at the stage of setting the fine. The use of 
presumptions facilitates the work of competition authorities at this stage, to the price, 
however, of accuracy and a better linkage between the harm caused (including the need for 
general and specific deterrence) and the sanction, as would have implied the reference to the 
principle of proportionality of sanctions. This preference for a formalistic approach explains 
also the institution of statutory maximum fines. The attraction of this form-based approach 
consists in saving the administrative costs and human resources that would have been 
required for the assessment of the harm of the cartel. As it is rightly explained by Harrington 
(2014)  
 
“(European Commission’s) fines are tied to revenue in the affected markets and not to 
incremental profits or customer losses, so the penalty does not scale up with the 
overcharge. If we take these estimates on face value, the only cartels that will form are 
those with abnormally high overcharges which are the ones imposing the largest losses on 
consumers. The problem here resides in the penalty formula not being proportional to the 
additional profits from colluding. […] That is the case in the U.S. as well. Though U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines have a maximum of “not more than the greater of twice the gross 
gain or twice the gross loss,” apparently that sort of calculation is not standard practice 
when the U.S. Department of Justice sets a fine That cartel profits are not taken account 
of in setting or negotiating fines is a criticism of both the competition authority and the 
body that sets their budget. One defense of this practice is that it is too costly to calculate 
those profits. That does not seem credible. There are many plaintiffs who perform exactly 
that exercise for much smaller markets involving much smaller sums. If a plaintiff can 
engage in a cost effective calculation of the impact of collusion on profits when hundreds 
of thousands of dollars of claims are at stake then a competition authority should be able 
to do so when millions of dollars of fines are at stake. A second defense is that a 
competition authority has limited resources and it is better for it to use those resources to 
develop additional cases. That is a valid point but then the argument should be made to 
increase the competition authority’s budget so they can engage in the proper setting of 
fines. We must remember that the ultimate goal is not to convict and penalize cartels but 
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rather to deter their formation, and that requires tying penalties to illicit profits. This point 
is worth emphasizing as competition authorities may attach too much weight to disabling 
cartels relative to deterring cartels”128. 
 
B. The need for an effects-based approach: assessing the individual harm of cartels 
 
Various methods to estimate cartel overcharge have been advanced in the literature, and they 
are frequently used for the computation of the quantum of damages following a competition 
law infringement
129
. The European Commission Staff has also prepared a practical guide 
quantifying harm in actions for damages cases, which provides a detailed and non-technical 
analysis of the different methodologies employed in economic research to quantify harm
130
. 
We summarize the different methodologies available: 
 
(i) Comparator-based approaches: before and after approaches (time-series) or 
approaches comparing prices in the cartelized market with those in ‘similar’ 
uncartelised markets in other geographic regions (cross-sectional approaches, the 
yardstick method) or difference in differences approaches. These approaches 
involve the estimation of the correlation between the pre-cartel prices in the 
cartelized or similar markets and the post-cartel prices in these markets, cross-
sectional econometrics, time-series econometrics and panel data regression;  
 
(ii) Financial cost-based approaches: which construct a “but for” cartel price “bottom 
up”, by measuring the relevant costs and comparing the average of marginal unit 
costs plus a reasonable mark-up with actual prices. This also involves some form 
of quantitative methods (bottom-up costing, valuation);  
 
(iii) Market-structure based approaches: these involve the use of simulation models in 
order to estimate the losses incurred, using different models of oligopolistic 
behaviour (Cournot, Bertrand) to predict the Lerner index of market power or to 
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estimate a demand and cost function that account for dynamic market 
conditions
131
. 
 
One of the main differences between the evaluation of fines and that of damages is that, first, 
courts have in general a broad discretion and are free to choose which methodology is best 
suited to the facts of the case, while the discretion of the Commission is limited with regard 
to the method of evaluation of fines (self-limitation through the joint effect of the guidelines 
on the method of setting fines (above) and the principle of legitimate expectations, as well as 
limitations through the operation of the proportionality principle e.g. final amount of the fine 
shall not, in any event, exceed 10 % of the total turnover in the preceding business year of the 
undertaking or association of undertakings participating in the infringement, Second, fines 
generally aim at deterrence, while damages are perceived in Europe as mostly inspired by the 
principle of compensation, although, of course, the right to compensation may also have a 
deterrent effect
132
. Thirdly, the calculation of damages for cartel infringements provides also 
the possibility to take into account of potential positive effects of cartels to consumers 
(efficiency gains), “like for instance, lower transportation costs or higher supply reliability”, 
which if significant would “have to be balanced against the potential negative effects to 
customers” in order to calculate the factual damages133. This is of course impossible in the 
context of calculating fines, because of the principle of deterrence. It follows, that the 
potential scope of intervention of econometric techniques will be more limited in the 
calculation of fines, should the Commission move to a more economics approach.  
 
There are various examples of an individual assessment of the amount of overcharge, in 
particular in the context of private enforcement for damages, as in both US and EU law 
cartels are prohibited per se or by their object, hence there is no need to establish the 
existence and the likely amount of consumer harm in order to apply Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act or Article 101 TFEU. 
 
The recent German Cement cartel case and the judicial scrutiny exercised by the Higher 
Regional Court Düsseldorf (OLG), which has specialized chambers for antitrust matters, to 
the decision of the Federal Cartel Office to impose a fine for additional turnover related to a 
cartel in the cement industry (making use of the possibility offered to the FCO by German 
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law to order the disgorgement of benefits) illustrates the different approaches that EU and 
national courts may take with regard to the assessment of evidence of a cartel overcharge
134
. 
In the cement cartel case, the Court reviewed the fines both under the law applicable in 2003 
(when the decision of the FCO was adopted, which provided for disgorgement of profits-
related fines of up to three times the additional proceeds obtained through a cartel). As the 
fines aimed to skim-off additional earnings related to the infringement, the economic 
evidence presented at the Court resembled to that usually submitted for the evaluation of 
antitrust damages. The OLG appointed an expert and quantified the additional turnover based 
on the econometric assessment submitted by the expert. With regard to the standard of proof, 
the OLG has a broad discretion to choose the best suited methodology so that the results are 
conclusive and economically reasonable. With the help of the expert, the Court identified the 
appropriate methodologies: among the different ones available for the evaluation of damages, 
the expert ruled out comparator-based geographical yardstick methods, as there were 
significant differences in market characteristics between the different regions and countries. 
The expert suggested instead a during-and-after time series approach, which involved the 
choice of an appropriate reference period (the period not influenced by the cartel). The Court 
followed the expert’s suggestions on the design of the empirical method for the estimation of 
additional turnover. The court expert then proceeded to the application step, carrying out the 
analysis using data submitted by the parties, before performing robustness checks, allowing 
the various parties (the FCO, the defendants, the public prosecutor) to put forward additional 
questions and criticisms
135
. These were extensively discussed in the judgment, although the 
OLG did not perform a control of the external validity of the evidence. The Court did not 
explain why it relied only on the time series method, but included some discussion of why it 
did not follow the regional yardstick analysis (essentially, because the prices in the other 
regional markets were either certainly or at least probably also affected by cartels). This may 
be owed to the fact that the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) had indicated in an earlier case 
that yardstick approaches (i.e. the comparison to the development of comparable markets) 
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was generally a superior approach compared to model-based approaches.
136
 The BGH later 
essentially upheld the OLG Düsseldorf’s judgment in the Cement case. 
 
 
C. The practice of the Chilean competition authority 
 
According to Article 26, paragraph 3 of the Chilean Competition Act, as amended by Statue 
No. 20.361, for the estimation of the fine to be imposed the Competition Tribunal (TDLC) 
should “consider the economic benefit gained as a result of the infringement, the seriousness 
of the conduct and recidivism, but also –and fundamentally– the damage to competition”137. 
FNE has proceeded in various instances to a case by case analysis of the effects of the cartel 
and the amount of the cartel overcharge or the excess profits gained by the cartel. In contrast 
to US, EU, UK, German and French competition law, it is thus possible to rely on an 
individual case by case analysis, rather than on proxies or presumptions, when assessing the 
compatibility of a collusive conduct to competition law or at the stage of setting fines or 
evaluating damages. Note however, that nothing precludes those authorities from conduction 
a case by case analysis. This constraint imposed by the Chilean competition law regime when 
assessing the compatibility of cartel conduct to competition law (in the sense that must be 
applied to cartel activity) may become an advantage if the information is used to design 
optimal cartel sanctions that take into account the amount of the overcharge and integrate the 
optimal enforcement theory’s focus on deterrence, in view of the low probability of detection 
of cartels in Chile. Indeed, it is only since 2009 that the agency has had, as part of its anti-
cartel toolkit, intrusive investigative powers (including dawn raid and wiretapping authority) 
and a leniency programme. The leniency programme has enabled so far the discovery of one 
cartel in the Whirlpool/ Tecumseh do Brasil Ltda investigation in 2012, which represents the 
first time in Chile a leniency application has resulted in the successful prosecution of a cartel. 
The high standard of proof for cartels, in view of the requirement to prove market power, 
may also lower the probability of detection of cartels in Chile, thus inviting for a more drastic 
consideration of deterrence at the stage of setting fines with the inclusion of a “deterrent 
factor”, as it is the case in the context of the EU Commission’s Guidelines in setting fines for 
competition law infringements.  
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We examine three cases in which the Chilean competition authority has evaluated excess 
gains of cartel activity. The cases presented below in a chronological order include: (a) Retail 
pharmacy chains, (b) commercialization of low power, hermetic compressors for the 
manufacturing of refrigerators and, (c) poultry meat production. We then comment on the 
practice followed. 
 
1. Case studies 
 
(a) In the Retail pharmacy chains case, initiated in the FNE filed a complaint against the 3 
main retail pharmacies: Farmacias Ahumada, Cruz Verde and Salcobrand accusing them of 
concerted action resulting in the price increase of around 200 drugs between December 2007 
and March 2008. The FNE estimated the excess gain as overprice charged for each drug 
multiplied by the quantities sold for the entire period of collusion.  
According to the information obtained during investigation the excess gain amounted to:  
 
Pharmacy Chain Gain (in 
UTA) 
Farmacias Ahumada   16,856  
Cruz Verde  29,009  
Salcobrand  14,472  
Total  60,338  
 
The above estimation is just a proxy, considering that it does not take into consideration the 
loss of those consumers that could not afford to buy the product due to its elevated price in 
addition to not accounting for dynamic inefficiencies. Furthermore, it does not account for 
the perpetrating effect in the market. In fact, the coordination between the three retail 
pharmacy chains shifted the equilibrium price upwards, which meant that, to date, long after 
the detection and conviction of the cartel, prices remain high. Until December of the 2008, 
the last month with available data, considering this perpetrating effect the gains obtained 
amounted to: 
 
Pharmacy Chain Gain (in 
UTA) 
Farmacias Ahumada   20,191  
Cruz Verde  32,055  
Salcobrand  16,719  
Total  68,965  
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The total gains obtained by the three pharmacies, even only considering the period with 
available data, exceeded the then maximum fine established by the Chilean Competition Law, 
set at UTA 20,000. 
 
(b) In the commercialization of low power, hermetic compressors for the manufacturing of 
refrigerators case, initiated in 2010, the FNE filed a complaint against Whirlpool S.A. and 
Tecumseh Do Brasil Ltda., the main providers of low power, hermetic compressors for the 
manufacturing of refrigerators, who participated in an international cartel that went back to 
2004. 
 
As part of the trial, the FNE submitted to the Competition Tribunal an economic report that 
justified the amount of fine requested on the basis of the estimation of the excess gains 
obtained by the cartel.  
 
The estimation of excess gains required the determination of the duration of the cartel as well 
as the overcharge charged during the price-fixing period. Tecumseh fully collaborated with 
information and data, as opposed to Whirlpool, who delivered inexact and incomprehensive 
data, impossible to be used for the analysis. As a result, the FNE relied exclusively on the 
Tecumseh data and used extrapolation to draw results on Whirlpool.  
 
The duration of the cartel was determined by qualitative information obtained by Tecumseh, 
according to which the cartel dated back to the beginning of 2004 and terminated around 
February of 2009.  
 
For the determination of a counterfactual, it was assumed that after the termination of the 
agreement the two firms returned gradually towards more competitive levels until December 
2009 by which time the market had fully returned to competitive conditions. Excess gains 
were then estimated using the profit margin of December 2009 as a counterfactual. The use of 
profit margins instead of prices for the estimation of excess gains addressed the defence 
argument that associated the high prices during the period of the collusion to the rising cost of 
commodities such as iron that were essential inputs for the production of compressors. The 
excess profits were then estimated as the real profits obtained by the two firms minus the 
profits that would have been obtained had margins been at the level of December 2009.    
 
Overall, it is estimated that margins were varying between 100% and 140%, during collusion, 
far in excess of the 33% observed in December 2009. According to the above, Tecumseh 
gained the sum of CLP 4.4 billion, or approximately USD 8.5 million.  
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Excess profits for Whirlpool were estimated by means of proportionality using the average 
market share of Whirlpool for the period of 2004-2009 which was at 58%. This brought 
excess profits at CLP 7.2 billion or USD 14 million. The FNE then requested a fine equal to 
the excess gain obtained by the cartel, amounting to approximately UTA 15,000.  
 
The Competition Tribunal ruled against Whirlpool and set the fine of UTA 10,500, lower 
than the gains directly accountable to the cartel, as calculated by the FNE
138
. 
 
(c) The third case relates to a complaint filed by FNE before the Competition Tribunal 
(TDLC) in 2011, accusing the three main poultry meat producers in Chile (i.e., “Agrosuper”, 
“Ariztía” and “Don Pollo”) of cartelization. The cartel was implemented and monitored by 
the Poultry Meat Producers’ Trade Association (APA – Asociación de Productores Avícolas 
de Chile A.G.). 
 
The FNE claimed that the agreement –which was operating for at least 10 years-, was 
overseen and coordinated through the Trade Association and aimed to reduce the production 
of poultry meat in the Chilean market by controlling the quantity of meat offered and by 
assigning market shares to each party.  
 
Taking into account the severity of their actions, the duration of the conduct, the market 
power the agreement conferred to the companies involved and the product (poultry meat is an 
essential product for lower income consumers), the FNE asked for the maximum penalty 
established in the act to be applied to each company cartelized – that is, 30,000 UTA (around 
USD 26 mil.) each. Additionally, the FNE asked for a penalty of 20,000 UTA and the 
dissolution of the Trade Association, due to its central role in coordinating and maintaining 
the cartel. 
This is the first time that the FNE made use of the recently acquired powers of dawn raids 
and hence constitutes a milestone in the history of persecution of cartels in Chile. The case is 
being litigated before the Competition Tribunal and is expected to be sentenced within 2014. 
 
The estimation of harm of the cartel was commissioned to two academics of the University of 
Chile, Andrés Gomes-Lobo and José Luis Lima. The authors estimated the real present value 
of the direct harm using the following formula: 
 
𝐷𝑖 = ∑ (1 + 𝜌)
(𝜏−𝑡) (𝑝𝑖𝑡
1 −𝑝𝑖𝑡
0 )𝑞𝑖𝑡
1
𝑈𝐹𝑡
𝑇𝑖
𝑡=1      (1) 
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Where: 
 
𝑝𝑖𝑡
1  is the observed wholesale price charged by company 𝑖 in month 𝑡 
𝑝𝑖𝑡
0  is the wholesale price in the absence of collusion for company 𝑖 in month 𝑡 
𝑞𝑖𝑡
1  is the observed quantity sold by company 𝑖 in month 𝑡 
𝜌 is the monthly discount rate that allows to bring the economic harm at month 𝑡 to its current 
value 
𝑇𝑖 is the last month of information 
𝑈𝐹𝑡 is the average value of UF
139
 in month 𝑡 
 
The estimation of this formula presented two difficulties, the first and most obvious was the 
estimation of the counterfactual, 𝑝𝑖𝑡
0 . In addition, the data available to the FNE covered the 
period of January 2006 until December 2010. However, the agreement between poultry meat 
producers goes back 1996. The authors of the report decided to estimate backwards up to 
1996 using the following formula: 
 
𝐷𝑖
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 =  {𝑠𝑝̅̅ ̅𝑖 ∙ 𝑞𝑖 ̅̅ ̅ ∙ (1 + 𝜌)
(𝜏−(𝑠𝑖−1)) ∙ (1 +
1
𝜃
) ∙ [1 −
1
(1+𝜃)(𝑠𝑖−1)
]} + {∑ (1 + 𝜌)(𝜏−𝑡) ∙ 𝑠𝑝𝑖 ∙
𝑇𝑖
𝑡=𝑠𝑖
𝑞𝑖𝑡} (2) 
 
The first bracket on the right hand side of equation (2) expresses the backward estimation of 
harm from 1996 until 2005 as a function of average overprice 𝑠𝑝̅̅ ̅𝑖 charged during the 
observed period multiplied by the average quantities sold during the observed period and 
adjusted by 𝜃 =
1+𝑔
1+𝜌
− 1, with 𝑔 being a parameter that reflects the average growth rate of 
sales during the unobserved period. According to the information provided by the Trade 
Association 𝑔 = 4.0%. In addition the authors considered 𝜌 = 3.17%, which is the average 
annual interest rate of 10-year Bonds offered by the Central Bank between 2002 and 2011.  
 
For the estimation of total damages (2), the only term that remains unknown is the 
counterfactual, 𝑝𝑖𝑡
0 . Three different methodologies were used in order to estimate overprice, i) 
the comparison of domestic prices with prices observed in the USA and Brazil (using 
purchasing power parity), ii) comparison of domestic prices with prices of exports, and iii) 
use of simulation to forecast the competitive outcome, whereby the firms are involved in a 
Cournot type competition with homogeneous products. 
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The results of the statistical analysis show that domestic prices were 33%-45% higher than 
the prices in Brazil or the USA in purchasing power parity. In comparison to the export price, 
domestic prices were between 28%-67% higher
140
. Finally the simulation model, estimates an 
overprice that varies between 12.9% and 15.9% assuming price elasticity of -0.93 and 
between 15.9% and 17.9% assuming a price elasticity of -1.393
141
. 
 
The estimation of damages uses the most conservative of the estimations of overprice; 
namely the result of the simulation models assuming price elasticity of -0.93. The results 
show that even with the most conservative estimation of overprices, damages were as high as 
USD 850 million, far exceeding the maximum fines established in the Chilean competition 
law.  
 
2. Comments 
 
Generally, the approach employed for fine imposition by the Chilean competition authority in 
the three cases analysed below is valid and roughly follows the logic close to the structure of 
the current EU antitrust guidelines on the method of setting fines.  
 
In the first two cases Chilean competition authority starts by assessing the gravity of the 
violation. This is done by estimating excess illegal gains for each member of the agreement. 
In the second and third case also duration of the cartel agreement has been taken into account. 
Then the fine imposed on each firm aims to extract the entire excess illegal gain obtained 
during the period of the violation. However, the final imposed fines were adjusted 
downwards due to the existence of the maximum fine established by the Chilean Competition 
Law or due to proportionality considerations. 
 
In the first case (Retail Pharmacies) excess illegal gains for each member of the cartel 
agreement were estimated as price-overcharge for each product multiplied by the quantities 
sold for the entire period of collusion. This approach seems to be supported by the economic 
theory (see section 2 below). However, existing sentencing guidelines in the two leading 
jurisdictions (EU and US) tend to avoid this method due to time and expense considerations 
that would be required to determine the actual overcharges in all the cases. 
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The method employed in the second case (Whirlpool-Tecumseh) seems to be the closest to 
the best current practices. In section 1.2 below, we will provide detailed explanations. 
 
In the third case (Poultry Meat Producers) the method employed for estimation of illegal 
gains was quite precise, but very specific to the case. Hence, it will be difficult to extend to 
general setting, since the rules of the fining guidelines should ideally be applicable ex-ante to 
all cases. 
 
Next, we will move to more detailed analysis of each of the three cases. 
 
a. Retail Pharmacies case 
 
The retail pharmacies case suggests several comments in light of our previous discussion: 
 
First, it appears that the FNE requested fines are a function of the direct estimate of the illicit 
profit by the pharmacies due to their collusion.  
 
The calculus of the overcharge avoids the biases referred to by Allain, Boyer, Kotchoniz, and 
Ponssard  (2013) when they criticize Connor for calculating biased and inflated estimates of 
average illicit surcharges and the distortive effect of sanctions based on total revenue 
mentioned by Bageri, Katsoulacos and Spagnolo (2013). 
 
Second to assess the harm of the collusion, the FNE takes into consideration the illegal profit 
of the pharmacists rather than the welfare losses due to the collusion. The welfare losses due 
to the collusion are greater than the illegal gains of the pharmacists since the consumers who 
were discouraged from consuming because of the higher price also experienced a decrease in 
their consumer surplus. The (legal) reason for which competition authorities usually do not 
include the consumer loss of the consumers which have been discouraged from buying in 
their computation of the harm of cartels (ie. the deadwright loss) is that the amount that 
would have been bought had the collusion not been in effect but was not bought because of 
the increase in price due to collusion is usually not easy to assess and could be considered too 
speculative for courts to consider.  
 
Third, the pharmacy case is a good example of the issues raised by Katsoulacos and Ulph 
(2013). It seems on the one hand that the collusion took place between December 2007 and 
March 2008 and had an effect that lasted longer than the duration of the collusive practice 
since it seems that the collusion “shifted the equilibrium price upwards”. It is often quite 
difficult to know when a market gets back to a competitive equilibrium level after a collusion 
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has been uncovered. Furthermore, the decision to sanction the cartel became final with the 
decision of the Supreme Court on September 2012, more than four years after the collusion 
ended.  
 
Any comparison between the calculated harm and the sanction would have two biases. The 
gains of the cartel would be underestimated since the cartel lasted probably longer than 
December 2008 (the last month for which data was available). The severity of the sanction 
imposed on the pharmacists would be overestimated since this sanction intervened several 
years after the end of the period during which data were available to estimate the harm to 
consumers.  
 
This means that had the pharmacists made a rational calculation in December 2007 to know 
whether they would violate the law, they would have taken into consideration more profits 
than the recorded profits and they would have discounted the sanction given that the sanction 
would only intervene several years after their collusion.  
 
In turn this means that a sanction equal to their recorded profits divided by the probability of 
their collusion being sanctioned underestimates the optimal sanction. 
 
Fourth, there is a cap on the amount of the sanction that can be imposed on the colluding 
firms and it appears that globally the amount of extra profit which the pharmacists were able 
to have due to their collusion is lower than the amount of the fine they received. As 
mentioned in the review of the literature, the existence of a cap on sanctions can prevent the 
sanction from being deterrent.  
 
In the case of the pharmacists it is clear that ex post profits from the collusion are greater than 
the sanctions imposed. Furthermore the profits from the collusion may also be an 
underestimate of the ex ante profits that the pharmacists expected (if they expected that the 
market would not get back to a competitive equilibrium immediately after December 2008) 
and the sanction is an overestimate of the ex ante cost of the sanction since it was imposed 
only in 2012 and therefore several years after the pharmacists benefitted from a large part of 
the illicit profits. 
 
Even if the probability of detection and sanction is equal to one (and we can guess that it is 
lower than one), the fine imposed on the pharmacists does not seem to be deterrent. 
 
One should add, however, that if there were additional sanctions on the cartel participants, 
(such as, for example, the negative publicity they got from being sanctioned for collusion) or 
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follow on actions for damages, they should be taken into consideration to know whether the 
enforcement against their collusion was deterrent.   
 
Finally we should keep in mind that general deterrence is based on the ex ante perceptions of 
the would-be violators (both in terms of anticipated profits and in terms of risk of 
punishment) rather than on ex post data.  
 
b. Whirlpool-Tecumseh case 
 
The cartel agreement consisted of two companies (Whirlpool S.A. and Tecumseh Do Brasil 
Ltda.). It lasted for a period of roughly 6 years (beginning of 2004 – February of 2009). 
Tecumseh Do BrasilLtda came forward, cooperated with the authority, applied for Leniency 
and as a result was exempted from the fine.  
 
The amount of fine imposed on the second member of the cartel (Whirlpool S.A.), which did 
not cooperate with the authority, was justified on the basis of estimation of the excess illegal 
gains obtained by the cartel and duration of the cartel. Excess gains seem to be correctly 
estimated through comparison to counterfactual profit margin (profit margin of December 
2009, when the market had fully returned to competitive equilibrium). The excess profits 
were then estimated as the real profits obtained by the firms minus the profits that would have 
been obtained had margins been at the level of December 2009. The Chilean competition 
authority then requested a fine equal to the excess gain obtained by the cartel, amounting to 
approximately USD 14 million. After the appeal before the Supreme Court the fine has been 
reduced to about USD 4.9 million. It was argued that a lower fine also met the deterrence and 
retribution objectives of fines in competition law, which could have been related to the 
application of proportionality principle that states that the fine should not be in excess of the 
minimum fine that achieves the same level of deterrence.
142
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This case again raises the issue of the duration of cartels. It is well known that once a price 
agreement is terminated, the market does not get back to the competitive equilibrium 
immediately. The FNE rightly determined that the end of the effect of the cartel was when the 
market had returned to competitive conditions.  
 
The FNE was also right to focus on profit margins rather than on prices. When a cartel lasts a 
number of years it is quite possible that variation in cost conditions may have an impact on 
prices independently of the level of competition. The profit margin is a good indicator of the 
market power exercised by the cartel members and of the loss of surplus of consumers due to 
the exercise of this market power. 
 
The methodology used by the FNE to assess the profit margin of Whirlpool assumes that 
Whirlpool had the same costs and the same prices than Tecumseh. If the compressor for 
refrigerators are standardized and undifferentiated, the assumption is not problematic. If there 
are sharp differences in product design or in production technology between the two 
manufacturers, the assumptions may not reflect the reality. However, given the lack of 
cooperation of Whirlpool, and the fact that, since the producers had formed a cartel, we can 
assume that their compressors must have been close substitutes, the fact that the NFE resorted 
to this pragmatic approach is entirely justified. Whirlpool could have chosen to cooperate if it 
considered the implicit assumptions of the FNE to be wrong. 
 
The reason for which the Supreme Court decreased the fine to UTA 5,000, and argued that a 
lower fine also met the deterrence and retribution objectives of fines in competition law is not 
clear. Unless one assumes that Whirlpool was likely to be sued for compensation by its 
clients (in which case the amount of damage likely to be awarded should be added to the fine 
to assess the sanction imposed on Whirlpool), or had faced very high legal fees, or had 
registered a large loss in reputation due to the publicity on the case, it seems that the sanction 
of Whirlpool is roughly a third of its extra profit due to the collusion.  If that is indeed the 
case, the message sent to would be violators is that they can expect, if they are caught, to be 
fined a third of the illicit gains that they will have secured thanks to their collusion. This 
would mean that collusion would be profitable even if they had a 100% chance of being 
caught. From an economic standpoint even some risk averse firms would find it in their 
interest to enter into collusion. It is also difficult to see how such a fine meet the retribution 
goal.  
 
Altogether, this case seems typical of the conflict we discussed when we stated: “In the 
competition law area, there is thus a risk that review courts (adhering to the legal principle of 
proportionality and the implicit “retribution approach” or “moral acceptability approach” to 
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sanctions) may find sanctions imposed (or requested)  by competition authorities (adhering to 
the economic principle of deterrence and the implicit “cost minimization approach” to 
sanctions) disproportional and therefore tend to reduce the amount of the sanctions to  non-
deterring levels”. 
 
The method employed in this second case seems to closer to the current practices in the EU 
and the US and can even be considered as a relatively advanced approach. Here, similarly to 
algorithms proposed in the USSG (2013) and EU guidelines (2006),
143
 the illegal gains are 
estimated, multiplied by duration of an infringement and then the fine is set equal to the 
calculated amount. However, there are some caveats with this approach. This approach is 
only appropriate for ex-post fine imposition, in case it is certain that cartel is discovered. 
However, as has been noted in Posner (2001) or Cooter and Ulen (2007), taking into account 
that the rate of law enforcement is generally lower than 1 (i.e. only fraction of the companies 
can be investigated), the ex-ante expected fine, which is generally described in the sentencing 
guidelines, will still be below the total gains from cartel. Better practice, which has been 
employed in e.g. Germany, Switzerland, or New Zealand, implies setting the fine equal to a 
multiple of illegal gains (e.g. up to three times the additional profit obtained as a result of the 
violation).
144
 
c. Poultry Meat Producers case 
 
The formula proposed for estimation of the harm in expression (1) gives the real present 
value of the illegal profits due to collusion. Hence, it does not directly estimate direct harm 
(or damages) as indicated in the description of the formula. Even in simple linear demand 
models harm (or loss in total (consumer) welfare) will generally be expressed as a non-linear 
function of cartel overcharge. 
 
As we mentioned earlier the FNE rightly focuses on the illegal profit due to the collusion. 
The assumption that if there had been no collusion, there would have been a Cournot 
oligopololy with undifferentiated products (and therefore a price level above the competitive 
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Note that in the EU and the US illegal gains or harm are approximated by the percentage of affected 
commerce. 
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 According to the OECD (2002): "It is widely agreed that an effective sanction against a cartel should take 
into account not only the amount of gain realized by the cartel but also the probability that any given cartel 
will be detected and prosecuted. Because not all cartels are detected, the financial sanction against one that is 
detected should exceed the gain actually realized by the cartel. Some experts believe that as few as one in six 
or seven cartels are detected and prosecuted, implying a multiple of at least six. A multiple of three is more 
commonly cited, however." In the Annex B of OECD (2002), a range of fines between two and three times the 
illegal profits is reported. 
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level) is realistic given the concentration of supply and the transparency of the market. Thus 
the overcharge is the difference between the observed prices and what would have been the 
oligopolistic price.  
 
The computation of the total damage due to the cartel (which lasted from 1996 to 2011) 
rightly takes into account the discount factor. 
 
It is interesting to compare the estimates in this case with the assumptions that Heimler & 
Mehta (2012) suggest to the courts which do not have the means to do detailed calculations. 
They posit a price elasticity of demand between 0.5 and 1.2. Here we are told that the 
estimate of the price elasticity of demand is between 0.93 and 1.393 which is for the most 
part in the range posited by Heimler and Mehta. They also posit a 15% permanent price 
increase due to the collusion. Here we are told that the estimate of the surcharge when using 
the simulation model is between 13% and 18% depending on the value of the elasticity 
chosen. These values are also close to the general hypothesis proposed by Heimler and Mehta 
and therefore their methodology seems to be applicable to the case. In order to see what 
percentage of the total turnover of the firms over the period should the sanction amount to, 
one would need two additional data, the Lerner index before the increase in price and the 
probability of sanction.   
 
This case shows, once more, that caps on fines can have the effect of preventing the 
enforcement mechanism from being deterrent. The level of extra profit generated by the 
colluding firms (appropriately discounted) is clearly much more important than the maximum 
amount of sanction that the court can impose. The disparity is all the more important that the 
cartel lasted a large number of years and that the cap does not seem to allow for the fact that 
some cartels lasted more than a decade. If the firms have the perception that they can reap the 
benefit from their cartels for many years before being caught (which suggests a low 
probability of detection and sanction) and that when caught their sanction is going to be 
limited to the cap resulting from the law, they may well have an incentive to enter into a 
cartel agreement.  
 
d. Overall Assessment 
 
As we have already stressed above, the approaches employed for fine imposition by the 
Chilean competition authority in the three cases analyzed are valid and roughly follow the 
logic of the current EU antitrust guidelines on the method of setting fines. The approaches of 
the second and the third case seem more advanced and could be utilized for developing 
antitrust sentencing guidelines together with the lessons from current practice in the US, EU 
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and several OECD countries, which have been described above. As has been mentioned 
above, basing fines on carefully estimated excess illegal gains and adjusting these gains 
(denoted in the report by π) by a proper multiplier (e.g. 3π, as it has been done in Germany, 
Switzerland, or New Zealand), which takes into account the expected rate of law 
enforcement, will increase the deterrent effect and at the same time will not have any price 
distortions. This structure is superior to fines based on volume of affected commerce or 
turnover (sales) as the latter cause substantial price distortions.
145
 On the other hand, the 
methods employed in the second and third case still miss a number of factors (such as 
aggravating and attenuating circumstances, proportionality and bankruptcy considerations) 
which should also be taken into account while calculating the fine. 
 
None of the three cases described above mention individual fines or imprisonment 
possibilities. These tools appear to be very effective according to the US experience and, 
perhaps, could be included in the new guidelines.
146
 
 
Further, discussion of the more strict treatment of repeat offenders, which is standard in the 
EU and the US, should also be included. 
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In particular, fines based on revenue may give incentives to increase cartel price as they do not target price 
reducing incentives directly, but rather target sales reducing incentives. This may lead to increase in prices 
even above monopoly level. See also Bageri, V., Katsoulacos, Y. and Spagnolo, G. (2013) "The Distortive Effects 
of Antitrust Fines Based on Revenue" The Economic Journal, 123 (572), 545-557 and Katsoulacos, Y., E. 
Motchenkova and D. Ulph (2014), “Penalizing Cartels: The Case for Basing Penalties on Price Overcharge”, 
mimeo (May 2014) for more detailed intuition. 
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See e.g. USSG (2013) or ADM cartel case literature Eichenwald, K. (2000) The Informant: a True Story, 
Brodway Books, Lieber J.B, (2000) Rats in the Grain: The Dirty Tricks and Trials of Archer Daniels Midland, the 
Supermarket to the World, Basic Books; Connor, J. (2001) “Our Customers Are Our Enemies”: The Lysine Cartel 
of 1992–1995," Review of Industrial Organization, 18(1), 5-21;  Connor, J. (2003) “Private International Cartels: 
Effectiveness, Welfare, and Anticartel Enforcement” Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of 
Agricultural Economics, Working Papers 03-12. 
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IV. The Chilean Competition Act’s legislative intent regarding fines  
 
The best way to find out Competition Act’s legislative intent regarding fines is to return to 
the discussions that led to its modifications. Below, we highlight some passages of the bills 
that later became amendments to the Competition Act.  
 
 
A. The History of Statute No. 19.911 (issued on October 2003) 
 
Statute No. 19.911 amended the existing competition agencies and Courts, by creating the 
TDLC and substantively transforming the structure of the FNE, as it is known today. Along 
with it, Act 19.911 amended the system of penalties. Therefore, the presidential message 
(motivation) of the bill included some reference to the justification on fines introduced: 
 
“Finally, a Tribunal strengthened with clear guidelines, should have 
adequate sanctioning powers which can effectively meet the objective of 
inhibiting anti-competitive behaviour in the strict constitutional framework. 
Therefore, it is proposed to replace the existing criminal penalties with 
higher fines and liability for the executives involved in actions contrary to 
free competition”147. 
----- 
“[…] For these reasons, it is advisable to maintain a comprehensive 
behavioural standard with basic examples, so the members of the body 
[TDLC] would be able to hear and decide causes according to the case, 
deciding which behaviours constitutes a breach of competition law. 
 
However, this approach is inconsistent with the existence of a criminal 
offense, in which the type specification is an essential requirement, failure of 
which is a violation of the constitutional guarantee provided by the final 
paragraph of section 3 of Article 19 of our Constitution. 
 
As a counterpart to the elimination of criminal penalties –which has rarely 
given rise to criminal proceedings and is estimated to have failed to deter 
misconduct against free competition–, it is proposed to increase fines and 
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 President of the Republic message on Bill 132-346 (May 17
th
, 2002), which establish the “Tribunal de 
Defensa de la Libre Competencia”. On: Library of National Congress (“Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, 
“BCN”), History of the Statue No. 19.911, p. 8. Available at: 
http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar/scripts/obtienearchivo?id=recursoslegales/10221.3/2472/1/HL19911.pdf  
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hold managers or directors of companies who commit them jointly and 
severally liable for payment. 
 
Thus, we estimate that eliminating criminal penalties, far from suggesting a 
softening against violations of competition law, will more effectively deter 
potential offenders”148. 
 
B. The History of Statute No. 20.361 (issued on July 2009) 
 
Statute No. 20.361 amended the Competition Act some years after the creation of the TDLC 
and the institutional changes introduced by Statute No. 19.911. Among other changes and 
adjustments, Statute No. 20.361 increased fines for certain violations of competition law. The 
justification given in the Presidential bill about this increase illustrates the legislator’s aim 
and goals. 
 
“[…] Moreover, the abolition of criminal sanctions for those who violate 
competition law has led economic agents –as rational subjects–, to take real 
risks of being sanctioned, but in the absence of rules determining fines, they 
may still incur such conduct under the hope of not being discovered or, if 
investigation is initiated, arguing general principles of tort system to apply this 
fines to their minimum or, as was not provided on the Statute No. 19,911, 
engage in behaviours that cause great harm to others, which are difficult to 
identify and, therefore, which have no incentives to deduct civil claims, without 
being such damages negatively weighted by the TDLC when applying fines”149. 
 ------------------------ 
“Under the foreseeable greater efficiency in investigative work of the National 
Economic Prosecutor’s Office, because of the new powers given to it and the 
introduction of "leniency", the office should be able to discover behaviours that 
cause great damage to the country's market system. This makes it desirable to 
increase the fines that Courts are able to apply against the facts, acts or 
agreements that prevent, restrict or hinder free competition, deterring such 
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 Ibíd., p. 12.  
149
 President of the Republic message on Bill 134-354 (June 5
th
, 2006), which “Amends DFL Act N°1/2005 
Ministry of Economy, Building and Reconstruction, 2005, about Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre 
Competencia”. On: Library of National Congress (“Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, “BCN”), History of the 
Statue No. 20.361, pp. 6-7. Available at: 
http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar/scripts/obtienearchivo?id=recursoslegales/10221.3/3841/2/hdl-
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practices and giving an additional incentive for the subject who is able to 
benefit of leniency rules. Thus, letter c) of the second paragraph of Article 26 
Competition Act is amended, increasing the maximum fines to be applied by 
the Court from 20,000 to 30,000 [UTA] Annual Tax Units. 
  
Incorporation of damage as a circumstance to determine the fines 
 
In accordance with this, for the estimation of the fine to be imposed the 
Tribunal will consider the economic benefit gained as a result of the 
infringement, the seriousness of the conduct and recidivism, but also –and 
fundamentally– the damage to competition; so third paragraph of Article 26 of 
the Competition Act is amended”150.  
 
The following is the current wording of the third paragraph of Article 26: 
  
“To determine the fines, the following circumstances, among others, will be considered: 
the economic benefit obtained as a result of the violation, the severity of the conduct, the 
reoffending nature of the offender, and, for the purposes of lowering the fine, the 
collaboration the latter provided to the Fiscalía before or during the investigation”. 
 
The current wording does not include any reference to the damage to competition and/or 
general or specific deterrence. 
 
C. Literature and other sources 
 
Currently, the national literature usually emphasizes the importance of deterring 
infringements of competition, particularly regarding collusion and other concerted practices. 
As a summary of some recent discussions and suggestions, it may be useful to consider some 
sections of the report that a special Advisory Committee to the President of the Republic 
issued in July 2012, suggesting some amendments to the Chilean competition law. 
 
“Regarding sanctions established by the TDLC, these are essentially fines and 
other administrative sanctions. In the case of monetary fines, the maximum 
amount was recently raised by the amendment made in 2009, leaving this in 
30,000 UTA for collusion. Notwithstanding this adjustment in the amount of 
monetary sanctions, it is important to empathize that –in general– this 
maximum does not appear to be a constraint on the decisions TDLC and 
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Supreme Court, since the average of the penalties imposed have remained 
substantially below the maximum allowed by law. However, the increase in 
the amount of the maximum fine established in the recent legislation 
amendment on competition (2009) is a signal from lawmakers to the TDLC 
and the Supreme Court to increase the sanctions for violations to the 
Competition Act
151
.  
 ---------------------- 
“Regarding sanctions to companies and corporations, an idea that raised a 
significant level of agreement in the Commission is the use of a scale 
indicator in determining the fine set by the TDLC to the firm(s) accused of 
anticompetitive actions. This is because there are practical difficulties 
associated with obtaining an accurate and timely estimation of "injury" in the 
traditional economic sense”. 
 
“It is recommended to adopt the practice used in many countries and set the 
fine as a percentage of sales of the company during the period of the anti-
competitive conduct, adding a “deterrent factor” 152.   
     ----------------------- 
“Some members of the Commission justified the existence of criminal 
sanctions for anti-competitive practices, arguing that fines and administrative 
sanctions are not an effective deterrent, a result that could only be achieved by 
the threat of a potential loss of liberty. Moreover, it was argued that the risk of 
deprivation of liberty would enhance the effectiveness of the mechanism of 
"leniency" as a tool to dismantle collusion”153. 
 
“On the other hand, other members of the Commission rejected the explicit 
incorporation of criminal sanctions within the scope of competition law. This 
position was based on the recent revision and refinement of an institutional 
framework that seeks to make the analysis and evaluation of situations related 
to competition in specialized courts […]”154.  
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 Presidential Advisory Committee on Competition Law. Final Report (July 2012), p. 10.  Available at: 
http://www.economia.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/INFORME-FINAL-ENTREGADO-A-PDTE-
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 Ibíd., p. 13.  
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One may thus conclude from the above that the legislator’s goal was to establish a system of 
effective and deterrent financial penalties against competition law infringements. 
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V. Recommendations 
 
We first proceed in summarizing the main recommendations of the existing literature on the 
determination of optimal antitrust fines and the optimal design of leniency programmes, 
before delving into our suggestions for the design of Guidelines on the setting of fines. 
 
A. Summary of the recent theoretical recommendations in the literature on 
determination of optimal antitrust fines and optimal design of leniency programme 
 
A literature review indicates the following recommendations for policy makers: 
 
 
- With regard to the base from which to calculate the fine, there are two options: to use 
profits as determined on a case-by-case basis as a base or to use proxies such as a 
proportion of the affected commerce or the value of sales. The former, profit-based, 
approach may reflect the economic harm more precisely, provided that the relevant 
data are available. The latter, turnover-based, approach may over- or underestimate 
the true economic harm, but has the advantage of greatly enhancing administrability 
and avoiding under-deterrence in cases in which the infringement causes real 
economic harm that is difficult to quantify, such as harm of cartels in declining 
industries that aim at preventing future losses, harm to innovation, or similar harm to 
competition. All jurisdictions surveyed in this report have chosen the latter approach 
of using turnover-based proxies. Nevertheless, some economic literature has 
suggested to move away from the volume of affected commerce (revenue or sales) as 
a base of the penalty to penalties based on profits (or overcharges) and a unique 
emphasis on a formalistic approach. This concern was also raised by the Antitrust 
Modernization Commission (AMC) (2007) in the US, which recommended to the 
Sentencing Commission to reconsider whether reliance on a proxy, such as a specific 
percentage of affected commerce, turnover/sales etc, is consistent with the principle 
that punishment should be calculated based on the actual harm in individual cases. 
The AMC recognized that “because general deterrence of antitrust violations does not 
require an exact correlation of expected harm and penalty, the Sentencing 
Commission determined that reliance on a proxy amount would be appropriate”155. 
However, the AMC noted that the “development of economic learning and estimation 
techniques over the past fifteen years may have made proving gain or loss in an 
antitrust case less difficult than it was when the Sentencing Commission created the 
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 Antitrust Modernization Commission (2007) “Final Report and Recommendations” 300, available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf 
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proxy”156. It is widely argued in the theoretical literature on antitrust that illegal gains 
and overcharges are more precise measures of gravity of violation.
157
 Also basing 
penalties on profits does not impose price distortions, while revenue based penalties 
are distortionary. In particular, fines based on revenue may give incentives to increase 
the cartel price as they give incentives not to reduce price, but to reduce sales. This 
may lead to an increase in prices even above monopoly level. See also Bageri, 
Katsoulacos, Spagnolo (2013) and Katsoulacos, Motchenkova and Ulph (2014) for 
more detailed intuition.  
 
- We believe that the suggestion to move towards a more effects-based approach in 
designing financial penalties has its disadvantages in the many competition cases in 
which it is difficult to quantify the exact harm. The German experience with 
“additional turnover”-based fines has not been an encouraging one: resources invested 
into the determination of the additional turnover could likely be put to better use 
elsewhere in a capacity-constrained competition authority. The greater precision of 
the case-by-case analysis of profits comes at a cost. On the other hand, the profit-
based approach suggested in the economic literature may be more easily achievable in 
Chile, in view of the obligation imposed by Art 3rd (a) of the Decree Law No. 211 of 
1973 (DL211) that any competitors’ agreements aiming at fixing prices, limiting 
output or allocating markets may be subject to the sanctions established by law, if 
abusing the market power conferred upon them by such agreements, thus requiring 
that current or potential effects on markets be shown for sanctioning cartel conducts. 
 
- Increasing or abolishing legal upper bounds (or maximum fines) is another 
recommendation suggested in a number of leading contributions in antitrust 
enforcement literature. Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007), Bos and Schinkel (2007), 
Wils (2007) and Harrington (2010) point out that the current inspection efforts and the 
existing upper bounds on fines, at least in the EU and several OECD countries, are 
insufficient to deter all cartels. In a number of related empirical studies, Connor and 
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Lande (2005, 2006, 2008, 2012) also argue that the existing US and EU penalties for 
cartel violations are too low resulting in high cartel overcharges. This suggests that 
the existing legal upper bounds (or maximum fines) are not high enough to deter 
cartel formation and, hence, should be adjusted upwards, above the current F 
max
=0,1T. One solution short of abolishing the legal maximum for the fine entirely 
would be to use a turnover-based approximation of the fine within the legal limit, but 
to permit fines that exceed the legal maximum where profits are shown to exceed this 
maximum. This would correspond to the German solution (§ 81(5) GWB with § 17(4) 
OWiG) and would be similar to the European solution in so far as the European 
Guidelines allow a higher proportion than 30 per cent of the value of sales where this 
is necessary to deprive the infringer of the gains improperly made. 
 
- Deterrence: Specific and general deterrence constitute the primary objectives of all 
financial penalties systems for the infringement of competition law that we have 
examined for the purposes of this report.  In view of the objective of deterrence, one 
may not expect an exact correlation between the harm and the penalty. According to 
economic theory, fines should be at least equal to the expected illegally earned profits 
divided by the probability to be caught, hence they should relate to expected profits 
originating from the violation and not to the profits actually gained that may be higher 
or lower than those expected at decision-making time, should the fines be paid after 
the period of infringement. The implementation of the principle of deterrence may 
involve reliance on presumptions and proxies based on a percentage of affected sales 
or volumes of commerce as a starting point for the calculation of the base fine, which 
although they do not correspond to the illicit gains of the competition law 
infringement or the damages caused, they integrate the need for general or specific 
deterrence. It is also possible to rely on a multiplier of the base fine equal to the 
inverse of the estimated detection probability, thus incorporating deterrence 
considerations in the calculation of financial penalties. 
 
- Imposing an entry fee (i.e. fixed fine in addition to proportional component) has been 
proposed in the EU (2006) guidelines and has been analyzed theoretically in 
Motchenkova (2008). This fee is imposed in order to deter companies from ever 
entering into seriously illegal conduct. In most serious cartel cases the Commission 
may add to the amount of the base fine a sum equal to 15% to 25% of the yearly 
relevant sales, whatever the duration of the infringement. In other words, the mere 
fact that a company enters into a cartel could “cost” it at least 15 to 25% of its yearly 
turnover in the relevant product. This will significantly increase deterrence. 
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- Increasing penalty rates can also be an effective instrument to increase deterrence and 
to reduce the gravity of the offence in cartel cases. This instrument, in case fines are 
based on illegal gains or overcharges, reduces the optimal cartel price and, hence, also 
reduces the harm to consumers. More detailed analysis of these issues can be found in 
Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013), Houba, Motchenkova and Wen (2010), and 
Katsoulacos, Motchenkova and Ulph (2014). 
 
- The fining guidelines should also be accompanied by properly designed leniency 
programmes. The most up to date recommendations on the design of leniency 
programs is a mix of the design implemented in the EU and the US: 
 
o Full immunity should be available only for strictly first reporting firm.158 
o While it has been suggested with good theoretical arguments that there should 
be no fine reductions for subsequent reporters,
159
 in practice there may be a 
need to reward further applicants in order to acquire a better evidence basis. In 
these cases, a reduction for the second or later applicants should be made 
contingent on strict criteria concerning the “added value” of the evidence these 
applicants must produce.  
o Ex-post availability of leniency (i.e. complete immunity can be granted even if 
the firm reports after the investigation has started).
160
 
o Repeat offenders are also allowed to obtain full immunity.161 
 
 
B. Suggested Design of Fining Guidelines 
 
Publishing sentencing guidelines will enable Fiscalia to send a strong message to potential 
cartelists and other competition law infringers that anti-competitive conduct will not be 
tolerated and might give rise to substantial financial penalties. Following the findings of the 
report on the impact of fining guidelines on the policy-making and executing discretion of 
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competition authorities, we consider that the publication of such guidelines will not affect the 
ability of Fiscalia to request high financial penalties in actions brought against infringers in 
front of the TDLC. It may also have the advantage of streamlining appellate scrutiny of the 
fines so as to accommodate the prosecutorial discretion of Fiscalia and the fact that fines are 
set by an independent and specialised trial judge with the necessary expertise as to integrate 
optimal deterrence. In our view, the structure of the Chilean enforcement system offers 
advantages as to the individualization of sanctions, so that they are reasonably related to 
culpability and thus proportional. Yet, the current statutory maximum of 30,000 [UTA] 
Annual Tax Units for any fines imposed greatly jeopardizes the effectiveness of the Chilean 
system of competition law enforcement. It is our view that this ceiling should be eliminated 
or at least revised to reflect current international practice, which is to set the maximum fine to 
10% of the total turnover of the undertaking in the preceding business year. Should the 
ceiling be lifted to this level, there would be a greater need for guidelines in view of the fact 
that, on balance, enhanced predictability of fines may be an advantage if the fine levels are on 
average very high. 
 
Effective deterrence “depends, in part on the uniformity and predictability of serious and 
swift punishment”162. As has been explained by Justice Breyer (in some of his extra-judicial 
writing), when drafting sentencing guidelines, a compromise should be made between two 
competing goals of a sentencing system: uniformity and proportionality
163
. The publication of 
guidelines will need to accommodate the aim of uniformity and general deterrence, without 
however compromising the need for flexibility and individualized assessment based on the 
facts of particular cases, inherent in the principle of proportionality. This aim can be achieved 
in the context of Guidelines, in view of the numerous parameters individualizing the sanction 
(linking it to the harm/overcharge) and the need to account for specific deterrence
164
. The 
publication of guidelines will certainly not bind the TDLC, although it will certainly inform 
its decision-making process, as the experience of the Sentencing Guidelines in the US shows 
with trial judges employing the Sentencing Guidelines as an initial benchmark, even if these 
are not mandatory. The publication of guidelines will also help put emphasis on the goal of 
deterrence and the need for optimal sanctions against anticompetitive conduct, in particular in 
view of the judicial scrutiny of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court should, in our view, 
accommodate the need for both general and specific deterrence, in view of the nefarious 
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 Thide, F. (2013) “Judicial Policy Nullification of the antitrust Sentencing Guideline”, Boston College Law 
Review 54(2), 861, 887. 
163
 Breyer, S. (1988) “The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the key compromises upon which they rest”, 
Hofstra Law Review 17(1) 1-50.. 
164
 See, for instance, the discussion in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 263-265 (2005) (Breyer delivering 
the opinion in part),  
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effects of cartel activity and, more generally anticompetitive conduct, to the whole economy 
and the consumers. 
 
The design of the sentencing guidelines should include the following three steps: estimate the 
base fine, integrate mitigating and aggravating circumstances adjusting the basic amount and 
applying the legal maximum should this exist, interaction with leniency and private 
enforcement. We do not provide more detail as to the different mitigating and aggravating 
factors that should be incorporated in the Guidelines, as we believe that these should take into 
account the local circumstances of regular business behaviour and the existing regulatory 
framework in other areas of law. We have provided, however, in our comparative analysis 
ample details on how these circumstances have been interpreted by five major competition 
law regimes. We think this analysis may be a source of inspiration for Fiscalia.  
 
The drafting team considered the balance to be achieved between administrability and 
accuracy in the design of guidelines.  
 
We took into account recent theoretical contributions by Bageri, Katsoulacos and Spagnolo 
(2013), Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013), Katsoulacos, Motchenkova and Ulph (2014) that show 
the superiority of the profit based fines over revenue (or sales) based proxies. We also 
recognized that the Chilean legislator has amended Article 26, paragraph 3 of the 
Competition Act to request, for the estimation of the fine to be imposed, the Tribunal to 
consider “the economic benefit gained as a result of the infringement, the seriousness of the 
conduct and recidivism, but also –and fundamentally– the damage to competition. We 
believe that there is value to integrate as much as possible an effects-based analysis in the 
determination of fines (Harrington, 2014) and rely on proxies only when the costs and delays 
of using more accurate calculations is high in view of the volume of affected sales. This 
choice reflects also the fact that when the volume of affected sales is relatively large, rigorous 
analyses will provide more accurate estimates, when the economists have sufficient reliable 
data and information to proceed with their estimation techniques. A mixed-methods approach 
that would fit the circumstances of each case, the availability of data, the costs of accurate 
estimation of expected profits and the amount of the fine requested, may provide the 
necessary degree of flexibility to accommodate both the requirements of optimal and just 
financial penalties. We consider that the competition authority should be offered the choice 
between three options among which it may choose the one leading to the greatest financial 
penalty of either (i), (ii) or (iii): 
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I. Estimate the excess illegal gains from the offense (that is 100% of the 
overcharge)
165
, or  
II. Estimate the pecuniary losses to a person other than the defendant (100% of these 
losses) to the extent the loss was caused intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, or  
III. If the above options would unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process, 
or would not reflect the harm caused by the anticompetitive conduct if this harm 
may not be quantified in the form of pecuniary losses,
166
 use a proxy based on a 
percentage of affected sales (on the basis of e.g. 10-15% as an overcharge 
estimate) 
 
Finally, we take into account that the adversarial process followed in the determination of the 
financial penalties by the TDLC, a specialised tribunal, will inevitably favour the use of the 
most accurate method possible for estimating fines, as the defendants will certainly challenge 
the accuracy of a fine requested on the sole basis of a proxy of a percentage of affected 
commerce. For this reason, in our view, it is inevitable for the FNE (unless it reaches a 
settlement with the defendants) to estimate the excess illegal gains from the offense and/or 
the pecuniary losses during the adversarial process in front of the TDLC.  Our proposal is 
influenced by the approach followed in US (and German) law, regarding financial penalties, 
when the use of a proxy does not adequately reflect seriousness of the offense in light of the 
pecuniary gain or loss it caused. The Guidelines should provide the choice to the FNE to 
proceed with either (i), (ii) or (iii). Yet, we also agree with some commentators that “as fine 
levels increase, they may eclipse the costs of more precisely estimating damages” and that 
“(f)rom an economic perspective, the administrative costs of more rigorous calculations are 
increasingly justifiable as the potential fine value rises, because these calculations can 
prevent costly errors when fines are underestimated or overestimated”167. Hence, it may make 
sense to use these methods, if expensive or time consuming, only for fines of a significant 
amount. Yet, this is a decision to be made on a case by case basis by the FNE, depending on 
nature of the offense and the data available (e.g. aggregate sales or profit data for the entire 
group of customers allegedly impacted by the anticompetitive conduct or customer 
transaction data), some of which it is easy, quick and inexpensive to collect, while for other 
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 This may be done with the integration of a structured effects-based approach, similar to that suggested by 
Heimler and Mehta [see our commentary, Section II(I) above], as a starting point for the analysis, the 
defendant being able to challenge these estimations with further evidence. 
166
 For instance, the harm relates to otehr parameters of competition than price, such as quality, innovation, 
variety, consumer choice, which is sometimes difficult to quantify in the form of pecuniary losses. 
167
 Kauper, R. and Langenfeld J. (2011) The Potential Role of Civil Antitrust Damage Analysis in Determining 
Financial Penalties in Criminal Antitrust Cases, George Mason L. Rev 18(4) 953-986, 962. 
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more difficult, expensive and time consuming
168
. In any case, such data are frequently used 
by courts in the context of private enforcement for the quantification of damages and could 
be of assistance also when determining the level of the financial penalty
169
. 
 
The three steps in the fine-setting process should be set as following: 
 
1. Determination of the basic amount of the fine: 
 
a. The FNE should be offered the choice between three options, among 
which it may choose the one leading to the greatest financial penalty: 
 
i. Estimate170 the excess illegal gains from the offense171 (that is 
100% of the overcharge), or  
ii. Estimate172 the pecuniary losses to a person other than the 
defendant (100% of these losses) to the extent the loss was caused 
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, or  
                                                     
168
 Ibid. 968, noting however that computer programs can often readily calculate revenues, quantities, and 
prices from customer transactions datasets, in particular if the data is available in user-friendly electronic 
format and accurate enough. 
169
 Idem. 
170
 An approximate calculation should suffice, allowing to make a reasonable estimate of the probable amount. 
In contrast to damages cases or restitution claims, the deterrent and punitive function of financial 
penalties may accord with a less precise calculation, as long as this is not speculation or guesswork, the 
defendant having being found to infringe competition law. Hence, she should bear the risks of any doubt 
on the exact amount of gains. Some authors have put forward a structured effects-based approach 
involving the estimation of expected profits from the anticompetitive conduct, on the basis of some 
percentage range of the values of sales to which the infringement relates [see, Heimler, A. and Mehta, K.  
(2012) “Violations of Antitrust Provisions: The Optimal Level of Fines for Achieving Deterrence”, World 
Competition 35 (1), 103–119]. This will require competition authorities to take into account the value of 
the Lerner index, or the change in the value of the Lerner index or the probability of detection as a starting 
point for such calculation, the defendant being able to challenge the figure put forward by the authority as 
not being accurate. 
171
 This refers to the total gross gain from the anticompetitive conduct, including the gross gain to the 
defendants and other participants in the anticompetitive conduct. 
172
 An approximate calculation should suffice, allowing to make a reasonable estimate of the probable amount. 
In contrast to damages cases or restitution claims, the deterrent and punitive function of financial 
penalties may accord with a less precise calculation, as long as this is not speculation or guesswork, the 
defendant having being found to infringe competition law. Hence, she should bear the risks of any doubt 
on the exact amount of losses. 
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iii. If the above options would unduly complicate or prolong the 
sentencing process, or would not reflect the harm caused by the 
anticompetitive conduct if this harm may not be quantified in the 
form of pecuniary losses, use a proxy based on a percentage of 
affected sales (on the basis of e.g. 10-15% as an overcharge 
estimate: e.g. in the EU the starting point is 30% of affected sales) 
 
b. Apply a multiplier equal to the inverse of the estimated detection 
probability (e.g. 6 if the detection probability is estimated as 1/6).
173
 
We consider that Article 26 of the Chilean Competition (Decree Law 
211) should be revised so as to include among the circumstances 
considered to determine the fines, which are now the following ones: 
the economic benefit obtained as a result of the violation, the severity 
of the conduct, the reoffending nature of the offender, and, for the 
purposes of lowering the fine, the collaboration the latter provided to 
the Fiscalía before or during the investigation, also the following two: 
damage to competition and specific and general deterrence. The new 
formulation of the text should also provide the possibility to 
incorporate deterrence by multiplying the base fine with a multiplier 
equal to the inverse of the estimated detection probability of the 
competition law infringement (e.g. 6 if the detection probability is 
estimated as 1/6, as it is the case for cartels
174
. 
c. In order to take duration into account, the base fine should be 
multiplied by the number of years of participation in the infringement. 
d. The current statutory maximum of 30,000 [UTA] Annual Tax Units 
should be eliminated as it has proven too low and under-deterrent in at 
least two cartel cases (pharmacies and poultry). Ideally, there should be 
no statutory maximum (including the one of 20,000 UTA for all other 
infringements) where the gains actually made or the damage to 
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 Cf. section II.B of this report. 
174
 For exclusionary abuses of a dominant position the probability of detection depends on the importance of 
the dominant position of the undertaking and hence the multiplier may vary (for instance, the probability of 
detection for most cases of exclusionary abuse of a dominant position is estimated as high as 70% - at least 
50% where the dominant firm is a relatively small entity and virtually 100% for super-dominant large firms 
with a market share of more than 80-90% (see Heimler, A. and Mehta, K.  (2012) “Violations of Antitrust 
Provisions: The Optimal Level of Fines for Achieving Deterrence”, World Competition 35 (1), 103–119, 115-
116). However, we consider that in order to induce large dominant undertakings to comply with competition 
law - in view of the general deterrence objective- the fines should be significant, hence the suggestion to keep 
a multiplier of 2 for all types of exclusionary abuses of a dominant position. 
108 
 
competition can be calculated. As a second best, the statutory 
maximum should change from its current form as a fixed amount to a 
proportion of the total turnover of the undertaking (e.g. 10% of the 
total turnover). 
 
2. Adjustments to the basic amount175 
 
a. Aggravating circumstances (upward adjustment) 
i. Repeat offenders176 
ii. Refusal to cooperate 
iii. Role of leader in the infringement 
 
b. Mitigating circumstances (downward adjustment) 
 
i. Sufficient cooperation with authority 
ii. Limited involvement in the infringement 
iii. [Effective corporate compliance programmes]177 
 
c. Application for leniency (downward adjustment or full 
immunity) 
 
d. Inability to pay – bankruptcy considerations (downward 
adjustment) 
 
e. Adjustment according to the legal maximum: it is 
suggested to eliminate or replace the legal maxima of 
20,000 and 30,000 [UTA] Annual Tax Units, which 
might lead to under-deterrence. As a first best, the legal 
maximum should be eliminated if it is possible to 
                                                     
175
Adjustments to the basic amount are proposed on the basis of the structure outlined in the current EU 
Guidelines (2006). As for the adjustments in percentage, we do not provide specific recommendations as this is 
at the discretion of the competition authorities and courts. One should take into account the fact that 
aggravating circumstances should not be as high as to eliminate the benefit of applying for leniency for the 
second or third applicant, in order to maintain the incentives to apply for leniency. For more specific 
percentages, see the practice of the French Competition Authority, in Appendix 5. 
176
The current EU Commission’s practice is to increase a fine by 50% -100% where the undertaking has been 
found to have been previously involved in one or more similar infringements. 
177
 More on this issue, see Appendix 1. 
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calculate the gains actually made or the damage to 
competition. As a second best, the current legal 
maximum should be replaced by a percentage of the 
worldwide turnover of the infringing undertakings, for 
instance, a percentage of 10%, as it is the case in the 
EU, UK, Germany and France. It is suggested for this 
percentage to operate as a maximum fine, not a cap (see 
our discussion of the debate in Germany in Appendix 
2). 
 
3. Additional issues 
 
a. Public antitrust enforcement should be accompanied by 
the possibility of private actions for damages. 
 
b. Corporate fines should be combined with individual 
fines as well as imprisonment. 
 
Summary of specific recommendations 
 
1. It is surprising that in none of the Chilean cases analysed, the fine 
requested by the FNE or that established by the TDLC or the Supreme 
Court, systematically incorporated deterrence by multiplying the base 
fine with a multiplier equal to the inverse of the estimated detection 
probability. General and specific deterrence constitutes one of the main 
objectives of competition law enforcement in all jurisdictions 
examined and the principle of deterrence is systematically integrated in 
the calculation either of the base fine (by relying on a minimum 
percentage of affected sales as a starting point of the calculation, e.g. 
30%) and/or by applying multipliers representing the inverse of the 
estimated detection probability. This is considered as a crucial reform 
so as to enhance the effectiveness of Chilean competition law. More 
concretely, it is suggested to include an explicit reference to general 
and specific deterrence in the text of Article 26 of the Decree Law 211, 
along with other factors usually taken into account, such as the 
economic benefit obtained as a result of the violation, the severity of 
the conduct, the reoffending nature of the offender. 
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2. The current text of Decree Law 211 lists among the factors to be taken 
into account in the calculation of damages only the following ones: the 
economic benefit obtained as a result of the violation, the severity of 
the conduct, the reoffending nature of the offender… In view of the 
high administrative costs and the possible under-deterrent effect of 
such calculation (which is often quite resource intensive and may not 
be possible for the lack of data), it is suggested to revise this section of 
Article 26 of the Decree Law 211 in order to add “damage to 
competition” to the existing factors, on top of the reference to “general 
and specific deterrence” that we propose at point 1. 
 
3. For the same reason, and in order to limit administrative costs when 
this is possible, it is suggested to include an option for the FNE to rely 
on proxies, such as a percentage of the affected sales as a starting point 
for the calculation of the base fine, in particular for lower fines. As we 
have explained in the report, there should be some balance achieved 
between, from one side, the need to ensure proportionality and, from 
the other side, the necessity to limit administrative costs, as well as the 
need to ensure general and specific deterrence. Article 26 of the Decree 
Law should be revised accordingly so as to provide FNE the discretion 
to choose among three options in order to estimate the base fine: 
 
a. Estimate the excess illegal gains from the offense (that is 100% 
of the overcharge), or  
b. Estimate the pecuniary losses to a person other than the 
defendant (100% of these losses) to the extent the loss was 
caused intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, or  
c. If the above options would unduly complicate or prolong the 
sentencing process, or would not reflect the harm caused by the 
anticompetitive conduct if this harm may not be quantified in 
the form of pecuniary losses, use a proxy based on a percentage 
of affected sales (on the basis of e.g. 10-15% as an overcharge 
estimate: e.g. in the EU the starting point is 30% of affected 
sales) 
 
4. In view of the emphasis put on general and specific deterrence,  Article 
26 of the Decree Law 211 should be amended in order to eliminate the 
current legal maxima of 20,000 UTAs and 30,000 UTAs for cartel 
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behaviour referred to in Article 3(a) of the Decree Law 211 (“express 
or tacit agreements among competitors, or concerted practices between 
them, that confer them market power and consist of fixing sale or 
purchase prices or other marketing conditions, limit production, allow 
them to assign market zones or quotas, exclude competitors or affect 
the result of bidding processes). Indeed fines have proven too low in at 
least two cases (pharmacies and Poultry). Ideally there should be no 
legal maximum where it is possible to calculate the illicit gains or the 
competition law damage. As a second best, the legal maximum should 
change from its current form (a fixed amount) to a percentage of the 
worldwide turnover of the infringing undertakings, for instance, a 
percentage of 10%, as it is the case in the EU, UK, Germany and 
France. 
 
5. Should the above reforms be implemented, it might be necessary to 
include among the factors taken account in Article 26 for the purposes 
of lowering the fine, its inability to pay. Appendix 3 provides 
information as to the criteria usually taken into account in the various 
jurisdictions examined in order to evaluate this factor. 
 
6. The lack of consistency observed in the fines applied in different 
decisions, and the excessive judicial scrutiny exercised by the Supreme 
Court, which has modified them in several occasions, without taking 
into account the need for deterrence, constitutes a significant weakness 
of the system. It is suggested that the economic prosecutor, the FNE, 
should establish guidelines, providing for a detailed methodology for 
the calculation of financial penalties for competition law infringement. 
The guidelines should include information on the way the basic 
amount will be set (including information on the deterrence 
multiplier(s) and/or the percentage of affected sales that will constitute 
the starting point of the calculation), as well as information on 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances Although the guidelines will 
not be binding for the TDLC and the Supreme Court, they will 
inevitably lead to the establishment of  more coherent financial 
penalties framework, the role of the Supreme Court being merely to 
verify that the principles of the guidelines have been followed, or that 
any departure from them is fully justified by the specific characteristics 
of the case. 
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7. Regarding the basic amount of the fine, the FNE should aim to 
ascertain the excess gains or at least the damage to competition, 
although it would make no sense, due to administrative costs, to do this 
systematically for the cases which involve low fines. FNE should 
enjoy some discretion to decide whether to use a form-based approach 
relying on the proxy of the percentage of affected sales as the starting 
point for the calculation or to opt for a more effects-based approach, 
which will require the estimation of the illicit gains or damage to 
competition.  
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Appendix 1: A Comparative Perspective  
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Although the design of an optimal financial penalties system depends on the economic 
circumstances prevailing in a jurisdiction and the institutional capabilities of the authorities in 
charge of competition law enforcement, we believe that a comparative analysis of the way 
other competition law regimes have proceeded in setting financial penalties for competition 
law infringements may provide useful insights. This is particularly the case, in view of the 
absence of any authoritative international source on this matter. Indeed, the Recommendation 
of the OECD Council concerning effective action against hard core cartels (1998) observed 
that “hard core cartels are the most egregious violations of competition law and that they 
injure consumers in many countries by raising prices and restricting supply, thus making 
goods and services completely unavailable to some purchasers and unnecessarily expensive 
for others”, and recommended Member countries of the OECD to provide for “effective 
sanctions, of a kind and at a level adequate to deter firms and individuals from participating 
in such cartels; and enforcement procedures and institutions with powers adequate to detect 
and remedy hard core cartels, including powers to obtain documents and information and to 
impose penalties for non-compliance”178. Yet, the Recommendation of the Council did not 
offer clear guidance on the way the fine-setting process should be structured. In 2002, the 
OECD adopted a more lengthy report noting that “the principal purpose of sanctions in cartel 
cases is deterrence” and proceeding to a comparative analysis of the sanctions for cartel 
activity available in the OECD Member States
179
. Yet again, the report did not provide a 
detailed account of how this fine-setting process should look like.  
 
The cartel working group of the ICN has published a report in 2008 on Setting of Fines for 
Cartels in ICN jurisdictions, which also took a comparative approach describing the different 
national experiences and guidelines, although it also stayed short in providing 
recommendations for a model/optimal fine-setting system and methodology
180. ECA’s, the 
European Competition Authorities’ Association, Working Group on Sanctions also published 
in May 2008 Principles for Convergence on Pecuniary sanctions imposed on undertakings 
for infringements of antitrust law reflecting the general principles shared by the European 
                                                     
178
 OECD (1998), Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels 
(Adopted by the Council at its 921st Session on 25 March 1998), C(98)35/FINAL, available at 
http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/ShowInstrumentView.aspx?InstrumentID=193  
179
 OECD (2002), Fighting Hard Core Cartels: Harm, Effective Sanctions and Leniency Programmes, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/2474442.pdf; See also, OECD (2003) Cartels Sanctions Against 
Individuals, available at http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/34306028.pdf .  
180
 ICN Cartel Working Group (2008), Setting of Fines for Cartels in ICN Jurisdictions, available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc351.pdf. 
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Competition Authorities for the determination of pecuniary sanctions
181
. All these documents 
may be consulted in the process of preparing guidelines. 
 
A. European Union
182
 
 
1. Historical Background 
 
The fining practice of the European Commission can be divided into four periods.  
 
 In the first period (1962 until 1979), fines did not exceed 2 per cent of the 
fined undertaking’s turnover.  
 
 In the second period (1979-1998), the Commission, with the Court’s approval, 
increased fines beyond this 2 per cent level to improve deterrence, but the 
average fine stayed low by today’s standards. Between 1990 and 1994, the 
average fine per undertaking was still only approximately €2 million, and 
between 1995 and 1999, the average fine was still only approximately €6 
million.  
 
 In 1998, the Commission adopted the first generation of Fining Guidelines. 
Average fines per undertaking increased to €20 million between 2000 and 
2004.  
 
 In 2006, the Commission adopted the second generation of Fining Guidelines. 
Average fines per undertaking increased to €40 million between 2005 and 
2009, and further to €50 million since 2010.  
 
                                                     
181
 ECA Working Group on Sanctions, Pecuniary Sanctions Imposed on Undertakings for Infringements of 
Antitrust Law. Principles for Convergence (May 2008), available at 
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/eca_principles_uk.pdf. 
182
  For literature on the fining policy and practice in the European Union generally, and under the 2006 Fining 
Guidelines in particular, see, e.g., Veljanovski, C. (2007) Cartel Fines in Europe. World Competition. 30(1), 
65-86; Veljanovski, C. (2011) Deterrence, Recidivism, & European Cartel Fines. Journal of Competition Law 
& Economics. 7(4) 871-915; Völcker, S. (2007) Rough Justice? An Analysis of the European Commission’s 
New Fining Guidelines. Common Market L.Rev. 44, 1285-1320; Wils, W. (2007) The European 
Commission's 2006 Guidelines on Antitrust Fines: A Legal and Economic Analysis. World Competition 30(2) 
197-230; Khan, N. (2012) Kerse & Khan on EU Antitrust Procedure. Ch. 7. 6th Ed. London: Sweet & 
Maxwell. 
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In the first two periods (1962-1998), the Commission’s discretion was only guided by the 
statutory regime, according to which it is necessary to consider the gravity and duration of the 
infringement, and whether the infringement is committed negligently or intentionally (below 
I.). In the latter two periods, the Commission published Guidelines on the Setting of Fines 
that resulted in a certain self-binding effect, limiting the Commission’s discretion. The first 
set of Fining Guidelines was published in 1998 (below II.). The current set of Fining 
Guidelines was published in 2006 (below, “DESCRIPTION OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM”). 
 
a. The first two periods (1962-1979; 1979-1998) 
 
In the first two periods, fines were only constrained by the statutory provisions in Article 15 
Regulation 17 of 1962,
183
 the provision that was essentially the equivalent of today’s Article 
                                                     
183
 Article 15 of Regulation 17 of 1962 provided:  
Article 15 - Fines 
1. The Commission may by decision impose on undertakings or associations of undertakings 
fines of from 100 to 5000 units of account where, intentionally or negligently:  
(a) they supply incorrect or misleading information in an application pursuant to Article 2 or in a 
notification pursuant to Articles 4 or 5 ; or 
(b) they supply incorrect information in response to a request made pursuant to Article 11 (3) or 
(5) or to Article 12, or do not supply information within the time limit fixed by a decision taken under 
Article 11 (5) ; or 
(c) they produce the required books or other business records in incomplete form during 
investigations under Article 13 or 14, or refuse to submit to an investigation ordered by decision 
issued in implementation of Article 14 (3). 
2. The Commission may by decision impose on undertakings or associations of undertakings 
fines of from 1000 to 1 000 000 units of account, or a sum in excess thereof but not exceeding 10 % of 
the turnover in the preceding business year of each of the undertakings participating in the 
infringement where, either intentionally or negligently:  
(a) they infringe Article 85 (1) or Article 86 of the Treaty; or 
(b) they commit a breach of any obligation imposed pursuant to Article 8 (1). 
In fixing the amount of the fine, regard shall be had both to the gravity and to the duration of the 
infringement. 
3. Article 10 (3) to (6) shall apply.  
4. Decisions taken pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not be of a criminal law nature. 
5. The fines provided for in paragraph 2 (a) shall not be imposed in respect of acts taking place:  
(a) after notification to the Commission and before its decision in application of Article 85 (3) of 
the Treaty, provided they fall within the limits of the activity described in the notification; 
(b) before notification and in the course of agreements, decisions or concerted practices in 
existence at the date of entry into force of this Regulation, provided that notification was effected 
within the time limits specified in Article 5 (1) and Article 7 (2). 
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23 Regulation 1/2003.
184
 Accordingly, in these first two phases the main principles in the 
setting of the fine for substantive competition law infringements were, pursuant to Article 
                                                                                                                                                                     
6. Paragraph 5 shall not have effect where the Commission has informed the undertakings 
concerned that after preliminary examination it is of opinion that Article 85 (1) of the Treaty applies 
and that application of Article 85 (3) is not justified. 
184
 Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003 provides:  
Article 23 – Fines 
1. The Commission may by decision impose on undertakings and associations of undertakings 
fines not exceeding 1 % of the total turnover in the preceding business year where, intentionally or 
negligently: 
(a) they supply incorrect or misleading information in response to a request made pursuant to 
Article 17 or Article 18(2); 
(b) in response to a request made by decision adopted pursuant to Article 17 or Article 18(3), 
they supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or do not supply information within the 
required time-limit; 
(c) they produce the required books or other records related to the business in incomplete form 
during inspections under Article 20 or refuse to submit to inspections ordered by a decision adopted 
pursuant to Article 20(4); 
(d) in response to a question asked in accordance with Article 20(2)(e), 
- they give an incorrect or misleading answer, 
- they fail to rectify within a time-limit set by the Commission an incorrect, incomplete or 
misleading answer given by a member of staff, or 
- they fail or refuse to provide a complete answer on facts relating to the subject-matter and 
purpose of an inspection ordered by a decision adopted pursuant to Article 20(4); 
(e) seals affixed in accordance with Article 20(2)(d) by officials or other accompanying persons 
authorised by the Commission have been broken. 
2. The Commission may by decision impose fines on undertakings and associations of 
undertakings where, either intentionally or negligently: 
(a) they infringe Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty; or 
(b) they contravene a decision ordering interim measures under Article 8; or 
(c) they fail to comply with a commitment made binding by a decision pursuant to Article 9. 
For each undertaking and association of undertakings participating in the infringement, the fine shall 
not exceed 10 % of its total turnover in the preceding business year. 
Where the infringement of an association relates to the activities of its members, the fine shall not 
exceed 10 % of the sum of the total turnover of each member active on the market affected by the 
infringement of the association. 
3. In fixing the amount of the fine, regard shall be had both to the gravity and to the duration of 
the infringement. 
4. When a fine is imposed on an association of undertakings taking account of the turnover of 
its members and the association is not solvent, the association is obliged to call for contributions from 
its members to cover the amount of the fine. 
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15(2) Regulation 17 of 1962, (1) that the fines must not exceed 10 per cent of the annual 
turnover of each undertaking, (2) that they must take into account the gravity and duration of 
the infringement, and (3) whether the infringement was intentional or only negligent. In the 
first period, lasting up to the late 1970s, the level of fines imposed stayed below 2 per cent of 
the turnover.
185
 
 
The second period can be said to start in the late 1970s, when the Commission started to 
increase its fine level considerably. In Pioneer Hi-Fi Equipment,
186
 the Commission imposed 
for the first time fines that exceeded 2 per cent of the turnover of the undertakings, and 
reached levels up to 4 per cent of the turnover.
187
 The Commission argued that a policy of 
higher fines was adequate and necessary because: 
 
many undertakings carry on conduct which they know to be contrary to Community 
law because the profit which they derive from their unlawful conduct exceeds the 
fines imposed hitherto. Conduct of that kind can only be deterred by fines which are 
heavier than in the past.
188
 
 
The Court of Justice approved of the Commission’s considerations, and stated that: 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Where such contributions have not been made to the association within a time-limit fixed by the 
Commission, the Commission may require payment of the fine directly by any of the undertakings 
whose representatives were members of the decision-making bodies concerned of the association. 
After the Commission has required payment under the second subparagraph, where necessary to 
ensure full payment of the fine, the Commission may require payment of the balance by any of the 
members of the association which were active on the market on which the infringement occurred. 
However, the Commission shall not require payment under the second or the third subparagraph 
from undertakings which show that they have not implemented the infringing decision of the 
association and either were not aware of its existence or have actively distanced themselves from it 
before the Commission started investigating the case. 
The financial liability of each undertaking in respect of the payment of the fine shall not exceed 10 % 
of its total turnover in the preceding business year. 
5. Decisions taken pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not be of a criminal law nature. 
185
 Cf. Judgment of the Court of 7 June 1983, Joined Cases 100 to 103/80 (SA Musique Diffusion Française and 
others v Commission of the European Communities) [1983] ECR 1825 at para. 103. 
186
 Commission Decision No 80/256 of 14 December 1979 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC 
Treaty (IV/29.595 — Pioneer Hi-fi Equipment), [1980] Official Journal L 60. 
187
 Cf. Judgment of the Court of 7 June 1983, Joined Cases 100 to 103/80 (SA Musique Diffusion Française and 
others v Commission of the European Communities) [1983] ECR 1825 at para. 103. 
188
 See the Commission’s argument in Judgment of the Court of 7 June 1983, Joined cases 100 to 103/80 (SA 
Musique Diffusion Française and Others v Commission of the European Communities) [1983] ECR 1825 at para. 
104. 
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in assessing the gravity of an infringement for the purpose of fixing the amount of the 
fine, the Commission must take into consideration not only the particular 
circumstances of the case but also the context in which the infringement occurs and 
must ensure that its action has the necessary deterrent effect, especially as regards 
those types of infringement which are particularly harmful to the attainment of the 
objectives of the Community.
189
 
 
The Court explicitly approved of the Commission’s reasoning that the persistence of 
infringing conduct could be an indication that the fines were not sufficiently deterrent, and 
that the Commission could therefore raise the level of fines to “reinforce their deterrent 
effect”.190 The Court did not accept the appellants’ argument that the Commission was 
estopped by its previous practice from increasing the level of fines for the future: “[o]n the 
contrary, the proper application of the Community competition rules requires that the 
Commission may at any time adjust the level of fines to the needs of that policy.”191 
 
Nevertheless, fines even in the second of these two initial periods stayed relatively low 
compared to the levels reached after the introduction of Fining Guidelines in 1998. It appears 
that in cases predating the 1998 Fining Guidelines, it was the usual – though not invariable – 
practice of the Commission to set the fines no higher than at 10 per cent of the turnover 
achieved with the relevant product on the relevant geopgraphic market.
192
 It has been noted 
that “[u]ntil the late 1980s, few fines had exceeded €1 million”.193 All of the ten highest cartel 
fines per undertaking since 1969 have been imposed after 2000.
194
 As will be explained in 
greater detail below, average fines per undertaking rose from around €2 million per 
undertaking in the period 1990-1994, to approximately €6 million per undertaking in 1995-
                                                     
189
 Ibid., at para. 106. 
190
 Ibid., at para. 108.  
191
 Ibid., at para. 109. 
192
 See the discussion in Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 28 June 2005, Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-
205/02 P and C-213/02 P, Dansk Rørindustri and others v Commission [2005] ECR I-5425 paras 156-197, 
especially at paras 157-158, 176, 180-181. 
193
 See Khan, supra note 18282, at § 7-053. A fine of more than €1 million per undertaking had first been 
imposed in European Sugar Industry (on Tirlemontoise), but it was reduced on appeal in Suiker Unie v 
Commission. Until the end of 1989 (inclusive), fines of more than €1 million were imposed in Pioneer, Flat 
Glass Benelux, Peroxide Products, John Deere, Polypropylene, Meldoc, Hilti, British Sugar, British Plaster Board, 
Flat Glass, PVC, LdPE (later annulled on appeal), and Welded Steel Mesh. 
194
 See European Commission, Cartel Statistics, Section 1.6, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf, reproduced below. 
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1999, and then steeply to some €20 million per undertaking in 2000-2004, €40 million in 
2005-2009, and €50 million since 2009.  
 
b. Fining Guidelines 1998 
 
In 1998, the Commission adopted its first set of Fining Guidelines.
195
  
 
i. Summary of the 1998 Fining Guidelines 
 
Under these Guidelines, the first step was to categorize the gravity of an infringement as 
“minor” (usually vertical agreements, limited market impact, limited geographic scope), 
“serious” (usually horizontal agreements, but also some abuses of dominant positions, wider 
market impact, wider geographic scope), or “very serious” (generally horizontal hardcore 
agreements, clear-cut abuses of a dominant position). The fine level (before adjustments) was 
between ECU 1,000 and ECU 1 million for minor infringements; between ECU 1 million and 
ECU 20 million for serious infringements; and above ECU 20 million for very serious 
infringements. Within these categories, the “effective economic capacity of offenders to 
cause significant damage to other operators” was to be taken into account, also allowing for a 
differentiation according to the specific weights of the offending conduct of each of several 
offenders participating in the same infringement.
196
 
 
This fine level was to be adjusted for the duration of the infringement in the following way: 
where the duration was “short” (usually shorter than 1 year), there was no adjustment; where 
the duration was “medium” (usually between 1 and 5 years), the fine would be increased by 
                                                     
195
  Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation 17 and Article 
65(5) of the ECSC Treaty, [1998] Official Journal C 9/3 (the “1998 Fining Guidelines”). On these Guidelines, see 
Wils, W. (1998) The Commission’s New Method for Calculating Fines in Antitrust Cases. European Law Review 
23(3), 252-263. 
196
 1998 Fining Guidelines, section 1.A., paras 4 and 6. Cf. Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fourth 
Chamber), 9 July 2003, Case T-224/00 (Archer Daniel Midland v Commission) [2003] ECR II-2597 at paras 187-
196, where the Court of First Instance stated that, while the 1998 Fining Guidelines did not clearly state that 
the overall or relative turnover were to be factored in, they did not prohibit these factors to be taken into 
account, and concluding with respect to the relevant turnover: “[T]he proportion of turnover derived from the 
goods in respect of which the infringement was committed is likely to give a fair indication of the scale of the 
infringement on the relevant market. In particular, as the Court of First Instance has emphasised, the turnover 
in products which have been the subject of a restrictive practice constitutes an objective criterion which gives 
a proper measure of the harm which that practice causes to normal competition.” Case T-151/94 British Steel v 
Commission [1999] ECR II-629, paragraph 643, upheld in, Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 18 May 2006, 
Case C-397/03 P, Archer Daniel Midland v Commission [2006] ECR I-4429 at paras 88-96). 
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50%; where the duration was “long” (longer than 5 years), the fine would be increased by 
10% for each year. This factoring in of the duration was said to result in a “considerable 
strengthening of the previous practice”;197 the 2006 Fining Guidelines led to a further 
strengthening of this aspect.
198
 
 
This basic amount – taking into account the gravity (minor/serious/very serious) and the 
duration (short/medium/long) – was then to be adjusted for aggravating or attenuating 
circumstances.
199
 
 
Finally, the 1998 Fining Guidelines applied the cap of 10% of the undertaking’s annual 
worldwide turnover in the preceding accounting year, and took account of “certain objective 
factors such as a specific economic context, any economic or financial benefit derived by the 
offenders [...], the specific characteristics of the undertakings in question and their real ability 
to pay in a specific social context”.200  
 
ii. Legal Challenges to the 1998 Fining Guidelines 
 
- Dansk Rørindustri (Pre-Insulated Pipes) 
 
The Commission applied the 1998 Fining Guidelines, inter alia, in the Pre-Insulated Pipes 
cartel decision of 21 October 1998. The undertakings concerned appealed the Commission 
decision, among other things, on the basis that the application of the 1998 Fining Guidelines 
to cartel conduct that took place before the Fining Guidelines had been published infringed 
the undertakings’ legitimate expectations and the principle of non-retroactivity, and that the 
                                                     
197
 1998 Fining Guidelines, section 1.B. 
198
 See infra, text accompanying notes 469-472. 
199
 1998 Fining Guidelines, section 2 and 3. Section 2 mentions, in a non-exhaustive list of aggravating 
circumstances: recidivism, refusal to cooperate or obstruction of investigations, leadership or being the 
instigator, retaliation against other undertakings to enforce the infringement, and the need to increase the 
penalty in order to skim off the gains improperly made as a result of the infringement. Section 3 mentioned, in 
a non-exhaustive list of attenuating circumstances, “passive or ‘follow-my-leader’ role”, non-implementation, 
termination as soon as the Commission intervenes, “existence of reasonable doubt ... as to whether the 
restrictive conduct does indeed constitute an infringement”; “infringements committed as a result of 
negligence or unintentionally”, and effective cooperation outside the scope of the Leniency Notice. The 
reference to “unintentional” infringements beside negligent infringements is slightly puzzling, because fines 
under Article 15 Regulation 17 of 1962 (and under Article 23 Regulation 1/2003) can only be imposed for 
intentional or negligent infringements. The 2006 Guidelines (infra 211) now only mention negligence as a 
mitigating factor, para. 29. 
200
 1998 Fining Guidelines, section 5 (a) and (b). 
132 
 
method of setting the fine in the 1998 Fining Guidelines was incompatible with Article 15(2) 
of Regulation 17 of 1962.  
 
The Court of First Instance rejected these arguments, and in Dansk Rørindustri, the Grand 
Chamber of the Court of Justice affirmed.
201
 The Court reasoned that the principle of 
legitimate expectations was not infringed by the change in the method of calculation, because 
the Commission had wide discretion in setting the fine within the statutory limit of 10 per 
cent of the annual worldwide turnover of the undertaking. It pointed to its 1983 judgment in 
Musique Diffusion Française to show that it must have been clear to the parties that the 
Commission is free to modify its fining practice “if that is necessary to ensure to the 
implementation of the Community competition rules”.202  
 
The undertakings also submitted the argument that the undertakings had legitimate 
expectations as to the pre-existing fining practice of calculating the fine because they had 
relied on this practice when applying for leniency and cooperating under the leniency 
programme. The Court rejected this argument as well, arguing that the only legitimate 
expectation to be formed under the leniency programme was as to the percentage of the 
reduction of the fine for the cooperation, not to the level of the fines.
203
  
 
The Court also rejected the plea alleging an infringement of the principle of non-retroactivity. 
In this context, it explained the effect of Guidelines in the following way:  
 
[A]lthough those measures may not be regarded as rules of law which the 
administration is always bound to observe, they nevertheless form rules of practice 
from which the administration may not depart in an individual case without giving 
reasons that are compatible with the principle of equal treatment.  
 
[...] 
 
In adopting such rules of conduct and announcing by publishing them that they will 
henceforth apply to the cases to which they relate, the institution in question imposes 
a limit on the exercise of its discretion and cannot depart from those rules under pain 
of being found, where appropriate, to be in breach of the general principles of law, 
such as equal treatment or the protection of legitimate expcetations. It cannot 
                                                     
201
 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 28 June 2005, Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-205/02 P and C-213/02 
P, Dansk Rørindustri & Others v Commission, [2005] ECR I-5425 paras 156-233. 
202
 Ibid., at paras 169-175, quotation in para. 169. 
203
 Ibid., at paras 182-197, in particular paras 188 and 191. 
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therefore be precluded that, on certain conditions and depending on their content, such 
rules of conduct, which are of general application, may produce legal effects.
204
 
 
The Court then, again, relied on Musique Diffusion Française to show that the change of the 
fining practice within the legal limit established in Article 15 of Regulation 17 of 1962 was 
reasonably foreseeable for the undertakings and therefore did not infringe the principle of 
non-retroactivity.
205
 
 
The Court further considered the method for setting the fines in the 1998 Fining Guidelines to 
be compatible with the statutory requirements that the fine be based on the gravity and 
duration of the infringement and the turnover of the undertakigns concerned. With regard to 
the total and relevant turnover to be taken into account to determine the gravity of the 
infringement, the Court explained that  
 
it is permissible, for the purpose of fixing the fine, to have regard both to the total 
turnover of the undertaking, which gives an indication, albeit approximate and 
imperfect, of the size of the undertaking and of its economic power, and to the 
proportion of that turnover accounted for by the goods in respect of which the 
infringement was committed, which gives an indication of the scale of the 
infringement. On the other hand, it follows that it is important not to confer on one or 
the other of those figures an importance disproportionate in relation to the other 
factors and, consequently, that the fixing of an appropriate fine cannot be the result of 
a simple calculation based on the total turnover. That is particularly the case where 
the goods concerned account for only a small part of that figure (see Musique 
Diffusion française and Others v Commission, paragraph 121, and Case 322/81 
Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, paragraph 111).
206
 
 
The Court considered the 1998 Fining Guidelines to give the Commission sufficient 
flexibility to take account of all the relevant factors for determining the fine.
207
 In particular, 
the Court rejected the argument by the applicants that the absolute brackets led to a basic 
amount of the fine that exceeded, for small and medium sized enterprises, the 10% of the 
                                                     
204
 Ibid., at paras 209, 211. See also Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 18 May 2006, Case C-397/03 P, 
Archer Daniel Midland v. Commission [2006] ECR I-4429 at para. 91; Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 
8 December 2011, Case C-272/09 P (KME Germany v Commission) [2011] ECR I-12789 para. 100. 
205
 Dansk Rørindustri, supra note 192, at paras 198-233, in particular paras 227-232. 
206
 Ibid., at para. 243. See also Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 18 May 2006, Case C-397/03 P, Archer 
Daniel Midland v Commission [2006] ECR I-4429 at para. 100. 
207
 Dansk Rørindustri, supra note 192, at paras 238-269, in particular 266-267. 
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total annual turnover threshold even before the duration and aggravating circumstances were 
taken into account, so that for these undertakings the fine was predetermined entirely by the 
basic amount and was no longer specific to the offence and the offender.
208
  
 
The Court further rejected the argument that the Commission is obliged (rather than merely 
authorized) to take into account the undertaking’s ability to pay. The Court accepted that the 
 
Court of First Instance correctly held at that paragraph [scil.: paragraph 308 of the LR 
AF 1998 v Commission judgment] that the Commission is not required, when 
determining the amount of the fine, to take into account the poor financial situation of 
an undertaking concerned, since recognition of such an obligation would be 
tantamount to giving an unjustified competitive advantage to undertakings least well 
adapted to the market conditions (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 96/82 to 102/82, 
104/82, 105/82, 108/82 and 110/82 IAZ v Commission [1983] ECR 3369, paragraphs 
54 and 55).
209
 
 
- Archer Daniel Midland 
 
In Archer Daniel Midland the applicants complained, among other things, that the fine 
imposed under the 1998 Fining Guidelines reached 115 per cent of the relevant turnover in 
the final year of the infringement, and that this breached the principle of proportionality. The 
                                                     
208
 Ibid., at paras 272-289, 322-323, 346. From a comparative perspective, it should be noted that exactly this 
argument prevailed before the German Federal Court of Justice in the Grauzement judgment, so that in 
Germany the 10% total worldwide annual turnover threshold is interpreted not as a cap (as it is under EU law), 
but as the maximum fine. See the description in the National Report on Germany. It may be that the European 
Courts are opening up to this line of argument as well in the context of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. See 
Judgment of the General Court, 16 June 2011, Case T-211/08, Putters International v Commission [2011] ECR II-
3729 where the General Court stated (at para. 75) that:  
In the context of the 2006 Guidelines, the application of the 10% ceiling laid down in Article 23[2] of 
Regulation No 1/2003 is now the rule rather than the exception for any undertaking which operates 
mainly on a single market and has participated in a cartel for over a year. In that case, any distinction 
on the basis of gravity or mitigating circumstances will as a matter of course no longer be capable of 
impacting on a fine which has been capped in order to be brought below the 10% ceiling. The failure 
to draw a distinction with regard to the final fine that results presents a difficulty in terms of the 
principle that penalties must be specific to the offender and to the offence, which is inherent in the 
new methodology. It may require the Court to exercise fully its unlimited jurisdiction in those specific 
cases where the application of the 2006 Guidelines alone does not enable an appropriate distinction 
to be drawn. In the present case, however, the Court finds that this is not the case (see also, in that 
regard, paragraphs 81 et seq. below). 
209
 Ibid, at para. 327. 
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Court rejected this argument by pointing out that the danger of disproportionality was 
precisely the reason for the cap of 10 per cent of the total turnover; fines below this level 
were not to be considered disproportionate merely because of their high level.
210
  
 
2. Description of the Current System 
a. Overview Fining Guidelines 2006 
 
In 2006, the Commission revised the fining guidelines to their current version.
211
 The 2006 
Fining Guidelines are to be applied “in all cases where a statement of objections is notified 
after their date of publication in the Official journal [...].”212 
 
At an abstract level, the setting of the fine under the 2006 Fining Guidelines proceeds in a 
similar steps as the 1998 Fining Guidelines: In a first step, a basic amount is calculated,
213
 
which is then, in a second step, adjusted, primarily according to aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances,
214
 but also to ensure a deterrent effect.
215
 Subsequently, the statutory cap of 
10% of the turnover will be applied if necessary,
216
 and, if applicable, any reductions under 
the leniency programme
217
 and/or the settlement procedure
218
 will be applied. Finally, the 
Commission may take account of the undertaking’s inability to pay the fine.219 
                                                     
210
 Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 18 May 2006, Case C-397/03 P, Archer Daniel Midland v Commission 
[2006] ECR I-4429 at 100-106. 
211
 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation 1/2003, [2006] 
Official Journal C 210/2 (the “2006 Fining Guidelines”). See, e.g., Völcker, supra n.182 at 1285-1320; Wils, 
supra n.130 at Ch. 4; Khan, supra n.182 at paras 7-055 to 7-250. 
212
 Para. 38 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. 
213
 Paras 10, 12-26 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines.  
214
 Paras 11, 27 with 28 and 29, respectively, of the 2006 Fining Guidelines.  
215
 Paras 30 (specific increase for undertakings with a particularly large turnover outside the relevant value of 
sales) and 31 (increase to skim off gains improperly made as a result of the infringement) of the 2006 Fining 
Guidelines. 
216
 Paras 32, 33 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. 
217
 Para. 34 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines in combination with the Leniency Notice.  
218
 The settlement procedure was only introduced in 2008, so that the 2006 Fining Guidelines do not mention 
this possibility. Commission Regulation (EC) No 622/2008 of 30 June 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 
773/2004, as regards the conduct of settlement procedures in cartel cases, [2008] Official Journal L 171/3; 
Commission Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of the adoption of Decisions pursuant to 
Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in cartel cases, [2008] Official Journal C 167/1. 
219
 Para. 35 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. See also the Information Note by Mr. Joaquín Almunia, Vice-
President of the Commission, and by Mr. Janusz Lewandowski, Member of the Commission, Inability to Pay 
under paragraph 35 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines and Payment Conditions Pre- and Post-Decision Finding an 
Infringement and Imposing Fines, SEC(2010) 737/2 of 12 June 2010. See below Section VI. 
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Despite this apparent similarity to the 1998 Fining Guidelines, however, the 2006 Fining 
Guidelines differ significantly, first, in the way in which the basic amount is calculated – 
namely, the value of sales is now (again) the starting point –, and secondly in the way in 
which the duration is taken into account –, namely, by multiplying the basic amount by the 
number of years of duration, rather than merely adjusting the basic amount. The 2006 Fining 
Guidelines now also quantify the adjustment for recidivism, which may be “up to 100%” of 
the basic amount for each previous infringement sufficiently similar to the one being fined 
(although it should be noted from the outset that the actual increases for recidivism are much 
lower). The General Court has considered the 2006 Fining Guidelines to be “a fundamental 
change in the methodology for setting fines”.220 
 
b. Fining Practice 
 
As mentioned previously, the introduction of the 1998 Fining Guidelines and the 2006 Fining 
Guidelines have led to a considerable increase in the fines imposed by the Commission.  
 
The amount of total fines imposed (adjusted for Court judgments) in 5-year brackets since 
1990 is illustrated in Figure 4 below. 
 
 
Figure 4: Fines for infringements of Article 101 TFEU imposed by the European 
Commission 1990-2014, adjusted for Court Judgments; source: 
                                                     
220
 Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber), 16 June 2011, Case T-199/08, Ziegler SA v Commission, 
[2011] ECR II-3507, para. 91, upheld on appeal, Judgment of the Court 11 July 2013, Case C-439/11 P, Ziegler 
SA v Commission [2013] ECR I-000 (but see ibid., para. 111, adding that this fact did not justify the conclusion 
the General Court drew at para. 92 that the Commission’s obligation under the 2006 Fining Guidelines to state 
reasons was therefore more onerous).  
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http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf (last updated 2 April 
2014)  
 
This increase in the total amount of fines is nearly exclusively due to an increase of the 
average fine per undertaking, rather than an increased number of fined undertakings. The 
number of fined undertakings has remained relatively stable
221
 despite the increased number 
of cartel cases since the introduction of the Leniency Programmes.
222
  
 
Average fines per undertaking have now reached approximately €50 million. Dividing the 
total fines imposed on cartels, as represented in Figure 4 (above), by the number of fined 
undertakings (or associations) in the relevant periods
223
 yields the following average cartel 
fines per undertaking for the respective periods:
224
  
 
1990-1994:   €1,860,986.76 
1995-1999:   €6,021,411.11 
2000-2004:   €20,110,501.34 
2005-2009:   €39,913,422.74 
++2010-2014++:  €50,398,536.40 
 
The change from the average fine in the period 2000-2004 to the average fine in the periods 
2005-2009 and 2010-2014 seems to bear out Veljanovski’s prediction that fines under the 
2006 Fining Guidelines were likely to double compared to the 1998 Fining Guidelines.
225
  
                                                     
221
 Between 1990 and 1994 (inclusive), cartel fines were imposed on 185 undertakings/associations; between 
1995 and 1999 (inclusive), 45 undertakings/associations were fined for cartel participation; between 2000 and 
2004 (inclusive), 157 undertakings/associations were fined for cartel participation; between 2005 and 2009 
(inclusive), 205 undertakings/associations were fined for cartel participation; between 2010 and 2014 
(inclusive until 2 April 2014), 167 undertakings/associations were fined for cartel participation. Source: 
European Commission, Cartel Statistics, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf, 
section 1.8. 
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 In each of the periods 1990-1994 and 1995-1999, the Commission issued 10 cartel decisions. In the period 
2000-2004, 30 cartel decisions were issued, in the period 2005-2009, 34 cartel decisions were issued, and in 
the current period since 2010, 25 decisions have been issued so far (as of 2 April 2014). See European 
Commission, Cartel Statistics, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf, Section 1.10. 
223
 Supra note 222.  
224
 Note that these numbers do not appear to have been adjusted for inflation.  
225
 Veljanovski, supra n.182 at 81-84. It should be noted, however, that Veljanovski used very strict 
assumptions (30 per cent of the value of sales for all very serious infringements, entry fee of 25 per cent), 
whereas the actual practice to date seems to be to use percentages between 15-20 per cent for both the value 
of sales and the entry fee.  
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The ten highest cartel fines per undertaking since 1969, as of 31 March 2014, are listed in 
Figure 5.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Ten highest cartel fines per undertaking since 1969, adjusted for Court 
decisions, last updated 31 March 2014 (source: European Commission, Cartel Statistics, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf, section 1.6) 
 
In the Yen Interest Rate Derivatives (YIRD) cartel, the Commission would have imposed a 
record-breaking fine of around €2.5 billion on UBS; however, UBS was the first leniency 
applicant and was granted full immunity.
226
 
 
The method of calculating fines in the 2006 Fining Guidelines is arguably tailored to cartel 
cases. In dominance cases, the application of the value of sales analysis may lead to 
extravagant fines. In the Intel case, the fine amounted to €1.06 billion, even though the 
Commission used only 5 per cent as the relevant percentage of the value of sales.
227
  
 
In conclusion, the average fine per undertaking in the period between 2010 and 2014 (as of 2 
April 2014) was €50 million. The highest fine actually imposed was the fine of €1.06 billion 
imposed in the Intel case. The highest fine ever on one undertaking would have been the fine 
                                                     
226
 See Commission, Press Release, 4 December 2013, IP/13/1208, Case COMP/39.861 – Yen Interest Rate 
Derivatives (YIRD); see also MEMO/13/1090 in the same case.  
227
 Commission Decision, 13 May 2009, Case COMP/37.990 – Intel at recital 1786 (appeal pending, Case T-
286/09). 
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on UBS in the Yen Interest Rate Derivatives cartel, calculated to be €2.5 billion; however, 
UBS received full immunity under the Leniency Notice.  
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B. United States 
 
1. Historical Background 
 
a. The road to the adoption of Antitrust Sentencing Guidelines 
 
The sanction of antitrust violations in the US has been a recurrent issue in US antitrust 
enforcement, since the adoption of the Sherman act in 1890. The Antitrust Division at the 
DOJ may prosecute Sherman Act violations either criminally or civilly. The DOJ benefits 
from an important prosecutorial discretion and in practice only prosecutes “hard core” 
violations criminally. A “hardcore violation” involves the clandestine activity, concealment 
and clear knowledge on the part of the perpetrators of the wrongful nature of their behaviour. 
In essence, these are currently the following categories of horizontal cartel agreements: 
horizontal price fixing including bid rigging, horizontal limitation of output and horizontal 
allocation/division of markets
228
. Hence, there are no civil or administrative financial 
penalties in US law for monopolization or other illegal agreements cases, the main civil 
remedy available in this instance being antitrust damages
229
. In order to impose sanctions, 
DOJ must either prove its case in a Federal court or negotiate a plea agreement with the 
accused. Hence, the US system is a fully prosecutorial system of antitrust enforcement and 
sanctioning. The final fine imposed on the undertaking is determined by the court. In the 
context of settlement, the DOJ regularly recommends a proposed US Sentencing Guidelines 
fines range, which judges regularly accept. Nearly all convictions for antitrust offences are 
the result of settlement (plea agreements in the US terminology) between the DOJ and the 
defendant. A defendant may seek to reach an agreement with the DOJ at any stage of the 
investigation, under the condition that he admits guilt and cooperates with the DOJ if the 
investigation continues. 
 
Federal district court judges have generally been afforded an important discretion to sentence 
defendants within the broad statutory ranges provided by Congress. Despite the possibility 
for sentencing decisions to be subject to appellate review, this “indeterminate” system of 
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 Pate, R.H. Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice (Aug. 12, 2003) Vigorous & Principled 
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sentencing, in the sense that similarly situated defendants may receive dissimilar sentencing 
decisions based on the judge assigned to their case, has been criticized.  
 
Although antitrust violations were subject to antitrust penalties from the enactment of the 
Sherman Act, until 1974, violations of the Sherman Act were a misdemeanour (transformed 
to felony in 1974), offenders being also subject to financial penalties (for corporations, the 
level was set to $5K in 1890, $50K in 1955, $1 million in 1974, $10 million in 1990, $100 
million in 2004).  In view of the low level of such penalties in practice, the Antitrust Division 
of the department of Justice published Guidelines for Sentencing (1977) consisting of base 
sentences along with aggravating and mitigating factors
230
. Nevertheless, the Antitrust 
Division had very limited success in obtaining prison sentences, the main focus of US 
antitrust enforcement action in view of the important deterrent effect.  
 
In 1984 Congress passed the Sentencing reform Act (1984), which created a Sentencing 
Commission with the mandate to develop sentencing guidelines
231
, these guidelines being 
made mandatory to sentencing judges
232
. Hence, once sentencing judges applied the 
Guidelines they were generally confined to the narrow sentencing range established by the 
Commission, something that was criticized at the time
233
. One of the main objectives of 
Congress was to reduce unwarranted sentencing disparities between similarly situated 
defendants by framing the sentencing judge’s discretion within statutory ranges provided for 
federal crimes. Congress empowered the Commission to review and revise the Guidelines 
based on new data and national experience. 
 
The Sentencing Commission implemented the Sentencing Guidelines in 1987 with the aim to 
provide a definite, transparent, uniform and respectful of the principle of proportionality 
process of sentencing individual offenders (including corporations)
234
. The Sentencing 
Commission also promulgated specific Antitrust Sentencing Guidelines in 1987, which are 
part of the Sentencing Guidelines
235
. These were most recently revised by the Antitrust 
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Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 (“ACPERA”), which increased the maximum 
penalty for corporations ten-fold (from 10 million to $100 million fines) and penalties for 
individuals more than three-fold (from 3 years to 10 years imprisonment, and from $350,000 
to $1 million in fines).
236
 Prior to ACPERA, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ was 
increasingly relying on the so-called “Alternative Fine” statute237 when seeking to impose 
substantial fines for violations of the antitrust laws, especially in the case of international 
cartels. Under the Alternative Fine authority, it is possible for the Antitrust Division at the 
DOJ to request fines of up to twice the gross gain (derived by all conspirators) or loss 
(suffered by all victims) resulting from the violation. Using this legal basis, the DOJ had 
obtained since 1997, fine settlements in excess of $100 million. This option is still available 
to the DOJ, which can choose either to rely ACREPA or on the “Alternative Fine” 
provisions. The later choice is the only one available if the US DOJ wants to request financial 
penalties exceeding $100 million. However, reliance is not without potential problems in 
particular as the standard of proof for the purpose of the Alternative Fine provision is the 
criminal one of beyond a reasonable doubt, and the Antitrust Division at the DOJ should 
prove at a sentencing hearing the actual amount of the gross gain or gross loss. The standard 
of proof for ACREPA purposes is the civil one of balance of probabilities. Moreover, § 
3571(d) by its terms does not apply where it would “unduly complicate or prolong the 
sentencing process”. The US DOJ in on solid ground when seeking fines of up to $100 
million, to rely on ACPERA (the revised Sentencing Guidelines) and it might have the 
incentive to limit the amount of the fine requested to less than $100 million where application 
of § 3571(d) and the Sentencing Guidelines would yield fines exceeding, but not substantially 
exceeding, $100 million, especially if the defendant appears willing to litigate the fine. 
 
b. The Sentencing Guidelines and the judiciary 
 
ACPERA was implemented literally days before the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. 
Blakely (2004) established that federal judges should enjoy greater discretion in sentencing, 
in comparison to that afforded in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
238
. This trend towards a 
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greater discretion for sentencing courts was confirmed in United States v. Booker (2005), 
where the Supreme Court held that the Sentencing Guidelines were not compulsory to 
sentencing courts but had only an advisory character
239
. The U.S. Supreme Court held that 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment because they permitted a 
defendant’s maximum possible sentence to be increased based on judicial fact-finding, rather 
than jury determination of the facts. The Supreme Court emphasized in Booker that although 
application of the Federal SG no longer is mandatory, sentencing courts still are required “to 
calculate and consider Guidelines ranges, although they retain the ability to tailor the 
sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well”240. Despite, however, this case law of 
the Supreme Court, until very recently, the lower courts have generally continued to embrace 
the Sentencing Guidelines, noting that they are advisory but applying them as if they were 
mandatory. As it was explained by some authors, 
 
“[...] in its decisions since Booker, the Court has been forced to walk a very fine line 
between promoting district court discretion and encouraging adherence to the 
Guidelines. In attempting to accomplish these two inconsistent aims, the Court has 
largely attempted to encourage adherence to the Guidelines through oblique 
methods—such as by mandating certain procedures that privilege the Guidelines and 
permitting less stringent appellate review of within-Guidelines sentences—rather than 
through substantive limits on district courts’ discretion”241. 
 
Some recent judgments of the Supreme Court have nevertheless questioned the 
implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines
242
. For instance, in Pepper the Supreme Court 
held that “a district court may in appropriate cases impose a non-Guidelines sentence based 
on a disagreement with the Commission’s views. That is particularly true where, as here, the 
Commission’s views rest on wholly unconvincing policy rationales not reflected in the 
                                                     
239
 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  
240
 Id.; see also United States v. Hughes, 2005 WL 147059 (4th Cir. Jan. 24, 2005) (holding that “consistent with 
the remedial scheme set forth in Booker, a district court shall first calculate the range prescribed by the 
guidelines. Then, the court shall consider that range as well as other relevant factors set forth in the guidelines 
and those factors set forth in § 3553(a) before imposing the sentence.”). 
241
 Byrne, C., Hessick, A. (2014) Critical Review of the Sentencing Commission’s Recent Recommendations to 
“Strengthen the Guidelines’ System”. Houston L. Rev. 51(5) 1335, 1337. 
242
 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 45–47 (2007), where the Court refused to conduct a proportionality 
review when the courts departed from the guideline range for fear of interfering with the sentencing 
court’s discretion; Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, (2007), where the Suprenme Court held that 
district courts have the ability to sentence outside of the Guidelines range; Spears v. United States, 555 
U.S. 261, (2009). 
144 
 
sentencing statutes Congress enacted”243. However, the Court also suggested that district 
court policy disagreement may not always be “appropriate”, thus indicating that courts have 
not received a full re-delegation of sentencing policy, the Guidelines remaining “as a 
substantive constraint on the discretion of district court judges, at least in some limited 
form”244. This flexibility enables sentencing courts to sentence outside of the Guidelines 
based on policy disagreements as long as they identify some fact about the defendant’s crime 
or personal background that warranted a non-Guidelines sentence
245
. Under the advisory 
Guidelines regime, judges are required to balance the sentencing factors prescribed by 
Congress and the Sentencing Reform Act to “make an individualized assessment based on the 
facts presented”246. In any case, judges should ground departures from an applicable 
Guideline provision and their judgment is subject to more intensive appellate scrutiny, the 
more it departs from the guidelines for judicial policy reasons or because of disagreements 
with its goals. For instance, some of the Guidelines’ features, such as the assumption of a 
10% overcharge for cartels and the consequent adoption of a 20% volume of commerce 
proxy in order to define the base fine has been criticized by the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission (AMC) in 2007 for not being compatible with an interpretation of the Supreme 
Court’s Booker judgment as holding that facts not proven to the jury or admitted by the 
defendant may not be used to increase a defendant’s sentence, for the cartels that have a 
lower overcharge than 10%
247
.  
 
In its 2012 report on the continuing impact of Booker, the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
recommended to Congress the adoption of a number of proposals designed to “strengthen the 
guidelines system” In particular, the Commission suggested to Congress, among others, to 
require heightened appellate scrutiny for the substance of sentencing decisions and require 
district courts to give substantial weight to the Guidelines as a factor at sentencing
248
. The 
Commission’s recommendations to Congress are explicitly designed to ensure that the 
Guidelines play a more prominent role in federal sentencing 
 
2. Description of the Current System 
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a. Overview 
 
The current financial penalties system in the U.S. relies on a delicate balance between the 
action of the Antitrust Division of the US DOJ putting forward criminal prosecutions and 
attaining settlements with defendants, under the shadow of the significant fines that may be 
imposed, should the Antitrust Sentencing Guidelines being applied or the Alternative Fine 
statute, and that of sentencing courts, which benefit from an important discretion, in 
particular post-Booker. The US Antitrust Sentencing Guidelines have already been briefly 
summarized at Part II and will be examined thoroughly in Part VI.  
 
b. Fining Practice.  
 
The U.S. Sentencing Commission collects data on the sentencing of organizations (and 
individuals) convicted by the federal courts. This data shows a considerable increase in 
antitrust criminal convictions and financial penalties imposed in recent years. 
 
The following statistics provide some further information on fining practice for organizations 
(corporations). 
 
Table 9 Criminal Sanctions for Organizations 
 
Fiscal year Total Fines 
Assessed 
($millions) 
Number of 
Organizations 
Fined 
Average Fine 
($millions) 
2006 $469.8 18 $26.1 
2007 $615.7 12 $51.3 
2008 $695.0 12 $57.9 
2009 $973.7 16 $60.9 
2010 $388.6 11 $30.8 
2011 $380.0 11 $34.5 
2012 $1473.0 33 $44.6 
2013 $272.2 24 $11.35 
Source: Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Workload Statistics Fiscal Years 2006-
2013 (p.11). The federal government’s fiscal year runs from October 1 to September 30th. 
 
On average, the fines imposed since 2006 amount to $39.7 million. To this of course one 
should add fines to individuals and also prison sentences, as well as treble damages. 
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DOJ Antitrust Division Workload Statistics 2013 
 
Sherman Act Violations – highest corporate fines 
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C. Germany 
 
1. Historical Background 
 
The fining system in Germany has undergone several changes since its inception, and in 
particular within the last decade. As will be explained in more detail, for infringements 
committed between 1958 and 2005, the fine mostly depended on the determination of the 
“additional turnover” derived from the infringement; the fine was then set at triple this 
amount. Since 2005, the German legislative framework resembles more closely the European 
framework. However, the interpretation of the provision on fines in Germany differs for 
constitutional reasons from the European interpretation despite the similarity of the wording 
of the provisions. The third part of this national report will describe the fining practice. The 
German law on administrative fines has recently also faced a number of other constitutional 
challenges. 
 
In addition to the administrative fines enforcement, Germany prosecutes bid rigging both 
under the general fraud provision (§ 263 Strafgesetzbuch (Criminal Code, StGB)) and, since 
1998, under a special provision against bid rigging (§ 298 StGB). While the data basis is 
incomplete, approximately 20 persons are sentenced annually under the special bid-rigging 
provision, mostly to criminal fines and/or suspended prison sentences, although there is also 
some anecdotal evidence of prison sentences that are not suspended. The following national 
report will focus on the administrative enforcement.
249
 
 
As will be explained in more detail, for infringements committed between 1958 and 2005, the 
fine mostly depended on the determination of the “additional turnover” derived from the 
infringement; the fine was then set at triple this amount. Since 2005, the German legislative 
framework resembles more closely the European framework. However, the interpretation of 
the provision on fines in Germany differs for constitutional reasons from the European 
interpretation despite the similarity of the wording of the provisions. The third part of this 
national report will describe the fining practice. The German law on administrative fines has 
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recently also faced a number of other constitutional challenges. We summarize the points 
examined in the following sections: 
 
 The initial legislative scheme in Germany required the determination of the 
“additional turnover” caused by the infringement. In many cases, it was difficult to 
prove the additional turnover.  
 The “additional turnover” scheme was therefore replaced by a scheme resembling the 
European system in 2005, allowing fines on undertakings of up to 10% of their annual 
worldwide turnover.  
 However, the threshold of 10% of the annual worldwide turnover of the undertaking 
has been interpreted by German courts not as a cap (as under EU law), but as a 
maximum fine. A judgment by the Federal Court of Justice to this effect has prompted 
the Bundeskartellamt to revise its Fining Guidelines in 2013. 
 The 2013 Fining Guidelines start with a working hypothesis of a “gains and harm 
potential” of 10% of the affected sales over the duration of the infringement; this is 
multiplied by a factor that depends on the global turnover, ranging from a factor of 2-
3 for undertakings with a global turnover below €100 million to a factor of more than 
6 for undertakings with a global turnover of more than €100 billion. 
 Both under the “additional turnover” scheme governing infringements committed 
before 2005 and the new statutory scheme, fines exceeding €100 million per 
undertaking have been imposed and upheld by the courts in cartel cases. 
 Additionally, fines on individuals of up to €1 million are possible, and fines in the 
magnitude of €250,000 for individuals are not unusual in cartel cases. 
 Particular problems have arisen with regard to the legal succession in the context of 
corporate restructuring of undertakings.  
 Constitutional challenges, for example against the accrual of pre-judgment interest on 
fines imposed by competition authorities, have so far been unsuccessful. 
 
a. The “additional turnover” framework (1958-2005) 
 
i. Legal framework 
 
In the original version of the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (Act against 
Restraints of Competition, “GWB”) of 1957,250 in force since 1 January 1958, the fine for 
intentional infringements of the main competition prohibitions was to be set at an amount up 
to the higher of  
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(1) Deutschmark (DM) 100,000 (the “absolute amount prong”), or  
(2) three times the additional turnover derived from the infringement (the “additional 
turnover prong”).251  
 
Case law defined the “additional turnover” as the difference between the actual turnover and 
the counterfactual turnover that would have resulted in the absence of the infringement.
252
 
 
While subsequent legislative changes modified certain aspects of the provision, the general 
framework for setting the maximum fine at the higher of a specified absolute amount or three 
times the additional turnover caused by the infringement remained in place until 2005 (and 
possibly beyond for infringements committed before 2005
253
). Before the major revision of 
the framework for setting fines in 2005 (below II.), the framework for fines was marginally 
modified in the following aspects:  
 
 The relevant section was renumbered in 1965254 and 1998.255 
 The differentiation between intentional and negligent infringements was removed 
from the text of the GWB in 1973, but remained in place in substance.
256
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 In 1980, the provision was amended in two aspects: first, the absolute amount 
prong for infringements was raised from DM 100,000 to DM 1 million, and, 
second, it was added that the amount of the additional turnover could be estimated 
for the additional-turnover prong.
257
  
 
The government’s explanatory memorandum for the 1980 amendments stated that the 
amendment was necessary to “sanction severe infringements adequately”.258 It was noted that 
the German Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office, BKartA) had already imposed fines 
amounting to a million DM or more under the additional-turnover prong, but that the 
calculation of the additional turnover frequently presented difficulties.
259
 Therefore the fixed-
amount prong was raised to DM 1 million, in order to signal that competition law 
infringements are not trivial but severe offences subject to deterrent sanctions.
260
 The 
memorandum also noted that the threshold of DM 1 million had already been proposed in 
1955, and was then only rejected because the highest criminal fine at the time was set at DM 
100,000.
261
 
 
It should be noted that this framework applied to fines for both individuals and undertakings. 
 
ii. Application of the additional-turnover framework in practice 
 
Despite the various changes over time, the framework proved inadequate to sanction severe 
infringements, such as hardcore cartels. The absolute amount prong of only DM 1 million 
was wholly inadequate, and the calculation of the additional turnover often proved 
problematic in practice. 
 
Under the additional turnover framework, which is still generally the framework to be applied 
to infringements predating the 2005 reform,
262
 it first has to be proven to the relevant 
standard of proof (the Court’s “full conviction” as required by criminal procedural law to 
overcome the in dubio pro reo presumption) that there was at least some positive additional 
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turnover.
263
 Only once the existence of some positive additional turnover is proven to the full 
conviction of the Court can the Court go on to estimate the amount of this additional 
turnover. The Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, BGH) facilitated this task, 
however, by establishing an evidential presumption for the existence of a positive additional 
turnover based on the following reasoning:
264
  
- Cartels are generally entered into in order to increase profits.  
- Where a cartel agreement is proven to exist, there is a high probability that the 
participants’ turnover is higher than it would have been in the absence of the cartel 
agreement.  
- The longer the duration and intensity of the cartel, and the greater its geographic 
coverage, the higher this probability will be, and the greater is the burden of 
explanation on a court that wants to argue that the cartel agreement did not result in 
any additional turnover.  
- In the absence of exceptional circumstances indicating that the cartel was wholly 
ineffective, there is an evidential presumption that there was at least some positive 
additional turnover.  
 
Once the existence of some positive additional turnover is established, the Court then has to 
estimate the amount of this additional turnover. In this respect, the Federal Court of Justice 
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ostensibly grants the trial courts “wide discretion”.265 The trial court may choose the most 
appropriate method for estimation aimed at coming as close as possible to reality.
266
 The 
chosen method has to be logically consistent and its results have to be possible and 
reasonable from an economic perspective.
267
 
 
Nevertheless, the Federal Court of Justice has repeatedly criticized the methods for 
estimation used by trial courts. The Court’s preferred method for estimation is a yardstick 
comparison to separate geographic markets that are unaffected by cartel agreements,
268
 if 
necessary foreign geographic markets,
269
 with the necessary corrections to take account of 
structural differences. In some cases, this approach may not be available, for example 
because there is at least a reasonable suspicion that these other markets are also affected by 
cartel agreements.
270
 Alternatively, a yardstick comparison to similar product markets, or 
before/after comparisons may be possible.
271
 Where these methods do not promise to be the 
best approximations of reality, it may be necessary to resort to economic modelling, which 
will “usually” require expert witnesses.272 In the Papiergroßhandel case, in which sellers of 
paper on the wholesale level had cartelized, the Court suggested that the counterfactual 
market price should be determined by (1) determining the prices which the producers charged 
the sellers on the wholesale level, adding (2) the costs of the wholesale level, and (3) an 
“empirically determined operating margin” in similar sectors; the results of this analysis 
should then be cross-checked against other indicators, such as similar product markets (taking 
account of structural differences) and prices that resulted after the cartel was dissolved (again, 
taking account of developments of the market conditions).
273
  
 
In the Grauzement case, the Higher Regional Court Düsseldorf appointed Lars-Hendrik 
Röller, the European Commission’s former Chief Economist, as a court-appointed expert. He 
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 BGH, 19 June 2007 – KRB 12/07, NJW 2007, 3792=WuW/E DE-R 2225, para. 12 – Papiergroßhandel. 
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 BGH, 28 June 2006 – KRB 2/05, WuW/E DE-R 1567, 1571 – Berliner Transportbeton I; BGH, 25 April 2005 – 
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2007, 3792=WuW/E DE-R 2225, paras. 13, 19 – Papiergroßhandel. 
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 Cf. BGH, 19 June 2007 – KRB 12/07, NJW 2007, 3792=WuW/E DE-R 2225, paras. 19 – Papiergroßhandel. 
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 BGH, 19 June 2007 – KRB 12/07, NJW 2007, 3792=WuW/E DE-R 2225, para. 13-14 – Papiergroßhandel; BGH, 
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 E.g., BGH, 26 February 2013 – KRB 20/12, WuW/E DE-R 3861, para. 78 – Grauzement (approving the 
contested judgment’s approach of comparing to the prices that had developped after the cartel was 
terminated).  
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 BGH, 19 June 2007 – KRB 12/07, NJW 2007, 3792=WuW/E DE-R 2225, paras. 19-20 – Papiergroßhandel. 
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 BGH, 19 June 2007 – KRB 12/07, NJW 2007, 3792=WuW/E DE-R 2225, paras. 19-20 – Papiergroßhandel. 
153 
 
developed an econometric model based on time-series data in consultation with the court and 
the parties.
274
  
 
b. The 10% turnover threshold as a maximum (2005/2007/2013) 
 
i. The new scheme 
 
In 2005, the legislator sought to align German competition law more closely with European 
law. Originally, the government bill had only proposed to increase the absolute amount of € 
500,000 to €1 million, and to continue the existing additional-turnover framework as 
described above.
275
 However, Parliament’s Economic Committee, after consultation with 
expert witnesses, considered that (1) German undertakings would be subject to a 10% of the 
turnover cap anyway as soon as the European Commission fined the infringement (Article 23 
Regulation 1/2003);
276
 (2) “the determination of the additional turnover is beset by substantial 
uncertainty” and this uncertainty prevented the imposition of fines that are sufficiently high 
to deter serious infringements;
277
 and (3) the absolute amount of €500,000 (or, as proposed, 
€1 million) was “utterly insufficient” to deter serious infringements.278 The Economic 
Committee therefore recommended that the wording of the new § 81(4) GWB should be 
aligned with the European fining system.
279
  
 
The legislator of the 7th Amendment to the GWB in 2005 followed this recommendation and 
introduced the following formulation into § 81(4) GWB:280  
 
In the cases of paragraph 1, paragraph 2 no. 1, no. 2 lit. a) and no. 5 and paragraph 3 
[scil.: these provisions enumerate substantive infringements of German and European 
competition law, such as anticompetitive agreements or abuses of dominant positions] 
the administrative offence may be punished by a fine of up to €1 million. Beyond 
sentence 1 a higher fine may be imposed on an undertaking or an association of 
undertakings; the fine must not exceed 10 percent of the total turnover of such 
                                                     
274
 OLG Düsseldorf, 26 June 2009, VI-2a Kart 2 - 6/08 OWi, 
http://www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/olgs/duesseldorf/j2009/VI_2a_Kart_2___6_08_OWiurteil20090626.html, 
paras 448-578 
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 Government Bill, 12 August 2004, BUNDESTAGS-DRUCKSACHE 15/3640, pp. 17, 67. 
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 Economic Committee, 9 March 2005, BUNDESTAGS-DRUCKSACHE 15/5049, p. 50. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid., at pp. 30, 50.  
280
 7th Amendment to the GWB of 7 July 2005, BUNDESGESETZBLATT PART I 2005, p. 1954. 
154 
 
undertaking or association of undertakings achieved in the business year preceding 
the decision of the authority. [... .] In fixing the amount of the fine, regard shall be had 
both to the gravity and to the duration of the infringement. 
 
Since this amendment, the absolute amount (now €1 million) is de facto only of relevance to 
individuals who are fined, whereas for undertakings and associations it is 10% of their annual 
turnover that is the relevant threshold. 
 
ii. Ancillary provisions 
 
The 2005 amendment also provided that 
 
(1) the fine “may” deprive the perpetrator of the gains improperly made due to the 
infringement, § 81(5) GWB; this modifies the general principle in the German law of 
administrative offences that the fine “should” deprive the perpetrator of these 
improper gains even if this exceeds the statutory maximum of the fine, § 17(4) OWiG, 
in order to relieve the competition authority of the necessity to determine the gains; 
(2) a fine imposed on legal persons and partnerships starts to accrue interest two weeks 
after the fining decision is served, § 81(6) GWB at a rate of 5% over the base interest 
rate (this amendment sought to provide a disincentive for fined entities to contest the 
fining decision merely to delay paying the fine in order to benefit from the interest in 
the meantime); 
(3) the Bundeskartellamt was authorized to issue guidelines on the exercise of its 
discretion with regard to fines, § 81(7) GWB. 
 
iii. 10% threshold as a maximum fine, not a mere cap 
 
Several commentators considered that the interpretation of the 10% threshold as a cap (as 
under European law), which the German legislator had intended in 2005, left the 
determination of the fine below this threshold to be insufficiently certain, and that this 
uncertainty infringed the constitutional guarantee of nulla poena sine lege certa.
281
 If the 10% 
threshold were a mere cap, a fine of greater than 10% of the turnover could result not only in 
the most serious cases, but even in the case of only low to medium range infringements, and 
in all these cases the fine would be capped at the same level, namely 10% of the turnover. 
This would not comply with the general rules on sanctions for criminal and administrative 
                                                     
281
 See, e.g., Wolfgang Deselaers, Uferlose Geldbußen bei Kartellverstößen nach der neuen 10% Umsatzregel 
des § 81 Abs. 4 GWB?, WUW 2006, 118, 121-122; Rainer Bechtold, GWB – KOMMENTAR 6th edn (Munich: C.H. 
Beck 2010) at § 81 paras 26, 34, 48, with further references. 
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offences, which require that the sanction be proportionate to the offence, and that the highest 
possible fine can only be imposed for the most serious case conceivable. 
 
In 2013, the Federal Court of Justice agreed that the 10% threshold would be unconstitutional 
if it were interpreted as a mere cap.
282
 § 81(4) GWB itself does not state that the 10% 
threshold is a mere cap, so that the provision is not unconstitutional because it can be 
interpreted in a way that leads to a result that complies with constitution, namely as a 
maximum fine. Accordingly, 10% of the undertaking’s worldwide annual turnover is the fine 
to be imposed only for the most serious infringement conceivable, whereas a “medium-
range” infringement could attract a fine of 5% of the worldwide annual turnover etc.283 This 
judgment led to the revision of the Bundeskartellamt’s fining guidelines and the current 
system. 
 
2. The Current System 
 
a. Overview 
 
§ 81(7) GWB was introduced in 2005 to dispel any lingering doubts as to the authority of the 
Bundeskartellamt to publish fining guidelines.
284
 The first set of fining guidelines was issued 
in 2006,
285
 which have since replaced by the 2013 Guidelines discussed in this section. 
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 BGH, 26 February 2013 – KRB 20/12, WuW/E DE-R 3861, para. 50-65 – Grauzement. 
283
 If this were strictly applied, the fines for large undertakings could become “unacceptably high” even for less 
serious infringements (Rainer Bechtold, GWB – KOMMENTAR 6th edn (Munich: C.H. Beck 2010) at § 81 para. 27); 
for example, an undertaking with a total turnover of €100 billion would, for an infringement of medium-range 
gravity, face a fine of €5 billion. To take this consideration into account, the Bundeskartellamt’s 2013 
Guidelines therefore use as the maximum fine the lower of (1) 10 per cent of the total turnover or (2) 10% of 
the relevant turnover multiplied by a multiplier that varies with the total turnover. See below.  
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 The predominant view is that the authorization is declaratory, because administrative authorities may issue 
self-binding guidelines to explain how they will exercise their discretion. Some commentators had argued, 
however, that the high amount of fines usual in competition cases required a legislative authorization. Even 
the authorization in § 81(7) GWB, however, is subject to attacks of commentators who argue that the high 
level of fines usual in competition cases requires that the definition of principles for setting the fines must not 
be left to the discretion of the competition authority, but that these principles need to be defined by the 
legislator itself. See, e.g., Bechtold, R. (2010) GWB – KOMMENTAR. 6th Ed. Munich: C.H. Beck. § 81, para. 34. 
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 Bekanntmachung Nr. 38/2006 über die Festsetzung von Geldbußen nach § 81 Abs. 4 Satz 2 des Gesetzes 
gegen Wettbe- werbsbeschränkungen [GWB] gegen Unternehmen und Unternehmensvereinigungen – 
Bußgeldleitlinien, 15 September 2006. For a discussion, see Vollmer, C. (2007) Die Bußgeldleitlinien des 
Bundeskartellamts. ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WETTBEWERBSRECHT (ZWER) 168-181 (German with an English abstract, noting 
the similarity of the German guidelines and the European guidelines, and stating that the “only major 
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§ 81(4) GWB requires, as does Article 23 Regulation 1/2003 in EU law, that the gravity and 
duration of the infringement have to be taken into account. In addition, the prevailing view is 
that § 17(3) OWiG is also applicable,286 according to which the fine has to take account of (1) 
the nature of the offence and (2) the culpability of the offender; furthermore, (3) the financial 
circumstances of the offender may be taken into account as well. 
 
As described above, the Federal Court of Justice in Grauzement accepted the constitutionality 
of this fining regime with the modification that the 10% threshold is a maximum fine rather 
than a mere cap. This allows courts to use the criteria of § 81(4) GWB and § 17(3) OWiG to 
pinpoint the appropriate level of the fine on the fining range reaching from €5 to 10% of the 
turnover. 
 
To take account of the principles espoused in the Grauzement decision, the Bundeskartellamt 
revised its 2006 Guidelines in 2013.
287
  
 
b. Fining Practice 
 
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that under German substantive competition law it 
has never been necessary to prove any market power where hardcore cartels are concerned 
(below I.). This is important for the interpretation of the average fines reported below (II. and 
III.), because fines for undertakings in cartels with market power are likely to be much higher 
than fines for undertakings in cartels without market power.
288
 In Germany, then, there will 
be many cartels with only limited effectiveness, which attract only a relatively low fine. This 
                                                                                                                                                                     
difference” between the two is the absence of the “entry fee” provision under German law, where instead 
every infringement that has been in effect for less than a year is deemed to have been in effect for a year). 
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 BVerfG, 19 December 2012, 1 BvL 18/11, WuW/E DE-R 3766, para. 11 (with further references) – 
Verzinsungspflicht, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ls20121219_1bvl001811.html (in 
German). 
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 Bundeskartellamt, Guidelines for the setting of fines in cartel administrative offence proceedings, 25 June 
2013, available at 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Leitlinien/Guidelines%20for%20the%20setting
%20of%20fines.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3 (the English translation is somewhat difficult to digest; the 
German version is much more readable: Bundeskartellamt, Leitlinien für die Bußgeldzumessung in 
Kartellordnungswidrigkeitenverfahren, 25 June 2013, available at 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Leitlinien/Bekanntmachung%20-
%20Bußgeldleitlinien-Juni%202013.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5).    
288
 See supra note 446: the factor “qualitative effects” for the determination of the fine includes, inter alia, 
“the significance of the companies involved in the infringement on the markets affected”. 
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will reduce the amount of the average fine. If one only considered the subset of cartels with 
market power, average fines in Germany would be considerably higher. 
 
It also has to be considered that large cartels whose effects transcend German borders, which 
arguably have higher overcharges and attract higher fines, will more likely be taken up by the 
European Commission. Accordingly, most cases dealt with by German authorities are 
regional or at most national cartels. This arguably explains, at least partially, the lower 
average of fines in Germany compared to those imposed by the European Commission and 
Court. 
 
i. Even cartels without market power are prohibited 
 
While it has always been necessary under German law that a restriction be “capable of 
affecting market conditions”, early case law settled that the likelihood of an “appreciable” 
effect was sufficient, and a likelihood of “substantial” restrictive effects need not be 
shown.
289
 An “appreciable” restriction in this sense could exist even where the combined 
market shares of the undertakings involved was below 5 per cent.
290
 The more problematic 
the nature of the infringement was, in particular where a restriction of competition was the 
object of the agreement, the less likely it was that an infringement would be denied on the 
basis of an absence of appreciability. Therefore, where hardcore restrictions were concerned, 
combined market shares as low as 0.5 per cent were considered to lead to an “appreciable” 
restriction.
291
 Furthermore, the threshold for appreciability will be lower where other factors 
already reduce the intensity of competition in the market.
292
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 BGH, 14 Jan. 1960, KRB 12/59, WuW/E BGH 369, 372–373 – Kohlenplatzhandel (no substantial restriction 
necessary; however, in that case there was no error in law where the appeal court found no appreciable 
restriction where a recommendation was followed by suppliers with a combined market share of some 5%). 
290
 BGH, 27 Jan. 1966, KRB 2/65, WuW/E BGH 726, 730–731 – Klinker, clarifying that the judgment in 
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market share of 5%; instead, any appreciable restriction will suffice, provided its effects are not merely 
speculative. 
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 BGH, 7 Jun. 1962, KZR 6/60, WuW/E BGH 486, 491-492 – SPAR (horizontal geographic market allocation 
between two grocery stores with a combined market share of some 0.5% was considered appreciable); BGH, 
27 Jan. 1966, KRB 2/65, WuW/E BGH 726, 730–731 – Klinker (where the competing parties participating in an 
exclusive sales agency had at least – depending on the product market definition –1% market share, see the 
appeal court's decision KG, 16 Oct. 1964, Kart B 1/63, WuW/E OLG 709, 713 – Bockhorner Klinker); OLG 
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matter of course, see BGH, 23 Feb. 1988, KRB 4/87, WuW/E BGH 2469, 2470 – Brillenfassungen, where an 
158 
 
 
Today, the European principles on appreciability of restrictions of competition apply to § 1 
GWB as well.
293
 In principle, only agreements that have the object or effect of appreciably 
restricting competition are prohibited. However, in Germany as in the European Union it is 
unambiguously clear that the respective de minimis notices do not apply to hardcore 
restrictions, so that there is no safe harbour of a combined 10 per cent for horizontal hardcore 
restrictions.
294
 The Expedia judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union has even 
indicated that in the case of object restrictions there may not be any need for showing any 
appreciability of the restriction.
295
 Even though it is questionable whether the Expedia 
                                                                                                                                                                     
optician had supplied a competitor with a computer program with price lists, and the Federal Court of Justice 
reversed the conviction and remanded for further determinations about the market conditions to assess 
whether the restraint was appreciable.  
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 Cf. BGH 14 Apr. 1983, KRB 4/82, WuW/E BGH 2000, 2001–2003 – Beistand bei Kostenangeboten (where bid 
rigging is rife in a market, even a bid rigging arrangement of minor proportions is capable of appreciably 
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reference prices by other competitors. 
293
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 Bundeskartellamt, Notice No. 18/2007 of the Bundeskartellamt on the Non-Prosecution of Cooperation 
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[internal footnote omitted]. 
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  Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 13 December 2012, Case C-226/11, nyr, paras 36-37: 
36 In that regard, the Court has emphasised that the distinction between ‘infringements by object’ 
and ‘infringements by effect’ arises from the fact that certain forms of collusion between 
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normal competition (Case C‑ 209/07 Beef Industry Development Society and Barry Brothers (‘BIDS’) 
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judgment is to be understood as removing the appreciability criterion for object restrictions 
completely, it is certainly an indication that for these restrictions the threshold for 
appreciability is much reduced; this would seem to lead to a similar result as the earlier 
German case law described above. 
 
ii. Fines Imposed on Individuals 
 
The statutory maximum fine for individuals is €1 million (§ 81(4) GWB). The 
Bundeskartellamt typically fines one individual for each undertaking fined. Between 1993 
and 2010, the Bundeskartellamt fined 510 individuals and 563 legal persons.
296
 The average 
fine per fined individual in that period was reportedly €56,000.297  
 
Data about the distribution of these fines is sparse, but there are indications that the 
distribution is skewed so that individual fines can be substantially higher, especially in cartel 
cases.  
 
For example, in the recent beer breweries cartel, 14 individuals were fined a total of 
approximately €3.6 million.298 Even if this amount were equally distributed among these 
individuals, the fine for each of these 14 individuals would be approximately €257,000. 
Similarly, individual fines of €250,000 and €200,000 were reported in the Papiergroßhandel 
and Grauzement cases, respectively.
299
 
 
iii. Fines on undertakings 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
[2008] ECR I‑ 8637, paragraph 17, and Case C‑ 8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands and Others [2009] ECR 
I‑ 4529, paragraph 29). 
37 It must therefore be held that an agreement that may affect trade between Member States and 
that has an anti-competitive object constitutes, by its nature and independently of any concrete 
effect that it may have, an appreciable restriction on competition. 
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 BVerfG, 19 December 2012, 1 BvL 18/11, WuW/E DE-R 3766, paras 52, 60 – Verzinsungspflicht, available at 
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 Bundeskartellamt, 2 April 2014, Fallbericht Bußgelder gegen Brauereien (Summary Case Report on the 
decisions of 27 December 2013 and 31 March 2014, Case B10-105/11), 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidung/DE/Fallberichte/Kartellverbot/2014/B10-105-
11.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1. 
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 In the Grauzement case, the individual fine was reduced by €10,000 on appeal because of the long duration 
of the appeal procedure (see infra note 264). 
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Between 1993 and 2010, the Bundeskartellamt fined 563 legal persons.
300
 The average fine 
for each undertaking over this period was €4.6 million.301 It should be noted, however, that 
fines have considerably increased since the turn of the millenium, as Figure 6 indicates, so 
that the average fine today is arguably much higher; also, the distribution is very likely 
significantly skewed, with a large number of very small fines but also a number of very high 
fines.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Fines imposed by the Bundeskartellamt (in million €) (source: 
Bundeskartellamt, Tätigkeitsbericht 2011/12, Bundestags-Drucksache 17/3675 of 29 
May 2013, p. 30) 
 
For example, in a recent cartel the Bundeskartellamt imposed overall fines of €280 million on 
three undertakings, including a fine of €195.5 million on one undertaking (Südzucker), a fine 
of approximately €75 million on a second undertaking, and a fine “in the single-digit 
millions” on a third (Nordzucker).302 
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 Bundeskartellamt, Fallbericht Bußgelder gegen Brauereien (supra note 298). 
301
 Ibid. 
302
 The Bundeskartellamt press release mentions only that three undertakings were fined a total fine of €280 
million. Südzucker self-reported the fine of €195.5 million 
(http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/kartell-280-millionen-euro-bussgeld-gegen-
zuckerhersteller-12808244.html) and Nordzucker, whose fine was “substantially reduced” to take account of 
its cooperation, self-reported a fine “in the single-digit millions” (ibid.). This leaves some €75-80 million for the 
third undertaking and the seven individuals fined. 
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In the Grauzement case, the Bundeskartellamt had initially imposed fines in the amount of 
€661 million, which were later approximately halved by the OLG Düsseldorf and further 
marginally reduced by the Federal Court of Justice.
303
 Even after all reductions on both 
appeals, these fines included a fine of some €161 million on one undertaking 
(HeidelbergCement AG), a fine of some €66.5 million on a second undertaking (Schenk 
Zement AG) and a fine of some €50 million on a third undertaking (Dyckerhoff AG), as well 
as some smaller fines of approximately €22.8 million (Lafarge Zement GmbH), some €13.9 
million (Holcim Deutschland AG), and some €12 million (ReadyMix, today CEMEX 
Deutschland AG) on further undertakings.  
 
In the Rail track cartel, one undertaking (ThyssenKrupp GfT Gleistechnik GmbH) was fined 
€103 million; overall, fines of €222 million were imposed on 12 undertakings in this cartel.304 
 
In another recent cartel of beer breweries (already mentioned above 2.), fines of 
approximately €334 million were imposed on 11 undertakings, despite substantial reductions 
for cooperation (up to 50 per cent) and settlements.
305
 The exact distribution of the overall 
fine over the 11 undertakings is not published, but it is likely that some breweries had to pay 
a much higher fine than the average of €30.36 million.  
 
In the Kesselhersteller cartel, one undertaking (ALSTOM Power Systems GmbH) had 
originally been fined €91 million under the additional turnover provision; the 
Bundeskartellamt had estimated the additional turnover according to the principles 
established in the Federal Court of Justice’s Papiergroßhandel judgment.306 Following the 
submission of a complaint, the Bundeskartellamt reduced this fine to €42 million, inter alia, 
because the undertaking had shown that certain of its costs had not been accurately estimated 
and that the undertaking had made substantial restitution for overcharges to its customers; 
this fining decision became final.
307
  
                                                     
303
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about the first set of fines in the Rail track cartel, decision of July 2012, Case B12 – 11/11). 
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306
 Bundeskartellamt, press release of 12 August 2010. 
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 Bundeskartellamt, 25 November 2011, Fallbericht Bußgeldverfahren gegen Hersteller von 
Großdampferzeugern (Case Report about producers of utility steam generators, decision of 20 October 2011, 
Case B11 - 26/05). 
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c. Controversies 
 
i. No nullity for retroactivity 
 
The 7th Amendment to the GWB in 2005 provided that the amendment was to enter into 
force “on 1 July 2005”. Because of various delays, however, the Act was only signed into 
effect on 7 July 2005, and promulgated in the official gazette on 12 July 2005. Taken 
literally, then, the Act provided that the amendments should enter into force retroactively. For 
administrative offences, as for criminal offences, such retroactivity is strictly prohibited 
(nulla poena sine lege). Some argued that therefore at least for a transitory period 
infringements were not subject to a fine; and some further argued that this period would have 
to be taken to be the mildest law.
308
 The Federal Court of Justice rejected this argument in 
2013. The Court argued that the 2005 Act was to be interpreted in such a way that the 
amendment concerning the fining of the administrative offence did not enter into force 
retroactively.
309
 
 
ii. Constitutional Complaint against the Execution of a Fine Imposed by the 
European Commission 
 
In ThyssenKrupp Nirosta, the addressee of a fines decision by the Commission applied to the 
Federal Constitutional Court for a preliminary injunction against the execution of the fine. It 
claimed that its fundamental rights before the European institutions were so deficient that it 
could invoke the Solange II principles. The Federal Consitutional Court rejected the 
application for a preliminary injunction, because the damage to the diplomatic interests of 
Germany if the injunction were granted and the complaint later turned out not to be well 
founed would be grave, whereas no irreparable harm would result if the fine were executed, 
even if the complaint should later turn out to be well founded.
310
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 The effect of this would have been that infringements committed before (at least) 2007 could no longer be 
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 BVerfG, 30 August 2013, 2 BvR 2752/11, WuW/DE-R 4081 – ThyssenKrupp Nirosta. 
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iii. Legislative changes and changes in the Guidelines 
 
More generally, the recent legislative changes in the 8th Amendment to the GWB and the 
major revision of the 2013 Fining Guidelines, as well as the recent “codification” (in the form 
of Guidelines) of the Settlement Procedure in Germany are bound to lead to further 
constitutional challenges in the near future.
311
 
 
D. United Kingdom 
 
1. Historical Background 
 
a. The statutory framework 
 
Section 36(1) and (2) of the Competition act 1998 provided the Office of fair Trading (OFT) 
the power to require an undertaking to pay a penalty in respect of an infringement of the 
Chapter I, Chapter II prohibition of the Competition Act 1998, as well as EU competition 
law. The OFT has discretion to impose financial penalties where the infringement has been 
committed intentionally or negligently by the undertaking
312
, up to the level of 10% of the 
undertaking’s worldwide turnover313. The Competition Act 1998 also required the OFT to 
publish guidance on how it determines the appropriate amount of the financial penalty 
imposed, which the OFT has done in several occasions
314
. Under the previous competition 
law regimes implemented in the UK no conduct was unlawful until after it had been 
proscribed by an order of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry or after the firm 
concerned had given a legally binding undertaking to the Competition Authority (the Director 
General of Fair Trading at the time) that it would refrain from anti-competitive conduct. 
Therefore no penalties could be levied for previous conduct, no matter how damaging to 
competition. 
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The CMA may of course make a finding of an infringement of the Competition Act even if 
no penalty is imposed, if it shows a legitimate interest in making such decision without 
imposing penalties. Yet, this requirement of intention or negligence has been broadly 
interpreted by the courts. For instance, the CMA does not have to decide if the conduct was 
committed intentionally or negligently, a cumulative qualification being sufficient for the 
purposes of imposing a financial penalty
315
. According to the CAT, 
 
“As to the meaning of “intentionally” in section 36(3), in our judgment an 
infringement is committed intentionally for the purposes of the Act if the undertaking 
must have been aware that its conduct was of such a nature as to encourage a 
restriction or distortion of competition:[…]. It is sufficient that the undertaking could 
not have been unaware that its conduct had the object or would have the effect of 
restricting competition, without it being necessary to show that the undertaking also 
knew that it was infringing the Chapter I or Chapter II prohibition:[…]. While in 
some cases the undertaking’s intention will be confirmed by internal documents, in 
our judgment, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the fact that certain 
consequences are plainly foreseeable is an element from which the requisite intention 
may be inferred. If, therefore, a dominant undertaking pursues a certain policy which 
in fact has, or would foreseeably have, an anti-competitive effect, it may be legitimate 
to infer that it is acting “intentionally” for the purposes of section 36(3). 
As to “negligently”, there appears to be little discussion of this concept in the case law 
of the European Community. In our judgment an infringement is committed 
negligently for the purposes of section 36(3) if the undertaking ought to have known 
that its conduct would result in a restriction or distortion of competition […]. For the 
purposes of the present case, however, we do not need to decide precisely where the 
concept of “negligently” shades into the concept of “intentionally” for the purposes of 
section 36(3), nor attempt an exhaustive judicial interpretation of either term”316. 
 
One should also consider the limited immunity in relation to “small agreements”, other than 
price fixing, under Section 39 of the Competition act 1998 for infringements of Chapter I, or 
“conduct of minor significance”, under Section 40 of the Competition Act 1998, for 
infringements of Chapter II, which preserve infringers to from the effect of financial penalties 
imposed under Section 36(2) of the Competition Act 1998. The concept of “small 
agreements” refers to agreements where the combined turnover of the parties in the preceding 
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calendar year was £20 million or less317. The concept of “conduct of minor significance” has 
been interpreted as referring to conduct where the perpetrator’s worldwide turnover in the 
preceding calendar year was £50 million or less318. The CMA may however withdraw the 
immunity, if as a result of an investigation, it considers that the conduct is likely to infringe 
the Chapter I and II prohibitions.  
 
The OFT published Guidance in 2000 on the methodology for setting financial penalties, 
which were revised in 2004 and most recently in 2012. The Guidance explains the steps 
which the OFT takes in calculating a penalty, setting out an approach in different steps. In the 
2004 version of the Guidance these consisted in taking a percentage of the relevant turnover 
as a starting point (step 1), adjust for the duration of the infringement (step 2), adjust for other 
factors in order to achieve the policy objectives pursued, in particular deterrence (step 3), 
adjust for aggravating and mitigating factors (step 4) and adjust to prevent the maximum 
penalty being exceeded (step 5). Normally the Guidance does not bind the Competition 
Appeal Tribunal (CAT), to which decisions on financial penalties may be appealed
319
.  
 
b. The impact of the judicial control of the CAT 
 
A crucial development regarding the OFT’s fining policy occurred with the CAT’s judgments 
in the construction cartel cases (nine judgments in the construction bid-rigging cartel
320
 and 
one judgment on the construction recruitment forum cartel
321
), where the CAT slashed fines 
imposed by the OFT by up to 90%. The OFT had in its decisions imposed financial penalties 
with the view that these should have a sufficient deterrent effect. Yet, this led to the charge 
that the level of these financial penalties was excessive. Most of the cases consisted in the 
practice of“simple” cover pricing and compensation payments made by the company 
providing the cover price to the company receiving it in the event that the former won the 
tender to which the cover price related, the OFT considering that the infringements involving 
compensation payments to be more serious than those involving “simple” cover pricing The 
OFT imposed penalties amounting to just under £130 million, the individual fines ranged 
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from £173 to almost £18 million, having calculated the penalties according to its own 
Guidance at the time (the 2004 version of it). In particular, at step 3, providing for an 
adjustment of the penalty figure in order to achieve deterrence, the OFT was concerned that 
in some cases the penalty arrived at by step 2 was small compared to the undertaking’s total 
worldwide turnover and in order to achieve deterrence, in particular in view of the economic 
size of the undertakings, the OFT increased the penalty, where necessary, to a level 
equivalent to a specific proportion (0.75% or 1.05%) of the undertaking’s worldwide turnover 
in the year prior to the decision.  
 
The OFT arrived to the figures of 0.75% (for simple cover pricing) and 1.05% (for 
infringements involving compensation payments) under the assumption that the 
undertaking’s turnover in the relevant market represented at least 15% of its total worldwide 
turnover. The OFT then applied the relevant Step 1 starting point percentage (5% or 7%, as 
the case might be) to this assumed 15%, resulting in the 0.75% or 1.05% figures. This was 
the so-called “minimum deterrence threshold” (“MDT”), which when applied had the effect 
of dissociating the link between penalty for the particular infringement and the actual relevant 
turnover, the financial penalty being instead related to total worldwide turnover. This led to 
fines after step three that were approximately 175% larger than what it should have been had 
the MDT not applied. The parties argued at the CAT that the MDT has been applied too 
mechanistically and produced fines which were unfair. The parties had also challenged, 
among other things, the definition of the relevant turnover by the OFT, for instance in the 
construction recruitment forum case, the reliance by the OFT on the gross turnover of the 
undertakings, instead of using net fees that would have not included temporary worker’s 
wages, in view of the specificity of the recruitment industry
322
.  
 
With regard to the first point, although the CAT recognized the OFT some margin of 
appreciation in considering that the infringements were serious, it also held that “cover 
pricing” was a less serious infringement than bid rigging and in view of the low margins in 
the industry, among other things, which did not support the existence of substantial cartel 
overcharges, the final penalties imposed by the OFT were excessive. The CAT contested the 
OFT’s decision to consider 5% of the relevant turnover as the starting point for the base fine 
under step 1, the OFT Guidance on fines setting a maximum of 10%, since the difference 
between 5% and 10% did not adequately reflect the distinction in culpability between cover 
pricing as practised in the construction industry in the relevant period and, say, a multi-partite 
horizontal price fixing or market sharing cartel”, hence “(g)reater head-room is required to 
accommodate the latter type of offence within the range currently provided by Step 1 of the 
                                                     
322
 Id. 
167 
 
Guidance”323. A starting point of 3.5% was more appropriate in such cases, although the CAT 
also recognized that the OFT was entitled to choose the same starting point for all 
infringements (cover pricing and compensation payments), if the differences among them 
could be accommodated at a later stage in the fining methodology
324
. These adjustments 
under step 3 were even more necessary as the definition of the market for the purpose of 
defining the relevant turnover by the OFT was extremely narrow. The CAT also found that 
the OFT had misapplied its own Guidance by taking into account in order to define the 
relevant turnover the relevant market in the last year prior to the adoption of the decision, 
instead of the turnover in the last year of the undertaking’s participation in the infringement, 
as it was indicated in the OFT Guidance.The CAT referred to some case law of the Court of 
Justice of the EU emphasising the importance of taking into account turnover which reflects 
the undertaking’s real economic situation during the period in which the infringement was 
committed, also observing that in case the OFT intended to adopt a different policy, they 
should first have consulted upon and sought approval for the change, eventually revising the 
Guidance. In the construction recruitment forum case, the CAT also held that the OFT should 
not focus mechanistically on the undertaking’s audited accounts, if there are more appropriate 
indicators of actual economic performance and activity of the business carried out by the 
undertaking in question.  
 
More importantly, the CAT challenged the mechanical use of the MDT by the OFT, with the 
aim to treat parties in different cases in a more uniform way, as this conflicted with the 
principle that penalties had to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, with regard to the 
individual circumstances of the parties, and the principle of proportionality. The CAT did not 
oppose to the use of the MDT, as “there is nothing in Step 3 which precludes, or is 
inconsistent with, use of a mechanism to assist the OFT in making an appropriate adjustment, 
provided always that the resulting figures are subject to an individual appraisal ensuring a 
proportionate penalty”325. According to the CAT, the choice of the 15% of the turnover was 
not justified, and in any case the bluntness of the method enhanced the risk of 
disproportionate figures, particularly in the case of firms with very substantial activities 
outside the sector to which the infringement related. For the CAT, and contrary to the 
assumptions behind the MDT, profits and cash flow was more important than turnover to take 
into account. More importantly, for the CAT, “there must be a link between culpability and 
the deterrent element in the penalty”, yet the MDT severed this link326.According to the CAT, 
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“(i)t is a cardinal principle that the ultimate penalty imposed must satisfy the 
requirements of proportionality. Whilst deterrence is a relevant consideration when 
assessing proportionality in this context, so equally is the culpability of the 
offender/seriousness of the offence. If these two considerations pull in different 
directions, a fair balance should be sought. Where a provisional penalty at Step 1 is 
deemed insufficient for the purpose of deterrence (or for that matter does not properly 
reflect the seriousness of the offence) it is proper to increase it. But the culpability 
consideration must not be lost to view, and it may well impose some limit on the 
extent of any increase based purely on deterrence. Ultimately the question will be: is 
the final penalty reasonable and proportionate having regard to the twin objectives set 
out in paragraph 1.4 of the Guidance? We are not aware that any of the above is 
controversial”327. 
 
Indeed, “determination of the penalty requires a refined consideration and assessment of all 
the relevant circumstances, and the element of deterrence, while undoubtedly one of those 
circumstances, should not lead to the level of penalty being calculated according to a 
mathematical formula”328. For the CAT, a mechanistic approach would run “counter to the 
thrust of the Guidance and ordinary penal principles, which require a case-by-case analysis 
and assessment of the appropriate penalty” and also may lead to excessive and 
disproportionate fines
329. The OFT “should have taken a step back and ask itself whether in 
all the circumstances a penalty at the proposed level is necessary and proportionate in order 
both to punish the particular undertaking for the specific infringement and to deter it and 
other companies from further breaches of that kind”330, looking “critically at the figure 
produced by the MDT”331. The CAT even made the suggestion for such a step, of stepping 
back, to be formalized in the OFT Guidance, in order to avoid a mechanistic application of a 
formula
332
. 
 
The jurisprudence of the CAT led the OFT to revise its Guidance in 2012 and introduce a 
new step (new step 4) in order to examine whether the penalty is proportionate as part of its 
overall assessment, after adjustments have been made on the basis of aggravating and 
mitigating factors and also achieves deterrence, emphasising the need for flexibility and an 
assessment of the individual circumstances of each case. 
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Following the implementation of the new UK enforcement regime introduced by the 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 on 1 April 2014, the functions of the 
Competition Commission and many of the functions of the OFT were transferred to the 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), which became the main competition law 
enforcer in the UK (the OFT and the Competition Commission being abolished). Hence, the 
provisions empowering the OFT to impose financial penalties are now implemented by the 
CMA. The CMA has also published on their website all the previous guidelines of the OFT, 
in particular those on financial penalties
333
 and leniency
334
, thus indicating that they will 
follow on the same policies. 
 
The legislator also put more emphasis on deterrence, thus tilting the balance between 
deterrence and proportionality to the former. Section 44 of the Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform Act (ERRA) 2013 amended section 36 (penalties) of the Competition Act, by adding 
after subsection (7), subsection (7A) stating the following:  
“In fixing a penalty under this section the CMA must have regard to   
(a) the seriousness of the infringement concerned, and  
(b) the desirability of deterring both the undertaking on whom the penalty is imposed 
and others from (i) entering into agreements which infringe the Chapter 1 prohibition 
or the prohibition in Article [101](1), or  (ii)engaging in conduct which infringes the 
Chapter 2 prohibition or the prohibition in Article [102].”  
 
Section 38 of the Competition Act was also reformulated by ERRA 2013 in order to impose 
an obligation to the Competition Appeal Tribunal to “have regard” to the guidance published 
by the CMA, thus indicating the need for the CAT to take, probably more into account, the 
OFT’s policy objectives of general deterrence. It remains to be seen if this textual 
reformulation will have any impact on the deference provided by the CAT to the OFT’s 
determination of financial penalties.  
 
Ensuring general and specific deterrence, while making sure that financial penalties are 
proportionate has been a recurrent theme in the development of an effective sanctions system, 
not only in the context of competition law, but also for all types of regulatory offenses. The 
six principles of regulatory sanctions developed by the Macrory report on Regulatory Justice: 
making Sanctions Effective (2006) recognize the complexity of integrating various 
parameters in the decision to impose variable monetary administrative penalties
335
. Of 
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particular interest is also one of the recommendations of the report to assess carefully the 
advantages and disadvantages of setting an upper limit to variable monetary administrative 
sanctions in underlying legislation, as this would pose undue complexity on the system
336
. 
Regulators should have flexibility and ability in “capturing the financial benefit businesses 
may have acquired through a regulatory breach”, hence the suggestion not to specify an upper 
limit. These suggestions illustrate the trend towards a more flexible, case-by-case approach in 
determining the level of sanctions, based on the harm inflicted by the violation with the 
addition of tools to take into account the objective of general deterrence and the low 
probability of detection for some regulatory offenses. 
 
2. Description of the current system 
 
a. Overview 
 
The OFT Guidance of 2012 indicates that a financial penalty imposed by the OFT (now 
CMA) under section 36 of the Competition Act 1998 will be calculated following a six-step 
approach: 
 
Step 1: calculation of the starting point having regard to the seriousness of the infringement 
and the relevant turnover of the undertaking  
•Step 2: adjustment for duration  
Step 3: adjustment for aggravating or mitigating factors  
Step 4: adjustment for specific deterrence and proportionality  
Step 5: adjustment if the maximum penalty of 10 per cent of the worldwide turnover of the 
undertaking17 
Step 6: adjustment for leniency and/or settlement discounts.  
 
b. Fining Practice 
 
The analysis of the fining practice of the OFT shows that in general the average starting 
amount for fines in the UK is relatively lower, compared to the EU and the US, with a 9.3% 
proportion of the firm sales in the relevant market taken into account, as opposed to 21.5%  in 
the EU and 20% in the US. This percentage increases slightly after deterrence is considered 
to 12.1%, after aggravating/mitigating circumstances to 12.7%, before being reduced to 
12.6% after adjustment for the 10% turnover limit and 9% after leniency. This percentage is 
significantly lower than the average of 15.8% for the EU and 21.5% for the US (after 
leniency). The fact that the financial penalty as a proportion of total turnover is not capped in 
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the US, explains of the higher on average financial penalties as a proportion of firm sales in 
the relevant market
337
. 
 
A closer look to the fining practice indicates that the OFT proceeded to impose a significant 
amount of financial penalties in some horizontal price fixing cartels, most notably in the 
airline passenger fuel surcharges cartel with a total fine to British Airways (BA) of the 
amount of £58.5 million (2012)338 , which was a substantial decrease from the staggering 
£121,5 million requested from BA in the early resolution agreement between the OFT and 
BA in 2007
339
, the OFT re-calculating the fine in view of the CAT’s more restrictive case law 
after the construction cartel cases in 2011. The fine was reassessed following the issue of a 
Statement of Objections in November 2011 also in light of the overall value added to the 
OFT's investigation by BA's co-operation was greater than had been anticipated at the time of 
the original agreement. One may also note the OFT’s fines (for price information exchange) 
against Royal Bank of Scotland, a fine of £ 28.59 million340, but also in abuse of dominance 
cases, such as a fine by the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority, a concurrent enforcer of 
competition law in the UK in the energy sector, against National Grid for £41.6 million341 or 
for vertical price fixing against Imperial Tobacco for the amount of £112.4 million 
approximately
342
 (see Appendix 1). Some significant cases of the OFT led also to significant 
aggregate financial penalties to the participants to the infringement. For instance, in the 
tobacco case the total fines imposed amounted to £225 million343, in the dairy products case 
to £49.51 million344, in the construction industry cartel £129.2 million (after leniency)345. The 
OFT has also proceeded so far to a reduction of fines for leniency purposes. For instance in 
construction recruitment case, the OFT limited the total fine to £39.3 million approximately 
from £173 million before leniency346. 
 
In view of the relatively small number of decisions imposing financial penalties for 
infringements of competition law in the UK, we do not include statistics but a table with all 
the decisions imposing fines, which is available at the Appendix 1 [See also, Table 10 
below]. 
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Year of 
infringement 
decision 
Number of 
infringement 
decisions 
Post leniency 
and settlement 
fines (£) 
Value of fines 
post-appeal (£)  
2001 1 3,210,000 2,200,000 
 
2002 4 6,515,409 6,187,369 
 
2003 5 48,046,598 37,991,000 
 
2004 2 2,004,626 1,922,835 
 
2005 4 696,897 696,897 
 
2006 3 2,624,267 2,624,267 
 
2007 
                               -
    
                          -
    
                          -
     
2008 
                               -
    
                          -
    
                          -
     
2009 2 168,044,016 71,280,274 
 
2010 1 221,642,290 58,138,327 
 
2011 3 88,275,056 84,348,556 
 
2012 1 58,500,000 58,500,000 
 
2013 3 3,298,633 3,298,633 
 
  
602,857,792 327,188,159 
 
     
Table 10: Competition law infringement decisions in the UK and value of fines post 
leniency and post appeal 
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E. France 
 
1. Historical Background 
 
The antitrust provisions related to antitrust agreements and concerted practices, from one 
hand, and abuses of dominant positions, from the other hand, were introduced in France in 
1953 and 1963. Only criminal courts could impose antitrust sanctions (fines). The French 
Competition Authority (FCA) only had consultative functions (the powers of investigations 
were in the hand of the Ministry of Economy). 
 
In 1977, the Minister of Economy was empowered of imposing administrative fines (up to 
5% of the net turnover realized in France during the last financial year for undertakings and 
to 5 million of Francs for other legal entities). 
 
In 1986, the new FCA (the “Competition Council”) has become in charge of the decision-
making power. Decisions of the FCA could be challenged before the Paris Court of appeal.  
 
In 2000, the antitrust provisions were introduced in the French Commercial Code (Articles 
L.420-1 and subsequent for the Legislative Party and R.420-1 and subsequent for the 
Decrees’ Party). 
 
In 2001, the maximum amount of fines was set from 5% of the turnover realized in France to 
10% of the global turnover. The 2001 Law has introduced a leniency program in French Law. 
The FCA has adopted a Leniency notice in 2006 which was revised in 2007 and 2009 in 
order to give clarifications on the conditions for leniency and on the procedure
347
. The 2001 
Law has also introduced the settlement procedure in French Law. The FCA has adopted a 
notice on settlement procedure in 2011
348
. 
 
In order to reinforce the separation of the powers of investigations and decision within the 
FCA, the Competition Council has become the Competition Authority in 2008. Its decisions 
are still challenged before the Paris Court of appeal. 
 
In parallel with administrative fines, criminal penalties are still provided by the French 
Commercial Code. Under its Article L.420-6, “any individual who takes part with fraud, 
personally and decisively, in the design, organization or implementation of practices referred  
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to in articles L.420-1 and L.420-2 shall be sentenced to four years’ imprisonment and fined 
75,000 Euros”. 
 
Criminal provisions are relatively rare. Criminal offenders are especially prosecuted for 
having been involved in bid rigging and others criminal infringements (i.e. corruption). 
 
a. The fining policy of the FCA before the adoption of the 2011 sentencing guidelines 
 
A 1992 Law has laid down three criteria which should be used to set the amount of the fines: 
the seriousness of the facts, the damage caused to the economy and the position of the 
convicted person.  
 
Despite this distinction, the FCA has not always reasoned its decisions on each of these three 
criteria. The FCA could invoke anticompetitive effects without identifying the seriousness of 
the facts or the damage caused to the economy. The reasoning was therefore general
349
. 
Sometimes, the application of these criteria was confusing: the impact on prices of collusion 
was analysed regarding the seriousness of the facts, not the damage caused to the economy
350
. 
This is also the case concerning the duration of the antitrust practices which is considered as a 
relevant element for the assessment the seriousness of the facts and the damage caused to the 
economy
351
. 
 
The fining policy could be considered as having more of a retributive function than a 
deterrent one taking into account, for instance, social issues
352
, health issues
353
 or the fact that 
the victims of the antitrust behaviours were fragile
354
. The jurisprudence of the Paris Court of 
appeal was especially attentive to the retributive function of the fines. 
 
The Paris Court of appeal has full jurisdiction on decisions of the FCA. The Paris Court of 
appeal quite used to review the decisions of the FCA, especially the assessment of the criteria 
used to set the amount of the fines. 
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b. The 2011 sentencing guidelines 
 
After a public consultation, the FCA has adopted its sentencing guidelines (hereafter, “SG”) 
the 16
th
 May of 2011
355
. The power for the FCA to adopt SG was strongly contested by 
lawyers. The Paris Court of appeal has decided that the FCA was empowered to adopt the 
SG, considered as guidelines which do not alter the legal framework
356
. 
 
The SG does not apply for procedural infringements or failure to comply with the merger 
control regime
357. The FCA can decide not to apply the SG (see SG, §7). The FCA has 
decided to depart from the SG method for an infringement of a very short duration and 
without impact
358
 and when the legal framework and the behaviour of the administration have 
encouraged the infringement
359
. 
 
The SG aim to introduce a fining policy more: 
(i) deterrent (general deterrence); 
(ii) coherent from a national perspective (cohesion of the fining policy of the 
FCA); 
(iii) coherent from an European perspective (soft harmonization with the European 
Commission policy); and 
(iv) reasoned in order to limit judicial review of the decisions of the FCA
360
. 
 
2. Description of the Current System 
 
a. Overview 
 
The 2011 Guidelines provide that the FCA will now rely on the direct turnover achieved in 
France by the company concerned on the relevant market during the last full year of the 
infringement, with limited exceptions where the turnover and/or the last full year is not the 
most representative reference (points 33 and seq.). The approach is very similar to that of the 
                                                     
355
 http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/notice_antitrust_penalties_16may2011_en.pdf. 
356
 Paris Court of appeal, 30
th
 January, 2014 (challenging decision N°11-D-17 of 8
th
 December, 2011). 
357
 See, for instance, Decisions N°12-D-12 of 11
th
 May, 2012, N°12-D-15 of 9
th
 July, 2012, N°13-D-01 of 31
st
 
January, 2013 and N°13-D-22 of 20
th
 December, 2013. 
358
 Decision N°13-D-03 of 13
th
 February, 2013, esp. §392. 
359
 Decision N°12-D-26 of 20
th
 December, 2012, esp. §§290-291. 
360
 See SG, §§ 1-19. 
176 
 
Commission. The basic amount of the fine is constituted by a share of this annual turnover, in 
principle between 0 and 30 % (and even between 15 and 30 % for hardcore horizontal 
restrictions) reflecting the seriousness of the infringement and the importance of the resulting 
damage to the economy
361
) The Notice then provides that duration is integrated to this 
amount according to a methodology leading to lower fines than that followed by the 
European Commission as the FCA applies a ratio of 1 for the first year, and then of 0.5 for 
each additional year. However, in bid-rigging cases, the FCA does not apply this method but 
rather retains a proportion of the total turnover achieved in France by the entity concerned or 
the group to which it belongs. This proportion will be defined taking into account the 
seriousness of the facts and of the harm done to the economy
362
. At this stage, the FCA 
proceeds to individualize the fine, based on mitigating and aggravating circumstances 
Recidivism may, for example lead to an increase by 15 to 50%. An additional 
individualization occurs with regard to the size, the more or less significant economic power 
the company concerned enjoys, its overall resources, the group to which the undertaking 
belongs
363
.This enables the FAC to tailor the specific deterrence effect of the sanction to the 
individual circumstances of the undertaking. Such factor has the potential to introduce 
significant changes in the final amount of the fine and may lead to impose higher fines to 
companies that are large and diversified, in comparison to smaller companies.  After 
checking that the maximum fine level (10 % of the total annual consolidated turnover) is not 
met, reductions for leniency and settlement are applied and the inability to pay is also 
considered in order to reduce or annul the final amount of the fine. The following list 
summarizes the different steps of the fine-setting process. 
 
Step1: Turnover of the market concerned multiplied by 0-30% gravity/damage. 
 
Step 2:  The amount after step 1 is multiplied with Duration 1+(0.5 x additional years). 
 
Step 3: To this amount (after step 2) is substracted approxinately - 0-50% for each mitigatign 
circumstance. 
 
Step 4: To this amount (after step 3) is added approximately + 0-50% for each aggravating 
circumstance. 
 
Step 5: The size and diversification of the undertakings is taken into account either to 
substract or to add. 
                                                     
361
 See SG §40. 
362
 See SG, §§ 67-68. 
363
 See SG, §§ 47 seq. 
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Step 6: Statutory maximum applied (10% of the total annual consolidated turnover). 
 
Step 7: Leniency and settlement. 
 
Step 8: Inability to pay. 
 
b. Fining Practice 
 
A closer look to the fining practice of the FCA indicates that the amount of fines imposed on 
average seems higher than the average of financial penalties in the UK, for instance, to 
compare with an economy with a roughly equal size. The FCA is also very actively enforcing 
competition law, with a significantly higher number of decisions imposing fines than the OFT 
in the UK. Fines for cartel cases tend to be significant in some cases. For instance, the FCA 
imposed in 2011 a fine of €240.2 million against Procter & Gamble, €92.3 million against 
Henkel and €35.4 million against Colgate Palmolive for their participation to a cartel 
involving the coordination of promotions and product offerings of laundry soap in French 
retail stores
364. Equally, a fine of €117.4 million was imposed against Orange & France 
Telecom and €65.7 million against SFR for an abuse of a dominant position for price 
discrimination and foreclosure effect
365, while €19 million was imposed against Nestle for an 
RPM and exclusivity clauses competition law infringement
366
. 
                                                     
364
 Decision N°11-1-17 of 8 December 2011. 
365
 Decision N°12-D-24 of 13 December 2012. 
366
 Decision N°12-D-10 of 20 March 2012. 
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Appendix 2: Issues to be addressed in guidelines/statutory regime on fines: a 
Comparative perspective 
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A. Calculating the Basic Amount of the Fine 
 
1. The Relevant Measure 
 
a. EU: Value of Sales 
 
For the calculation of the basic amount, first the value of the undertaking’s sales of goods to 
which the infringement directly or indirectly relates in the relevant geographic market within 
the European Economic Area
367
 will be determined (“value of sales”).368 As the Court noted 
in Team Relocations, “point 13 of the 2006 Guidelines pursues the objective of adopting as 
the starting point for the calculation of the fine imposed on an undertaking an amount which 
reflects the economic significance of the infringement and the size of the undertaking’s 
contribution to it.”369 
 
It is important to note that the “goods to which the infringement directly or indirectly relates” 
are not restricted to those goods in respect of which it can be proved that the infringement 
had an effect,
370
 and they are also not synonymous with the relevant product market:
371
 
                                                     
367
  Where the nature of the infringement requires it, the market share of a wider market may be applied to 
overall sales within the EEA, para. 18 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. This will be the case, for example, for 
world-wide market allocation cartels, where some participants may not have any sales, or only sales not 
representative for their impact, on markets within the EEA. For the corresponding practice under the 1998 
Guidelines, see, e.g., Commission decision, 24 January 2007, Case COMP/F/38.899 – Gas Insulated 
Switchgear, at recital 481: 
 Given the global character of the cartel arrangements, the worldwide sales figures give the most 
appropriate picture of the participating undertakings’ capacity to cause significant damage to 
other operators in the EEA. This approach is supported by the fact that the object of the cartel 
was, inter alia, to allocate markets on a worldwide level. Thus, the worldwide turnover of any 
given party to the cartel also gives an indication of its contribution to the effectiveness of the 
cartel as a whole or, conversely, of the instability which would have affected the cartel had it not 
participated. In fact, since it is concluded that a common understanding existed that the Japanese 
undertakings would refrain from competing on the European market, the Commission would 
substantially underestimate the role of the Japanese participants in the cartel if it were to rely on 
turnover data pertaining only to the EEA. The comparison is made on the basis of the worldwide 
product turnover in the last full year of the infringement for each undertaking. 
368
  Para. 13 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. 
369
  Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 11 July 2013, Case C-444/11 P, Team Relocations v Commission 
[2013] ECR I-000 para. 76. 
370
  Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 11 July 2013, Case C-444/11 P, Team Relocations v Commission 
[2013] ECR I-000 paras 76-78. 
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Where the price level of products or services that belong to another product market is 
influenced by the infringement, for example because the products or services that constitute 
the relevant product market serve as a reference point, the turnover with these products or 
services may be counted into the value of sales. 
 
b. US: 20% of the volume of affected commerce, 
 
As we have previously explained, the Sentencing Guidelines (SG) provide guidance on fines 
to organizations (and individuals) in the United States. Regarding Antitrust Offenses (bid 
rigging, price fixing and market allocation), Section 2R1.1.subsection (d) provides a special 
instruction for fines of organizations in order to define the base fine: “in lieu of the pecuniary 
loss”, as it is the case for other offenses without a special regime, the sentencing judge should 
use “20 percent of the volume of affected commerce”. This applies only to covert 
conspiracies that are intended to, and serve no purpose other than to, restrict output and raise 
prices, and that are so plainly anticompetitive that they have been recognized as illegal per se, 
without any inquiry in individual cases as to their actual competitive effect. Other antitrust 
offenses are not included, in view of the lack of consensus about their harmfulness. The 20 
percent reflects the empirical basis of the guidelines at the time of their adoption (in 1987) 
that the average overcharge imposed by a price-fixing conspiracy is 10 percent. The 
Commission doubled the figure representing the average overcharge (10%) in order to 
account for losses, including customers who are priced out of the market (counterfactual 
customers). The Guidelines make the presumption of 10% overcharge almost conclusive. 
This forms one of the core assumptions of the antitrust part of the SG and their concern for 
deterrence although one may put forward that the percentage chosen underestimates the 
average overcharge and it should be set at a higher level
372
. The purpose of specifying a 
percent of the volume of commerce is to avoid the time and expense that would be required 
                                                                                                                                                                     
371
  It is true that the General Court in Team Relocations stated that “[t]he wording of point 13 therefore 
relates to sales in the relevant market” (Judgment of the General Court, 16 June 2011, Joined Cases T-
204/08 and T-212/08, Team Relocations v Commission [2011] ECR II-3569 para. 63, pointing to the German 
language version of para. 6 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines), and the Court of Justice upheld the decision on 
this point (Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 11 July 2013, Case C-444/11 P, Team Relocations v 
Commission [2013] ECR I-000 paras 80-81). However, the argument there was that para. 13 of the 
Guidelines referred to sales on the entire relevant product market, not only to that part of the product 
market that could be shown to be affected by the infringement. Arguably neither the General Court nor 
the Court of Justice wanted to exclude the possibility, clearly indicated in footnote 1 accompanying para. 
13 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines, that an infringement could indirectly relate to other product markets 
than the relevant product market to which it relates directly. 
372
 Connor, J.M., Lande, R.H. (2005) How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications for Optimal Cartel Fines. 
Tulane L. Rev 80, 513, 516-518. 
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for the court to determine the actual gain or loss. As it is explained by the SG Commission’s 
commentary, the offense levels are not based directly on the damage caused or profit made by 
the defendant because damages are difficult and time consuming to establish, while the 
volume of commerce is an acceptable and more readily measurable substitute. Empirical 
evidence on pre-guidance practice has also shown that fines increased with the volume of 
commerce. In cases in which the actual monopoly overcharge appears to be either 
substantially more or substantially less than 10 percent, this factor should be considered in 
setting the fine within the guideline fine range. The Commission’s commentary also notes 
that another consideration in setting the fine is that the average level of mark-up due to price-
fixing may tend to decline with the volume of commerce involved.  
 
This is not the only possibility offered to assess the base fine. The Antitrust Division at the 
DOJ may also use the Alternative Fine Statute for fining cartel related activities occurring 
after June 22, 2004
373
. This text provides two additional measures for the base fine: (i) the 
pecuniary gain to the organization from the offense and (ii) the pecuniary loss from the 
offense caused by the organization, to the extent the loss was caused intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly as a measure for the base fine. The Antitrust Division will thus 
choose the greatest of either the affected volume of commerce, the pecuniary gain to the 
organization by the offense or the pecuniary loss from the offense. Practically, the third 
alternative is almost always the one applied as it leads to the largest fine range, because of the 
existence of a presumption of the pecuniary loss caused by the defendant equal to 20% of the 
affected commerce for the purpose of applying the alternative fine provision of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act. This leads the Antitrust Division to rely on the 
conspiracy’s volume of commerce (not just that of the individual defendant’s) and indicates 
that notwithstanding the option chosen the affected volume of commerce should be 
determined. 
 
c. Germany: 10% of Domestic Sales connected with the Infringement 
 
The 2013 Guidelines start with a generally assumed “gains and harm potential” of 10% of the 
domestic sales of products or services “connected with”374 the infringement over its entire 
duration (the “relevant turnover”).375 Where the infringement evidently had a higher potential 
                                                     
373
  18 U.S. CODE § 3571. 
374
  This is the formulation the English translation of the Guidelines uses; it is likely that this is to be 
interpreted along the same lines as the “related to the infringement” in the 2006 European Fining 
Guidelines. 
375
 Para. 10 of the Guidelines. Note that, in contrast to the EU Guidelines, the duration of the infringement is 
integrated into the determination of the affected sales. Where there were no or lower sales due to the 
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for gain and/or harm, the proportion of the relevant turnover may exceptionally be set higher 
than 10%.
376
 
 
The relevant turnover is then multiplied by a factor that varies with the aggregate annual 
worldwide turnover of the undertaking i.e., the single economic entity, which may comprise 
several legal and/or natural persons; the relevant period is the financial year preceding the 
authority’s decision.377 Where this turnover is below €100 million, the factor is 2-3; where it 
is between €100 million and €1 billion, the factor is 3-4; between €1 billion and €10 billion, 
the factor is 4-5; between €10 billion and €100 billion, the factor is 5-6; and above €100 
billion, the factor is greater than 6.  
 
Where the product of the relevant turnover multiplied by this factor is greater than the 
maximum statutory fine (10% of the aggregate worldwide turnover for intentional 
infringements or 5% for negligent infringements), the statutory maximum will be the relevant 
upper limit.
378
 Where the product of the relevant turnover multiplied by the factor is below 
the statutory threshold, this product will – absent special circumstances379 – constitute the 
relevant upper limit.
380
 
 
d. United Kingdom: the relevant turnover 
 
The starting point for determining the level of financial penalty is generally calculated by 
looking to the relevant (assumed) turnover of the undertaking, as well as the seriousness of 
the infringement
381
. With regard to the relevant turnover, this is defined in the Guidelines as 
“the turnover of the undertaking in the relevant product market and relevant geographic 
market affected by the infringement in the undertaking’s last business year”382. An 
                                                                                                                                                                     
nature of the infringement (such as a market allocation or bid-rigging cartel for the undertaking submitting 
cover bids), the affected sales will be estimated with reference to the sales that would have been 
expected in the absence of the infringement (para. 11 of the Guidelines and the examples in the 
explanatory notes accompanying the Guidelines). Where the infringement lasted less than 12 months, 
para. 12 states that the calculation will be based on a period of 12 months, and that it is the 12 months 
prior to the end of the infringement that are relevant for the calculation. 
376
  Para. 15 of the Guidelines, and Explanatory Note, Comment 2 accompanying para. 10 of the Guidelines. 
377
  Para. 13 of the Guidelines with the accompanying Explanatory Note 4. 
378
  Para. 14 of the Guidelines and accompanying example 2 in the Explanatory Notes. 
379
  Para. 15 of the Guidelines. 
380
  Para. 14 of the Guidelines and accompanying example 1 in the Explanatory Notes. 
381
 OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.3. The OFT Guidelines on financial penalties are also engaging the 
CMA and are published at the CMA’s website. 
382
  OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.7. 
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undertaking’s last business year is the financial year preceding the date when the 
infringement ended. This introduces a change with regard to the 2004 Guidelines of the OFT, 
which took into account the year preceding the OFT’s decision. 
 
It has been suggested during the consultation leading to the adoption of the 2012 Guidelines 
that a minimum starting point of 25% should be set. However, the proposal met with strong 
opposition and such minimum was not finally included in the Guidelines. 
 
e. France: affected sales  
 
The basic amount is set from the affected sales made during the ultimate full accounting year 
of participation in the infringement (see SG, §33 and s.)
383
. When bid-rigging is concerned, 
the FCA considers that a percentage on the global turnover is more appropriate than the value 
of the relevant market
384
.  
 
2. Whose Sales are Taken into Account?  
 
a. EU: The “Undertaking” and the Single Economic Unit 
 
It is “the undertaking’s” sales that are taken into account. It is “the undertaking” that infringes 
competition law. The concept of undertaking in European competition law may comprise two 
or more legal entities, provided they act as a single “economic unit.”385 Such a single 
economic unit exists where a parent company has exercised decisive influence, directly or 
indirectly, over a subsidiary.
386
 Where a parent company holds a 100%, or nearly 100%, 
                                                     
383
 When the ultimate year is not representative, the FCA refers to several years. See, for instance, Decision 
N°12-D-02 of 12
th
 January, 2012, esp. §§176 and 177. 
384
 Decision N°13-D-09 of 17
th
 April, 2013, esp. §149. 
385
  Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber), 26 September 2013, Case C‑ 179/12 P, Dow Chemical v 
Commission [2013] ECR I-000 paras 52, 57; Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 19 July 2012, Joined 
Cases C‑ 628/10 P and C‑ 14/11 P, Alliance One International & Another v Commission [2012] ECR I-000 
para. 42; Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 20 January 2011, Case C-90/09 P, General Química SA 
and Others v Commission [2011] ECR I-1 para. 35; Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 10 September 
2009, Case C‑ 97/08 P, AKZO Nobel v Commission [2009] ECR I-8237 para. 55. 
386
  Alliance One (supra note 385) para. 43:  
Specifically, the conduct of a subsidiary may be imputed to the parent company in particular where, 
although having a separate legal personality, that subsidiary does not decide independently upon its 
own conduct on the market, but carries out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by the 
parent company, having regard in particular to the economic, organisational and legal links between 
those two legal entities (Case C‑ 97/08 P Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission [2009] ECR I‑ 8237, 
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shareholding, the exercise of decisive influence is rebuttably presumed.
387
 Where the 
presumption applies, the Commission may consider the “parent company as jointly and 
severally liable for payment of the fine imposed on its subsidiary, unless the parent company, 
which has the burden of rebutting that presumption, adduces sufficient evidence to show that 
its subsidiary acts independently on the market.”388 Where shareholdings are substantially 
below 100%, the presumption does not apply, and the Commission will have to adduce 
evidence for the actual exercise of decisive influence.
389
 To establish actual exercise, the 
Commission has to consider “the economic, organisational and legal links which tie that 
subsidiary to the parent company, which may vary from case to case and cannot therefore be 
set out in an exhaustive list”.390 
 
While the Commission Decision has to be addressed to specific legal entities, all legal entities 
forming a “single economic unit” and therefore belonging to the same “undertaking” are 
jointly and severally liable. The Commission has discretion whether to address the decision to 
a parent where these requirements for parental liability are met.
391
 Today, the Commission 
generally exercises this discretion in favour of addressing the decision also to the parent or 
parents. 
 
b. US: Person/Participant to the conspiracy or his principal 
 
According to the SG, the volume of commerce is the one done by the individual participant to 
a conspiracy or his principal in goods or services that were affected by the violation. When 
multiple counts or conspiracies are involved, the volume of commerce should be treated 
cumulatively to determine a single, combined offense level. Yet, such definition leaves an 
area of ambiguity, which is to define what portion of the commerce was in fact “affected” by 
the violation. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
paragraph 58; Elf Aquitaine v Commission, paragraph 54, and Case C‑ 520/09 P Arkema v Commission 
[2011] ECR I‑ 8901, paragraph 38). 
387
  Alliance One, supra note 385, paras 46-48; AKZO Nobel, supra note 385, para. 60; General Química, supra 
note 385, paras 39-41. 
388
  Alliance One, supra note 385, para. 47 (with further references). 
389
  Dow Chemical v Commission, supra note 385, paras 58-70 (discussing when the parents of a 50:50 joint 
venture are jointly and severally liable with the joint venture). 
390
  Alliance One, supra note 385, para. 45 (with further references). 
391
  See Alliance One, supra note 385, a case in which the Commission had chosen to forgo sole reliance on the 
“100% presumption” for most addressees and had instead relied on a “dual basis”, holding the parents 
only liable where there was evidence of actual influence. For one addressee, however, it had exclusively 
relied on the “100% presumption”. The Court considered this differential treatment of addressees in one 
and the same case to infringe the principle of equality. 
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c. Germany: The “Undertaking” and the Single Economic Unit 
 
§ 81(4) GWB, introduced by the 7th Amendment in 2005, that established the 10% turnover 
threshold in German law originally did not specify whose turnover was to be taken into 
account; the new § 81(4) GWB merely spoke of the turnover of the “undertaking”. This gave 
rise to a debate whether it one should use the company’s turnover, the turnover of the single 
economic unit, or the turnover of the entire corporate group. In 2007, the legislator inserted a 
clarification that the relevant turnover was the worldwide turnover of all the natural and legal 
persons acting as a single economic unit.
392
 The Grauzement judgment of the BGH later held 
that the added sentence about the single economic entity was a mere declaratory clarification 
and that the same result had already obtained under § 81(4) GWB in the 2005 version, which 
had used the term “undertaking” that was to be interpreted with reference to the European 
concept of an undertaking that could comprise one or more legal entities forming a single 
economic unit.
393
 
 
d. United Kingdom: The “Undertaking” and the Single Economic Unit 
 
The relevant turnover taken into account is that of the undertaking found to infringe 
competition law. The undertaking in this context may include subsidiary entities as well. 
 
e. France: The Undertaking and the Single Economic Unit 
 
Only the sales made by the concerned legal entity are taken into account. A joint liability can 
be found when the parent company control the undertaking. Should a decisive influence of 
the parent company on the subsidiary established, the fact that the parent company was not 
involved in the antitrust practices is irrelevant
394
.   
 
3. Calculation of Relevant Sales/Turnover 
 
a. EU: Calculation of Relevant Sales 
 
                                                     
392
  Article 1 no. 17 of the Preismissbrauchsnovelle of 18 December 2007, BUNDESGESETZBLATT PART I 2007, p. 
2966 (the same amendment also added that the turnover may be estimated, and specified that the 
guidelines under § 81(7) GWB may, in particular, provide guidance as to the amount of the fine).  
393
  BGH, 26 February 2013 – KRB 20/12, WuW/E DE-R 3861, para. 66-70 – Grauzement. 
394
 Decision N°13-D-12 of 28
th
 May, 2013, esp. §821. 
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The 2006 Guidelines state that the Commission will “normally take the sales made by the 
undertaking during the last full business year of participation in the infringement”395 – before 
VAT and other directly sales-related taxes – as a basis.396 While the Commission has in some 
cases made use of this approximation permitted by the Guidelines for reasons of expediency, 
the Commission has in other cases taken into account the actual sales figures over the 
duration of the cartel where the data were easily accessible.
397
  
 
The value of sales includes the undertaking’s entire EEA-wide turnover of the goods to which 
the infringement relates, without deduction of input costs; the argument that the fine should 
be determined in relation only to the value added has been rejected by the Court, at least in 
the context of the 1998 Fining Guidelines.
398
  
 
An issue that has recently become extremely controversial and has not been dealt with 
consistently in the Commission practice is the inclusion or exclusion of “captive” (or 
“internal”) sales into the value of sales, that is, the sales by a vertically integrated undertaking 
                                                     
395
  Para. 13 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. Paras 15 and 16 elaborate that the Commission will take the best 
available figures, and may make the determination on the basis of partial figures where the information 
are incomplete or unreliable.  
396
  Para. 17 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. 
397
  Commission Decision, 8 December 2010, Case COMP/39.309 – LCD at recital 384:  
The Commission normally takes into account the sales made by an undertaking during the last full 
business year of its participation in the infringement (point 13 of the Guidelines on fines). In this case, 
however, the actual relevant data can be established with relative ease for the entire duration of the 
infringement. Moreover, having regard to the exponential growth of the sales over the different years 
for all undertakings (except Hannstar, whose sales anyway fluctuated enormously), in deviation from 
normal practice and in line with claims submitted by some parties, it is appropriate to take the 
average annual value of sales (based on the actual sales over the entire duration of the infringement) 
as the basis for the 'value of sales' calculation. 
From a comparative perspective, it is noteworthy that the German 2013 Fining Guidelines (para. 11) 
appear to require the determination of sales generally over the entire duration, although they point out 
that an estimation is permissible.  
398
  Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 8 December 2011, Case C-272/09 P, KME Germany v 
Commission [2011] ECR I-12789 paras 40-57, in particular 53 (“[scil.: A distinction between] net and gross 
turnover [...] would be difficult to apply and would give scope for endless and insoluble disputes, including 
allegations of unequal treatment.”). This case was decided under the 1998 Fining Guidelines, but took the 
turnover on the relevant market into account in determining the gravity of the infringement, so that its 
conclusions may be indicative for the practice under the 2006 Fining Guidelines as well. Indeed, it is said 
that the Commission’s Airfreight decision (Case COMP/39.258, a decision whose non-confidential version 
is not yet available, and appeals against which are currently pending before the General Court) used the 
argument in the context of the 2006 Fining Guidelines; see Khan, supra n.182. 
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to its subsidiaries (or parents, respectively). In its earlier practice, the Commission had 
consistently included the value of such captive sales into the value of sales. Vertically 
integrated undertakings challenged this practice as inflating their value of sales, arguing that 
cartel prices had not been applied to internal sales. These arguments were rejected by the 
Commission and the Court, among other things, because (1) the value of sales included not 
only sales that were affected by the infringement (see above), and (2) vertically integrated 
undertakings indirectly benefit from the cartel prices being applied to outsiders, because the 
non-application of cartel overcharges to the internal sales means that the subsidiary operating 
downstream has a competitive advantage over its non-vertically integrated competitors on the 
downstream market.
399
  
 
Despite this approval by the Court of the Commission’s practice to include the internal sales 
into the value of sales, the Commission has excluded these internal sales of vertically 
integrated undertakings in a number of more recent decisions, starting with the Flat Glass 
decision.
400
 This time the undertakings that were not vertically integrated challenged the 
fining decisions addressed to them, arguing that (1) internal sales were to be included in the 
value of sales of vertically integrated undertakings, and (2) if they were not included in the 
value of sales for the vertically integrated undertakings, this was de facto amounting to a 
reduction in the fine that should, for reasons of equal treatment, also be applied to the fines of 
the undertakings that were not vertically integrated. The General Court in its Guardian 
judgment sided with the Commission, and found no error in the Commission’s exclusion of 
the value of the internal sales from the value of sales used for the calculation of the fines of 
the vertically integrated undertakings.
401
 On appeal to the Court of Justice, Advocate General 
Wathelet has recently argued that the General Court erred in upholding the decision of the 
Commission in so far as it excluded the internal sales from the calculation of the value of 
sales for the vertically integrated undertakings.
402
 It remains to be seen whether the Court 
agrees with this assessment by the Advocate General. 
 
                                                     
399
  See, e.g., Commission Decision, 3 December 2003, 2004/420/EC Case C/38.359 – Electrical & Mechanical 
Carbon & Graphite Products, paras 291-295 (upheld in Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fifth 
Chamber), 8 October 2008, Case T-68/04, SGL Carbon v Commission [2008] ECR II-2511 and Judgment of 
the Court (Fourth Chamber), 12 November 2009, Case C-564/08 P, SGL Carbon v Commission [2009] ECR I-
191*); see already Judgment of the Court, 16 November 2000, Case C‑ 248/98 P (KNP BT v Commission), 
[2000] ECR I‑ 9641, para. 62. 
400
  Commission Decision, 28 November 2007, C(2007)5791, Case COMP/39.165 – Flat Glass.  
401
 Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber), 27 September 2012, Case T-82/08 Guardian Industries 
Corp. & Guardian Europe S.à.r.l. v Commission, [2012] ECR II-000 (appeal pending, Case C-580/12 P).    
402
  Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, 29 April 2014, Case C-580/12 P, Guardian Industries Corp. and 
Guardian Europe S.à.r.l. v Commission. 
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b. US: Calculation of the volume of affected commerce 
 
As it was mentioned above, the SG retain the figure of 20% of the volume of the affected 
commerce as the starting point for setting the base fine. Much debate has followed the 
adoption of the SG on how the volume of commerce may be calculated. The SG do not 
provide much guidance on this issue. The prevailing practice has been to use only the volume 
of US commerce affected by the conspiracy, not that of the defendant
403
, when calculating 
that defendant’s SG fine range. So only the domestic commerce (sales within the US) 
affected by the illegal conduct is taken into account. Foreign sales have been used more as an 
aggravating factor requiring an increase in the fine. Yet, the factors attaching a sale to 
domestic commerce are unclear
404
. Potential relevant factors may include from the location 
and relationships between the manufacturing and sales arms of the defendants to the location 
of bank accounts from which money was transferred for the transaction, the location of 
contract negotiations and signing etc. The implementation of the domestic commerce 
criterion is particularly difficult in the context of a conspiracy involving international 
commerce, in view of the restrictive approach followed by the Supreme Court in Empagran 
wirh regard to the interpretation of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 
(FTAIA), which defines the jurisdictional boundaries of the Sherman Act in cases involving 
international trade or commerce. As the Supreme Court explained in Empagran, US exporters 
(and firms doing business abroad) are not prevented from entering into business arrangements 
that are anticompetitive, as long as those arrangements adversely affect only foreign markets, 
mainly for reasons of comity
405
. These limits on the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act 
necessarily reduce the potential scope of the “volume of commerce” concept taken into 
account in setting penalties.  
 
The issue of what may be included in domestic commerce has been debated in courts, which 
have increasingly an important role to play in the setting of fines, despite the existence of SG, 
some taking an expansive approach, finding that there is a presumption that affected 
commerce includes all sales during the period of the conspiracy, without regard to whether 
individual sales were made at the target price
406
, while others reject this expansive approach 
finding that only sales above the competitive market price should be included in “volume of 
                                                     
403
 Hammond, S.D. Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice (Nov. 3, 2005) Statement on Behalf of 
the United States Department of Justice, Before the Antitrust Modernization Commission Hearings on 
Criminal Remedies, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/testimony/othertestimony.html.  
404
  For a discussion, see Mutchik, J.H., Casamassina, C.T., Rogers, B.A. (June 2008) The Volume of Commerce 
Enigma. The Antitrust Source. 1-10. 
405
  F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. V. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004); FTAIA, 15 U.S.C  §6a. 
406
 United States v. Hayter Oil CO., 51 F.3d 1265, 1273 (6th Cir. 1995). 
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affected commerce”407, and others prefer a rebuttable presumption that all sales during the 
period of the conspiracy have been affected by the illegal agreement
408
. 
 
c. Germany: Calculation of the Relevant Turnover 
 
The relevant turnover is (generally) 10% of the domestic turnover achieved by the 
undertaking from the sale of the products or services connected with the infringement over 
the duration of the violation; it may be estimated.
409
  
 
The Bundeskartellamt applies § 38(1) GWB by analogy in order to calculate the relevant 
turnover, with the modification that sales between affiliated undertakings are included if they 
are connected with the infringement.
410
 § 38(1) GWB is the provision used for the calculation 
of turnover for purposes of merger control. It includes, by reference, the principles in § 
277(1) of the Handelsgesetzbuch (Commercial Code, HGB). This provision states that 
turnover is the revenue from the sale or lease of products and goods that are typical for the 
usual activities of the corporation, and from services that are typical for the usual activities of 
the corporation, after the deduction of expenses and value-added tax. For financial 
institutions and insurance companies, § 38(4) GWB is applied by analogy.411 
 
Where the turnover to be expected in the ordinary course of events does not materialize “due 
to the nature of the infringement or an unforeseen course of development”, the turnover that 
would have been achieved in the ordinary course of events will be used.
412
 The Explanatory 
                                                     
407
 United States v. SKW Metals & Alloys Inc., 195 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 1999). 
408
 United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 1999). 
409
  Paras 10-11, 15 of the German Guidelines.  
410
  Explanatory Note, Comment 4 accompanying para. 10 of the Guidelines. For the controversial question 
whether such “internal” or “captive” sales are to be considered under European Law, see the Flat 
Glass/Guardian case described in the National Report on the European Union. 
411
  Explanatory Note, Comment 4 accompanying para. 10 of the Guidelines. § 38(4) GWB provides (translation 
by the Bundeskartellamt):  
In the case of credit institutions, financial institutions and building and loan associations, the turnover 
shall be replaced by the total amount of the proceeds referred to in § 34 (2) sentence 1 no. 1 point (a-
e) of the Regulation on the Rendering of Accounts of Credit Institutions [Verordnung über die 
Rechnungslegung der Kreditinstitute] of 10 February 1992 (Federal Law Gazette [Bundesgesetzblatt] I 
p. 203), minus value added tax and other taxes assessed directly on the basis of such proceeds. In the 
case of insurance undertakings, the premium income in the last completed business year shall be 
relevant. Premium income shall be income from insurance and reinsurance business including the 
portions ceded for cover. 
412
  Para. 11, third sentence. 
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Notes give the example of a market-sharing cartel for a case where the “nature of the 
infringement” prevents the expected turnover from arising.413 As an example where an 
“unforeseen course of development” prevents the turnover from being achieved, the 
explanatory notes adduce the example of collusive tendering that fails because the contract is 
awarded to a third party or the tendering process is abandoned.
414
  
 
d. United Kingdom: Calculation of the Relevant Turnover 
 
Relevant turnover is calculated after deducting sales rebates, VAT, and other taxes directly 
related to turnover. However, there is no need for the purposes of setting fines to proceed to a 
formal analysis of the relevant product market and the Courts have found sufficient for the 
OFT (CMA) “to be satisfied, on a reasonable and properly reasoned basis, of what is the 
relevant product market affected by the infringement
415”. Indeed, as this was recognized by 
the English Courts, this is by nature a hypothetical test (assumed turnover, not real turnover) 
and it is not necessary for the turnover to have a connection with the infringement in 
question
416
.  
 
It is possible for the CMA to determine the turnover for the starting point by considering not 
only the relevant product market directly affected by the infringement but also the turnover in 
related products which may reasonably be considered to have been affected by the 
infringement. For instance, in Umbro the OFT included turnover in socks and shorts although 
the infringement only concerned shirts, under the justification that shirt prices had spill over 
effects on related products and they were sold together as a kit in the majority of cases
417
. 
 
As it is explained in the Guidelines, the CMA will base relevant turnover on figures from an 
undertaking’s audited accounts, although it is also acknowledged that in exceptional 
circumstances it might be appropriate to use a different figure as reflecting the true scale of 
an undertaking’s activities in the relevant market418. This is indeed the case where the 
                                                     
413
  Example 1 in the explanatory note accompanying para. 11, third sentence, of the Guidelines. This example 
seems to assume that the undertaking to be fined was allocated a market (at least partially) outside the 
territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
414
  Example 2 in the explanatory note accompanying para. 11, third sentence, of the Guidelines. 
415
  Argos Limited v. Office of Fair Trading and JJB Sports plc v. Office of Fair Trading [2006] EWCA Civ 
1318, para. 169, 170-173. See also Umbro Holdings Ltd v. OFT [2005] CAT 22, paras 111-112; Quarmby 
Construction Company Limited & St James Securities Company Limited v. OFT, [2011] CAT 11, para. 160. 
416
  Umbro Holdings Ltd v. OFT [2005] CAT 22, paras 113-115. 
417
  Id. at para. 116. 
418
  OFT Guidelines (2012), para. 2.9. See Eden Brown Ltd and others v Office of Fair Trading [2011] CAT 8 (the 
Construction Recruitment Forum judgment), paras 44-59.   
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remuneration for services supplied is based on commission fees. In these circumstances, the 
CMA will consider a number of factors, such as (i) whether the remuneration for the services 
is decided by the seller of the services or the client; (ii) whether the undertaking is purchasing 
inputs in order to supply a fresh product incorporating those inputs to its client; (iii) whether 
the person takes ownership of the goods and (iv) whether the person bears risks resulting 
from the operation of the business in question. Other particular circumstances may arise in 
the areas of credit, financial industries and insurance. In “relevant turnover is used to reflect 
the effective scale of activity of the undertaking and thus, where several undertakings are 
involved, to reflect the appropriate relationship between the penalties imposed on each of 
them” 419.  In other words, the CMA should be careful not to just look to turnover figures 
found in the undertaking’s audited accounts. It might be appropriate, additionally, to explore 
if there are more appropriate indicators of actual economic performance and activity of the 
business carried out by the undertaking in question. 
 
When enforcing articles 101 and 102 TFEU, the UK competition authorities take into account 
the effects in another Member State of the agreement or the unilateral conduct in question, 
hence considering turnover generated in another member State if the relevant geographic 
market is wider than the UK and it has the express consent of the relevant Member State or 
National Competition Authority for the particular case
420
. 
 
e. France: Calculation of the Relevant Sales 
 
Only (but all) sales realized in France are taken into account when the practices concern only 
France (see SG, §34). When the practices had an impact on the sales outside France, all the 
sales realized in the concerned foreign countries are taken into account
421
. 
When the defendant is a commercial agent or intermediary, the relevant reference is the 
amount of its commissions, not of the value of the sales made in the name of the principal
422
.  
The taxes are excluded. 
 
B. Determining the Basic Amount  
 
                                                     
419
 Eden Brown Limited v. OFT [2011] CAT 8, para. 44. 
420
  OFT Guidelines (2012), para. 2.10. 
421
 See for a market-share agreement between France and Germany, Decision N°12-D-09 of 13
th
 March, 2012, 
esp. §779. Only the seriousness and the damage caused to the Economy established in France were taken 
into account. 
422
 Decision N°12-D-09 of 13
th
 March, 2012, esp. §§781 and 782. 
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1. Gravity/Seriousness of the Infringement 
 
a. EU 
 
Having calculated the value of sales, the gravity of the infringement will be assessed to 
determine the proportion of the value of sales to be considered in the setting of the fine. This 
proportion can, under the Guidelines, generally be set at up to 30 per cent of the value of 
sales.  
 
Factors determining this percentage include the “nature of the infringement, the combined 
market share of all undertakings concerned, the geographic scope, and whether the 
infringement has been implemented”.423 Beyond these factors, “all the relevant circumstances 
of the case” will be taken into account.424 
 
i. Nature of the Infringement 
 
Hardcore infringements, such as horizontal price fixing, market sharing and horizontal output 
limitations, are said to usually result in a percentage of the value of sales close to 30 per 
cent.
425
 However, despite this announcement the percentage in most cartel cases has only 
been set at between 15 and 20 per cent of the value of sales,
426
 with the decision in Marine 
Hoses being one of the few instances where the Commission went beyond this range and 
used a percentage of 25 per cent.
427
 
 
                                                     
423
  Para. 22 of the 2006 EU Fining Guidelines. See also the factors mentioned in Judgment of the Court 
(Second Chamber), 8 December 2011, Case C-272/09 P, KME Germany v Commission [2011] ECR I-12789 
paras 96-97; Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 11 July 2013, Case C-444/11 P, Team Relocations v 
Commission [2013] ECR I-000 para. 100. 
424
  Para. 20 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. 
425
  Ibid., para. 23. 
426
  See, e.g., Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber), 14 May 2014, Case T-406/09, Donau Chemie v 
Commission [2014] ECR II-000, paras 26, 63 (noting that despite the Guidelines the percentage was set at 
only 17% and therefore closer to the middle of the range); Judgment of the Court, 11 July 2013, Case C-
439/11 P, Ziegler SA v Commission, [2013] ECR I-000 at paras 117-123 (noting that where the Commission 
set the percentage at 17% and accordingly “considerably below the upper limit of the scale ... for the most 
serious restrictions”, the addressee could not require a “particular explanation as to the choice of that 
percentage”); see also the parallel Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 11 July 2013, Case C-444/11 P, 
Team Relocations v Commission [2013] ECR I-000 paras 121-126. See also Khan, supra note 182, § 7-077. 
427
  Commission decision, 28 January 2009, Case COMP/39406 – Marine Hoses at recital 445.  
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ii. Market Shares 
 
Market shares have a double role to play. First, the combined market shares of, for example, 
cartelists is an indication for a higher impact of the cartel on the market and undistorted 
competition. Secondly, the market share of the individual participants of an infringement 
used to serve as an indicator for a differentiation between the individual contributions of the 
participants.
428
 However, under the 2006 Fining Guidelines, the market share will already 
directly affect the value of sales, so that an adjustment based on the market shares of the 
individual participants will usually not be indicated.
429
  
 
iii. Geographic scope 
 
The 2006 Guidelines mention the “geographic scope” as a factor in the determination of the 
gravity of the infringement. This is arguably a legacy from the 1998 Guidelines, where this 
factor was used in the categorization of an infringement as “minor”, “serious” or “very 
serious”.430 Under the 2006 Guidelines, the geographic scope will already be taken into 
account in the “value of sales”: a larger geographic scope will usually be automatically 
reflected in a higher value of sales.
431
 It is, however, possible that a comprehensive 
geographic coverage may take on a separate importance, for example because a global cartel 
may distort competition to a greater degree than is reflected in the (EEA-wide) value of sales. 
 
iv. Implementation 
 
Implementation of the infringement is not to be confused with an impact on the market. 
Neither the 2006 Guidelines nor the Court require the Commission to determine an impact on 
                                                     
428
  See, e.g., Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 13 July 2011, Case T-38/07, Shell Petroleum v 
Commission [2011] ECR II-4383 para. 154 (“[B]y setting the starting amount of the fine at a higher level for 
those undertakings with a relatively larger market share than the others in the relevant market, the 
Commission took account of the actual influence of the undertaking on that market. That factor is the 
expression of the higher degree of responsibility of the undertakings with a relatively larger market share 
than the others in the relevant market for the damage caused to competition and, in the final analysis, to 
consumers by forming a secret cartel”).  
429
  Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber), 14 May 2014, Case T-406/09, Donau Chemie v 
Commission [2014] ECR II-000, para. 106. 
430
  1998 Fining Guidelines Section 1.A.: Where the restriction affected “only a substantial but relatively 
limited part of the Community market”, this was an indication for a “minor” infringement; where the 
restriction had “effects in extensive areas of the common market”, this was an indication for a “serious” 
infringement. 
431
  See Khan, supra note 182, § 7-082. 
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the market.
432
 The implementation of the infringement remains a factor to be considered for 
the determination of the gravity of the infringement under the 2006 Fining Guidelines, but 
this element is already fulfilled where, for example, a cartel agreement is acted upon, for 
example where an undertaking informs its employees or customers of (agreed) prices, or 
takes measures to supervise its own distributors’ or its competitors’ adherence to agreed 
prices.
433
 The enquiry into implementation does not entail an enquiry into actual effects on 
the market; even where an infringement is implemented, it is possible that there is no impact 
on the market.
434
 The Commission may additionally consider the actual effects of an 
infringement in the overall assessment, but is generally not obliged to do so, unless the 
undertaking can substantiate that there were no such effects on the market.
435
 Where the 
amount of gains improperly made as a result of the infringement is known, this will, under 
the 2006 Guidelines, be a reason to increase the fine.
436
  
 
b. US437 
 
As it was previously mentioned, only certain categories of antitrust offenses are subject to 
criminal penalties following the Sentencing Guidelines (for which there is “near universal 
agreement” that they can cause serious economic harm), such as horizontal price-fixing 
(including bid-rigging) and horizontal market allocation). For all other anticompetitive 
practices, other punitive and remedial tools, such as treble damages etc are available. Once 
the judge determines the volume of commerce and calculates the base fine (20%), the 
Organizational Guideline provides information on how to determine the firm’s final offense 
level by reference to some “culpability multipliers”.  
 
Under one of the special instructions in §2R1.1(d), the minimum multiplier must be at least 
0.75, so the bottom of the Guidelines range will be at least 15% of the affected volume of 
commerce, although in most cases that will be higher. For antitrust offenses the culpability 
multipliers may vary between 0.75 and 4, thereby producing a total fine between 15 and 80% 
                                                     
432
  See Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 8 December 2011, Case C-272/09 P, KME Germany v 
Commission [2011] ECR I-12789 paras 29-36. 
433
  Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber), 14 May 2014, Case T-406/09, Donau Chemie v 
Commission [2014] ECR II-000, paras 69-72.  
434
  Ibid. 
435
  Cf. ibid., paras 75-82; Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 8 December 2011, Case C-272/09 P, KME 
Germany v Commission [2011] ECR I-12789 paras 29-36. 
436
  2006 EU Fining Guidelines, para. 31.  
437
 The developments draw partly on United States Sentencing Commission, Chapter Eight Fine Primer: 
Determining the Appropriate Fine Under the Organizational Guidelines (March 2013), available 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/Primer_Organizational_Fines.pdf  
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of the volume of commerce. The sentencing judge has to multiply the base fine amount by 
the minimum and maximum culpability multipliers to arrive at the fine range. The relevant 
“culpability multiplier” is derived from a table in the Guidelines Manual by reference to the 
organization’s “culpability score”438. For instance, a culpability score of 10 or more results in 
a minimum multiplier of 2.00 and a maximum multiplier of 4.00, while a lower culpability 
score of 3 results in a minimum multiplier of 0.60 and a maximum multiplier of 1.20
439
. The 
maximum and minimum multipliers are then used to calculate the guideline fine range under 
§8C2.7. To find the organization’s culpability score, §8C2.5 instructs the judge to start with 5 
and then add or subtract points based on the applicability of a number of factors set forth in 
that section. Hence, mitigating and aggravating circumstances are directly considered at the 
level of determining the guideline fine range, rather than as an adjustment to the base fine. 
Factors such as the duration of the infringement (and its effects) are in any case considered 
when examining the affected volume of commerce. In any case, no penalty can be less than 
15% of the affected volume of commerce, no matter the culpability score that would 
otherwise apply. We will examine the culpability score, when we comment on mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances.  
 
The guideline fine range is determined by multiplying the base fine calculated under §8C2.4 
by both the minimum multiplier calculated under §8C2.6, which yields the minimum of the 
guideline fine range, and by the maximum multiplier calculated under §8C2.6, which yields 
the maximum of the guideline fine range
440
. Courts may determine the appropriate fine 
amount between the minimum and maximum ranges resulting from application of the 
multiplier to the base fine. The court may depart up or down from the fine range due to 
various factors, including the risk presented by the offense to the integrity or continued 
existence of a market
441
, if the organization is a public entity
442
, or exceptional organizational 
culpability
443. The policy statement at §8C2.8(a) instructs the sentencing court that, in 
determining the appropriate fine, the court must consider certain factors under 18 U.S.C. §§ 
3553(a) and 3572(a). These may include the following: (i) the defendant’s income, earning 
capacity, and financial resources, (ii) the burden that the fine will impose upon the defendant, 
any person who is financially dependent on the defendant relative to the burden that 
alternative punishments would impose, (iii) whether restitution is ordered or made and the 
amount of such restitution, (iv) the need to deprive the defendant of illegally obtained gains 
                                                     
438
  USSG §8C2.6. 
439
  USSG §8C2.6. 
440
  USSG §8C2.7(a), (b). 
441
  USSG §8C4.5. 
442
 USSG §8C4.7. 
443
 USSG §8C4.11. 
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from the offense, (v) whether the defendant can pass on to consumers or other persons the 
expense of the fine, (vi) the size of the organization and any measure taken by the 
organization to discipline any officer, director, employee, or agent of the organization 
responsible for the offense and to prevent a recurrence of such an offense,  It is also 
mentioned that if, as a result of a conviction, the defendant has the obligation to make 
restitution to a victim of the offense, other than the United States, the court shall impose a 
fine or other monetary penalty only to the extent that such fine or penalty will not impair the 
ability of the defendant to make restitution. An additional factor is whether the organization 
failed to have an effective compliance and ethics program at the time of the offense. The 
court may also consider the relative importance of any factor used to determine the fine 
range, so that a court is able to differentiate between cases that have the same offense level 
but differ in seriousness or between two cases with the same aggravating factors but where 
the factors vary in their intensity
444
. 
 
c. Germany 
 
Within the range between €5 (§ 17(1) OWiG) and the relevant upper limit as defined in 
paragraph 14 of the Guidelines, that is, the lower of (1) 10 per cent of the overall global 
turnover, or (2) 10 per cent of the relevant sales in Germany multiplied by a factor that 
depends on the overall global turnover, the Bundeskartellamt considers various criteria 
related to the offence itself and to the offender to determine the actual fine.  
 
Under the non-exhaustive list of examples in paragraph 16 of the Guidelines, offence-related 
criteria are:  
 
- the type and duration of the infringement,445  
- its qualitative effects (e.g. size of the geographic markets affected by the 
infringement, significance of the companies involved in the infringement on the 
markets affected),
446
  
                                                     
444
  USSG §8C2.8(b). 
445
  It should be noted that the duration would already appear to be included in the German Guideline’s 
definition of “relevant turnover”, so that it arguably cannot be taken into account in so far as it would lead 
to double counting. As to the type of infringement, the Guidelines further note that “[i]n the case of price-
fixing and quota cartels, territorial and customer agreements and other similarly serious horizontal 
competition restraints, the fine will usually be set in the upper range.” 
446
  Again, one will have to avoid double counting: the size of the geographic market and the individual market 
share are generally already taken account of in the relevant turnover. The combined market share is likely 
to be of more relevance. 
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- the importance of the markets (e.g. type of product affected by the infringement) and  
- the degree of organisation among the parties involved.  
 
Offender-related criteria are under the non-exhaustive list in the second bullet-point in 
paragraph 16 of the Guidelines:  
- the role of the company (undertaking?) within the cartel,  
- its position on the market affected,  
- specifics concerning the degree of value creation,  
- the extent of intention/negligence,  
- previous infringements, and also 
- the company's (undertaking’s?) financial capacity. 
 
d. United Kingdom 
 
As it is explained in the CMA Guidelines (2012), the starting point, which is expressed as a 
percentage rate, will depend on the nature of the infringement. The more serious and 
widespread the infringement is, the higher the starting point is likely to be. The Guidelines 
list the following among the most serious infringements: price-fixing or market-sharing 
agreements and other cartel activities, but also serious infringements of the provisions on 
abuse of dominance position, such as predatory pricing
447
. The Guidelines apply a rate of up 
to 30% to an undertaking’s relevant turnover in order to reflect adequately the seriousness of 
the particular infringement and hence increase deterrence. It is also mentioned in the 
Guidelines that the CMA will use a starting point towards the upper end of the range for the 
most serious infringements of competition law, including hardcore cartels and “the most 
serious” abuses of dominant position448. This constitutes a significant change in comparison 
to the previous 2004 OFT Guidelines, in which the maximum starting point was 10%, with 
the result that financial penalties in UK competition law were significantly lower than those 
in the EU and other jurisdictions
449
. 
 
                                                     
447
 OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.4. For an example of predatory pricing as a serious infringement, see 
Aberdeen Journals Ltd v. Director General of Fair Trading (No2) [2003] CAT 11, para. 491. 
448
 OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.5. 
449
 For a comparison, see OFT 1132, An assessment of discretionary penalties regimes (October 2009), pp. 61-
62 (noting that because of this lower maximum starting point UK fines were on average 65% lower than 
comparable EU fines when firms sales in the relevant market are between €50m and €170 m. The study 
also noted that the base fine as a proportion of firm sales in the relevant market started at 9.3% in the UK, 
while it was 21.5% in the EU and 20.0% in the US, after initial adjustments the average fine increasing to 
12.1% in the UK, 26.5% in the EU and 33% in the US). 
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In determining the percentage rate, the CMA assesses the seriousness of the infringement, 
taking into account a number of (non-exhaustive) factors: 
 
- the nature of the product, 
- the structure of the market, 
- the market share(s) of the undertaking(s) involved in the infringement, 
- entry conditions and the effect on competitors and third parties 
- the need to deter other undertakings from engaging in such infringements in the future 
- the damage caused to consumers whether directly or indirectly will also be  
 
This assessment is made on a case-by-case basis for all types of infringement, taking into 
account “all the circumstances of the case”450. It was however made clear by the CAT that the 
profit or gain of the infringing party is not a relevant factor in fixing the penalty, as the CAT 
accepted that the penalty may be several times greater than the profit margin earned on the 
relevant products
451
. 
 
e. France 
 
The FCA takes into account the seriousness of the infringement, as well as the damages 
caused to the Economy. 
The seriousness of the infringement depends on (non-limitative list): 
- The nature of the competition restraint (systematic and the most important criteria); 
- Number of practices
452
; 
- The fact that a cartel is secret and intentional
453
; 
- The existence of a legal or factual monopoly
454
; 
- The fact that the offender was previously in charge of a legal monopoly
455
; 
- The existence of a monitoring of the cartel
456
; 
- The nature of the products
457
; 
- The legal framework
458
; 
                                                     
450
  OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.6. 
451
  Argos Ltd & Littlewoods Ltd v. OFT [2005] CAT 13 (judgment on penalty), para. 228. 
452
 Decision N°13-D-21 of 18
th
 December, 2013, esp. §536. 
453
 Decision N°12-D-09 of 13
th
 March, 2012, esp. §792. 
454
 Decision N°12-D-06 of 26
th
 January, 2012, esp. §232. 
455
 Decisions N°12-D-25 of 18
th
 December, 2012, esp. §679 ; N°13-D-20 of 17
th
 December, 2013, esp. §577. 
456
 Decisions N°12-D-09 of 13
th
 March, 2012, esp. §§795 and s. ; N°12-D-10 of 20
th
 March, 2012, esp. §252 
(absence of measures of deterrence) ; N°13-D-12 of 28
th
 May, 2013, esp. §§916 and s. 
457
 Decision N°12-D-24 of 13
th
 December, 2012, esp. §§618 and 621. 
458
 Decision N°12-D-26 of 20
th
 December, 2012, esp. §§294-295. 
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- The existence of economic difficulties
459
; 
- An antitrust intent
460
; 
- The identity of the victims
461
; 
- ... 
However, a buying power of the victims is not relevant to mitigate the seriousness
462
. 
The damages caused to the Economy depend on (non-limitative list): 
- The value of the relevant market; 
- The combined market shares of the offenders
463
; 
- The impact of the practices on the market
464
; 
- The price elasticity of the demand
465
; 
- Barriers to entry
466
; 
- The duration of the infringement
467
; 
- Characteristics of the relevant economic sector
468
; 
- ... 
 
2. Duration 
 
a. EU 
 
Under the 2006 Fining Guidelines, the percentage of the value of sales determined in this way 
will be multiplied by the number of years of participation in the infringement,
469
 in contrast to 
the mere adjustment under the 1998 Fining Guidelines.
470
  
                                                     
459
 Decision N°13-D-03 of 13
th
 February, 2013, esp. §328. 
460
 Decision N°13-D-06 of 28
th
 February, 2013, esp. §239 ; N°14-D-02 of 20
th
 February, 2014, esp. §360. For a 
notice sent by the competition authorities in order to alert the entities about the illegality of its behaviour: 
Decision N°13-D-03 of 13
th
 February, 2013, esp. §§ 419 and s. 
461
 Taking into account that infringements concern public resources: Decisions N°13-D-14 of 11
th
 June, 2013, 
esp. §170 ; N°13-D-21 of 18
th
 December, 2013, esp. §533 (Public heath). 
462
 Decision N°12-D-27 of 20
th
 December, 2012, esp. §242. 
463
 Decision N°12-D-09 of 13
th
 March, 2012, esp. §801. 
464
 Decision N°12-D-06 of 26
th
 January, 2012, esp. §243 (price increase) and §250 (necessity to lunch a new 
tender).  
465
 Decisions N°12-D-06 of 26
th
 January, 2012, esp. §248 ; N°12-D-09 of 13
th
 March, 2012, esp. §810 ; N°12-D-
10 of 20
th
 March, 2012, esp. §260. 
466
 Decisions N°12-D-06 of 26
th
 January, 2012, esp. §251; N°12-D-25 of 18
th
 December, 2012, esp. §694 ; N°14-
D-02 of 20
th
 February, 2014, esp. §366. 
467
 Decision N°12-D-24 of 13
th
 December, 2012, esp. §§632 and 664. 
468
 Decision N°12-D-24 of 13
th
 December, 2012, esp. §§639 and s. 
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This is arguably the most important change from the 1998 Fining Guidelines.
471
 The General 
Court conceded that the way in which the duration is taken into account under the 2006 
Fining Guidelines constituted “a fundamental change in methodology as to how the duration 
of a cartel is taken into consideration”, but it added that “Article 23(3) of Regulation No 
1/2003 does not, however, preclude such a development”; the General Court noted that while 
the French-language version of Regulation 1/2003 seems to accord higher weight to the 
gravity of the infringement than to its duration, the German- and English-language versions 
of the Regulation accord equal weight to gravity and duration.
472
 
 
b. US 
 
The duration is already taken into account in the affected volume of commerce, because it is 
the affected volume of commerce “over the entire duration” of the infringement that is 
relevant. 
 
c. Germany 
 
The duration is already taken into account in the relevant turnover, because it is the turnover 
“over the entire duration” of the infringement that is relevant.473  
 
d. UK 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
469
  Fractions of an entire year will be considered in the following way: 0<fraction≤6 months will be counted as 
half a year, 6<fraction≤12 months will be counted as one year. Para. 24, second sentence, of the 2006 EU 
Fining Guidelines. The Commission has, however, used the actual number of months, rather than rounding 
them up in some cases. See Kerse & Khan, supra note 182, § 7-087, quoting from Case COMP/39.258 – 
Airfreight at recital 1189 (currently there is no non-confidential version of this decision available). 
470
  As described above, the adjustment under the 1998 Guidelines was essentially 10% per year; under the 
2006 Guidelines, the adjustment is 100% per year. 
471
  Cf. Wils, supra n.130 at 281.  
472
  Judgment of the General Court, 16 June 2011, Joined Cases T-204/08 and T-212/08, Team Relocations v 
Commission [2011] ECR II-3569 para. 109. On appeal, the Court of Justice considered the relevant ground 
of appeal to be partially inadmissible. Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 11 July 2013, Case C-444/11 
P, Team Relocations v Commission [2013] ECR I-000 paras 132-136. 
473
  This appears to be a difference to the European Guidelines, according to which the preceding financial 
year’s turnover is multiplied by the number of years, but in European practice, the Commission also uses 
the actual turnover data where they are available.  
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The second step in setting financial penalties in the UK is the adjustment for duration. The 
Guidelines note that penalties for infringements which last for more than one year may be 
multiplied by not more than the number of years of the infringement. For 
agreements/collusive practices the duration commences from the date of the agreement rather 
than the date the agreement comes into effect
474
. 
 
e. France 
 
The duration of the infringement is taken into account through a multiplication by number of 
years: SG, §42: “The proportion set by the Autorité is applied, for the first full year of 
participation of each undertaking or entity at stake in the infringement, to the value of the 
sales made during the full accounting year of reference, and, for each of the following years, 
to half of this value. Beyond the last full year of participation in the infringement, the 
remaining duration is taken into account by the month, insofar as the elements in the case-file 
make it possible to do so”. 
When several infringements are found, the FCA can take into account the converging period 
of all the infringements
475
. However, the FCA can decide to impose several fines, one by 
infringement
476
. 
The FCA can take into account the duration of the antitrust effect, and not only the duration 
of the practices
477
. 
 
3. Additional amount (“entry fee”) 
 
a. EU 
 
In cases of hardcore infringements (and possibly beyond), a so-called “entry fee” of 15-25 
per cent of the value of sales will additionally be included in order to be able to fine these 
infringements even where they are detected prior to, or soon after, implementation.
478
 The 
Commission practice, sanctioned by the Court, frequently uses the same percentage factor for 
the entry fee as it does for the determination of the percentage of the value of sales to be 
                                                     
474
 Umbro Holdings Ltd v. OFT [2005] CAT 22, para. 184. 
475
 Decision N°12-D-25 of 18
th
 December, 2012, esp. §719 
476
 Decisions N°12-D-27 of 20
th
 December, 2012, esp. §219 ;  N°13-D-12 of 28
th
 May 2013, esp. §887. 
477
 Decision N°13-D-21 of 18
th
 December, 2013, esp. §628. 
478
  2006 Fining Guidelines, para. 25. 
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taken into account.
479
 With regard to the hardcore restrictions enumerated in paragraph 25, 
the addition of the entry fee is automatic.
480
 
 
b. US 
 
As it was previously mentioned, a multiplier range of at least 0.75 is applied to antitrust 
offenses, no matter the culpability score, for deterrence purposes, leading to a fine of at least 
15% of the affected volume of commerce in any circumstance. 
 
c. Germany 
 
The German Guidelines do not add an entry fee; however, they count any infringement 
lasting less than 12 months as having a duration of 12 months,
481
 which achieves a similar, 
albeit not identical effect. 
 
d. UK 
 
There is no entry fee. However, part years are treated as full years and where the total 
duration of an infringement is less than 12 months that duration is treated as a full year. In 
exceptional circumstances, the starting point may be decreased where the duration of the 
infringement is less than one year. Finally, if the infringement is more than one year, part 
years will be rounded up to the nearest quarter year, although in exceptional cases it will be 
possible to round up the part year to a full year
482
. 
 
e. France 
 
There is no entry fee. 
 
                                                     
479
  See, e.g., Judgment of the Court 11 July 2013, Case C-439/11 P, Ziegler SA v Commission [2013] ECR I-000 
at paras 117-124, concluding, at para. 124, in relation to the “additional amount” (= the entry fee): “The 
General Court was therefore entitled to refer ... to its analysis of the reasons given for the percentage 
figure used to determine the basic amount of the fine.” Cf. Judgment of the General Court (Third 
Chamber), 14 May 2014, Case T-406/09, Donau Chemie v Commission [2014] ECR II-000 paras 8, 9, 25, 26, 
63. 
480
  Judgment of the General Court, 16 June 2011, Joined Cases T-204/08 and T-212/08, Team Relocations v 
Commission [2011] ECR II-3569 para. 117, upheld in Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), 11 July 2013, 
Case C-444/11 P, Team Relocations v Commission [2013] ECR I-000 paras 140-141. 
481
  Para. 12 of the Guidelines. 
482
  OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.12. 
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4. Adjustments for aggravating circumstances 
 
a. EU 
 
The adjustments for aggravating and mitigating circumstances are similar to the ones in the 
1998 Guidelines.  
 
Aggravating factors are, in particular, recidivism, that is the continuation or repetition of “the 
same or a similar infringement” after a finding of an infringement; a refusal to cooperate or 
obstruction of investigations; the role as a leader or instigator; and any steps to coerce or 
retaliate against other undertakings. 
 
i. Recidivism 
 
Recidivism is said to be “the most commonly invoked aggravating factor”.483  
 
One potentially significant difference to the 1998 Fining Guidelines is that under the 2006 
Fining Guidelines the increase for recidivism concerning “the same or a similar 
infringement” is now specified to be “up to 100%” of the basic amount “for each such 
infringement established”. In practice, the Commission appears more likely to impose an 
increase of approximately 50% where there is one such infringement, and 30% of the basic 
amount for each such infringement where there is more than one, and 100% for four prior 
infringements.
484
  
 
It should be noted that the “same or similar infringement” is interpreted broadly. First, where 
the practice before the Court falls under Article 101 TFEU, any and all prior Article 101 
TFEU infringements appear to be interpreted as being “the same or similar infringement”, 
and the same is true, mutatis mutandis, for Article 102 TFEU infringements.
485
 Second, the 
2006 Fining Guidelines envisage taking account not only of previous cases in which the 
European Commission found an infringement, but also of cases in which national 
competition authorities made such a finding.  
 
It is controversial whether the absence of any time limitation for taking account of 
infringements in the distant past is problematic. Even quite old findings of infringements 
                                                     
483
  Khan, supra note 182, § 7-109. 
484
  Wils, W.P.J. (2012) Recidivism in EU Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis. World 
Competition. 35(1), 5; Khan, supra n.182, § 7-108. 
485
  Khan, supra n.182, § 7-101. 
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have been taken into account, at least where there was some personal continuity in the 
undertaking between the time of the prior infringement and the infringement in question.
486
 
The Court has emphasized, however, that the lapse of time between the infringements may be 
taken into account in assessing the tendency to infringe competition law in each individual 
case, and that the principle of proportionality obliges the Commission and the Courts to 
consider this point.
487
  
 
ii. Refusal to Cooperate or Obstruction of Investigations 
 
The 2006 Guidelines mention the refusal to cooperate and the obstruction of investigations as 
aggravating circumstances. It is alternatively possible to impose separate fines for procedural 
infringements of up to 1% of the relevant turnover under Article 23(1) Regulation 1/2003, 
and it has been argued with good reason that this is today the preferable approach with regard 
to refusals to cooperate or obstructions of investigations where they do not affect the gravity 
of the substantive infringement.
488
 The practice of increasing the basic amount of the 
substantive fine for such procedural infringements developed under Article 15(1) Regulation 
17 of 1962, which provided for a maximum fine of €5,000. The practice of increasing the 
substantive fine was arguably a circumvention of this clearly inadequate maximum.
489
 Since 
                                                     
486
  Wils, supra n.485 at 15-17 (discussing, inter alia, Judgment of the Court, 8 February 2007, Case C-3/06 P, 
Danone v Commission [2007] ECR I-1331, paras 37-39; Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 17 June 
2010, Case C-413/08 P, Lafarge v Commission [2010]  ECR I-5361, paras 66-75). 
487
  See Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 17 June 2010, Case C-413/08 P, Lafarge v Commission 
[2010]  ECR I-5361, paras 69/70: 
  [T]he Court there [scil.: in Danone] emphasised that the Commission may, in each individual case, 
take into consideration the indicia which confirm an undertaking’s tendency to infringe competition 
rules, including, for example, the time that has elapsed between the infringements in question 
(Groupe Danone v Commission, paragraph 39). Moreover, the principle of proportionality requires 
that the time elapsed between the infringement in question and a previous breach of the competition 
rules be taken into account in assessing the undertaking’s tendency to infringe those rules. For the 
purposes of judical review of the Commission’s measures in matters of competition law, the General 
Court and, where appropriate, the Court of Justice may therefore be called upon to scrutinise 
whether the Commission has complied with that principle when it increased, for repeated 
infringement, the fine imposed, and, in particular, whether such increase was imposed in the light of, 
among other things, the time elapsed between the infringement in question and the previous breach 
of the competition rules. 
488
  Khan, supra n.182, §§ 7-031, 7-111. For an example of a procedural infringement that did have an impact 
on the gravity of the substantive infringement, see ibid., footnote 53 (SGL Carbon’s informing of its co-
conspirators to continue the operation of the cartel). 
489
  But see Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) 27 September 2012, Case T-357/06, Koninklijke 
Wegenbouw Stevin BV v Commission [2012] ECR II-000, paras 247-251 (upheld in Judgment of the Court 
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the maximum fine for procedural infringements has been increased to 1% of the overall 
turnover, this reason for treating procedural infringements as an aggravating factor in setting 
the substantive fine has disappeared. Nevertheless, the Court continues to allow the 
Commission to choose to consider procedural infringements as aggravating factors for the 
substantive fine instead of fining them separately.
490
  
 
A refusal to cooperate may, of course, only be considered as an aggravating factor where the 
undertaking is legally obliged to cooperate, and not where the rights of defence permit a 
refusal to cooperate.
491
 
 
iii. Leader, Instigator, Coercer 
 
The Guidelines also consider the role as “leader in, or instigator of, the infringement”, “steps 
taken to coerce other undertakings to participate” and “retaliatory measures taken against 
other undertakings” as aggravating circumstances. “Instigator” and “leader” refer to different 
concepts. Increases for either role or both roles have been in the region of 30-50 per cent.  
 
An “instigator” is an undertaking that initiates an infringement or encourages others to join it. 
As the General Court explained in Shell: 
 
[I]n order to be classified as an instigator of a cartel, an undertaking must have 
persuaded or encouraged other undertakings to establish the cartel or to join it. By 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(Tenth Chamber) of 19 December 2013, Case 586/12 P, Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin BV v Commission 
[2013] ECR I-000), rejecting the accusation that the Guidelines’ use of obstruction as an aggravating 
circumstance intended the circumvention of the €5,000 limit. 
490
  Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) 27 September 2012, Case T-357/06, Koninklijke 
Wegenbouw Stevin BV v Commission [2012] ECR II-000, paras 247-251 (upheld in Judgment of the Court 
(Tenth Chamber) of 19 December 2013, Case 586/12 P, Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin BV v Commission 
[2013] ECR I-000); Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber), 24 March 2011, Case T-384/06, IBP v 
Commission [2011] ECR II-1177 paras 109:  
The fact that Regulation No 1/2003 allows the Commission to impose a fine of a maximum of 1% of an 
undertaking’s turnover for obstruction or for the supply of false or misleading information in response 
to a request for information, as an autonomous infringement, does not mean that it cannot be taken 
into account as an aggravating circumstance (see, to that effect, Case C‑ 308/04 P SGL Carbon v 
Commission [2006] ECR I‑ 5977, paragraph 64). However, if conduct is classified under one of those 
heads, it cannot at the same time be classified under the other. 
491
  Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 28 June 2005, Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-205/02 P and C-213/02 
P, Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission [2005] ECR I-5425 paras 348-353 (on the equivalent 
provision in the 1998 Fining Guidelines). 
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contrast, it is not sufficient merely to have been a founding member of the cartel. That 
classification should be reserved to the undertaking which has taken the initiative, if 
such be the case, for example by suggesting to the other an opportunity for collusion 
or by attempting to persuade it to do so (BASF v Commission, paragraph 140 above, 
paragraph 321). The Courts of the European Union do not however require the 
Commission to have information regarding the development or the detailed planning 
of the cartel. Lastly, the Courts of the European Union have made it clear that 
instigation is concerned with the establishment or enlargement of a cartel (BASF v 
Commission, paragraph 140 above, paragraph 316), and it is therefore conceivable 
that several undertakings might simultaneously play a role of instigator within the 
same cartel.
492
 
 
A “leader” is an undertaking that is a “significant driving force”. As the General Court 
explained in more detail in Siemens:  
 
According to the case‑law, in order to be classified as a ‘leader’ in a cartel, an 
undertaking must have been a significant driving force for the cartel (BASF v 
Commission, paragraph 311 above, paragraph 374, and Case T‑410/03 Hoechst v 
Commission [2008] ECR II‑881, paragraph 423) and have borne individual and 
specific liability for the operation of the cartel (see, to that effect, BASF v 
Commission, paragraph 311 above, paragraph 300). That factor must be assessed in 
the light of the overall context of the case (see, to that effect, BASF v Commission, 
paragraph 311 above, paragraphs 299 and 373). The classification as ‘leader’ has been 
established when the undertaking carried out the duties of coordinator within the 
cartel and, in particular, organised and staffed the secretariat responsible for the actual 
implementation of the cartel (Case T‑224/00 Archer Daniels Midland and Archer 
Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission [2003] ECR II‑2597, ‘ADM’, paragraphs 
246 and 247), or when that undertaking played a central role in the actual operation of 
the cartel, for example by organising numerous meetings, by collecting and 
distributing information within the cartel, by taking responsibility to represent certain 
members within the cartel or most often formulating proposals relating to the 
operation of the cartel (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 96/82 to 102/82, 104/82, 
105/82, 108/82 and 110/82 IAZ International Belgium and Others v Commission 
                                                     
492
  Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber), 27 September 2012, Case T-343/06, Shell Petroleum & 
Others v Commission) [2012] ECR II-000 para. 155. The Commission had increased the basic amount by 50 
per cent for SNV’s role as leader and instigator of the cartel. The General Court held that the role of SNV 
as instigator and leader was not sufficiently established. The application to appeal has been withdrawn, 
see Order of the President, 11 April 2013, Case C-585 P.  
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[1983] ECR 3369, paragraphs 57 and 58, and BASF v Commission, paragraph 311 
above, paragraphs 404, 439 and 461).
493
 
 
Coercive or retaliatory conduct, in the form of economic pressure or even physical violence, 
has led to increases of some 30 per cent.
494
  
 
iv. Other aggravating factors  
 
The list of aggravating factors in the 2006 Guidelines is not exhaustive. One of the more 
important “innominate” factors is the continuation of an infringement after the undertakings 
have been informed of investigations.
495
  
 
b. US496 
 
The US SG put forward a number of factors to determine the “culpability score” of the 
organization having committed the antitrust offense. Although these factors do not operate as 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances leading to the adjustment of the fine, but form 
inherent part of the calculation of the guidelines fine range, we will examine them briefly, by 
focusing here on the factors that add points to the culpability score (upwards adjustments), as 
                                                     
493
  Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 3 March 2011, Case T-110/07, Siemens AG v 
Commission [2011] ECR II-477 para. 337 (upheld in Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber), 19 December 
2013, Joined cases C-239/11 P, C-489/11 P and C-498/11 P, Siemens AG and others v Commission [2013] 
ECR I-000). 
494
  See, e.g., Commission Decision 2003/600/EC, 2 April 2003, Case COMP/C.38.279/F3, [2003] Official Journal 
L 209/12 – French Beef, recital 173; substantially upheld (the only modification was that the Court 
considered the exceptional circumstances of the mad cow crisis to justify a reduction of 70% instead of 
the 60% applied by the Commission) in Judgment of the Court of First Instance (First Chamber) of 13 
December 2006, Joined cases T-217/03 and T-245/03, Fédération nationale de la coopération bétail et 
viande (FNCBV) and others v Commission [2006] ECR II-4987, in particular paras 273-290, describing, inter 
alia, blockades of abattoirs by farmers and the attack on refridgerators; upheld in Judgment of the Court 
(Third Chamber), 18 December 2008, Joined Cases C-101/07 P and C-110/07 P, Coop de France bétail et 
viande and others v Commission [2008] ECR I-10193. 
495
  See ibid.: the undertakings continued their infringement in secret, after having promised to the 
Commission that the infringement would cease. The Commission applied an increase of 20 per cent with 
the approval of the CFI (recital 174 of the Commission Decision in French Beef, para. 271 of the Judgment 
of the Court of First Instance in FNCBV). 
496
 The developments draw partly on United States Sentencing Commission, Chapter Eight Fine Primer: 
Determining the Appropriate Fine Under the Organizational Guidelines (March 2013), available at: 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/Primer_Organizational_Fines.pdf.  
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opposed to those that led to a point reduction (downwards adjustment), which we will explore 
in the part on mitigating circumstances. 
 
i. Recidivism 
 
Recidivism in infringing antitrust, in particular by participating to cartels, has been an 
important concern for US antitrust scholarship. Ginsburg and Wright (2010), for instance, 
observed that, over just the past few decades, several companies were convicted more than 
once in the United States for engaging in cartel activity, suggesting that there is a problem 
with recidivism
497
. In contrast, other authors, Werden, Hammond & Barnett (2011) searched 
U.S. enforcement records for instances of cartel recidivism and found none at all since July 
1999 when the first non-U.S. national was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 
participation in international cartel activity, thus indicating the effectiveness of anti-cartel 
enforcement in the United States
498
.  
 
Notwithstanding which of the two theses is true, prior history of infringement is considered 
as a factor increasing upwards the culpability score. According to §8C2.5 of the Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual: 
 
“If the organization (or separately managed line of business) committed any part of 
the instant offense less than 10 years after (A) a criminal adjudication based on 
similar misconduct; or (B) civil or administrative adjudication(s) based on two or 
more separate instances of similar misconduct, add 1 point; 
 
Or 
 
(2) If the organization (or separately managed line of business) committed any part of 
the instant offense less than 5 years after (A) a criminal adjudication based on similar 
misconduct; or (B) civil or administrative adjudication(s) based on two or more 
separate instances of similar misconduct, add 2 points”499. 
 
                                                     
497
 Ginsburg, D.H., Wright, J.D. (Autumn 2010) Antitrust Sanctions. Competition Policy Int’l. 3, 15; See also 
Connor, J.M. (Autumn 2010) Recidivism Revealed: Private Int’l Cartels: 1990-2009. Competition Policy Int’l. 
101. 
498
 Werden, G., Hammond, S.D., Barnett, B.A. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Div. (Sept. 22, 2011) Recidivism 
Eliminated: Cartel Enforcement in the United States Since 1999. Address Before the Georgetown Global 
Antitrust Enforcement Symposium, available at: http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/275388.pdf.  
499
 USSG §8C2.5(c)(1)-(2). 
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ii. Refusal to Cooperate or Obstruction of Investigations 
 
Obstruction of justice constitutes the fourth aggravating factor that increases the culpability 
score
500
. Under this provision, if the organization wilfully obstructed or impeded, attempted 
to obstruct or impede, or aided, abetted or encouraged obstruction of justice during the 
investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense, the court adds three points to 
the organization’s culpability score. This three-point enhancement is also applicable if the 
organization knew of such obstruction or impedance or attempted obstruction or impedance 
and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent it. 
 
Similarly, the third aggravating factor listed in the US SG increases the culpability score by 
one or two points if the commission of the instant offense violated a judicial order or 
injunction, or the organization violated a condition of probation
501
. 
 
iii. Participation of high-level or substantial authority personnel in the 
infringement 
 
This aggravating factor concerns high-level or substantial authority personnel in 
organizations of varying sizes who participate in, condone, or are wilfully ignorant of 
criminal activity
502. The organization’s culpability score is increased by between one and five 
points depending on the number of employees in the organization or unit of the organization 
and the involvement of individuals who are either within high-level personnel or substantial 
authority personnel. The commentary to the guidelines define the terms “high-level 
personnel” and “substantial authority personnel.” “High-level personnel” means individuals 
who have substantial control over the organization or who have a substantial role in the 
making of policy within the organization, such as directors, executive officers, individuals in 
charge of sales, administration, or finance, and individuals with substantial ownership 
interests
503. “Substantial authority personnel” means individuals who within the scope of their 
authority exercise a substantial measure of discretion in acting on behalf of an organization, 
such as plant managers, sales managers, individuals with authority to negotiate or set price 
levels, or individuals authorized to negotiate or approve significant contracts
504
. 
 
                                                     
500
 USSG §8C2.5(e). 
501
 USSG §8C2.5(d)(1)-(2). 
502
  USSG §8C2.5(b)(1)-(5). 
503
  USSG §8A1.2, comment. (n.3(B)). 
504
  USSG §8A1.2, comment. (n.3(C)). 
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c. Germany 
 
The German Guidelines do not separately discuss aggravating circumstances. However, such 
circumstances would arguably be taken into account as “innominate” considerations under 
paragraph 16 of the 2013 Fining Guidelines. 
 
i. Recidivism 
 
With regard to recidivism, the Higher Regional Court Düsseldorf explained in Grauzement 
that the Court (in contrast to the Bundeskartellamt) had in previous cases not taken account of 
prior infringements of a similar nature, but indicated that, in principle, it would be willing to 
do so in the future.
505
  However, in contrast to the European Union, prior infringements can 
only be taken into account under restrictive time-limitations: § 153(6) of the 
Gewerbeordnung (Trade Regulations Act, GewO) prohibits taking account of infringements 
that have been entered into the Commercial Register but have expired.
506
 Infringements 
generally expire after 5 years, and are expunged one year thereafter.
507
 While European fines 
decisions are not entered into the register, the rules on expiry are applied by analogy.
508
  
 
ii. Refusal to Cooperate 
 
In general, this aspect will not be an aggravating factor under German law, because the 
accused is generally not required to contribute to its conviction (nemo tenetur se ipsum 
prodere); there is no general duty to cooperate as there is under Regulation 1/2003 in the 
European Union. 
 
iii. Leader, instigator of the infringement  
 
This is taken into account as an offender-related criterion under para. 16 of the Fining 
Guidelines. 
 
                                                     
505
  OLG Düsseldorf, 26 June 2009, VI-2a Kart 2 - 6/08 OWi, 
http://www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/olgs/duesseldorf/j2009/VI_2a_Kart_2___6_08_OWiurteil20090626.html, 
para. 409. 
506
  Ibid. 
507
  § 153(1) no 2, (5) GewO. 
508
  OLG Düsseldorf, 26 June 2009, VI-2a Kart 2 - 6/08 OWi, 
http://www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/olgs/duesseldorf/j2009/VI_2a_Kart_2___6_08_OWiurteil20090626.html, 
para. 409. 
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d. UK 
 
The third step in the calculation of financial penalty is to increase the penalty based on 
aggravating factors. According to the CMA Guidelines, aggravating factors include the 
following: 
 
i. Recidivism 
 
Repeated infringements by the same undertaking or other undertakings in the same group 
may constitute an aggravating factor. The Guidance of the CMA clarifies that where the 
CMA, concurrent regulators or the European Commission have previously issued a decision 
relating to the same or similar infringements in the preceding 15 years, this may result in the 
amount (following the application of steps 1 and 2) being increased y up to 100%. The prior 
infringements are taken into account only where they had an impact in the UK. According to 
the 2012 Guidance, infringements are the “same or similar” where they fall under the same 
provision of the CA98 or equivalent provision of the TFEU. For instance, an infringement 
decision under the Chapter I prohibition or Article 101 could be counted as a ‘same or 
similar’ infringement when assessing the penalty for another infringement of Chapter I or 
Article 101. The actual amount of any such increase for recidivism will be determined on a 
case-by-case basis having regard to all relevant circumstances
509
.   
 
ii. Refusal to cooperate 
 
Persistent and repeated unreasonable behaviour that delays the CMA’s enforcement action 
constitutes since the adoption of the 2012 Guidance an aggravating factor. This includes 
repeatedly disrespecting CMA procedures’ time limits, for instance, for providing 
representations on confidentiality. However, as the Guidance notes, the full exercise of the 
party’s rights of defence will not be treated as unreasonable behaviour, which will certainly 
raise interesting questions in practice as to the distinction between a legitimate exercise of the 
right of defence and the need to ensure its protection and unreasonable behaviour in 
responding to onerous information requests. 
 
iii. Leader, instigator of the infringement  
 
This is generally taken into account
510
. 
 
                                                     
509
 OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.14. 
510
 Umbro Holdings Ltd v. OFT [2005] CAT 22 (judgment on penalty), paras. 39, 203. 
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iv. Other aggravating factors 
 
The Guidance lists some additional aggravating factors, such as the involvement of directors 
or senior management, retaliatory or other coercive measures taken against other 
undertakings aimed at ensuring the continuation of the infringement, continuing the 
infringement after the start of the investigation. 
 
e. France 
 
As illustrated by the Appendix 2, the most frequent aggravating circumstance taken into 
account is the size and economic power of the concerned undertaking and/or its group. 
 
i. Recidivism 
 
Recidivism (reiteration) is established when the four following conditions are met
511
: 
 
- The existence of a previous infringement has been found by the FCA before the 
termination of the practice at stake
512
; 
- The practice at stake and the previous one must be identical or similar; 
- The previous finding of infringement is definitive by the day the FCA adopts its 
decision; and 
- The period of time running from the prior finding infringement to the starting point of 
the practice at stake does not exceed 15 years (by principle)
513
. The shorter this period 
is, the most it can be considered as serious
514
. 
 
To be identical or similar, practices must have a same anticompetitive object or effect, as for 
instance foreclosure. Relevant markets can differ
515
.  
 
ii. Refusal to cooperate 
 
                                                     
511
 SG, §51. Paris Court of appeal, 10th October, 2013, (challenging decision N°12-D-10 of 8
th
 December, 2011 
of 20
th
 March, 2012). 
512
 The practice at stake can have started before the previous finding of infringement: Decision N°12-D-26 of 
20
th
 December, 2012, esp. §311. 
513
 Decision N°12-D-24 of 13
th
 December, 2012, esp. §§677 and s. 
514
 Decision N°12-D-25 of 18
th
 December, 2012, esp. §753. 
515
 Decision N°12-D-24 of 13
th
 December, 2012, esp. §688. 
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Under Article L. 450-8 of the French Commercial Code, refusal to cooperate is a criminal 
offence (up to 2 year imprisonment and a €300,000 fine). 
 
iii. Leader, instigator, coercer ... 
 
As before the European Commission, the role during the infringement has become an 
aggravating factor which is rarely taken into account
516
. 
 
5. Adjustments for mitigating circumstances 
 
a. EU 
 
Mitigating factors mentioned in the non-exhaustive list in paragraph 29 of the 2006 
Guidelines are the immediate termination of the infringement as soon as the Commission 
intervenes (this is not applicable to secret agreements or practices); the commission of the 
infringement based on mere negligence; substantially limited involvement in the infringement 
by avoiding the application of the offending agreement “by adopting competitive conduct in 
the market”;517 effective cooperation outside the scope of the Leniency Notice and beyond 
the undertaking’s legal obligation; and the authorization or encouragement by public 
authorities or by legislation.
518
  
 
One of the most controversial questions is whether the existence of an effective compliance 
scheme should be considered as a mitigating factor. Practitioners and some academics argue 
that such a fines discount programme would be an incentive to establish effective compliance 
schemes.
519
 The Commission and the Court have rejected such arguments, and argue that the 
benefits of an effective compliance scheme lie in its prevention of infringements.
520
  
 
b. US 
 
                                                     
516
 But see Decisions N°13-D-12 of 28
th
 May, 2013, esp. §§956 and s. ; N°13-D-14 of 11
th
 June, 2013, esp. §181. 
517
  It should be noted that mere cheating on the cartel does generally not suffice to invoke this head of 
mitigating circumstances, unless this leads to the collapse of the cartel.  
518
  For an example for this last mitigating circumstance, see the French Beef case, para. 176 of the 
Commission Decision). 
519
  See, e.g., Geradin, D. (2013) Antitrust Compliance Programmes & Optimal Antitrust Enforcement: A Reply 
to Wouter Wils. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement. 1(2) 325-346. 
520
  For a sustained argument against accepting evidence of effective compliance programmes as a mitigating 
factor, see Wils, W.P.J. (2013) Antitrust Compliance Programmes & Optimal Antitrust Enforcement. 
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement. 1(1) 52-81. 
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The guideline lists two mitigating factors that decrease the culpability score. The first allows 
the court to subtract three points from the organization’s culpability score if the organization 
had an effective compliance and ethics program in place at the time of the offense
521
. The 
concept of “effective compliance and ethics program is defined in length at §8B2.1 of the 
USSG
522
. This reduction should be denied, however, if the organization unreasonably delayed 
reporting the offense to the appropriate governmental authorities or under specified instances 
in which high-level or substantial authority personnel participated in, condoned, or were 
wilfully ignorant of the offense
523
. 
 
The second mitigating factor decreases the culpability score by five points if the organization 
self-reported the offense to the appropriate governmental authorities, fully cooperated in the 
investigation, and clearly demonstrated recognition and affirmative acceptance of 
responsibility for its conduct
524
. If the organization did not self-report, but fully cooperated in 
the investigation, and accepted responsibility for its conduct, the culpability score is reduced 
by two points
525
. Finally, if the organization did not self-report or cooperate, but clearly 
demonstrated recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its conduct, the 
culpability score is reduced by one point
526
.  
 
c. Germany 
 
The German Guidelines do not separately discuss mitigating circumstances. However, such 
circumstances would arguably be taken into account as “innominate” considerations under 
paragraph 16. 
 
Cooperation may be a mitigating factor,
527
 and given that there is no general duty to 
cooperate under German law, it is easier than in European law to reach the threshold for 
cooperation that may be rewarded by a reduction in the fine. 
 
                                                     
521
 USSG §8C2.5(f)(1). 
522
 For the full text see, http://70.32.97.65/resources/statutes/Chapter-81.pdf pp. 512-517. 
523
  USSG §8C2.5(f)(2), (f)(3). The involvement of high-level or substantial authority personnel is not, however, 
an absolute bar to this reduction. 
524
 USSG §8C2.5(g)(1). 
525
  USSG §8C2.5(g)(2). 
526
 USSG §8C2 5(g)(3). 
527
  OLG Düsseldorf, 26 June 2009, VI-2a Kart 2 - 6/08 OWi, 
http://www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/olgs/duesseldorf/j2009/VI_2a_Kart_2___6_08_OWiurteil20090626.html, 
paras 414-420.  
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One aspect that has to be considered is a delay that infringes the right of the accused to a 
speedy trial.
528
 The fine is not reduced, but any delay is declared in the decision, and where 
this is appropriate, a proportion of the fine is deemed to have been executed.  
 
d. UK 
 
The 2012 Guidance includes as mitigating factors: 
 
(i) The role of the undertaking, for example, where the undertaking is acting under 
severe duress or pressure;  
(ii) Genuine uncertainty on the part of the undertaking as to whether the agreement or 
conduct constituted an infringement;  
(iii) Adequate steps having been taken with a view to ensuring compliance with articles 
101 and 102 TFEU and the national equivalents (Chapter I and II of the Competition 
Act 1998).  The latter category may include compliance activities under specific 
circumstances. For instance, the Guidance notes that in principle compliance 
activities will be “neutral” and the CMA will consider carefully the evidence 
presented by the undertaking in order to assess if its compliance activity “merits a 
discount from the penalty of up to 10%
529
. Hence, according to the Guidance the 
“mere existence” of compliance activities will not be considered as a mitigating 
factor, but in individual cases, “evidence of adequate steps having been taken to 
achieve a clear and unambiguous commitment to competition law compliance 
throughout the organization (from the top down) – together with appropriate steps 
relating to competition law risk identification, risk assessment, risk mitigation and 
review activities – will likely be treated as a mitigating factor”530. It is explained that 
“(t)he business will need to demonstrate that the steps taken were appropriate to the 
size of the business concerned and its overall level of competition risk”, as well as 
present evidence “on the steps it took to review it compliance activities, and change 
them as appropriate, in light of the events that led to the investigation at hand”531. 
However, in some “exceptional cases”, the CMA may treat compliance activities as 
an aggravating factor justifying an increase in the financial penalty, in particular for 
situations where compliance activities were used to conceal or facilitate an 
infringement, or to mislead the CMA during its investigation. 
                                                     
528
  For the European Union, see Judgment of the Court, 26 November 2013, Case C-50/12 P, Kendrion v 
Commission [2013] ECR I-000 paras 77-107. 
529
 OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.15, footnote 26. 
530
 Ibid. 
531
 Ibid. 
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(iv) Termination of the infringement as soon as the OFT intervenes. 
(v) Cooperation which enables the enforcement process to be concluded more effectively 
and/or speedily. The Guidance specifies that cooperation over and above respecting 
CMA’s time limits will be necessary but still not sufficient to merit a reduction at this 
step. Undertaking benefiting from the leniency programme will not receive an 
additional reduction in financial penalties under this head (since continuous and 
complete cooperation is a condition of leniency)
532
. 
 
Other mitigating factors include admission of liability
533
 and a public apology
534
 or some 
other action taken to compensate consumers
535
.  
 
e. France 
 
Since the FCA must take into account all the elements in the file, it can find mitigating 
circumstances without request from the undertaking. Nevertheless, some mitigating 
circumstances need a demonstration by the concerned company when it is the only one to 
have relevant information (as inability to pay
536
). 
 
As abovementioned, the FCA takes into account the antitrust intent. 
 
As stated in the SG (§45), cheating from a cartel can be considered as a mitigating factor537. 
 
The existence of an effective compliance program is considered as a mitigating factor only 
when there is settlement. Indeed, in the French settlement procedure, the FCA enforces the 
effective application of the compliance program
538
. Nevertheless, in accordance with the 
Framework document of the FCA (§28), the Paris Court of appeal has ruled that an effective 
compliance program can be considered as a mitigating factor when, before the opening of the 
                                                     
532
 See, e.g., Umbro Holdings Ltd v. OFT [2005] CAT 22 (judgment on penalty), para. 333. 
533
 Id. at paras 201 and 265. 
534
 Id. at para. 265. 
535
 Id. at paras 265 and 266. 
536
 Decision N°12-D-25 of 18
th
 December, 2012, esp. §758.  
537
 See, for instance, Decision N°12-D-09 of 13
th
 March, 2012, esp. §§848 and s. 
538
 Decisions N°12-D-27 of 20
th
 December, 2012, esp. §327 ; N°13-D-12 of 28
th
 May, 2013, esp. §984 (absence 
of mitigating factor in a “normal” procedure). Confirmed by Paris Court of appeal, 30
th
 January, 2014 
(challenging decision N°11-D-17 of 8
th
 December, 2011). See the 2012 framework-document: 
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/framework_document_compliance_10february2012.pdf. 
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investigations, the concerned undertaking has (i) adopted its compliance program and (ii) put 
an end to the antitrust practices
539
.  
 
The legal framework can be considered as a mitigating factor
540
. . For instance, as mentioned 
in the FCA’s press release, “the progressive drop in ceiling rates for termination calls 
imposed by sector regulation created a transitional economic interest for operators to 
encourage their customers to make “on net” calls. In light of this, the FCA reduced the 
amount of the fines imposed on both companies by 50%antitrust practices”541. 
 
The absence of illicit gain is not considered as a mitigating factor
542
. 
 
C. Specific increase for deterrence  
 
1. EU 
 
The 2006 Fining Guidelines then add that the fine needs to have a sufficiently deterrent effect 
and that the fine derived by adjusting the basic amount by mitigating and aggravating factors 
may need to be increased for undertakings with a particularly large turnover relative to the 
value of sales (application of a so-called “multiplier” for specific deterrence).543  
 
The fine may also be increased to skim off the “amount of gains improperly made as a result 
of the infringement where it is possible to estimate that amount”.544  
 
2. US 
 
The penalty multipliers essentially take into account the objective of specific deterrence. 
 
3. Germany 
 
The total-turnover-based multiplier under paragraph 13 essentially serves the function of the 
specific increase for deterrence. However, it should be borne in mind that the product of 
multiplier and relevant turnover merely determines the maximum fine. 
                                                     
539
 Paris Court of Appeal, 10th October, 2013, (challenging decision N°12-D-10 of 20
th
 March, 2012). 
540
 Decision N°12-D-24 of 13
th
 December, 2012, esp. §705. 
541
 Ibid. 
542
 Ibid., esp. §700. 
543
 Para. 30 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. 
544
 Para. 31 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. 
219 
 
 
In accordance with § 81(5) GWB, the Bundeskartellamt may impose a higher fine (or pursue 
separate proceedings under § 32 or § 34 GWB) to skim off the economic benefit derived from 
the offence.
545
  
 
4. UK 
 
The 2012 Guidance includes a fourth step in the setting of fines enabling the CMA to adjust 
for specific deterrence and proportionality. We will focus here on deterrence. For doing so, 
the CMA will examine appropriate indicators of the size and financial position of the 
undertaking, including where they are available, total turnover, profits, cash flow and 
industry margins, as well as any other relevant circumstances of the case, concerning the 
undertaking’s size and financial position at the time the penalty is being imposed, but also 
from the time of the infringement. According to the Guidance, the penalty figure resulting 
from steps 1 to 3 may be increased by the CMA to ensure that the penalty imposed will have 
a deterrence effect on the undertaking in the future (specific deterrence)
546
. Such an increase 
will be limited to situations in which the undertaking has a significant proportion of its 
turnover outside the relevant market or where the CMA has evidence that the infringing 
undertaking has made or is likely to make an economic or financial benefit from the 
infringement that is above the level of penalty reached at the end of step 3
547
. The CMA may 
also account for any gain which might accrue to the undertaking in other product and 
geographic markets as well as the relevant market in question. This would be the case, for 
instance, of predation cases, where the relevant market may be very small but the act of 
predation provides the undertaking with a reputation for aggressive behaviour which may be 
used to its advantage in many other markets. This will also include the gain in another 
Member State, when the CMA implements Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, provided that the 
CMA has the express consent of the relevant Member State or NCA in each particular case. 
The CMA will proceed to an adjustment of the penalty on a case by case basis for each 
individual infringing undertaking. This will be particularly the case when the undertaking has 
very low or zero turnover at the end of step 3, in which case the CMA may make significant 
adjustments to the amount of the penalty.  
 
5. France 
 
                                                     
545
  Para. 17 of the Guidelines. 
546
 OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.17. 
547
  OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.17 
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For undertakings with "large turnover, it is a very frequent aggravating factor (see hereafter 
Appendix 2). 
 
D. Statutory Maximum fine and Proportionality 
 
1. EU 
 
The fine derived by the basic amount, where applicable as adjusted and increased, will then 
be capped at the statutory limit of 10% of the total turnover in the preceding business year.
548
 
Where an association is fined, the limit is 10% of the sum of the total turnover of each 
member that is active on the relevant market to which the infringement relates directly or 
indirectly.
549
  
 
Regarding the relevant “preceding business year”, the Court has recently reaffirmed in a case 
where the undertaking’s turnover had dropped significantly in the year before the adoption of 
the Commission Decision because the undertaking had sold off assets and converted them 
into cash, and the Commission had therefore not considered that year (2008) but instead the 
previous year (2007), that: 
 
15      In determining the preceding business year, the Commission must assess, in 
each specific case and in the light of both its context and the objectives pursued by the 
scheme of penalties created by the regulation, the intended impact on the undertaking 
in question, taking into account in particular a turnover which reflects the 
undertaking’s real economic situation during the period in which the infringement 
was committed (see Case C‑76/06 P Britannia Alloys & Chemicals v Commission 
EU:C:2007:326, paragraph 25). 
16     The Court has observed in relation to the concept of the preceding business year, 
in paragraph 29 of Britannia Alloys & Chemicals v Commission (EU:C:2007:326), 
that, in certain situations, the turnover in question does not provide any useful 
indication as to the actual economic situation of the undertaking concerned and the 
appropriate level of fine to impose on that undertaking. 
17      In such a situation, and as the Court made clear in paragraph 30 of Britannia 
Alloys & Chemicals v Commission (EU:C:2007:326), the Commission is entitled to 
refer to another business year in order to be able to make a correct assessment of the 
                                                     
548
  Article 23(2) Regulation 1/2003; paras 32 and 33 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. 
549
  Article 23(2) Regulation 1/2003; paras 32 and 33 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines. See in particular Judgment 
of the Court (Third Chamber), 18 December 2008, Joined Cases C-101/07 P and C-110/07 P (Coop de 
France bétail et viande and others v Commission) [2008] ECR I-10193. 
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financial resources of that undertaking and to ensure that the fine has a sufficient and 
proportionate deterrent effect.
550
  
 
2. US 
 
Under the Sherman Act (and the 2004 ACREPA amendments)
551
, the statutory maximum 
corporate fine is $100 million
552
. In addition, the Alternative Fines Statute, should the 
Antitrust Division choose this route, states: 
 
“If any person derives pecuniary gain from the offense, or if the offense results in 
pecuniary loss to a person other than the defendant, the defendant may be fined not more 
than the greater of twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss, unless imposition of a fine 
under this subsection would unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process”. 553 
 
Hence, in cases in which the Antitrust Division will seek a fine above the Sherman Act 
statutory maximum, it will allege the amount of gain or loss attributable to the entire cartel, 
thus twice the loss caused by the cartel rather than by the defendant. Specifically identifying 
twice the gain or twice the loss under 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) constitute “facts” that must be 
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt
554
. It is also reminded that joint and several 
liability does not apply for the Alternative Fines Statute. Since 2005 the Antitrust Division 
has entered into a number of plea agreements in which the agreed fine exceeded the statutory 
maximum. 
 
3. Germany 
 
There is no statutory “cap” under German law; instead, the statutory limit of 10% of the 
undertaking’s annual worldwide turnover (or, if lower, 10 per cent of the relevant domestic 
turnover multiplied with the total global turnover based multiplier) defines the maximum 
fine. 
                                                     
550
  Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 15 May 2014, Case C-90/13 P (1. garantovaná v Commission) 
[2014] ECR I-000 paras 15-17. 
551
 Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act 2004 (“ACREPA)  §215(a) (15 U.S.C. § 1 note). 
552
 One may remark the important increase of the statutory maximum of the Sherman Act from $5K in 1890, to 
$50K in 1955, to $1 million in 1974, $10 million in 1990, $100 million in 2004. 
553
 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (d). 
554
 Southern Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012), 2351 n. 4, 2351-52 [6th amendment right to 
jury finding) for any fact (other than a prior conviction) that increases a criminal defendant’s maximum 
potential sentence]. 
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4. UK 
 
The UK financial penalties regime addresses proportionality and the maximum statutory fine 
as two different steps in the setting of fines. Proportionality is now assessed along with 
deterrence in the fourth step of the fine-setting process. Again, the CMA has regard to factors 
such as the size of the undertaking, its financial position and the nature of the infringement. 
According to the 2012 Guidance, penalties, even if they factor in deterrence, should not be 
“disproportionate or excessive having regard to the undertaking’s sixe and financial position 
and the nature of the infringement
555
. In addition to this necessary compromise between 
deterrence and proportionality, the CMA will address at the fourth step of the analysis if the 
overall penalty is appropriate in the round. It will do so by having regard again to the 
undertaking’s size and financial position and the nature of the infringement, but also on the 
impact of the undertaking’s infringing activity on competition556.  
 
The maximum penalty cannot exceed 10% of the worldwide turnover of the undertaking in its 
last business year, which is that preceding the date on which the decision of the CMA is taken 
or, if figures are not available for that business year, the one immediately preceding it
557
. This 
adjustment for the maximum penalty will be made after all the relevant adjustments have 
been made in steps 2 to 4 and also before any further adjustments in respect of leniency or 
settlement discounts under step 6
558
. If there is an infringement by an association of 
undertakings (for instance a trade association) relating to the activities of its members, the 
penalty should not exceed 10% of the sum of the worldwide turnover of each member of the 
association of undertakings active on the market affected by the infringement
559
. 
 
The Guidance also notes that if a penalty or fine has been imposed by the European 
Commission or by a court or other body in another Member State in respect of an agreement 
or conduct, the CMA “must take that penalty or fine into account when setting the amount of 
a penalty in relation to that agreement or conduct, according to Article 38(9) of the 
Competition Act 1998 in order to ensure that double jeopardy will be avoided. Hence, where 
an anti-competitive agreement or conduct is subject to proceedings resulting in a penalty or 
                                                     
555
 OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.19. 
556
 OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.20. 
557
  OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.21. 
558
 OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.22. 
559
 OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.23. 
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fine in another Member State, an undertaking will not be penalized again in the UK for the 
same anti-competitive effects
560
. 
 
5. France 
 
According Article L. 464-2 of the French Commercial Code, “the maximum amount of the 
penalty is €3 million. Where the infringer is an undertaking, the maximum account is 10% of 
the highest worldwide pre-tax turnover achieved during one of the accounting years closed 
since the accounting year prior to that in which the practices have taken place”. 
 
E. Leniency and Settlement Discounts 
 
1. EU 
 
The fine so determined may be reduced according to the Leniency Notice.
561
 The application 
of the 10 per cent turnover cap before any reductions under the Leniency Notice ensures that 
there remains a sufficient incentive to make use of the Leniency Programme.
562
 
 
Where the fined undertakings or associations comply with the settlement procedure, the fine 
(if applicable: after application of a leniency discount) will be reduced by 10 per cent.
563
 
 
                                                     
560
  OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.24. 
561
  2006 Fining Guidelines, para 34. 
562
  If the cap were applied after the leniency discount, cooperation might not be rewarded at all. For 
example, where a mono-product undertaking that is only active in the EEA has participated in a 5-year 
hardcore cartel that covered the EEA, the basic amount could be, for example, 20 per cent of the value of 
sales multiplied by the duration of 5 years, i.e. 100 per cent of the value of sales, which, in the case of a 
mono-product undertaking active only in the EEA would at the same time be 100 per cent of the annual 
turnover. If this undertaking could expect a 50 per cent reduction under the Leniency Programme, but this 
reduction were applied before the cap, then the cooperation would not be rewarded at all: without 
cooperation, the fine would be capped at 10 per cent of the annual turnover; applying the reduction for 
cooperation would also lead to a cap at 10 per cent of the annual turnover (50 per cent of 100 percent of 
the annual turnover would be 50 per cent of the annual turnover, which would also capped at the 
statutory 10 per cent threshold). Applying the leniency discount after capping results in a fine of only 5 per 
cent of the annual turnover. 
563
  Article 10a Regulation 773/2004, as amended by Regulation 622/2008 (supra note 218). This is not 
mentioned in the 2006 Fining Guidelines, because the Settlement Procedure was only introduced after 
their publication. 
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2. US 
 
The US was the first jurisdiction to develop wide-ranging leniency programmes in order to 
provide substantial incentives for cartel participants (companies and individuals) to report 
cartel activity to the Antitrust Division of the DOJ. Corporate leniency covers the corporation 
and all directors, officers, and employees of the corporation who admit their involvement in 
the illegal antitrust activity as part of the corporate confession, and assist the Antitrust 
Division throughout the investigation. The Antitrust Division grants leniency only to first 
qualifying application in order to attempt to create a race among cartel participants to report 
the antitrust offense.  
 
There are various types of leniency possibilities: type A corporate leniency when the 
Antitrust Division has not received information about the illegal activity from any other 
source or upon discovery, the corporation took prompt and effective action to terminate its 
participation, where possible, the corporation makes restitution to injured parties, it clearly is 
not the leader in or the originator of the illegal activity, among other conditions. Type B 
leniency is awarded to the corporation that is the first to come forward and qualify for 
leniency with respect to the activity and the Antitrust Division does not have evidence against 
the company that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction and such cooperation advances 
the investigation of the Antitrust Division. Finally, “amnesty plus” provides a company that 
is too late to obtain leniency for one conspiracy, but has information on a second conspiracy, 
to obtain leniency for the second conspiracy.  
 
The Antitrust Division will also recommend a substantial reduction in the financial penalties 
for the first conspiracy to which the company participated. ACREPA also provides a limited 
leniency recipient’s liability to actual damages caused by the recipient’s wrongful acts as the 
leniency recipient is not liable for treble damages and is not jointly or severally liable. This 
benefit is dependent on the leniency recipient’s “satisfactory cooperation” with the private 
claimants. 
 
3. Germany 
 
The fine as determined by the 2013 Guidelines may be subject to further reductions on the 
basis of the leniency notice or the settlement notice.
564
 
                                                     
564
  Para. 18 of the Guidelines with the Leniency Notice (Notice no. 9/2006 of the Bundeskartellamt on the 
immunity from and reduction of fines in cartel cases - Leniency Programme - of 7 March 2006, 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Leitlinien/Notice%20-
%20Leniency%20Guidelines.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5) and the Settlement Notice (which is not 
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4. UK 
 
The consideration for any reductions for leniency or for settlement agreement forms part of 
the sixth step in the fine-setting process. The CMA has published guidelines concerning 
applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases
565
. Part 3 of the 2012 Guidance on the 
setting of financial penalties summarizes the different types of leniency available and the 
criteria governing their award. 
 
The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 in operation since on 1 April 2014 also 
formalized the settlement procedure to simplify the process by which a company may admit 
infringing competition law in return for a reduced penalty (20% discount if settlement is 
before a Statement of Objections and 10% afterwards). This will streamline the investigation 
procedure and provide greater predictability and consistency of process and outcomes. 
However, the use of settlement procedures will be at the CMA’s discretion. The proposals 
draw substantially on the European Commission’s well-established settlement procedure, 
which it has used successfully in several cartel investigations. 
 
5. France 
 
In accordance with Article L 464-2-IV of the French Commercial Code, the FCA has 
published guidelines regarding applications of the criteria and the procedure of its leniency 
program. The third and last version is dated March 2
nd
, 2009
566
. 
 
F. Inability to Pay 
 
1. EU 
 
The Guidelines go on to state (similarly to, but more elaborately than the 1998 Guidelines) 
that  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
translated into English; the German version is: Bundeskartellamt, Merkblatt - Das Settlement-Verfahren 
des Bundeskartellamtes in Bußgeldsachen, 23 December 2013, 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Merkblätter/Merkblatt-
Settlement.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2).  
565
 OFT 1495 (CMA), (2013).  “Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases”  
566
 http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/cpro_clemence_uk_2_mars_2009.pdf. 
226 
 
[i]n exceptional cases, the Commission may, upon request, take account of the 
undertaking’s inability to pay in a specific social and economic context. It will not 
base any reduction granted for this reason in the fine on the mere finding of an 
adverse or loss-making financial situation. A reduction could be granted solely on the 
basis of objective evidence that the imposition of the fine as provided for in these 
Guidelines would irretrievably jeopardise the economic viability of the undertaking 
concerned and cause its assets to lose all their value.
567
  
 
First, it should be pointed out that the Grand Chamber in Dansk Rørindustri held, as quoted 
above, that there is no obligation on the Commission to take the inability to pay into account, 
because this would give an “unjustified competitive advantage to undertakings least well 
adapted to the market conditions”.568  
 
Accordingly, it was not easily predictable whether the Commission would take the inability 
to pay into account in any specific case. In particular in the course of the financial crisis after 
2007 applications for a reduction under paragraph 35 of the 2006 Guidelines increased. 
Additionally, post-decision requests for an ex post reduction or waiver of the fine were often 
addressed to the Commission.  
 
The Competition Commissioner and Vice-President of the Commission Joaquín Almunia and 
Janusz Lewandowski therefore published an “Information Notice” in 2010 to clarify the 
Commission’s practice.569  
 
The Notice first registers its reservations against taking inability to pay (ITP) into account, 
based on (1) the possibly unequal treatment by taking ITP into account in the case of “those 
companies that are inefficient, badly managed or over-leveraged at the expense of well 
managed and financially prudent companies” ; (2) the resulting danger of  moral hazard, 
among other things by providing incentives for corporate restructuring; (3) the danger of 
inconsistency in the fining practice; (4) the diminution of the deterrent effect of fines.
570
 On 
the other hand, the Notice states that competitive companies and productive assets should not 
                                                     
567
 Fining Guidelines, para 35. 
568
 C-213/02 P (Dansk Rørindustri and others v Commission) [2005] ECR I-5425 (in the context of the similar 
provision in the 1998 Fining Guidelines). 
569
  Information Note by Mr Joaquín Almunia, Vice-President of the Commission, and by Mr. Janusz 
Lewandowski, Member of the Commission, Inability to pay under paragraph 35 of the 2006 Fining 
Guidelines and payment conditions pre- and post-decision finding an infringement and imposing fines, 
SEC(2010) 737/2 of 12 June 2010. 
570
  Ibid., para. 4. 
227 
 
be driven out of the market by fines, a danger that is particularly high for “SMEs and/or 
mono-product companies”.571  
 
The Notice then elaborates on the interpretation of paragraph 35, stating that the financial 
situation of the company will be assessed on the basis of primarily the solvency and liquidity, 
as estimated by bankruptcy prediction models such as the Altman Z-score test, but also of 
profitability and capitalization.
572
 The indicators are assessed relying on historical data and 
projections for the future, especially with regard to cash flows.
573
  
 
The condition of the economic and social context are said to be “fulfilled relatively easily, 
e.g. during a sectoral or general economic crisis”; both a cyclical sectoral crisis and the 
general difficulty in getting access to capital and credit may suffice.
574
  
 
The Notice widens the scope of the ITP argument by replacing the 2006 Fining Guideline’s 
condition that the productive assets would “lose all their value” by the less strict condition 
that they would “lose ‘significantly’ their value”, which is already the case where the 
bankruptcy would lead “to the disappearance of the undertaking as a going concern”.575 
 
The consequence of a successful ITP application is either a reduction of the fine to be paid, or 
a relaxation in the conditions for payment, such as deferred payment by instalments. While 
the Notice recognizes that from a deterrence perspective it would be preferable to keep the 
nominal amount of the fine as determined by the 2006 Fining Guidelines and only relax the 
conditions of payment, the Notice gives more weight to the consideration that such a 
relaxation of the payment conditions is less beneficial to the undertakings.
576
 Therefore, the 
Notice announces that in the future successful ITP applications will generally lead to 
reduction of the fine, and only exceptionally to a mere relaxation of the payment conditions, 
or – very exceptionally – to a combination of these two options.577  
 
The Notice further states that companies that appeal a fine should be able to choose freely 
between paying the fine provisionally or providing a valid bank guarantee.
578
 
                                                     
571
  Ibid. 
572
  Ibid., para. 7. 
573
  Ibid.  
574
  Ibid., para. 8. 
575
  Ibid., para. 9.  
576
  Ibid., paras 11-12. 
577
  Ibid., para. 13. 
578
  Ibid., paras 14-16. 
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Finally, the Notice explains the procedure for taking ITP concerns into account that arise 
subsequent to the adoption of the decision.
579
 In such a case, the College of Commissioners 
would have to partially or fully waive the fine.
580
 The exact procedure differs depending on 
the point in time when the financial distress develops.
581
 
 
2. US 
 
According to the US SG, the court must reduce the fine below that otherwise required by the 
guidelines to the extent that imposition of such fine would impair the organizations ability to 
make restitution to its victims
582
. The court may impose a fine below that otherwise required 
if the court finds that the organization is not able and, even with the use of a reasonable 
instalment schedule, is not likely to become able to pay the minimum fine required, provided 
that the reduction is not more than necessary to avoid substantially jeopardizing the continued 
viability of the organization
583
. 
 
3. Germany 
 
Any inability to pay is taken into account in determining the financial capacity of the 
undertaking in the application of the offender-related criteria (§ 17(3) OWiG, paragraph 16, 
second bullet point).  
 
4. UK 
 
The Guidance recognizes that in exceptional circumstances, the CMA may reduce the penalty 
where the undertaking is unable to pay it because of its financial position
584
. This adjustment 
for financial hardship forms part of the sixth step of the fine-setting process. The 2004 
Guidelines integrated its assessment in considering mitigating circumstances. In its Achilles 
judgment the CAT had agreed with the OFT submission that “the fact that a fine may result 
in a company going into liquidation and exiting the market is something that the OFT should 
take into account but is not necessarily a reason for reducing the fine”585. The CAT also 
                                                     
579
  Ibid., paras 17-21. 
580
  Ibid. para. 19. 
581
  Ibid., paras 18, 20. 
582
  USSG §8C3.3(a). 
583
 USSG §8C3.3(b). 
584
 OFT (CMA) Guidelines (2012), para. 2.27. 
585
 Achilles Paper Group Ltd v. OFT [2006] CAT 24, paras 21-23, 42 and 43 referring to the position in EU law. 
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refused to consider the argument put forward by Achilles that paying the fine would lead it to 
exit the market and that such exit will leave one market player with very significant power. 
According to the CAT, limiting fines on this basis will be extremely difficult, recognizing a 
margin of appreciation to the OFT on how to balance deterrence as against possible adverse 
effects on the market structure. 
 
5. France 
 
The FCA has published a questionnaire on the ability to pay of all entities (not only 
undertakings) in 2011
586
. Inability to pay is assessed at the group level
587
. Undertakings must 
provide the FCA with the information requested in this questionnaire: individual and 
consolidated (when applicable) financial statements for the last three years, a summary of the 
financial covenants concluded between the undertaking and its banks, the amount of banking 
credit lines available on the last day of each of the last three certified fiscal years, amount of 
the provisions for the last closed fiscal year as well as for the ongoing fiscal year. Additional 
information is requested for foreign undertakings or for undertakings which do not resort to a 
statutory auditor.  
 
The questionnaire is not legally binding. However, the burden of proof is on the undertaking 
which asked for a reduction, therefore it is strongly recommended to provide the FCA with 
the information mentioned in the questionnaire. 
 
 
G. Deferred payment, Interest on Fines 
 
1. EU 
 
Where the Commission has imposed a fine, no interest will be due where the fine is (at least 
provisionally) paid by the deadline specified in the Decision.
588
 Once the deadline has passed, 
interest starts to accrue at the rate of 3.5 per cent above the interest rate applied by the 
European Central Bank to its main refinancing operations.
589
 Where a financial guarantee has 
                                                     
586
 http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/questionnaire_itp_mai_2011_en.pdf. 
587
 Decision N°12-D-25 of 18
th
 December, 2012, esp. §762. 
588
  Article 78(3)(b) of the Commission Regulation (EC, EURATOM) No 2342/2002 of 23 December 2002 laying 
down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the 
Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, [2002] Official 
Journal L 357/1, as amended. 
589
  Article 86(1), (2)(b) of Regulation 2342/2002.  
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been accepted by the accounting officer in lieu of provisional payment, the interest rate is 
only 1.5 per cent above the interest rate applied by the European Central Bank to its main 
refinancing operations.
590
 
 
The rate of 3.5 per cent above the interest rate applied by the European Central Bank to its 
main refinancing operations has been challenged as being above market rates; this could 
prevent addressees of fines decisions from seeking an effective judicial remedy. However, the 
Court has found the rate to be acceptable, reasoning that too low a rate would give an 
incentive to bring dilatory appeals merely to benefit from the interest collected, and that the 
rate was not so high as to deter addressees from seeking judicial recourse.
591
  
 
2. US 
 
The sentencing court must order immediate payment of the fine unless it finds that the 
organization is financially unable to make immediate payment or that such payment would 
pose an undue burden on the organization, in which case the court shall require full payment 
at the earliest possible date, either by setting a date certain or by establishing an instalment 
schedule
592
. In no event should the period provided for payment exceed five years. 
 
3. Germany 
 
§ 81(6) GWB, provides that a fine imposed on legal persons or partnerships starts to accrue 
interest two weeks after service of the fining decision, at a rate of 5% above the base interest 
rate. The legislator introduced this duty to pay interest in order to prevent the persons 
concerned from moving for court decisions solely in order to delay having to pay the fine.  
 
In 2011, the OLG Düsseldorf made a preliminary reference to the Federal Constitutional 
Court because it considered this provision to infringe the constitutional guarantee of equal 
treatment
593
 in three respects:  
 
                                                     
590
  Article 86(5) of Regulation 2342/2002. 
591
  Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fifth Chamber), 8 October 2008, Case T-68/04 (SGL Carbon v 
Commission) [2008] ECR II-2511 paras 140-154 (pointing out that the case-law predating Regulation 
2342/2002 even accepted interested as high as 13.75%), upheld in Judgment of the Court (Fourth 
Chamber) of 12 November 2009, Case C-564/08 P (SGL Carbon AG v Commission) [2009] ECR I-191. 
592
  USSG §8C3.2(a) and (b). 
593
  Article 3(1) Grundgesetz (the German Constitution, GG. 
231 
 
(1) it discriminates between legal persons and partnerships on the one hand, and 
individuals and sole proprietors on the other hand;  
(2) it discriminates between fines in competition cases and other administrative fines, 
which do not accrue interest; and  
(3) it discriminates between fines imposed in the authority's decision, which 
automatically start to accrue interest, and fines imposed by the court.
594
  
 
The plaintiffs had also argued  
 
(4) that the accruing interest provided a disincentive to make use of the constitutional 
right
595
 to seek judicial recourse and  
(5) that the duty to pay interest before the decision had become final infringed the 
presumption of innocence.  
 
In 2012, the German Federal Constitutional Court rejected all these arguments and held that 
§ 81(6) GWB is constitutional.596 In particular, the differentiation between legal persons and 
partnerships on the one hand and natural persons and sole proprietors on the other hand was 
held to be justified because fines on the latter category were found to be considerably lower, 
so that the strategic incentive to appeal a decision to delay paying the fine did not exist to the 
same extent in these cases, whereas undertakings (and associations) have a much greater 
incentive to appeal for the strategic purpose of earning interest in the meantime.
597
 Nor was 
the provision a significant disincentive to lodge meritorious appeals; the rate of interest to be 
paid could potentially be earned on the capital market and was therefore not prohibitive, and 
where a defendant feared that it would not earn 5% above the base rate, it could avoid the 
duty to pay interest by paying the fine provisionally, subject to the outcome of the appeal.
598
 
The Court also rejected the argument that the duty to pay interest infringed the presumption 
of innocence; after all, where the administrative decision does not become final, the duty to 
pay interest is eliminated as well.
599
 
 
                                                     
594
  Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court, OLG) Düsseldorf, 24 May 2011, V-1 Kart 1/11 (OWi), WuW/E 
3308, 3315–3320 – Zinsverpflichtung. 
595
  Article 19(4) GG. 
596
 Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfG), 19 December 2012, 1 BvL 18/11, WuW/E 
DE-R 3766 – Verzinsungspflicht, available at 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ls20121219_1bvl001811.html (in German). 
597
 Ibid., paras 43-62. For the rejection of the other alleged infringements of the equal treatment clause, see 
ibid., paras 63-67. 
598
 Ibid., paras 68-88. 
599
 Ibid., paras 89-91. 
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4. UK 
 
Payment of the financial penalty is normally due up to three months from the date of their 
notice
600
. The CMA may also recover interest in respect of any amount outstanding, by virtue 
of the rules of civil procedure for recovery of a debt in the United Kingdom. Appeals by the 
undertaking which is the subject of the decision against the imposition, or the amount of a 
penalty will automatically suspend the effect of the penalty imposed. In those cases, although 
the requirement to pay the penalty will be suspended until the appeal is determined, under 
Rule 27 of the Competition Appeal Tribunal’s Rules, if it confirms or varies any penalty the 
CAT may, in addition, add interest on the penalty from the date no earlier than the date on 
which the application was made
 601
. 
 
5. France 
 
According Article L.464-4 of the French Commercial Code, the fines imposed by the FCA 
“are recovered as State debts separate from taxes and state property”. Since 2009, the FCA 
is empowered to ensure that the concerned undertakings comply with its decisions 
(previously, it was the Minister of Economy who was empowered). However concerning the 
payment of the fines, this is the Treasury Department which sends the fines companies a debit 
note mentioning when the payment must be done and the level of interest on fines. The fines 
companies may negotiate conditions of payment with the Treasury Department.  
 
An appeal before the Paris Court of appeal does not suspend the obligation to pay fines. This 
court can suspend the duty to pay when exceptional circumstances are met (risk for the 
undertaking to disappear). 
 
H. Corporate Restructuring 
 
1. EU 
 
Particular problems may arise from corporate restructuring. Where the infringing entity is 
transferred after the infringement has ceased, European law takes the position that, first, the 
transferring undertaking remains liable for the infringement, but second, where the 
transferring undertaking is left without substantial assets, the legal successor – understood as 
“the person who has become responsible for [the] operation” of “the combination of physical 
                                                     
600
 Section 37(1) Competition Act 1998 on recovery of penalties. 
601
 Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd v. Director general of Fair Trading, para 542; CAT Rules 2003, SI 
2003/1372, rule 56. See also, Kier Group plc  v. OFT [2001] CAT 3, para. 343. 
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and human elements which contributed to the commission of the infringement”602 – may be 
liable.
603
  
 
2. US 
 
In general common law, successor liability typically applies when a company has acquired 
another company as a result of an actual merger or stock acquisition. For instance, the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas, the court refused to dismiss 
criminal charges against an acquiring entity for premerger conduct in a conspiracy to fix the 
price of asphalt sold to state highway departments, rejecting the acquiring company’s claim 
that it “unwittingly bought into an ongoing conspiracy”, and instead finding that the company 
“had ample opportunity to detect and reject the illegal practices” prior to and after its 
assumption of control.
604
. Successor liability is usually not recognized if there is only a sale 
of the assets. Courts have consistently held that a purchaser of only assets takes the assets 
free and clear of any liability or debts
605
. Indeed, a different position would, according to 
certain courts, “allow every corporate entity concerned about potential antitrust liability to 
impose a collateral obstacle to such liability simply by removing its offending element, e.g., 
by creating a subsidiary”606. However, some exceptions exist where an asset sale could 
generate the same successor liability as a merger or acquisition. One exception occurs when 
the purchasing entity is merely a continuation of the existing business. The specific facts of 
each asset sale must be analyzed to determine if successor liability is applicable
607
. 
 
3. Germany 
 
The imposition of administrative fines on undertakings suffered a severe (to some extent 
temporary) setback, when the Federal Court of Justice held in 2011 that the legal successor of 
                                                     
602
  Judgment of the Court of First Instance (First Chamber), 17 December 1991, Case T-6/89 (Enichem Anic 
SpA v Commission) [1991] ECR II-1623 para. 237. 
603
  For details and references see Khan, N., supra note 182, §§ 7-009 - 7-016. 
604
 See, United States v. Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas, 427 F.2d 969, 974 (10th Cir. 1970). 
605
 See, United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934, 941 (6th Cir. 1963). 
606
 See, United States v. Ashland Oil, 537 F. Supp. 427, 432 (M.D. Tenn. 1988). 
607
 An additional issue may arise from the implementation of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which 
entitles a reorganized debtor to a “fresh start” and releases him from all claims that could have been 
asserted against it prior to the Bankruptcy Court's confirmation of the reorganized debtor's bankruptcy 
plan. For a recent analysis of this issue, see Salzman, H. and Reiss, W.V. (2013) The Case for Joint, Several 
Liability of Reorganized Debtors That Continue to Participate in Antitrust Conspiracies Post-Discharge 
(Bloomberg BNA, Nov. 4), available at http://www.bna.com/the-case-for-joint-several-liability-of-
reorganized-debtors-that-continue-to-participate-in-antitrust-conspiracies-post-discharge/  
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an undertaking whose managers committed administrative offences is not liable for the fine 
on the undertaking, unless there is “identity or near identity” between the predecessor 
undertaking whose managers committed the offence and the successor.
608
 This left a 
substantial loophole for undertakings to escape liability for competition law fines by 
restructuring.
609
 The Bundeskartellamt even asked the European Commission to take over 
German cartel cases where they may affect trade between Member States (Article 11(6) 
Regulation (EC) 1/2003).
610
 
 
The 8th Amendment to the GWB did not completely eliminate this loophole, but narrowed 
the scope for circumvention considerably. § 30(2a) OWiG now provides that a fine may be 
imposed on a legal successor in certain cases, capped by the amount of the value added by 
legal succession. The legislative change took care of at least most of the opportunities for 
circumvention that have actually been used to date.
611
 However, the Bundeskartellamt and the 
European Commission have noted that this still leaves loopholes that can be used to 
circumvent the imposition of a fine, for example where the assets are disposed of by way of 
an asset deal.
612
 The legislator tried to plug this loophole by facilitating writs of attachment 
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  BGH, 10 Aug. 2011, KRB 55/10, WuW/E DE-R 3455 = NJW 2012, 164 – Versicherungsfusion. The insurer 
whose managers had infringed competition law was restructured by merging the company into another 
insurance company that was part of the same corporate group (see Konrad Ost, Die Regelung der 
Rechtsnachfolge und weitere Neuerungen im Kartellordnungswidrigkeitenrecht durch die 8. GWB-Novelle, 
in DAS DEUTSCHE KARTELLRECHT NACH DER GWB-NOVELLE 305, 309 (Florian Bien, ed., Baden-Baden: Nomos 
2013)). The resulting successor took over 4% of the insurance policies of the predecessor, which made up 
28% of the successor's portfolio of insurance policies, accounting for 45% of the predecessor's and 42% of 
the successor's gross premium income. The Bundeskartellamt imposed a fine on the successor 
undertaking. The Higher Regional Court denied the successor's liability for the fine, because the successor 
was neither identical nor nearly identical to the predecessor, and the Federal Court of Justice affirmed. 
609
  See the Bundeskartellamt’s opinion of 22 Jun. 2012 on the Government Bill for an 8th Amendment to the 
GWB, pp. 13–15, available at 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/publikationen/Diskussionsbeitraege/Stellungnahmen.php (in 
German), including, as an annex, the facsimile of a letter from Alexander Italianer of DG Comp to the 
President of the Bundeskartellamt. 
610
  See Kurgonaite, E. (2013) “Interview with Andreas Mundt”, ABA-Section of Antitrust Law/International 
Committee, International Antitrust Bulletin 1, 2, 3–4. 
611
  Ost, K. (2013) “Die Regelung der Rechtsnachfolge und weitere Neuerungen im 
Kartellordnungswidrigkeitenrecht durch die 8. GWB-Novelle“, in Bien,F.  (ed) Das deutsche Kartellrecht 
nach der GWB-Novelle, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2013, 305, 313. Yomere, A. (2013) “Die Novellierung des 
Kartellbußgeldverfahrens durch die 8. GWB-Novelle” WuW  1187, 1192-1195., considers the new regime 
for legal succession to infringe the constitutional requirement of personal responsibility for (quasi) 
criminal conduct. 
612
  See the references supra note 609; see also Ost, K. supra note 611, at 311. 
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following the issuing of a fining decision.
613
 Apart from concerns about the practicality of 
such attachments, there is also the continuing danger of restructuring activities before the 
fines decision is issued.
614
 
 
4. UK 
 
According to the UK courts
615
, the undertaking is not liable for the illegal acts of its 
employees since competition rules impose liability only on the undertakings for the specific 
conduct. Therefore, the company is personally at fault and is not subject to vicarious liability. 
Hence, the cartelist may not pass on the fines it had suffered to the employees who had 
caused them (in breach of their duties to the employer) as this would allow the defendant to 
avoid the consequences of its own egregious behaviour. The UK courts should take into 
account the EU jurisprudence on this matter, in view of the obligation imposed under Section 
60 of the Competition Act 1998 to implement the Act in a manner which is consistent with 
the treatment of corresponding questions arising in EU Competition Law. 
 
5. France 
 
The transferable undertakings are liable. Please find hereafter in Appendix 2 the details of the 
reasoning of the FCA in its decisions when it applies the SG. 
  
                                                     
613
  § 30(6) OWiG, which provides for the application of § 111d of the Strafprozessordnung (Criminal 
Procedure Code, StPO), substituting the authority’s administrative fines decision for the judgment usually 
required.  
614
  Ost, supra note 611, at 313-314. 
615
 See, for instance, Safeway and others v Twigger and others [2010] EWCA Civ 1472, para. 20 & 23. 
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Table 11: A cross-jurisdictional study of the fine-setting process 
 
Issue EU US Germany UK France 
Institution in 
charge of 
setting the 
fine 
European 
Commissio
n, subject to 
unlimited 
judicial 
review (Art. 
261, 263 
TFEU) 
Sentencing 
judges 
Bundeskartellamt (or, less 
importantly, Länder competition 
authorities); once the 
undertaking/association 
concerned raises a complaint, the 
Court becomes competent to set 
the fine based on a de novo 
appraisal of the facts after a full 
trial 
Competition 
and Markets 
Authority 
Autorité de la 
concurrence (French 
Competition Authority) 
Guidelines 
available? 
Yes (2006) Yes (1987), 
last revised 
2004 
Yes (2013) Yes (2012) Yes (2011) 
Guidelines 
binding to the 
sentencing or 
appellate 
courts 
No Yes (until 
2005); No 
(since 2005) 
No No No 
The Relevant 
Measure 
value of 
sales 
Affected 
turnover 
Upper limit of the fining range is 
determined by a mixture of 
relevant domestic turnover and 
overall global turnover; within 
Relevant 
turnover 
Value of sales 
237 
 
237 
 
that range, offence- and offender-
related criteria determine the fine 
Entry fee 
(minimum 
fine) 
15-25% A multiplier 
range of at 
least 0.75 is 
applied to 
antitrust 
offenses, no 
matter the 
culpability 
score, for 
deterrence 
purposes, 
leading to a 
fine of at least 
15% of the 
affected 
volume of 
commerce in 
any 
circumstance 
No separate entry fee, but where 
duration is less than a year, 
infringement will be deemed to 
have existed for one year  
No separate 
entry fee, but 
where duration 
is less than a 
year, 
infringement 
will be deemed 
to have existed 
for one year 
No 
Proportionalit
y of the fines 
as a separate 
No. 
However, 
the cap at 
No, but taken 
into account in 
the overall 
No, but taken into account in the 
overall assessment 
Yes Yes 
238 
 
238 
 
step in the 
fine-setting 
process 
10% of the 
worldwide 
turnover is 
generally 
seen as a 
sufficient 
protection 
of the 
proportional
ity principle 
assessment 
Aggravating 
factors
616
 
     
Infringement 
committed 
intentionally  
Intentional 
infringemen
t is taken to 
be the 
norm; 
where the 
undertaking 
proves mere 
negligence, 
this may be 
a mitigating 
Yes Intentional infringement is taken to be the 
norm; where there is only negligence, the 
fining range is halved  
No, but taken into 
account in the overall 
assessment 
Yes 
                                                     
616
 Indicate Yes or No, if possible. 
239 
 
239 
 
factor 
Involvement 
of senior 
management  
Not 
mentioned 
explicitly in 
the GL, but 
aggravating 
factors are 
non-
exhaustive; 
meetings 
between 
senior 
managemen
t was 
mentioned 
in 
determinati
on of 
leading role 
within the 
cartel (eg 
ADM) 
Yes May be considered in the overall 
assessment 
Not explicitly Yes 
Leading role 
in the 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
240 
 
240 
 
infringement 
Non-
cooperation  
Obstruction 
of the 
investigation 
Yes Yes (separate fines or criminal sanctions for 
procedural infringements possible) 
Yes Yes 
Recidivism Yes Yes Yes (but generally only infringements 
within the previous five years can be 
taken into account) 
Yes Yes 
Size of firm Yes 
(deterrence 
multiplier; 
10% of 
worldwide 
turnover 
cap) 
Yes Yes (in setting the multiplier for the 
relevant domestic turnover, and for the 
10% of worldwide turnover maximum 
fine) 
Yes Yes 
Mitigating 
factors 
     
Acceptance of 
responsibility 
May be 
considered 
as 
cooperation; 
may also 
lead to 
Yes May be considered in the overall 
assessment; may also lead to settlement 
under the Settlement Notice (10% 
reduction) 
Yes Yes 
241 
 
241 
 
settlement 
under the 
Settlement 
Notice 
(10% 
reduction) 
Compensatio
n of injured 
parties 
Has been 
taken into 
account in 
some cases 
(eg Fine on 
ABB 
reduced in 
Pre-
Insulated 
Pipes 
Cartel; 
Nintendo) 
No Has been taken into account in some 
cases 
Yes No 
Cooperation 
with the 
investigation 
Yes (but 
only if it 
exceeds the 
general 
legal 
obligation 
Yes (but only if it 
exceeds the general 
legal obligation to 
cooperate) 
Yes Yes (but only if it 
exceeds the general 
legal obligation to 
cooperate) 
No 
242 
 
242 
 
to 
cooperate) 
Effective 
compliance 
programme 
No Under certain 
conditions 
No Under certain 
conditions 
Under certain 
conditions 
Minor role in 
the 
infringement 
Yes 
(mitigating 
factor if 
involvement 
was 
substantiall
y limited; 
but a very 
strict 
standard is 
applied, 
mere 
cheating on 
the cartel 
does not 
suffice) 
No Yes Not explicitly No 
Non-
implementati
on 
(taken into 
account in 
determining 
No Yes  No Yes 
243 
 
243 
 
the relevant 
percentage 
of the value 
of sales) 
Participation 
under duress, 
coercion 
sometimes 
considered, 
but strict 
standard 
No sometimes considered, but strict standard Yes Yes 
Self-reporting Yes (under 
Leniency 
Notice, or 
as 
cooperation 
outside of 
Leniency 
Notice as a 
mitigating 
factor) 
Yes Yes (under Leniency Notice, or as 
cooperation outside of Leniency Notice 
in the overall assessment) 
No Yes (under Leniency 
Notice, or as 
cooperation outside of 
Leniency Notice in the 
overall assessment 
Termination 
of the 
infringement 
as soon as 
investigation 
started 
May be 
considered 
as 
mitigating 
circumstanc
e, but not 
No May be considered in the overall 
assessment 
Yes No 
244 
 
244 
 
usually in 
secret 
cartels. 
Uncertainty 
as to existence 
of an 
infringement  
Where the 
infringemen
t is not 
proven to 
the relevant 
standard of 
proof, there 
will be no 
fine 
No Where the infringement is not proven to 
the relevant standard of proof, there will 
be no fine 
Yes Yes 
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Appendix 3: Financial Penalties in UK Competition Law  
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Fines imposed 
by the OFT 
Case  
OFT decision  Infringement  Level of Fine  Judicial scrutiny 
Access control 6 December 2013 Chapter I: collusive £53,310 total.  
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& alarm 
systems 
bidding arrangements  
 Cirrus 
Communicati
on Systems 
Ltd.: £0 
(leniency). 
 Glyn Jackson 
Communicati
ons Ltd.: 
£35,700. 
 Peter 
O'Rourke 
Electrical 
Ltd.: £15,933. 
 Owens 
Installations 
Ltd.: £1,777 
(includes 20% 
leniency 
discount). 
Distribution of 
Mercedes Benz 
commercial 
vehicles 
27 March 2013 Chapter I: price 
fixing and market 
division 
£5.4 million total 
fine. 
 
21 February 2013 
Settlement 
Agreement 
(Mercedes & 
dealers): 
 Mercedes-
Benz UK Ltd, 
parent 
Daimler UK 
Ltd, and 
ultimate 
parent 
Daimler AG 
(Mercedes): 
£1,492,646. 
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 Road Range 
Ltd.: 
£115,774. 
 Ciceley 
Commercials 
Ltd. and 
parent Ciceley 
Ltd. (Ciceley): 
£659,675. 
 Enza Motors 
Ltd., parent 
Enza 
Holdings Ltd. 
and ultimate 
parent Enza 
Group Ltd. 
(Enza): 
£347,198. 
 Northside: £0 
(leniency). 
 
27 March 2013 
Settlement 
Agreement 
(Mercedes & 
commercial vehicle 
dealers): 
 Ciceley: 
£659,675, 
includes 15% 
discount for 
settling 
(otherwise 
£776,088). 
 Enza: 
£347,198, 
includes a 
15% discount 
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for settling 
(otherwise 
£408,469). 
 Mercedes: 
£1,492,646, 
includes a 
15% discount 
for settling 
(otherwise 
£1,756,054). 
 Road Range: 
£115,774, 
includes a 
15% discount 
for settling 
(otherwise 
£136,204). 
 H&L Garages 
Ltd.: 
£242,076. 
 Northside: £0 
(leniency). 
Airline 
passenger fuel 
surcharges 
19 April 2012  Chapter I: price 
fixing  
£58.5 million total 
fine imposed on 
British Airways with 
the other party to the 
infringement (Virgin 
Atlantic Airways) 
receiving immunity. 
 
Dairy products 10 August 2011 Chapter I: vertical 
price fixing 
£49.51 million total 
fine. 
 
Dairy Processors: 
 Arla: £0 
(leniency). 
 Dairy Crest: 
£7.14m  
(includes 35% 
Tesco appealed 
the OFT’s 
decision, and the 
CAT set aside 
portions of that 
judgment but 
requested 
additional 
information before 
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617
 Case 1188/1/1/11, Tesco Stores Ltd. et al. v. OFT, [2012] CAT 31 (20 Dec.). 
early 
resolution 
discount). 
 The Cheese 
Company: 
£1.26m 
(includes 35% 
early 
resolution 
discount). 
 McLelland: 
£1.66m 
(includes 30% 
early 
resolution 
discount). 
 Wiseman: 
£3.20m 
(includes 35% 
early 
resolution 
discount). 
 
Supermarkets: 
 Asda: £9.10m 
(includes 35% 
early 
resolution 
discount, 10% 
leniency 
discount). 
 Safeway: 
£5.69m 
(includes 35% 
early 
resolution 
discount). 
reducing the 
fine.
617
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 Sainsbury’s: 
£11.04m 
(includes 35% 
early 
resolution 
discount). 
 Tesco: 
£10.43m. 
Reckitt 
Benckiser  
13 April 2011  Chapter II: unfair 
commercial practices 
in relation to a 
patented medicine 
(withdrawing and 
delisting drug from 
NHS prescription 
channel) 
£10.2 million total 
fine (resolution 
agreement) imposed 
on Reckitt Benckiser. 
 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
20 January 2011  Chapter I: pricing 
information exchange  
£28.59 million total 
fine imposed on 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland, with the 
other party to the 
infringement 
(Barclays) receiving 
immunity. 
 
 
 
252 
 
                                                     
618
 Joined Cases No. 1160/1/1/10 et seq., Imperial Tobacco Group Plc et al. v. OFT, [2011] CAT 41 (12 Dec.). 
Tobacco 15 April 2010  Chapter I: vertical 
price fixing  
£225 million total 
fine. 
 
Manufacturers: 
 Imperial 
Tobacco: 
£112,332,495. 
 Gallaher: 
£50,379,754. 
 
Retailers: 
 Asda: 
£14,095,933. 
 The Co-
operative 
Group: 
£14,187,353. 
 First Quench: 
£2,456,528. 
 Morrisons: 
£8,624,201. 
 Safeway: 
£10,909,366. 
 Sainsbury’s: 
£0. 
 Shell: 
£3,354,615. 
 Somerfield: 
£3,987,950. 
 T&S Stores 
(now One 
Stop Stores): 
£1,314,095. 
 TM Retail: 
£2,668,991. 
The CAT upheld 
appeals brought 
by six parties 
(Imperial 
Tobacco, Co-
operative Group, 
Morrisons, 
Safeway, Asda, & 
Shell) and 
quashed the 
OFT’s decision 
concerning those 
parties.
618
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619
 Joined Cases No. 1140/1/1/09 et seq., Eden Brown Ltd. et al. v. OFT, [2011] CAT 8 (1 Apr). 
Construction 
Recruitment  
29 September 2009  Chapter I: collective 
boycott & price 
fixing  
£173 million total 
fine before leniency. 
 
£39.27 million total 
fine after leniency. 
 
 A Warwick 
Associates 
Ltd.: £3303. 
 CDI 
AndersElite 
Ltd. (Parent: 
CDI Corp): 
£7,602,789 
(includes 30% 
leniency). 
 Eden Brown 
Ltd.: 
£1,072,069 
(includes 35% 
leniency). 
 Fusion People 
Ltd.: 
£125,021 
(includes 20% 
leniency). 
 Hays 
Specialist 
Recruitment 
Ltd. (Parent: 
Hays 
Specialist 
Recruitment 
(Holdings) 
Ltd.) 
(Ultimate 
Parent: Hays 
Fines reduced by 
CAT to £8.14 
million overall, 
specifically for 
three 
defendants:
619
 
 
 Eden 
Brown 
Ltd.: from 
£1,072,069 
down to 
£477,750. 
 CDI 
AndersElit
e Ltd: from 
£7,602,789 
down to 
£1,543,500
. 
 Hays 
Specialist 
Recruitme
nt Ltd: 
from 
£30,359,12
9 down to 
£5,880,000
. 
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620
 See Appendix for chart of individual fines. 
621
 Joined Cases No. 1114/1/1/09 et seq., Kier Group Plc et al. v. OFT, [2011] CAT 3 (11 Mar.). 
plc ): 
£30,359,129 
(includes 30% 
leniency). 
 Henry 
Recruitment 
Ltd.: 
£108,043 
(includes 25% 
leniency). 
 Beresford 
Blake Thomas 
Ltd. & Hill 
McGlynn & 
Associates 
Ltd.: £0 
(100% 
leniency). 
Bid rigging in 
the English 
construction 
industry  
21 September 2009  Chapter I: bid rigging 
(cover pricing)  
£194.1 million fine 
before leniency. 
 
£129.2 million fine 
after leniency. The 
highest individual 
penalty, £17,894,438, 
was imposed on Kier 
Regional Ltd.
620
 
(1) Fines 
reduced by 
CAT 
overall to 
£63.9 
million, 
specificall
y for six 
defendants
:
621
 
 
 Kier 
Group Plc: 
down to 
£1,700,000 
from 
£17.9m. 
 Ballast 
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Nedam 
N.V.: 
reduced 
from 
£8,333,116 
to 
£534,375. 
 Bowmer 
and 
Kirkland 
Ltd.: 
reduced 
from 
£7,574,736 
to 
£1,524,000
. 
 Corringwa
y 
Conclusion
s plc: 
reduced 
from 
£769,592 
to 
£119,344. 
 Thomas 
Vale 
Holdings 
Ltd.: 
reduced 
from 
£1,020,473 
to 
£171,000. 
 John Sisk 
& Son 
Ltd.: 
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622
 Case 1124/1/1/09, North Midland Construction Plc v. OFT, [2011] CAT 14 (27 Apr.). 
623
 Joined Cases 1115/1/1/09 et seq., Crest Nicholson Plc et al. v. OFT, [2011] CAT 10 (15 Apr.). 
reduced 
from 
£6,191,627 
to 
£356,250. 
 
(2) CAT 
reduced 
£1.5m fine 
on North 
Midland 
Constructi
on to 
£300,000.
622
 
 
(3) CAT 
reduced 
joint & 
several 
liability 
between 
Crest 
Nicholson 
& ISG 
Pearce for 
infringeme
nt 75 from 
£5,188,846 
to 
£950,000.
623
 
 
(4) CAT 
reduced 
joint and 
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624
 Case 1120/1/1/09, Quarmby Construction Co. Ltd. & St. James Securities Holdings Ltd. v. OFT, [2011] CAT 11 
(15 Apr.). 
625
 Joined Cases 1128/1/1/09 et seq., GAJ Construction Ltd. et al. v. OFT, [2011] CAT 9 (15 Apr.). 
several 
liability on 
Quarmby 
Constructi
on & St. 
James 
Securities 
Holdings 
for 
Infringeme
nts 6, 214, 
and 233 
from 
£881,749 
to 
£213,750.
624
 
 
(5) CAT 
further 
reduced 
the 
following 
fines:
625
 
 
 Francis 
Constructi
on for 
infringeme
nts 69, 
208, and 
234: from 
£530,238 
to 
£169,575. 
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 GAJ 
Constructi
on for 
infringeme
nt 174: 
from 
£109,683 
was varied 
to £42,750. 
 Allenbuild 
Ltd. for 
Infringeme
nts 39, 
137, and 
204: from 
£3,547,931 
to 
£926,250. 
 Robert 
Woodhead 
Ltd. for 
Infringeme
nts 46, 78, 
and 178: 
from 
£411,595 
to 
£151,725. 
 J H Hallam 
Ltd. for 
Infringeme
nts 95, 96, 
and 183: 
from 
£359,588 
to £99,000. 
 Hobson & 
Porter Ltd. 
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626
 Case 1121/1/1/09, Durkan Holdings Ltd. et al. v. CAT, [2011] CAT 6 (22 Mar.). 
627
 Case No. 1099/1/2/08, National Grid Plc v. GEMA, [2009] CAT 14 (29 Apr.). 
for 
Infringeme
nts 230, 
236, and 
238: from 
£547,507 
to 
£123,750. 
 
(6) CAT 
reduced 
joint and 
several 
liability on 
Durkan 
Holdings, 
Durkan, & 
Concentra 
from 
£6,720,551 
to 
£789,000 
for 
Infringeme
nt 135 and 
£1,647,000 
for 
Infringeme
nt 240.
626
 
Ofgem 
(National Grid) 
21 February 2008 Chapter II: Abuse of 
a dominant position 
Ofgem fined National 
Grid £41.6 million. 
Fine reduced by 
CAT to £30.0 
million (highest 
ever penalty in 
UK for abuse of 
dominance).
627
  
Court of Appeal 
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628
 National grid plc v. Gas & Electricity Markets Authority, [2009] CAT 14 and on appeal, National Grid plc and 
Gas and Electricity Markets Authority [2010] EWCA Civ 114).  
629
 The price-fixing participants were: Ampleforth College, Bedford School, Benenden School, Bradfield College, 
Bromsgrove School, Bryanston School, Canford School, Charterhouse School, Cheltenham College, 
Cheltenham Ladies College, Clifton College, Cranleigh School, Dauntsey's School, Downe House School, 
Eastbourne College, Epsom College, Eton College, Gresham's School, Haileybury, Harrow School, King's 
School Canterbury, Lancing College, Malvern College, Marlborough College, Millfield School, Mill Hill 
School, Oakham School, Oundle School, Radley College, Repton School, Royal Hospital School, Rugby 
School, St Edward's School, Oxford, St Leonards-Mayfield School, Sedbergh School, Sevenoaks School, 
Sherborne School, Shrewsbury School, Stowe School, Strathallan School, Tonbridge School, Truro School, 
Uppingham School, Wellington College, Wells Cathedral School, Westminster School, Winchester College, 
Woldingham School, Worth School and Wycombe Abbey. 
further reduced 
fine to £15.0 
million.
628
 
British Airways 1 August 2007  Chapter I: price 
fixing and 
information exchange  
£121.5 million total 
fine imposed on 
British Airways, with 
the other party to the 
infringement (Virgin 
Atlantic) receiving 
immunity. 
 
Schools: fee 
information 
exchange 
21 November 2006 Chapter I: exchange 
of information on 
future fees 
£489,000 total fine 
before leniency. 
 
£467,500 total fine, 
£10,000 per school, 
after leniency.
629
  
 
The OFT granted 
leniency to the 
following schools: 
Eton College (50 per 
cent), Winchester 
College (50 per cent), 
Sevenoaks School (45 
per cent), Benenden 
School (30 per cent), 
Cheltenham Ladies' 
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College (30 per cent) 
and Malvern College 
(20 per cent). 
English Welsh 
& Scottish 
Railway Ltd. 
17 November 2006 Chapter II: 
exclusionary & 
discriminatory 
behaviour 
£4.1 million total fine 
on EWS (includes 
35% discount for 
early resolution). 
 
Aluminium 
spacer bars 
29 June 2006 Chapter I: price-
fixing, market 
allocation, non-
compete clauses 
£1.384 million total 
fine before leniency. 
 
£898,470 total fine 
after leniency. 
 
 EWS 
(Manufacturin
g) Ltd.: 
£490,050. 
 Thermoseal 
Group Ltd.: 
£380,700, 
reduced to 
£228,420 by 
leniency. 
 Double Quick 
Supplyline 
Ltd.: 
£180,000. 
 Ulmke Metals 
Ltd.: 
(£333,300, 
reduced to £0 
by leniency). 
 
Stock check 
pads 
4 April 2006 Chapter I: price-
fixing & market 
allocation 
£2.184 million total 
fine before leniency. 
 
£168,318 total fine 
after leniency. 
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 BemroseBoot
h Ltd.: 
£1,888,600 
reduced to £0 
by leniency. 
 Achilles Paper 
Group Ltd.: 
£255,697.50 
reduced to 
£127,848.75 
by leniency. 
 4imprint 
Group PLC: 
£40,470. 
Collusive 
tendering for car 
park 
23 February 2006 Chapter I: price-
fixing 
£1.852 million total 
fine before leniency. 
 
£1.557 million total 
fine after leniency. 
 
 Anglo Asphalt 
Company 
Ltd.: one 
infringement, 
£2,865 
penalty, 
reduced to 
£2,005 by 
leniency. 
 Asphaltic 
Contracts 
Ltd.: three 
infringements 
amounting to 
£22,255 
penalty. 
 Briggs 
Roofing & 
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Cladding Ltd.: 
five 
infringements 
amounting to 
£328,264 
penalty, 
reduced to £0 
by leniency. 
 Cambridge 
Asphalte Co. 
Ltd.: five 
infringements 
amounting to 
£71,699 
penalty, 
reduced to 
£53,774 by 
leniency. 
 Coverite Ltd.: 
one 
infringement, 
£104,498 
penalty. 
 Durable 
Contracts 
Limited: two 
infringements, 
amounting to 
£47,221 
penalty. 
 Holme 
Asphalt: two 
infringements, 
amounting to 
£6,453 
penalty. 
 Makers UK 
Ltd.: one 
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infringement, 
£526,500 
penalty. 
 Pirie Group 
Ltd., one 
infringement, 
£6,743 
penalty 
reduced to 
£3,034 by 
leniency. 
 Prater Ltd., 
two 
infringements, 
amounting to 
£270,432 
penalty. 
 Rio Asphalt & 
Paving Co. 
Ltd.: two 
infringements, 
amounting to 
£12,113 
penalty, 
reduced to 
£9,085 by 
leniency. 
 Rock 
Asphalte Ltd.: 
17 
infringements, 
amounting to 
£852,253 
penalty, 
reduced to 
£511,351 by 
leniency. 
 WG Walker & 
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Co. Ltd.: one 
infringement, 
£1,570 
penalty, 
reduced to 
£863 by 
leniency. 
Collusive 
tendering for 
roofing 
contracts 
12 July 2005 Chapter I: price-
fixing & bid-rigging 
£238,576 total fine 
before leniency. 
 
£138,515 total fine 
after leniency. 
 
 Pirie: £0 total 
fine, reduced 
from £85,774 
because of 
leniency. 
 Walker: 
£41,907 total 
fine, reduced 
from £76,194 
because of 
leniency. 
 Advanced 
Roofing 
Systems Ltd.: 
£1,963 total 
fine. 
 Brolly: 
£22,239 total 
fine. 
 Bonnington: 
£45,187 total 
fine. 
 McKay: 
£27,219 total 
fine. 
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Collusive 
tendering for 
mastic asphalt 
flat-roofing 
contracts 
8 April 2005 Chapter I: price-
fixing & bid-rigging 
£231,445 total fine 
before leniency. 
 
£87,353 total fine 
after leniency. 
 
 Briggs: £0 
total fine, 
reduced from 
£57,120 
because of 
leniency. 
 Pirie: £51,693 
total fine, 
reduced from 
£114,873 
because of 
leniency. 
 Walker: 
£16,415 total 
fine, reduced 
from £29,845 
because of 
leniency. 
 Lenaghen: 
£19,245 total 
fine, reduced 
from £29,607 
because of 
leniency. 
 
Collusive 
tendering for 
felt & single ply 
flat-roofing 
contracts 
8 April 2005 Chapter I: price-
fixing, bid-rigging, 
market allocation 
£598,223 total fine 
before leniency. 
 
£471,029 total fine 
after leniency. 
 
 Briggs: £0 
total fine, 
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630
 Case No. 1048/1/1/05, Double Quick Supplyline Ltd. v. OFT, consent order of 19 May 2005. 
reduced from 
£88,956 
because of 
leniency. 
 Dufell: 
£74,624 total 
fine. 
 Hodgson & 
Allon: 
£74,151 total 
fine. 
 Hylton: 
£47,700 total 
fine, reduced 
from £73,385 
because of 
leniency. 
 Kelsey: 
£262,000 total 
fine. 
 Roofclad: 
£12,554 total 
fine, reduced 
from £25,107 
because of 
leniency. 
 Single Ply: £0 
total fine. 
UOP Ltd./Ukae 
Ltd. 
(Desiccants) 
9 November 2004 Chapter I: price-
fixing. 
£2.433 million total 
fine before leniency. 
 
£1.707 million total 
fine after leniency. 
 
 UOP Ltd.: 
£1,232,000 
CAT reduced 
overall fine to 
£1.635m.630 
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total fine, 
which 
includes 20% 
discount off 
£1,540,000 
due to 
leniency. 
 UKae Ltd.: £0 
total fine, 
reduced from 
£278,000 
because of 
leniency. 
 Thermoseal 
Supplies Ltd.: 
£139,000 total 
fine, which 
includes a 
50% discount 
off £279,000 
due to 
leniency. 
 Double Quick 
Supplyline 
Ltd.: 
£109,000 total 
fine. 
 Double 
Glazing 
Supplies 
Group Plc.: 
£227,000 total 
fine. 
West Midlands 
roofing 
contractors 
17 March 2004 Chapter I: price-
fixing & bid-rigging 
£971,186 total fine 
before leniency. 
 
£297,625 total fine 
after leniency. 
CAT reduced the 
overall fine to 
£288,625 by 
lowering the 
penalty imposed 
 
 
269 
 
                                                     
631
 Case No. 1033/1/1/04, Richard W. Price Ltd. v. OFT, [2005] CAT 5 (24 Feb.). 
 
 Apex: 
£35,922.80 
total fine. 
 Briggs: £0 
total fine after 
100% 
leniency. 
 Brindley: 
£55,540.80 
total fine. 
 General 
Asphalte: 
£63,192.86 
total fine. 
 Howard 
Evans: 
£35,510.25 
total fine, 
after 50% 
leniency 
(£71,020.50 
original fine). 
 Price: 
£18,000.00 
total fine. 
 Redbrook: 
£17,802.90 
total fine. 
 Rio: 
£45,049.68 
total fine. 
 Solihull: 
£26,606.25 
total fine. 
on Price from 
£18,000 to 
£9,000.631 
Hasbro II 2 December 2003 Chapter I: price- £38.25 million total CAT reduced 
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632
 Joined Cases 1014/1/1/03 et seq., Argos Ltd. & Littlewoods Ltd. v. OFT, [2005] CAT 13 (29 Apr.). 
633
 Joined Cases 1019/1/1/03 et seq., Umbro Holdings Ltd. v. OFT, [2005] CAT 22 (19 May). 
fixing fine before leniency. 
 
£22.66 million total 
fine after leniency. 
 
 Hasbro UK 
Ltd. paid £0 in 
total fines 
because of 
100% 
leniency, 
reduced from 
£15.59 
million. 
 Argos Ltd. 
paid £17.28 
million in 
total fines. 
 Littlewoods 
Ltd. paid 
£5.37 million 
in total fines. 
overall fine to 
£19.50 million, 
including the fine 
of Argos from 
£17.28 million to 
£15 million, and 
the fine of 
Littlewoods from 
£5.37 million to 
£4.5 million.632 
Replica Football 
Kits 
1 August 2003 Chapter I: price-
fixing. 
£18.668 million total 
fine before leniency. 
 
£18.627 million total 
fine after leniency. 
 
 Manchester 
United Plc. 
paid £1.652m 
in total fines. 
 Football 
Assoc. Ltd. 
paid £0.158m 
in total fines, 
CAT reduced 
overall fine to 
£15.49m, 
including:
633
 
 
 For 
Umbro, 
from 
£6.641 
million to 
£5.3 
million. 
 For MU, 
from 
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which 
included a 
20% reduction 
from £0.198m 
due to 
leniency. 
 Umbro 
Holdings Ltd. 
paid £6.641m 
in total fines. 
 Allsports Ltd. 
paid £1.350m 
in total fines. 
 Blacks 
Leisure Group 
Plc. paid 
£0.197m in 
total fines. 
 JJB Sports 
Plc. paid 
£8.373m in 
total fines. 
 Sports Soccer 
Ltd. paid 
£0.123m in 
total fines. 
 The John 
David Group 
Plc. paid 
£0.073m in 
total fines. 
 Florence 
Clothiers 
(Scotland) 
Ltd. 
(previously 
“Sports 
Connection”) 
£1.652 
million to 
£1.5 
million. 
 For JJB 
Sports, 
from 
£8.373 
million to 
£6.7 
million. 
 
For the first time, 
CAT increased the 
fine for Allsports 
from £1.35 
million to £1.42 
million. 
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634
 Case No. 1016/1/1/03, Genzyme Ltd. v. OFT, [2004] CAT 4 (11 Mar.). 
635
 The ten distributors were: Lewison Ltd., A.B. Gee of Ripley Ltd., Sellicks (Plymouth) Ltd., George Clapperton 
& Son Ltd., J A Magson Ltd., L B Group Ltd., Newswell Ltd., Williams of Swansea Ltd., Youngsters Ltd., & 
Esdevium Games Ltd. 
paid £0.020m 
in total fines, 
which 
included a 
25% reduction 
from £0.027m 
due to 
leniency. 
 Sportsetail 
Ltd. benefited 
from 100% 
leniency and 
thus paid £0 
in total fines, 
reduced from 
£0.004m. 
Genzyme Ltd. 27 March 2003 Chapter II: tying & 
margin squeeze. 
£6.8m total fine on 
Genzyme. 
CAT reduced 
overall fine on 
Genzyme from 
£6,809,598 to 
£3.0m.634 
Hasbro I 6 December 2002 Chapter I: price-
fixing. 
£9 million total fine 
before leniency. 
 
£4.95m total fine 
levied on Hasbro UK 
Ltd. after leniency. 
 
The OFT refrained 
from levying any 
fines on the 10 
distributors
635
 also 
party to the price-
fixing arrangement 
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636
 Case No. 1009/1/1/02, Aberdeen Journals v. OFT, [2003] CAT 11 (23 June). 
because Hasbro had 
taken the initiative in 
setting prices and 
because the 
distributors were in 
substantially weaker 
market positions. 
Aberdeen 
Journals Ltd. 
16 September 2002 Chapter II: predation £1.328m total fine on 
Aberdeen. 
CAT reduced 
overall fine on 
Aberdeen from 
£1,328,040 to 
£1.0m.636 
John Bruce Ltd., 
Fleet Parts Ltd., 
& Truck and 
Trailer 
Components 
17 May 2002 Chapter I: price-
fixing 
£33,737 total fine. 
 
 John Bruce 
(UK) Ltd. 
paid 3% of its 
relevant 
turnover in 
fines (exact 
amount 
redacted), 
after receiving 
a 10% 
reduction due 
to full 
cooperation, 
10% for not 
disputing the 
facts, and 
20% due to 
remedial 
action taken.  
 Fleet Parts 
Ltd. paid 
5.6% of its 
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relevant 
turnover 
(exact amount 
redacted), 
after receiving 
a 10% 
reduction due 
to full 
cooperation, 
10% for not 
disputing the 
facts, and 
another 10% 
for swift 
remedial 
action. 
 Truck & 
Trailer 
Components 
paid 24% of 
its relevant 
turnover 
(exact amount 
redacted). 
Arriva plc & 
First Group plc 
5 February 2002 Chapter I: market 
allocation 
£203,632 total fine 
after leniency. 
 
Prior to leniency 
applied, OFT levied 
fine of £318,175 on 
Arriva and £529,852 
on First Group, for a 
total of £848,027.  
After leniency 
applied, OFT levied 
fine of £203,632 on 
Arriva and nothing 
(£0) on First Group. 
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637
 Case No. 1001/1/1/01, Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd. v. Director General of Fair Trading, [2002] CAT 1 
(15 Jan.). 
Napp 
Pharmaceutical 
Holding Ltd. 
5 April 2001 Chapter II: 
exclusionary 
discounts & 
exploitative prices 
£3.21m total fine 
imposed on Napp. 
CAT reduced 
overall fine from 
£3.21 to £2.2m.637 
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Appendix 4: Financial penalties in French Competition law 
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DECISIONS WITH APPLICATION OF THE 2011 SG 
DECIS
ION 
(N° and 
date) 
UNDERTAK
INGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVI
TY 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplicat
ion factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
11-D-
17 
 
12-8-
2011 
UNILEVER 
CARTEL 
Particula
rly grave 
Certain 
20% 
 
5Y,9M,12D
638
 (3,37) 
198.830.0
00 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +25% 
N/A 
100% 0 
CONFIRM
ED (Paris, 
30
th
 June, 
2014) 
HENKEL 
5Y,9M,12D 
(3,37) 
107.031.0
00 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +15% 
25% 
92.310.00
0 
PROCTER & 
GAMBLE 
5Y,9M,12D 
(3,37) 
240.240.5
60 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +25% 
20% 
240.240.0
00 
COLGATE 
PALMOLIVE 
4Y,10M, 
12D (2,91) 
36.216.00
0 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
15% 
35.400.00
0 
                                                     
638
 Y=YEAR ; M=MONTH ; D=DAY. 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° and 
date) 
UNDERTAK
INGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVI
TY 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplicat
ion factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
group: +15% 
11-D-
19 
 
12-15-
2011 
KONTIKI RPM Grave 
Very 
low 
9% 
4Y,2M 
(2,58) 
13.467.60
0 
Mono-product 
firm and strong 
decrease of its 
turnover: -90% 
N/A 
N/A 1.340.000 
CONFIRM
ED (Paris, 
16
th
 May, 
2013) 
12-D-
02 
 
01-12-
2012 
GEFIL 
(professional 
organization) 
CARTEL 
(price 
coordination 
through a 
professional 
organization) 
Grave 
Very 
low 
9% 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
15.000 
CONFIRM
ED (Paris, 
6
th
 June, 
2013) 
ARC ESSOR 
1Y,11M 
(1,45) 
27.125 
Partial inability 
to pay 
8.500 
ASSAI 
11M 
(1) 
832 N/A 800 
DELOITTE 
CONSEIL 
5Y,10M 
(3,41) 
340.966 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +50% 
510.000 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° and 
date) 
UNDERTAK
INGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVI
TY 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplicat
ion factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
HOTELS 
ACTION 
CONSEILS 
3Y,6M 
(2,25) 
82.398 
Mono-product 
firm:-70% 
24.700 
MAITRES 
DU REVE 
5Y,7M 
(3,29) 
94.673 
Mono-product 
firm:-70% 
N/A 
28.400 
MEDIEVAL 
3Y,6M 
(2,25) 
63.620 
Partial inability 
to pay 
12.000 
MERIMEE 
CONSEILS 
5Y,10M 
(3,41) 
60.653 
Mono-product 
firm:-70% 
Partial inability 
to pay 
2.600 
PHILIPPE 
CAPARROS 
DEVELOPPE
MENT 
5Y,10M 
(3,41) 
27.634 
Mono-product 
firm:-70% 
8.000 
PROMOTOU
R 
4Y,11M 
(2,95) 
8.294 
Mono-product 
firm:-70% 
800 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° and 
date) 
UNDERTAK
INGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVI
TY 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplicat
ion factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
CONSULTA
NTS 
SOMIVAL 
5Y,9M 
(3,37) 
49.918 N/A 49.900 
12-D-
06 
 
01-26-
2012 
EXPLOITATI
ON DES 
CARRIERES 
CARTEL 
AND 
ABUSE OF 
COLLECTI
VE 
DOMINAN
T POSITION 
(FORCLOS
URE 
EFFECT) 
Particula
rly grave 
Certain, 
but 
limited 
to a 
small 
territory 
16% 
17Y,8M 
(9,33) 
150.999 
N/A 20% 
N/A 
120.790 
NO 
APPEAL 
ALLEN-
MAHE 
17Y,8M 
(9,33) 
111.901 89.520 
ATELIER 
FER 
17Y,8M 
(9,33) 
73.239 58.590 
GUIBERT 
FRERES 
17Y,8M 
(9,33) 
119.149 95.310 
SOCIETE 
SAINT-
PIERRAISE 
DE 
13% 
(only 1 
antitru
st 
5Y,3M 
(3,12) 
21.499 17.190 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° and 
date) 
UNDERTAK
INGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVI
TY 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplicat
ion factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
TRANSPORT practic
e) 
12-D-
09 
 
03-13-
2012 
AXIANE 
MEUNERIE 
CARTEL 
 
(Market 
share 
between 
French and 
German 
producers) 
Particula
rly grave 
Significa
nt 
19% 
5Y,11M 
(3,45) 
19.927.20
0 
 
N/A N/A 19.927.00
0 
PENDING 
APPEAL 
BACH 
MUHLE 
5Y,11M 
(3,45) 
36.708 Leader :+10% 
N/A N/A 
40.000 
BINDEWAL
D 
KUPFERMU
LHE 
4Y,7M 
(2,79) 
2.891.695 
Maverick : -
10% 
N/A N/A 
2.602.000 
BLIESMUHL
E 
6Y,1M 
(3,54) 
1.929.689 
N/A N/A N/A 
1.929.000 
FLECHTORF
ER MUHLE 
WALTER 
THONEBE 
6Y,1M 
(3,54) 
4.510.455 
N/A N/A N/A 
4.510.000 
FRANCE 6Y,1M 7.541.191 Leader :+10% N/A N/A 8.295.000 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° and 
date) 
UNDERTAK
INGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVI
TY 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplicat
ion factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
FARINE (3,54) 
FRIESSINGE
R MUHLE 
6Y,1M 
(3,54) 
11.770.50
0 
 
N/A N/A 11.770.00
0 
GRANDS 
MOULINS 
DE PARIS 
4Y,8M 
(2,83) 
11.834.23
9 
 
N/A N/A 
11.834.00
0 
GRANDS 
MOULINS 
DE 
STRASBOUR
G 
5Y,11M 
(3,45) 
11.635.12
5 
Partial inability 
to pay: -15% 
N/A N/A 
9.890.000 
HEYL et 
GRAIN 
MILLERS 
6Y,1M 
(3,54) 
2.564.623 
N/A 10% N/A 
1.564.000 
HEYL 
6Y,1M 
(3,54) 
N/A N/A 
487.000 
MILLS 6Y,1M 6.602.914 N/A 10% N/A 4.028.000 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° and 
date) 
UNDERTAK
INGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVI
TY 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplicat
ion factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
UNITED 
HOVESTAD 
& 
MUNSTERM
ANN & 
GRAIN 
MILLERS 
(3,54) 
MILLS 
UNITED 
HOVESTAD 
& 
MUNSTERM
ANN 
6Y,1M 
(3,54) 
N/A N/A 
1.254.000 
SAALEMUH
LE 
ALSLEBEN 
8M 
0,66 
297.699 
N/A N/A N/A 
297.000 
VK MUHLEN 4Y,8M 17.110.68 N/A N/A N/A 17.110.00
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DECIS
ION 
(N° and 
date) 
UNDERTAK
INGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVI
TY 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplicat
ion factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
(2,83) 9 0 
WILH 
WERHAHN 
   
4Y,6M 
(2,75) 
16.667.75
0 
N/A N/A 
100% 0 
AXIANE 
MEUNERIE 
CARTEL 
 
(French 
market) 
Particula
rly grave  
(but less 
than the 
other 
cartel, 
since it 
was not 
secret) 
Significa
nt 
17% 
46Y 
(13) 
44.032.04
0 
N/A N/A N/A 44.032.00
0 
EUROMILL 
NORD & 
NUTRIXO 
46Y 
(13) 35.205.30
0 
N/A N/A N/A 
14.435.00
0 
EUROMILL 
NORD 
46Y 
(13) 
N/A N/A N/A 20.770.00
0 
GRANDS 
MOULINS 
DE PARIS & 
NUTRIXO 
42Y,4M 
(12,62) 
24.605.59
2 
N/A N/A N/A 
10.392.00
0 
GRANDS 
MOULINS 
DE PARIS 
42Y,4M 
(12,62) 
N/A N/A N/A 
14.213.00
0 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° and 
date) 
UNDERTAK
INGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVI
TY 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplicat
ion factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
GRANDS 
MOULINS 
STORIONE & 
NUTRIXO 
16% 
(only 
one 
cartel) 
10Y 
(5,5) 
95.920 
N/A N/A N/A 
95.000 
GRANDS 
MOULINS 
DE 
STRASBOUR
G 
17% 
45Y,7M 
(12,95) 
22.274.77
7 
Partial inability 
to pay: -15% 
N/A N/A 
18.930.00
0 
MINOTERIE
S CANTIN 
32Y,6M 
(11,64) 
23.622.91
4 
N/A N/A N/A 23.622.00
0 
MOULINS 
SOUFFLET 
16% 
(only 
one 
cartel) 
8Y 
(4,5) 
393.120 
N/A N/A N/A 
393.000 
12-D-
10 
NESTLE 
RPM and 
EXCLUSIVI
Grave Low 
[5-
10%] 
4Y 
(3) 
18.576.00
0 
Size and 
economic 
18% N/A 19.040.00
0 
CONFIRM
ED (Paris, 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° and 
date) 
UNDERTAK
INGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVI
TY 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplicat
ion factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
 
03-20-
2012 
TY 
CLAUSES 
Confid
ential 
power of the 
group: +25% 
10
th
 
October, 
2013) 
ROYAL 
CANIN 
10.102.00
0 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +15% 
 
Recidivism: 
+25% 
20% N/A 
11.618.00
0 
HILL’S PET 
NUTRITION 
& COLGATE-
PALMOLIVE 
None 
[3-7%] 
Confid
ential 
4.056.000 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +15% 
N/A N/A 
4.664.000 
12-D-
24 
 
12-13-
ORANGE & 
FRANCE 
TELECOM 
ABUSE OF 
DOMINAN
T POSITION 
(Price 
Grave Certain 5% 
3Y 
(2) 
142.326.0
00 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +10% 
N/A N/A 
117.419.0
00 
PENDING 
APPEAL 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° and 
date) 
UNDERTAK
INGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVI
TY 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplicat
ion factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
2012 discriminatio
n : 
foreclosure 
effect) 
 
Recidivism: 
+50% 
 
Legal context:  
-50% 
SFR 
119.470.0
00 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +10% 
 
Legal context:  
-50% 
N/A N/A 
65.708.00
0 
12-D-
25 
 
12-18-
SNCF 
ABUSE OF 
DOMINAN
T POSITION 
(Abusive use 
Grave Certain 6% 
From 
1Y,10M to 
4Y,7M 
(1,75) 
48.195.00
0 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +15% 
N/A N/A 
60.966.00
0 
PENDING 
APPEAL 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° and 
date) 
UNDERTAK
INGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVI
TY 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplicat
ion factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
2012 of 
confidential 
information 
regarding 
competitors, 
restraint to 
access to 
essential 
facilities, 
predatory 
prices) 
 
Recidivism: 
+10% 
12-D-
27 
 
12-20-
2012 
FNAC 
Price fixing 
Grave 
(not 
secret 
practices
) 
Low 12% 
4Y,9M 
(2,87) 
3.383.044 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +15% 
10% N/A 
3.501.000 
NO 
APPEAL 
FNAC & 
FRANCE 
1.519.918 
Size and 
economic 
10% N/A 
1.573.000 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° and 
date) 
UNDERTAK
INGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVI
TY 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplicat
ion factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
BILLET power of the 
group: +15% 
TICKETNET 1.073.795 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +15% 
20% N/A 
987.000 
FNAC 
Boycott 
Particula
rly grave 
Low 13% 
1Y,11M 
1,45) 
1.851.637 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +15% 
10% N/A 
1.916.000 
FNAC & 
FRANCE 
BILLET 
831.895 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +15% 
10% N/A 
861.000 
TICKETNET 587.719 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
20% N/A 
540.000 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° and 
date) 
UNDERTAK
INGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVI
TY 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplicat
ion factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
group: +15% 
13-D-
03 
 
02-13-
2013 
ABERA 
CARTEL 
(Concerted 
limitation of 
the 
production in 
order to 
decrease the 
buying 
prices) 
Particula
rly grave 
by nature 
(but 
effectivel
y, less 
grave 
due to 
the 
economi
c 
difficulti
es of the 
sector) 
Low 16% 
3M 
(0,25) 
1.316.742 
Mono-product 
firm:-50% 
N/A N/A 
592.533 
PENDING 
APPEAL 
BERNARD 1.398.083 
Mono-product 
firm:-50% 
18% N/A 
573.213 
GAD & 
FINANCIERE 
DU FOREST 
1.485.254 
Mono-product 
firm:-60% 
N/A N/A 
250.000 
GROUPE 
BIGARD 
3.648.391 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +10% 
18% N/A 
1.339.698 
SOCOPA 
VIANDES & 
GROUPE 
BIGARD 
1.948.090 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +10% 
18% N/A 
1.757.177 
FRENCH CARTEL  Very Very N/A 2D 3.000 N/A 10% N/A 2.700 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° and 
date) 
UNDERTAK
INGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVI
TY 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplicat
ion factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
MEAT 
ASSOCIATIO
N 
(Purchase 
price fixing) 
grave by 
nature 
 
(but very 
short 
duration) 
low 
FEDERATIO
N DES 
ACHETEURS 
AU CADRAN 
3.000 
N/A 10% N/A 
2.700 
BERNARD 5.000 N/A 18% N/A 4.100 
COOPERL 
ARC-
ATLANTIQU
E 
5.000 
N/A  N/A 
5.000 
ABERA 3.000 N/A 10% N/A 2.700 
AIM 
GROUPE & 
HAIM 
3.000 
N/A 18% N/A 
2.460 
GAD & 7.000 N/A 10% N/A 6.300 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° and 
date) 
UNDERTAK
INGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVI
TY 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplicat
ion factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
FINANCIERE 
DU FOREST 
GROUPE 
BIGARD 
7.000 
N/A 18% N/A 
5.740 
KERMENE 7.000 N/A  N/A 7.000 
FRENCH 
MEAT 
ASSOCIATIO
N 
Price fixing 
Particula
rly grave 
Very 
low 
N/A  12.000 N/A 
10% N/A 
10.800 
COOPERL 
ARC-
ATLANTIQU
E 
CARTEL 
(Price fixing 
and market 
allocution) 
Particula
rly grave 
Very 
low 
15% 
2M 
(1) 
12.081 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +10% 
10% N/A 
13.288 
GAD & 
FINANCIERE 
DU FOREST 
3.048 
Mono-product 
firm:-60% 
10% N/A 
1.097 
13-D- CONSEIL ABUSE OF Very Certain 7% 7Y,5M 1.617.024 Legal 22% N/A 77.220 PENDING 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° and 
date) 
UNDERTAK
INGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVI
TY 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplicat
ion factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
06 
 
02-28-
2013 
SUPERIEUR 
DE L’ORDRE 
DES 
EXPERTS-
COMPTABL
ES 
DOMINAN
T POSITION 
(Exclusivity 
clauses,...) 
grave (4,2) maximum 
limited to 
1.500.000 for 
non-
undertakings 
which face a 
simplified 
procedure. 
Use of moral 
authority 
(professional 
order):+10% 
APPEAL 
EXPERT 
COMPTABL
E MEDIA 
ASSOCIATIO
N 
N/A 1.170.000 
13-D-
09 
 
04-17-
2013 
EIFFAGE 
CARTEL 
(Bid-rigging) 
Particula
rly grave 
Moderat
e 
1% of 
the 
French 
turnon
ver 
N/A 647.568 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +15%  
 
N/A N/A 740.000 
NO 
APPEAL 
EIFFAGE 
CONSTRUCT
ION 
N/A N/A 
220.000 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° and 
date) 
UNDERTAK
INGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVI
TY 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplicat
ion factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
Recidivism: 
+30% 
VILMOR 
CONSTRUCT
ION 
65.445 
Partial inability 
to pay 
N/A N/A 
5.000 
13-D-
11 
 
05-14-
2013 
SANOFI 
ABUSE OF 
DOMINAN
T POSITION 
(Denigration
) 
Particula
rly grave 
Effective 13% N/A 
27.080.01
2 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +50% 
N/A N/A 
40.600.00
0 
PENDING 
APPEAL 
13-D-
12 
 
05-28-
2013 
BRENNTAG 
& DBML 
CARTEL 
 
(Major part 
of France 
concerned) 
Particula
rly grave 
Certain 20% 
7Y,5M 
(4,2) 
48.194.37
0 
Instigator: 
+15% 
 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +15%  
N/A 
25% 
47.802.78
9 
PENDING 
APPEAL 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° and 
date) 
UNDERTAK
INGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVI
TY 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplicat
ion factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
DBML 
(Liability 
as 
previous 
Brenntag’ 
parent 
company) 
Limited to the 
period of 
control  
N/A N/A 
5.311.422 
CALDIC EST 
4Y,11M 
(2,95) 
1.668.796 N/A 
20% 
N/A 1.335.036 
SOLVADIS 
5Y,9M 
(3,37) 
13.430.42
0 
N/A 
N/A 
100% 0 
UNIVAR 
6Y,8M 
(3,83) 
19.412.35
5 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +15%  
 
15% 
20% 
15.180.46
1 
GEA GROUP  
(Liability 
as 
Limited to the 
period of 
20% 
N/A 9.405.279 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° and 
date) 
UNDERTAK
INGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVI
TY 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplicat
ion factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
previous 
Solvadis’ 
parent 
company) 
control 
BRENNTAG 
CARTEL 
 
(One client 
concerned) 
Particula
rly grave 
Certain 20% 
7Y,1M 
(4,04) 
62.216 
Leader :+15%  
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +15% 
N/A 
100% 0 
DBML 
(Liability 
as 
previous 
Brenntag’ 
parent 
company) 
Limited to the 
period of 
control 
N/A 
N/A 50.916 
CHEMCO 36.603 
Partial inability 
to pay:-73% 
N/A N/A 
10.000 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° and 
date) 
UNDERTAK
INGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVI
TY 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplicat
ion factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
13-D-
14 
 
06-11-
2013 
CONSEIL 
REGIONAL 
DES 
VETERINAIR
ES 
D’ALSACE 
CARTEL  
 
(through 
professional 
orders) 
Particula
rly grave 
Moderat
e 
N/A (based on the 
amount of the 
resources of the 
CRVA) 
20.000 
Use of moral 
authority 
(professional 
order) and 
leader:+25% 
N/A N/A 
25.000 
NO 
APPEAL 
SYNDICAT 
NATIONAL 
DES 
VETERINAIR
ES 
D’EXERCICE 
LIBERAL 
(BAS-RHIN) 
N/A (based on the 
amount of the 
resources of the 
SYNDICATE) 
5.000 
N/A N/A N/A 
5.000 
SYNDICAT 
DEPARTEME
NTAL DES 
N/A (based on the 
amount of the 
resources of the 
1.000 
N/A N/A N/A 
1.000 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° and 
date) 
UNDERTAK
INGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVI
TY 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplicat
ion factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
VETERINAIR
ES 
D’EXERCICE 
LIBERAL 
(HAUT-
RHIN) 
SYNDICATE) 
13-D-
20 
 
12-17-
2013 
EDF 
ABUSE OF 
DOMINAN
T POSITION 
(favoritism 
of a 
subsidiary by 
an 
undertaking 
in charge of 
a Service of 
General 
Particula
rly grave 
Moderat
e 
11% 
1Y,5M 
(1,2) 
5.255.158 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +50% 
 
Recidivism: 
+25% 
N/A N/A 
9.853.420 
PENDING 
APPEAL 
Grave 
Very 
low 
3% 
11M 
(0,91) 
1.968.015 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +50% 
N/A N/A 
3.690.027 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° and 
date) 
UNDERTAK
INGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVI
TY 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplicat
ion factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
Economic 
Interest)  
 
Recidivism: 
+25% 
13-D-
21 
 
12-18-
2013 
SCHERING-
PLOUGH & 
FINANCIERE 
MSD & 
MERCK 
ABUSE OF 
DOMINAN
T POSITION 
(Denigration 
of a 
competitive 
product and 
loyalty 
rebates) 
Particula
rly grave 
High 14% 
1Y 
(1) 
12.806.64
0 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +50% 
 
20% 
N/A 
15.367.00
0 
PENDING 
APPEAL 
SCHERING-
PLOUGH & 
FINANCIERE 
MSD & 
MERCK 
CONCERTE
D 
PRACTICES 
(Application 
of the ADP) 
Particula
rly grave 
Taken 
into 
account 
for the 
ADP 
4% 
2M,4D 
(0,16) 
345.245 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +50% 
20% 
N/A 414.000 
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DECIS
ION 
(N° and 
date) 
UNDERTAK
INGS 
INFRINGE
MENT 
GRAVI
TY 
DAMA
GES 
CAUSE
D TO 
THE 
ECONO
MY 
% OF 
SALE
S 
VALU
E 
DURATIO
N 
(Multiplicat
ion factor) 
BASIC 
AMOUN
T 
 
PERSONALIZ
ATION 
SETTLE
MENT 
REDUC
T.  
LENIE
NCY 
REDU
CT. 
FINAL 
AMOUN
T 
JUDICIA
L 
REVIEW 
RECKITT 212.125 
Size and 
economic 
power of the 
group: +50% 
20% 
N/A 318.000 
14-D-
02 
 
02-20-
2014 
EDITION 
PHILIPPE 
AMAURY 
ABUSE OF 
DOMINAN
T POSITION 
(Predatory 
practices) 
Grave Effective 9% 
9M 
(0,75) 
8.786.745 
Partial inability 
to pay:-60% 
N/A N/A 3.514.000 
PENDING 
APPEAL 
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Appendix 5: Corporate compliance as a mitigating circumstance 
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Enhancing compliance: Can compliance programmes contribute to effective enforcement? Should there be a bonus for compliance 
programmes? 
 
Corporate compliance refers to the organisational measures taken by companies in order to achieve the degree of compliance desired. In the 
context of competition law, compliance programmes can be defined as: 
 
‘A set of measures adopted within a company or corporate group to inform, educate and instruct its personnel about the antitrust prohibitions 
[…] and the company’s or group’s policy regarding respect for these prohibitions, and to control or monitor respect for these prohibitions or 
this policy. Antitrust compliance programmes are thus a type of organizational control system aimed at standardizing staff behaviour, 
specifically within the domain of antitrust compliance’.639 
 
After providing an overview of existing national approaches to compliance programmes, this section will analyse the contribution of corporate 
compliance to the enforcement objectives of prevention and detection of anti-competitive collusive practices. The specific option of rewarding 
compliance programmes in the context of antitrust infringement will be then discussed.  
 
1. Overview of different national approaches to compliance 
 
Many competition authorities engage with compliance programmes, through soft law instruments. A first set of tools are designed to provide 
practical guidance to companies on how to achieve compliance.
640
 Some competition authorities give further detailed guidance: among the 
                                                     
639
 Wils, W.P.J (2013) “Antitrust Compliance Programmes & Optimal Antitrust Enforcement”, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 1, 52-81, 52. 
640
 See for example ‘Materials & guidance on compliance programs’ available at  
 http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/working-groups/current/cartel/awareness/business.aspx. 
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existing initiatives, some agencies tailor guidance to SMEs (the UK
641
) or to specific sectors (the Netherlands
642
); some provide a template or 
framework based on which companies can establish their compliance programmes (Canada
643
, Japan
644
 and Australia
645
); and also others engage 
in direct support to the implementation of compliance measures (Japan
646
). Certification and standardisation of an existing compliance 
programme that meet particular criteria is available in Brazil and South Korea
647
. In addition, the willingness of competition authorities to 
engage with corporate compliance translates in resources being spent in understanding the drivers of compliance (France, the UK, Australia)
 648
, 
or in engaging in advocacy and outreach aimed at changing social and business norms towards a culture of compliance (Brazil)
649
. Some 
authorities even acknowledge that corporate compliance is a key component or asset of their enforcement system (France, Australia).
650
   
                                                     
641
 OFT ‘Quick Guide on Competition Law Compliance’ (2009) available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/competition-act-and-cartels/competition-law-compliance/quick-
guide/#.U3YFSCi1aTI  
642
 Eg. Insurance sector and home care industry. International Chamber of Commerce (2011) “Promoting Antitrust Compliance: the various approaches of national 
antitrust” 5. 
643
 http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/CorporateCompliancePrograms-sept-2010-e.pdf/$FILE/CorporateCompliancePrograms-sept-2010-e.pdf 
644
 International Chamber of Commerce (2011) “Promoting Antitrust Compliance: the various approaches of national antitrust”.  
645
 http://www.accc.gov.au/business/business-rights-protections/implementing-a-compliance-program#download-the-templates 
646
 Active coordination with the Fair Trade Institute (an affiliate of the Japan Competition authority) which helps 
companies establish and implement compliance programmes. International Chamber of Commerce (2011) “Promoting Antitrust Compliance: the various approaches of 
national antitrust”. 
647
 International Chamber of Commerce (2011) “Promoting Antitrust Compliance: the various approaches of national antitrust” 3. 
648
 Europe Economics(2008), “Etat des lieux et perspectives  des programmes de conformité, Une étude réalisée pour le  Conseil de la concurrence” 
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/etudecompliance_oct08.pdf; OFT report (2010) “The Drivers of Compliance and Non-compliance with Competition Law”, 
Australia has observed a three phase evolution and the fact that a company rarely reverts to non-compliance once it has progressed to the third phase. (International 
Chamber of Commerce) 3.  
649
 “Annual report on Competition Policy in Developments in Brazil” (2012), submitted to the OECD 
http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/displaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/AR%282013%2919&docLanguage=En 
650
 Australia: compliance is regarded as an "important component of the ACCC's integrated suite of compliance tools" 
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Competition authorities seem more reluctant to integrate compliance programmes in the hard law dimension of their enforcement systems. The 
European Commission affirmed that compliance programmes cannot constitute a mitigating factor in the context of a conviction.
651
 The US 
Department of Justice also refuses to consider compliance programmes in antitrust infringements.
652
 Only a few competition authorities give 
credit to compliance programmes in the context of a litigation or investigation, granting a maximum of a 10% reduction in fine. In most cases, 
compliance programmes are taken into consideration, in relation to measures implemented after the infringement (post-factum), typically set up 
in response to an investigation (Netherlands
653
, Italy
654
, France
655
). In the UK, in contrast, companies may benefit for a 10% reduction in fine for 
having effective compliance measures before (or soon after) the infringement (ante factum).
656
 In addition, undertakings to implement a 
compliance programme can be required in the enforcement stage (Canada
657
, South Africa
658
, Australia
659
).  In contrast some anti-corruption 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
France: the Autorité described compliance as an "asset" for antitrust authorities. International Chamber of Commerce (2011) “Promoting Antitrust Compliance: the various 
approaches of national antitrust” 4.  
651
 J. Almunia, Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Competition Policy, “A successful compliance programme brings its own reward. The main 
reward for a successful compliance programme is not getting involved in unlawful behaviour. Instead, a company involved in a cartel should not expect a reward from us 
for setting up a compliance programme, because that would be a failed programme by definition.” SPEECH/11/268, 14 April 2011. 
652
 According to the US Sentencing Guidelines, the US may consider compliance programmes as a mitigating factor in the context of corporate crimes. However, the 
conditions attached to it almost exclude this possibility for antitrust violations. In addition, the Antitrust Division seems to clearly exclude the consideration of 
compliance programmes in the context of antitrust: ‘[T]he Antitrust Division has established a firm policy, understood in the  business community, that, credit should 
not be given at the charging stage for a compliance program.’ Murphy, J.E. (2013) “Making the Sentencing Guidelines Message Complete” available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_Comment/20130801/Public_Comment_Murphy_Proposed_Priorities.pdf 
653
 International Chamber of Commerce (2011) 3. 
654
 http://www.mwe.com/Italys-Competition-Chair-and-Minister-of-Justice-Confirm-That-ad-hoc-Compliance-Programs-Will-Continue-to-be-Considered-as-a-Mitigating-
Factor-10-28-2013/  
655
 France : Autorité de la Concurrence, (2012) “Document-cadre du 10 février 2012 sur les programmes de conformité aux règles de concurrence” para 31.  
656
 The OFT (2012) “OFT's guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty” para 2.15;  
657
 http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03280.html#footnote3b  
658
 See for example http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/AttachedFiles/MyDocuments/CC-Pioneer-Foods30Nov2010.pdf 
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laws of the same jurisdictions open the possibility for companies to be relieved from anti-corruption completely, on ground related to 
compliance programmes.
660
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Summary of existing soft and hard law national approaches
661
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
659
 Section 87B of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974: the Australian Competition authority can accept formal administrative undertakings, which may include 
compliance programme obligations.  
660
 See for example the UK:  Section 7 (2) of the UK Bribery Act; US: The Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Enforcement Division of the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, ‘A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’ (2012) 53. 
661
 This chart summarises the existing corporate compliance tools used by countries under examination, based on information available in F. Thépot, “A Study of Corporate 
Compliance” (forthcoming) and International Chamber of commerce. The proportions are only indicative and do not reflect any trend beyond the countries that are 
mentioned here.  
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2. Rewarding compliance programmes in the light of sanctions optimality662 
 
A very important element of the effectiveness of sanctions is the perceived probability that an illegal act is detected. A threat of prison sentence 
or high pecuniary sanction deters the wrongdoing only if detection can be expected. Rewarding compliance programmes in a manner that induce 
companies to prevent and detect illegal behaviour internally, can improve the probability of detection.
 663
 A first value of compliance 
programmes to the enforcement policy stems from the informational advantage of companies over agencies.
 
 
 
Giving credit to compliance programmes can improve the effectiveness of corporate liability regime, especially in cases where companies have 
neither the incentives nor the means to address such issue internally.  Corporate liability, in the absence of individual penalties, imposes sanction 
on shareholders and not on the responsible individuals. A company can seek to mitigate the risk that individuals expose the company to liability 
and, some argue, have a natural incentive to implement a compliance programme.
 664
 However, corporate liability does not automatically induce 
the adoption of internal compliance measures.
665
 Firstly, the incentive to adopt compliance programmes may be mitigated by ‘perverse’ effects 
of a strict corporate liability. A company may fear that implementing internal measures to prevent and detect the wrongdoing of their employees 
increases the probability of detection.
666
 Weighing the costs and benefits of implementing a compliance programme, a company may decide not 
to incur any of those costs if they expect that the costs of detection are higher than the expected benefit of detecting the crime internally.  
 
Second, companies may not have ‘effective methods of preventing individuals from committing acts that impose huge liabilities on them’.667 
Companies can set up effective methods, but at a certain cost. The extent to which a company is capable of monitoring their employees 
                                                     
662
 The following developments are inspired from F. Thépot, “A Study of Corporate Compliance” (forthcoming). 
663
According to optimal sanction theory Becker, G.S. (1968) "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy 76, 169-217. 
664
 Of course this depends on the level of fine and probability of detection. 
665
 Sokol, D. (2012) “Cartels, corporate compliance, and what practitioners really think about enforcement” Antitrust Law Journal, 78, 202. 
666
 Arlen, J. (1994) “The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability” The Journal of Legal Studies 23, 833-867. 
667
 R.A. Posner, (1976) Antitrust Law: an Economic Perspective, University of Chicago Press, 225. 
 
 
307 
 
adequately depends on the quality of internal mechanisms such as corporate governance. Corporate governance schemes that fail to reach the 
objectives for which they have been designed, are not likely to be highly effective in preventing individuals from committing illegal acts either.  
 
In the presence of individual sanctions, compliance programmes have potentially a greater outreach on company’s employees than when they are 
not personally liable. A senior executive may pay greater attention to a compliance training if pecuniary or prison sanctions are part of the non-
compliance risk. Therefore, compliance programmes may yield much greater value to the company. Competition authorities should leverage the 
potential of greater value that compliance programmes constitute to companies, in giving more importance to internal prevention and detection. 
Competition authorities, facing the issue of cartel detection, would then benefit from the informational advantage companies have on their 
managers and employees. 
 
Compliance programmes could then enhance the effectiveness of leniency if it enables companies to better monitor and collect information 
relevant to a leniency application. A company that is better able to prevent and detect an infringement internally is also equipped with better 
tools to constitute a leniency application. In addition, it can help the company detect earlier the infringement than the other cartel members.
668
 
 
3. The key foundations of an effective compliance programme 
 
Corporate compliance is a matter of degree and resources allocated to achieving compliance. More than the mere training sessions delivered to 
employees, a compliance programme encompasses all types of compliance efforts and processes taken by a company.  
 
A first essential foundation of an effective corporate compliance lies in the culture embedded from the top of the hierarchy. The OFT describes 
how clear and unambiguous commitment by senior management serves the purpose of setting the high compliance standard throughout the 
                                                     
668
 Geradin, D. (2013) “Antitrust Compliance Programmes & Optimal Antitrust Enforcement: A Reply to Wouter Wils” Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 1 (2), 18. 
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firm.
669
 Such core commitment needs to be written and strongly communicated within the company. To ensure that senior management’s 
commitment is supported by a real awareness of the organisation of compliance, board members need to be part of the compliance effort.  
 
Communication constitutes another key dimension of compliance programmes. Communicating a strong message of compliance throughout the 
organisation involves holding training sessions to teach employees and senior executives, compliance risks and procedures, especially those 
presenting exposure with competitors. In addition to delivering educational training about competition law, compliance programmes need to 
motivate the employees, so as to raise the compliance awareness within the company. Therefore, compliance needs to work hand in hand with 
communication so as to ‘impact emotionally’ and avoid training fatigue.  
 
Related to the communication dimension, the organisation of compliance needs to be structured around an ‘ambassador’ of competition law 
compliance. With sufficient degree of responsibility, this person, either as part of legal services or compliance department needs to have room to 
advocate the compliance with competition law. The issue of competition compliance cannot be diluted and given a lower level of priority 
compared to other areas of business. Especially true for large companies, the need for a ‘compliance ambassador’ also stands for smaller 
companies that can hand the compliance responsibility to someone particularly sensitive to such issue.  
 
Effective corporate compliance entails procedures of prevention, detection and response
670
. To do so, procedures to monitor risky business 
activities or that provide legal advice need to be clearly established. In addition, the eventuality of an infringement needs to be addressed, for 
example by anonymous alert systems, and credible sanctioning schemes.
671
  
                                                     
669
 The OFT (2011) “How your business can achieve compliance with competition law” para 2.1-2.3. 
670
 Which may involve sophisticated technique such as screenings. Abrantes-Metz, R. Bajari, P.  and Murphy, J.E (2010). “Enhancing Compliance Programs Through Antitrust 
Screening” The Antitrust Counselor 4 (5).  
671
 The ICC provides a whole range of practical solutions to implement an effective compliance programme, relevant not only to large companies, but to those of much 
smaller size and constrained with resources. Also, For example, J. Murphy proposes an organisation of compliance to small companies for ‘a Dollar a Day’ that meet the 
principles set out in the US Sentencing Guidelines and OECD Good Practice Guidance: ‘A Compliance & Ethics Program on a Dollar a Day: How Small Companies Can 
Have Effective Programs’ (2010) available at http://www.hcca-info.org/Portals/0/PDFs/Resources/ResourceOverview/CEProgramDollarADay-Murphy.pdf 
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4. The verifiability of compliance programmes 
 
Most of the debate about compliance programmes crystallises around the verifiability of the quality of compliance programme. Some argue that 
the inherent difficulty to evaluate a compliance effort may create perverse incentives: companies would then adopt ‘cosmetic’ compliance 
programmes to ensure a reduction in the level of fine.
672
 As a result, infringing competition law would become less costly. This argument may be 
rejected on grounds similar to those advocating the use of leniency programmes. The fine eventually imposed no longer matches the gravity of 
the infringement, in order to stimulate the level of detection. Therefore, the competition authority operates a trade-off between reducing the 
potential deterrent effect of fines, at the benefit of an increased level of detection. Rewarding compliance efforts entails a reduced level of fine, 
at the benefit of increased level of internal prevention and detection.  
 
Based on the foundations of effective compliance programmes, tangible elements can be required by competition authorities to demonstrate that 
appropriate compliance effort can be rewarded. To attest that there is a core commitment to competition compliance, competition authorities 
could require evidence that compliance is being discussed regularly at board meetings and that senior management attended training. The 
authority may also want to verify that there is a board member responsible for compliance, and the frequency at which the compliance unit 
reports to the board. The communication dimension of an effective compliance lies in internal communication and training material: the 
availability of a code of conduct, adopted internally and also in relation with business partners is part of compliance communication. In addition, 
evidence of mention of the compliance in top executives speeches or other internal communication, as well as the involvement of 
communication department in compliance can attest of an effective communication of compliance. The actual implementation of compliance can 
be evidenced with training attendance records, the percentage of good results achieved. In particular, competition authorities can request proof 
that senior executives, sales managers or high risk positions attended training, and whether or not they can get disciplined if they do not attend.  
Companies can also demonstrate that clear procedures are in place, in hiring employees - human resources can indicate that their employee have 
no past history of antitrust infringement- and in monitoring risky business areas – such as trade association meetings. In addition, the availability 
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of sanctioning procedures and a history of sanction cases are signs that compliance comprises wider range of procedures than training sessions. 
The availability of corporate compliance audit reports signals a willingness to continually adapt the compliance programme.
 
 
 
5. Conclusion on rewarding compliance programmes 
 
Based on the elements outlined, the validity of compliance efforts seems verifiable. However such process, which needs to be undertaken by 
trained agency staff, involves gathering and checking a large amount of evidence that is not costless. In addition, such inquiry may interfere with 
a company’s internal affairs and may concern sensitive information. Therefore, competition authorities may choose to give credit to compliance 
programmes, but only in the context of an investigation.
673
 Because it holds informational advantage over the competition authorities, the burden 
of proof should in any case lie with the company. Upon cooperation and sufficient evidence of adequate compliance’s efforts, one may consider 
allowing a company to benefit from a reduction in the level of fine, assessed on a case-by-case basis. One could consider rewarding commitment 
by a company to introduce or improve an existing compliance programme. However, in the light of optimal penalty policy, the reward, if any, 
should not just focus on post-infringement compliance programmes. The objective is to encourage the implementation of compliance effort ex 
ante. Ex post consideration of compliance may undermine the impact such reward is designed to have on prevention of cartels in the first place.   
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 An argument against a penalty discount for compliance schemes is that such a reward is an implicit subsidy of compliance schemes, but one that is contingent on an 
infringement; firms that have a compliance scheme (perhaps a very effective one) and never infringe competition law, do not get to benefit from such a subsidy.  For 
details see Wils, W.P.J (2013) “Antitrust Compliance Programmes & Optimal Antitrust Enforcement”, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 1, 52-81. 
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